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


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*James Lenox.*











British



THE  
BRITISH MERCURY;  
OR,  
*HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS*  
OF  
THE EVENTS OF THE PRESENT TIMES.  
THE SECOND YEAR.

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BY  
*J. MALLET DU PAN.*

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VOLUME IV.

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—Orientia tempora notis  
Instruct exemplis. Hor.

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INTRODUCTION.

WHEN we entered upon this Work a year ago, there remained in Europe no more than two great Powers whom the French Republic had not caused to lay down their arms, either in consequence of victories or treaties. Never had such fortune been enjoyed by any modern empire, and never was fortune more abused. To the real strength which it derived from its usurpations, and the despotism of its alliances, it added that of the terror with which it had struck most

of the surrounding nations, of the public prejudices respecting the invincible causes of its prosperity, and of the inflexible infatuation of its proselytes, who, undeceived in spite of themselves as to its rectitude and its principles, continued to bestow on its triumphs that fondness which their conscience began to refuse to its doctrines. Between Governments that were tottering, and Governments that were overwhelmed, the Rulers of France had but one fear, that of not subjugating soon enough the States which they boasted of despising.

—Europe has been drawn from the brink of this abyss, which is filled with carcases, but not yet closed. Few periods of history can furnish an example of a change at once so rapid and so complete. When we observe the new genius of War, and its immense field within a few years, such vast means of attack and of defence, the expansion of combined armies forming a continued chain over regions, rivers, mountains, and seeming to render great conquests almost impossible, we wonder to see in so short a space of time the destiny of several great nations once more take a different aspect.

To the stupor and depression which pervaded the Continent, we opposed hopes and resources. To allow that these remained was in itself to diminish danger. Two foundations of courage  
continued

continued entire, and the event has proved their solidity.

Had the French Directory possessed genius, foresight, and discretion, they might again have laid Europe asleep: their politics might have tended to inspire some security, to show the bounds of an ambition that had been opposed with arms in vain, and which, satiated with troubles and invasions, was willing to grant to others that safety which it had acquired for itself. A variety of prejudices among foreign nations was ready to support the illusion; but no, the French Republic preserved its character, it continued more adapted to sacrifice victims than to impose on dupes.

The nature of its system and of its rulers, removed the fears of observers, who saw the dangers of its moderation. Sooner shall the magnet cease to attract steel, than a Government constructed and administered as was that of France, compound with its passions, grant something to justice, respect any right but that of force, moderate the impetuosity of triumphant audacity, resist the errors of presumption and rage, and terminate a Revolution, interminable while there remains abroad an inch of territory to unsettle and to desolate.

Thus the very excesses of the Revolution became its corrective; thus the constitution and situation

situation of its leaders induced the abuse of their power, and on that abuse depended the salvation of Europe. The former Directory was our first deliverer.

In the next place, neither its snares nor its victories were able to shake two united Powers, around whom the tottering States could rally, and whose example, activity, and succours, served at once as guide, consolation, and centre to all who would resume their arms: the one inaccessible from his distance and military strength; the other invulnerable behind her maritime ramparts, still unhurt in all her institutions, less proud of her public opulence than of knowing how to make use of it, rising in energy in proportion as courage failed elsewhere, and defended by the triple buckler of power, talents, and public spirit. While France failed to overpower England and Russia, the independence of the other States that were threatened, preserved two anchors on which they might depend to ride out the storm.

All that was lost then were States of secondary importance, and the senses of declaimers and weak men, who represented the world to be approaching the day of judgment, and whose political astrology predicted inevitable ruin to Europe, from the easy and certain conquests of an immortal Revolution.

When

When the memorable event at Aboukir had broken the enchantment, common sense would make us suppose that the Government of Paris, after losing their best army, and the flower of their naval forces, and, by their extravagant expedition, uniting the Porte and Russia against them, would have been wary in their conduct to the Empire and the Emperor of Germany. The one had never ceased testifying conciliatory dispositions; and the other had exhausted at Rastadt every means, honour and all, to obtain a ridiculous and fatal peace.

Instead of lowering their arrogance, and concealing their pretensions, the Directory persevered in their outrages: trusting to the system of terror by which they imagined that they had petrified the Continent, they caused their Councils to pass an order for levying 200,000 men, that nobody might doubt the obstinacy of their enterprises. Two monarchies had escaped them in Italy; these they overturn: not satisfied with repulsing the King of Naples, they drive him from his States, and instead of forever disarming him and the Emperor by granting him peace, they destroy his kingdom, and transform it into a revolutionary republic. The ruin of the King of Sardinia costs them but a snare, a piece of treachery, the lie of a manifesto.

Were

Were private persons to conduct their affairs with a similar spirit, their relations would appeal to the law to consider them as lunatics. Were a Minister to plunge his King into the consequences of such designs, he would lose his head as an enemy to the State. All the Republicans of France, however, applauded the successful rashness of the Directory, nor did they perceive their follies till the fortune of arms had punished their wicked enterprises.

This is a new lesson, but as useless as the rest, to demonstrate that the fate of empires is attached to the genius of those who govern them. *Fontenelle* made the equilibrium of Europe to consist, not in treaties, but in the balance nearly equal of mutual follies. The French Government have repaired only those of their enemies. May experience secure the latter from returning the like service!

Whatever may have been the motive for the temporising of Austria, during that shower of insults, provocations, and revolutions with which the French Ministers wearied her inexhaustible patience, the event has proved that she did not intend to submit long to so critical a situation. Her recruited armies assumed a new countenance; a new spirit of discipline was infused; the troops were animated to zeal, order, and confidence; and the divisions were so cantoned as to facilitate

tate, at a given time, the most unexpected junctions. At length the impatience and uneasiness of the Directory taking for granted that the Russians, who were marching to defend the States of the Emperor, were to assist him in acting offensively, war ensued.

It has deceived the expectation of its authors; it has even exceeded the hopes of those who, with reason, considered it as the last resource of Europe.

As well as the distance of the places, the exaggerations of public news, and the rarity of foreign information worthy of belief, have permitted us, we have gathered the first and principal sketches of this scene, the events of which astonish the imagination, and console it for the past, yet without removing the modest doubtfulness that shades the future.

It is not only two hundred leagues of territory, protected by armies and important fortresses, and delivered in less time than was formerly spent in the conquest of a few acres in Flanders or Germany; it is not only Thrones re-established, revolutionary Colonies overturned, and Nations restored to their ancient laws; by which the attention is fixed on this picture.

The delusions are removed; the delusions to which the French Republic was indebted, if

not for her preservation, at least for her greatness, the depression under which Europe was sinking, but from which she is now recovered. It will never more be believed that to command revolutionary armies is enough to subjugate the earth ; that their *Rewbells* and *Merlins* must necessarily crush Crowns and Senates, Institutions and Nations, under the weight of their talents. Neither the irresistible power, nor the secret magic of the disturbers of the world, will ever more be believed. The French Government have lost the consideration bestowed by the vulgar on fortunate violence, and that renown that awaits the success of rashness, mistaken for the effects of genius. They have lost the support of terror spread by the past prosperity of their enterprizes ; they have lost that confidence which, from one end of Europe to the other, ensured them the factious and incendiaries.

When we see at once the authority of the dogmas of the Revolution decline, its armies beaten, and its exterior creations annihilated ; and with this picture compare its former hectorings, those multiplied transports of a delirious presumption, that umpirage of the fate of the world given to the French Republic by its leaders, its orators, and its proselytes ; in short, a *Merlin* gravely pronouncing last year that the fall of Kings would justify Providence ; we can hardly

hardly imagine that such a contrast will ever be presented twice.

Let us pray that these dazzling<sup>s</sup> of prosperity may not pass from the Directory to their enemies. Although humbled, impoverished, and overcome, France still is neither crushed nor even discouraged by her misfortunes; it would be as inconsiderate to overlook the distance between us and the annihilation of her system, as to call in question the possibility of subverting it.

To shut our eyes on obstacles is to go in quest of disasters: to be frightened at them before we have ascertained and weighed them, is a weakness that will never disconcert the plans of a General or a Statesman.

The French Republic is driven from half of the territories she had subjugated by her arms and her anarchial extravagances. They who complain that nothing is yet done, and they who flatter themselves that little remains to be done, have equally forgotten the past.

France now experiences the crisis into which she had thrown Europe, and with greater disadvantages than those she overcame in 1794; but are her frontiers, which remain perfect, exposed to invasion, and will they be invaded before the opening of a second campaign? To what will the continuation of the war tend?

Will there be a harmony among the combined Powers as to its operations and its term?

Will the winter meliorate, or not, the situation, critical indeed but not desperate, into which the Republic has precipitated herself at home as well as abroad? Will the Governments she has united against her usurpations be also united against her nature and her existence? Will they, with the same hand, weigh the consequences of a peace, which, reducing her to her ancient limits, would seem to deprive her of the power of disturbing the tranquillity of Nations soon again, and the consequences of a fruitless war carried into the very heart of that Empire to re-establish the Monarchy? Lastly, Will the intestine causes of her dissolution retain more energy than the union of the confederated States possesses solidity and durability? Will there be a concurrence, or an opposition between the external force which threatens the seat of the Revolution, and the force of the circumstances which endangers its stability in France itself?

These important questions, fortunately for us, are foreign to the object of this work. Let others decide them in the paroxysms of their desires and of their hopes, and settle the meditations of the Governments of Europe; our task is to follow the progress of their solution, and to recount it.

Let

Let us begin then with recapitulating the course of events, taking it up at the period where we left it last month, that is to say, at the consequences of the battle of Trebia.

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*A View of the principal Occurrences of the Campaign in the Course of the Month of August, and to the Middle of September.*

It is difficult to separate truth from falsehood in those prognosticated and exaggerated accounts added by most of the public reporters to the plain and simple narrative of the battles, which, after the defeat of General Macdonald on the Trebia, we foresaw would be the consequences of that action, and to which they ascribed a greater extent than they have had.

The northern States of Italy have been again rescued; the immense advantages of the Allies have been preserved; the investing of Tortona maintained; the sieges of Alexandria and Mantua terminated successfully; the entire possession of Piedmont regained; the deliverance of Tuscany, of the Republic of Lucca, and of the Imperial Fiefs, ensured; and the French pent in the territory of the States of Genoa.

But the losses of the French General, and the checks he encountered in his retreat, did not prevent

prevent the junction of most of his divisions with the principal army then under *Moreau*; and a body of them maintained themselves on the eastern river. *Moreau*, far from meditating a final retreat, or being uneasy about his communication with the western river and the county of Nice, strengthened himself in the strong position which had been occupied by *Buonaparte* when he entered Italy, and which, from Savona to Vado, extends through the Appennines, and behind the Bormida to Milesimo.

While he was attending to the re-establishment and concentration of his army, and to the assembling of the detachments dispatched to him from the interior, Marshal *Suvorof*, confining himself to advancing the sieges of Alexandria and Mantua, undertook no operations either against La Rochette, which was fortified and defended, or against *Moreau's* positions. Genoa and its territory bore the oppressive weight of the presence of the French and of their alliance. There were no means of shaking off the yoke; the Genoese were doomed to crouch to it, and to wait and to dread the events that were to fix the deplorable fate of their Republic.

*Moreau*, to whose activity, patience, courage, and military popularity, the Directory were indebted for still having an army in Italy, had been just appointed to the command of that assembling

assembling in Alsace. Whether it was, that comparative weakness or prudence forbade his attempting to succour them, Alexandria and Mantua fell without his making any effort to save them; the reduction of both took place a few days before the arrival of his successor General *Joubert*, who, in the beginning of August, came to take upon him the command, the embarrassments, the perplexities, and the dangers of the army.

The Citadel of Alexandria capitulated on the 21st of July, a week after the opening of the trenches: it was attacked under the direction of General Count *de Bellegarde*, and was defended by one of the best Officers and staunchest Republicans of the French army, General *Gardanne*; but his garrison, reduced to 2500 men, was much too feeble for the extent and the unhealthiness of the fortress.

Scarcely was the news of this speedy reduction known, when that of Mantua arrived to renew astonishment and gratify the public expectation. That formidable bulwark, the possession of which Austria thought of such importance that General *Kray*, who conducted the siege, was ordered to carry it on without interfering in any operation of the grand army, let the occasion be what it would; that Mantua, where General *de Wurmser* so gloriously terminated

nated his military career, and the gates of which were opened to *Buonaparte* only by famine and mortality, capitulated on the 28th of July.

The trenches before the body of the fort were opened on the 14th, but the outer posts had been all carried. An immense fire kept up from the artillery for a fortnight, and assaults upon several of the works, sufficed to reduce the garrison. Thirty years ago a fortification of the third order cost the besiegers more.

The mutual politeness which accompanied the capitulation; the advantageous terms granted to the garrison, who were permitted to return to France; a particular article which might be considered either as a favour or as a security, and by which the Staff Officers of the fortress were to remain prisoners for three months in the States of the Emperor; and lastly, the celerity of the conquest, created a suspicion of the integrity of the French Commander, *Foiffac-Latour*. Particularly in his own country the Government, and the Jacobins, who have no idea of a necessary or natural defeat, accused him of treason.

This accusation has been supported by no proof whatever. The incomparable activity and talents of General *Kray*, the intrepidity of his troops, the superiority which has been acquired by the Austrian artillery, and the prodigious

digious use made of it during the siege, account for the celerity of it. It is a novelty, no doubt; but a novelty produced by known means, of which the increase and unfolding have rendered the attack of fortified towns irresistible at the end of a given time. To calculate the duration of sieges is now a mechanical operation. All ramparts must fall under the fire of multiplied batteries, which, silencing by their superiority that of the enemy, compels him to abandon the town he defends to the horrors of bombardment, destruction, and assault. Thus, in future, fortified places, consisting of towns, the buildings and inhabitants of which are to be spared, will not suffice. The system of fortification, like that of the tactics of war, must be changed, and detached citadels must be resorted to, where the garrisons may wait the overturning of the last stone before they open their gates.

It is clear that the Austrian General, either to save so noble a city as Mantua, or to accelerate the reduction of it, would not be difficult in the terms of capitulation. The garrison consisted of seven thousand seven hundred men; among whom were two thousand foreigners, Cisalpine, Swiss, or Austrian deserters, who have since joined the standards of the conqueror. Five thousand French have returned to their country.

The rapidity of these two sieges were essentially injurious to the plans of General Joubert,

and crushed a part of his hopes. He wanted more time to re-organize his army, to discipline the mass of conscripts who had joined him, and to receive fresh succours, as well as to secure the advantage of a diversion of the army of the Alps, which was forming in Dauphiné and Savoy under General Championnet.

Besides, Marshal Suvarof's army was about to recover twenty thousand men; but this reinforcement having scarcely left Mantua, it was of consequence to the French to prevent their junction with the grand army, and this determined Joubert to take the offensive himself, and to hazard a battle.

The French forces, which had been described to us as in a state next to annihilation, and which had for a month past been so often dissolved, dispersed, and sent back to the Var, amounted to more than forty thousand men. The Allies, who had been joined by General Kray on the 12th of August, had the advantage in number, the quality of the troops, emulation, and the recollection of their victories. Joubert was not deterred by this from trusting to his fortune, and the hope of checking the enterprises of the confederated army by attacking it.

A few days before the engagement his left wing advanced from Mellesimo, passed the Bormida, dislodged General Bellegarde from Acqui, and posted itself on the Orba, in the plain

plain of Alexandria. These movements, leaving no doubt of the designs of *Joubert*, Marshal *Suvorof* concertated his divisions, and on the 13th marched against the enemy, who had penetrated as far as Novi.

It was on the heights behind that town that the French army, on the 15th, was preparing to give battle; when it was anticipated, notwithstanding the advantage of its position, by a General who is not stopped by difficulties or prevailed upon to relax by the logic of temporising.

The French supported the attack with a determined firmness. Three different times they repulsed the right wing and centre of the Imperial armies: unshaken in their position, they sustained with valour the efforts of equal valour; and, till the afternoon, they might have deemed themselves victorious. The loss of the Allies, particularly among the Russians, exceeded theirs; but their right wing, which was commanded by General *Moreau*, who, with a spirit as rare as exemplary, had continued under *Joubert*, feebly supported the rest of the army. General *Melas*, at the head of the Austrian grenadiers, succeeded in turning it: *Joubert*, mortally wounded, had given up the command, and confusion and discouragement were the consequence. The heights were carried, the field of battle abandoned, and victory secured on all

hands to the Allies. The glory and advantages of the day cost ten or eleven thousand men killed and wounded.

The two parties differ but slightly in their accounts of the circumstances and effects of this action. For the first time, the French have acknowledged their defeat, and they might do it without blushing; nor have the Allies concealed what their triumph has cost them. Throwing aside the ridiculous amplifications of *Gazettes* and newsmongers, who are great lovers of carnage, it appears by the official reports that the loss of the Austrians amounted to five thousand six hundred, killed, wounded, or taken prisoners: that of the Russians has not been stated; it is said to be proportionably greater than the loss of their Allies, as not a Russian would either move back or ask quarter. The enemy left only 5000 men on the field of battle, but, at least, as many prisoners fell into the hands of the conqueror. Their Commander in Chief killed; four Generals, *Perignon*, *Grouchy*, *Colli*, and *Partonneau* taken, and thirty pieces of artillery captured, have shown the extent of the victory.

At Paris the Jacobins laid hold of it as a party advantage, and exaggerated the disaster. They alone have refused justice to the memory of *Joubert*, whose sentiments, independence, and attachment to the Constitution they dreaded.

He

He was regretted by his army, by the Government, by the most opposite cabals, and particularly by the *Modérés* \*, who believed that he had secret intentions.

This event has no doubt been felt at Vienna, as a success so important and so vigorously disputed ought to be; but it has been observed, and not without some surprise, how coldly the Court Gazette has mentioned the part taken by the Russians and their illustrious Commander, whose genius and conduct were probably of more consequence on the 15th of August, than appears in the official narrative.

This makes five battles, more or less general, which, in the course of five months, have chastised the French Republic for three years of depredations, outrages, and tyrannies, by tearing from her the bloody sceptre of Italy, where a hundred thousand of her soldiers have found their grave, where she sowed the seeds of every vice, where her crimes have met more apologists than imitators, where she in a manner improved upon her own corruption; where, under the name of Commissioners, Agents, Heralds of

\* It is hardly necessary to inform the reader that the terms *Modérés* and *Enragés* were early in the Revolution appropriated, the former to those who wished to pursue reform with moderation, and the latter to those who were violent in the extreme.

Reason, and Architects of Liberty, the famished wolves of the 18th century outdid those of the middle ages:

The public have seldom but one way of judging of battles, namely, by their result. It was the result which immortalized those of Arbela, Actium, Agincourt, and Blenheim; battles which changed the face of an empire or decided the fate of a cause pain. So late as the first of this month, the victory of the 15th of August did not appear to be attended with consequences so extensive, or advantages so immediate, as those which have hitherto distinguished the arms of the Allies in Italy; There has been little variation in the respective positions; the French having recovered their first consternation, preserved their former lines; and General Suvarof appeared to be taking the necessary steps to dislodge them, to open the way to Genoa, either by Bochetta or the Eastern River, where General Klenau was making great progress, and to invest Coni, and commence the siege of it.

The Gazettes of Italy, copied by those of Germany, have announced the removal of the army from the Bochetta, the reduction of Genoa, and the retreat of the French: the writers of those papers are in the habit of composing the history of the present with a seasoning of the future; as they take towns at the opening of the trenches; force

force defiles the moment the plan of forcing is known; with a dash of their pen annihilate armies that rise again while the Gazetteer is telling his tale; and always feed our curiosity with a journal of anticipations, their last narratives deserve little credit, and the less still as they are not yet countenanced by any official intelligence,

Will Italy be entirely cleared of the French before the end of the campaign? Will her deliverers cross the Alps or the Var? Who will answer these questions? Neither skilful Generals nor wise Ministers; but there are political scribblers who will not be embarrassed by them.

General *Championnet* has succeeded *Joubert*. With the forces called the Army of the Alps, which were under his command, he had projected, about the middle of August, a diversion connected with the designs of General *Joubert*. Some of his detachments penetrated into the valley of Suez, passed over the Little St. Bernard, and threatened the Upper Piedmont. The defeat at Novi put a stop to those movements. It is said that the two armies are ordered to form a junction: together they will amount to about 50,000 men. To execute this junction on the one hand, and to prevent it on the other, will probably be the object of the first efforts of both parties.

If

If from this seat of the war, where attack and resistance ate preparing new events, we descend to the lower parts of Italy; we see the extinction of the last remains of that destructive domination, the remembrance of which will be impressed upon the nations of those regions, like that of the showers of locusts, of the plague of darkness, and of earthquakes.

Macdonald's defeat in the Duchy of Placentia, and his retreat towards Genoa, opened Tuscany to the Allies. Some French detachments that continued wandering in the Duchy were incessantly pursued, beaten, and shut up, as well by the people who had risen, as the Austrian auxiliaries. The enemy, evacuating Florence in an orderly manner, retreated to Leghorn; where, as they had no means of escaping farther, the embarrassment of their desperate situation was terminated by a capitulation. The weak garrisons that had been left in different parts of Tuscany followed their example, and laid down their arms. Lucca recovered, if not her former liberty, at least the happiness of being delivered from her ravishers.

It is worthy of observation, that, in the countries where the French Revolution has not had time to extend its roots, the public virtue and courage of the nations, but slightly touched by its influence, unfolded themselves with energy.

Thus

[ 35 ].

Thisy Piedmont and Euscany, subjugated without  
for months, have reflected shame upon themselves,  
by spontaneous insurrections, and their attachment  
to their old laws.

On the contrary, Rome, and its provinces,  
Lombardy, and Switzerland, injured by unsuccess-  
ful and premature insurrections, their morale  
and habits longer attacked by the residence of  
the French, by their example, and by their inci-  
vations, have shewn much less unanimity and  
vigour in uniting for their restoration.

Who could wonder at it? Violent revolutions,  
even those against which nations manifest their  
antipathy, terminate, by breaking, the springs  
of strong minds, and by perverting the inclina-  
tions and spirit of common opos. They who  
resist the new opinions are crushed for their re-  
sistance; the extermination of the first martyrs  
to the love of their country, frightens the rest of  
the nation, and in a little time, they who were  
slaves by compulsion, become voluntary slaves,  
one wish only remains,—that of repose; one  
means only is left to obtain it,—that of submission.

The opposite situations were both found in the  
State of Naples; it contained a great number  
of rebels to the Revolution, and many of its vo-  
taries, particularly among those of the retired  
conditions of life. There appeared at once ob-  
stinate, resistance to the new system, and a rage,

had been established before the fall of the  
of republican ~~dictatorship~~, which in the capital yield-  
ed at last only to the superiority of ~~canons~~ and  
~~bayonets~~. ~~which~~ ~~left~~ ~~A~~

When General Macdonald evacuated this sub-  
phantom country, he left some forces to the  
care of feeble garrisons, supported by the Na-  
tional Jacobins armed, embodied, and who, there-  
as officers, styled themselves Patriots. Some  
remains of the royal army having assembled in  
Calabria with the country people, marched  
against Naples, as soon as the French had left it.  
This force was commanded by Cardinal Ruffo,  
formerly treasurer of the Apostolic Chamber; and  
now returning to his country, to defend it in the  
character of a soldier, as the *Roures*, the *La Va-  
lisses*, and several other warlike Prelates, had  
done before.

Naples opened her gates to him upon a capi-  
tulation, which the King afterwards refused to  
ratify. The Calabrians, less accustomed to con-  
quer than to rob, treated the Neapolitans like  
caravans of travellers; and the town was again  
plunged into mourning and terror by the hor-  
rible excesses they committed against all whom  
they suspected of having aided the Revolution.  
It has been attempted to cast a veil over the  
scenes of this period, and the only knowledge  
of them among foreign nations has been re-  
ceived from the accounts given by some English-  
men,

men, who witnessed them with horror and indignation.

At the time of this shocking retaliation, Lord Nelson arrived in the Bay. A small body of English troops, joined by a detachment of Russians, and some Swiss battalions of the Napoleonic army, soon reduced, one after the other, the forts of St. Elmo, Capua, and Gaeta, the garrisons of which were sent back to their country on their parole.

This repression was not attended with any battle of importance. Few of the French would have escaped the just vengeance of the allies; and, if the foreigners who drove them away had not saved their lives. Among the singularities of this counter-revolution, the most extraordinary is this: that the kingdom of Naples, which last year had 40,000 men under arms, has been chiefly indebted for its deliverance to an Admiral and a Captain of the British navy, a Russian officer, and a Swiss, Lieutenant General Bourcard; to marines, sailors, and a few slight detachments of Russian and British troops.

In the South of Italy, every point of which is marked with ravages, destruction, depopulation, and wretchedness; there only remain to be taken a few forts in the Ecclesiastical States. The detachments of the enemy wandering over its surface have deserted the interior, and taken refuge in Ancona and Civita-Veccia,

whether they were followed by the revolutionary parties. The sieges of these places can neither be long nor doubtful; they will terminate the round and successes of the military operations in those countries.

The greater part has been recovered without much effusion of blood, and it will be found to have been easier to remove the yoke than it will be to render the inhabitants peaceful and flourishing. The fate of several provinces remains uncertain, at least unknown. To what authority have they submitted? Will they or not preserve their old Constitution? We shall postpone this inquiry till we treat of the moral and political state of Italy, and first let us proceed to the history of Switzerland and Germany.

### SWITZERLAND and GERMANY.

Under these days circumstances it appears that the campaign in Italy has justified the renown of the great Commander at the head of the Imperial armies; while the hasty and successful, rapidity, and result of his operations have succeeded the foresight of art, and driven the limits of the Revolution back to the frontiers of Dauphiné; the warring Switzerland has taken a very different turn, and has adopted a more

It is, not our intention here to investigate the reasons of this difference. However curious the question may be, it would interrupt the course of the military narrative, and it shall have a place in a subsequent article; but we cannot help remarking the contrast presented by the Helvetic campaign, between the public prejudices which, at its opening, persisted in misunderstanding the bearings of it, and the slow progress made by the Imperialists.

When they had, after several bloody battles, established themselves between the Rhine and the Jura, appearances seemed to favour them. The enemy's army, diminished and disengaged, stood in need of reinforcements, and received but very imperfect ones; it had lost its positions among the Alps, from the frontiers of the Grisons to the summit of St. Gothard.

Trusting to a speedy deliverance, the loyal inhabitants were prepared to stand forth: the marks of fermentation appeared; the Upper Valais rose, demanding and expecting assistance; the commotion began to spread into the valleys of the Alps of the Canton of Berne; the democratic Cantons, escaped from the yoke, assembled their contingents; the dispositions of the greater portion of the part of Switzerland which was still separated from their deliverers by their enemies, perplexed the latter, who were under the necessity

necessity of preventing resistance by multiplied detachments, and those in several places were insufficient.

It was expected that some grand general measure of rallying would be adopted among those small Republics, although they had no common centre, no leaders, no harmony among them. It was presumed that a truly national army, devoted to free their country, to defend its frontiers, and thus connected with the immediate interest of all, would be encouraged, supported, and brought into action, under the protection of the Austrian forces.

But this patriotic levy not having been realized, enthusiasm has cooled. Uncertainty and distrust were increased by the inaction of the Imperialists; the affability, the prudence, the soothings, the respect shown by the Archduke Charles, to the independance of the country, and even to the mistakes of many of its inhabitants, could not overcome the error of an original illusive confidence in the facility of the enterprise. In Switzerland, as elsewhere, it was hoped that on the firing of the first cannon in the country, almost all the inhabitants would ring the alarm-bell for attacking the French. These illusions showed very little knowledge of the local relations: they who set out with dissembling the difficulties of any design whatever, rarely accomplish it.

A great

A great portion of the districts of Switzerland, occupied by the Austrians, were precisely those in which the spirit of the revolution had been the most cherished, in which the old authorities preserved the least influence, and in which discontents, not all groundless, relaxed the wills in favour of a restoration. The legion of Swiss emigrants, under the command of Colonel *de Rovere*, which gave continual proofs of its bravery and devotion, and which was recruited on the spot, after sustaining honourable losses in several battles; some hundreds of mountainers in three of the democratic Cantons armed for the defence of their rocks; and some particular regiments in the pay of Great Britain, and by no means led freely, were almost the only auxiliaries in the field that seconded the Imperial army.

We described at the time the position it occupied after the taking of Zutich, and also that of the enemy. Let us now take a view of its line, and the division of its forces, as they stood in the middle of August, before the checks which preceded the retreat of His Royal Highness.

The army, extending from the Rhine to St. Gotthard and the Fourche, was divided into four principal commands. General *Nauhauy*, to the right, occupied the space between the Rhine and the town of Baden. The centre under the Archduke extended from Baden to Rapperschweil,

Schweil, towards the eastern extremity of the Lake of Zurich; the advanced posts were stationed before the rivers Sihl and Limmat. Several bodies of cavalry, in the rear of this line, formed, as it were, a second line from Schaffhausen to the Grisons.

To the left, General *Yellachich* commanded the division of the army which extended from Rapperschweil through the Canton of Schwitz to Brunnen on the Lake of Lucerne, the navigation of which was intercepted by the enemy. The posts of this division reached, at Fluelen, the fourth position under the command of General *de Bay*, who had the defence of the Canton of Uri, and the Valley of Urseren to the centre of Mount St. Gotthard.

These four divisions, according to the nature of the places, were very unequal as to extent, force, and the means of subsistence. The two last-mentioned had to defend a country intersected by mountains, woods, gulleys, and a thousand steep bye-paths through which the enemy might issue; a country too, where provisions were very scarce, and whither they could not be brought but with great difficulty.

The army of the enemy was less exposed to these disadvantages. Its right wing, posted close to the frontiers of the Canton of Uri, and on those of Unterwalden, Zug, and Lucerne, was nearer

heater to succour, to provisions, and to find points of retreat. Maffea commanded the centre which extended from Zug by the mountains of Albis to Baden, whence his left wing stretched to the confluence of the Aar and the Rhine.

The months of June and July passed away in a kind of truce, except some skirmishing of the advanced posts. At a distance the minds of men became impatient at this inaction; but the respective positions accounted for it. Each party considered that of his adversary as not to be attacked, or too dangerous to be attempted, and even as independent of the issue of a battle fought in the flat about Zurich.

To make all easy, the politicians and military realoners postponed the renewal of offensive operations, sometimes till the Russians joined the Austrian army, sometimes till the plan of turning Maffea's position by his right was executed. Every day heard a repetition of the tale of the voluntary evacuation of Switzerland, of desertion in the enemy's army, of its speedy defection, and of the pretended famine which was to compel its retreat. To doubt it was almost a Jacobinical heresy.

We were afterwards assured confidently that divisions detached from the allied army in Italy were to scale the Valais and the two St. Bernards, come out upon the Lake of Geneva, and

attack the enemy on his rear. A messenger of this kind, who never saw greater hills than those of his own county, with the dash of his pen, and at the head of twenty thousand men, marches to a jig over those ice-capped summits whose heads are lost above the clouds.

An enterprise of this kind has, in fact, been attempted. An Austrian body of five thousand men, under the command of General *Straub*, penetrated to Munster, in the Upper Valais, and pushed a post to the Grinsel. Prince *Victor de Roban* occupied the Simplon with two thousand four hundred men, and on the 7th of July, General *Haddick*, re-ascending by the valley of Aost, arrived at the foot of the Great Saint Bernard with ten battalions extremely weakened.

The French were not the only enemies which those officers had to contend with: the nature of the country presented obstacles as great. On these summits, the highest inhabited on the globe, M. *de Straub*'s troops still found themselves but at the feet of enormous mountains covered with ice and snow; they double-guarded their camps in those regions of frost; endured the extremes of hunger and cold, without wood and without victuals. The bread that supported them was baked at Bellinzone, and thence carried across the Alps.

The whole country to Brég had the appearance of a desert. When the French left it, they burnt every thing they could not carry away—houses, furniture, provisions, and wood. The unfortunate Valaisians, who had risen against them, were under the necessity of following their colours, or of leaving the ruins of their villages to disperse like wild deer, and wander among the mountains. The Canton of Uri, defended by General *de Bay*, presented the same desolated aspect; the towns and villages reduced to ashes; no cultivation, no cattle, no inhabitants. Had the mountains of the Alps fallen upon these ruined valleys, the event could not have heaped more calamities upon them.

To the natural defences the enemy joined the most skilful use of the topographical positions; none of them, not even those reputed inaccessible, were neglected; the whole chain of mountains which separate the Valais of the Canton of Berne, the most important passes, and all the valleys in their possession, were stopped up and fortified. At the foot of the Simplon, and on the Great St. Bernard, they had thrown up formidable entrenchments.

In this mountain-war, it is not to be denied that the French have displayed a superiority of knowledge and conduct. All that icy circuit which extends from the Alps of Savoy to those of the

Grisons, had been examined by them, and plans of their slightest windings taken ; the multitude of valleys closed; of passes choaked up, and of difficult bye-paths which traverse it, were the work of the diligence and abilities of their engineers before the commencement of hostilities.

To defend themselves from surprises in this labyrinth of defiles, whence the enemy can break out unexpectedly upon their posts, the most active vigilance is not enough, without a general knowledge of those outlets which are often thought impracticable and neglected, but which are accessible to enterprising men.

General *de Bay*, whom we left stationed in the Canton of Uri, experienced the danger of this topographical situation. He built his security on excellent arrangements : he had fixed posts, scouts, and cannon, in places which Nature seemed to have reserved for the nimble animals of the Alps. The French, nevertheless, surprised him ; he became their prisoner with one of his detachments, and some of his positions were lost.

*Maffra*, encouraged by this success, and resolving to dislodge the left wing of the Imperialists, reinforced his right, and on the 14th of August ordered it to attack General *Jellachich's* advanced corps, from the eastern shore  
of

of the Lake of Zurich to the extremity of the line in the Canton of Uri. During this manœuvre he engaged the attention of the Archduke *Charles* in a very smart action before Zurich, appearing to threaten the town.

He was repulsed ; but Generals *Le Courbe* and *Cabran*, who had the conduct of his right wing, succeeded in the principal points of their attack from the 14th to the 17th of August. Altorf and the Canton of Uri were taken from General *Simbischön*, who had succeeded *M. de Bay*, and who, having suffered a considerable loss, retired to the Grisons. The posts of Brunnen, Schwitz, and d'Eusfielden, also gave way, and fell back to Uznach. The loss of Altorf was followed by that of the valley of Urseren and St. Gothard; and even the Grisons were, for a time, in danger. At the same instant of time the enemy surprised Colonel *Strauch* in the Upper Valais, killed or took the greater part of his detachment, and forced him to re-descend into Italy. The Prince *de Roban* also abandoned the Simplon, and followed Colonel *Strauch*.

These different actions restored to the French all the passes and the summits of the Alps to the frontiers of the Grisons ; but that country was saved. General *Jellachich*, having received some reinforcements, resumed in a few days, and even without fighting, several of his former positions.

Although

Although the Imperial army had lost, among these rocks, eight thousand men, more than half of whom remained prisoners; although the confidence of the inhabitants was altered by this local and unexpected defeat; and although experience had taught the invaders to make a juster estimate of the obstacles to be overcome, before the immense and colossal fortress of Switzerland could be reduced, still the hastened march of the Russians supported their hopes; when in the latter end of August, and a few days after the arrival of those auxiliaries, the Archduke *Charles* marched back into Suabia with forty-five thousand men, that is, with three-fourths of his army, leaving the territory they occupied to be defended by twelve thousand Austrians, under the command of General *Hotze*, and twenty-five thousand Russians under General *Korsakof*.

Was this unexpected retreat fortuitous, or previously concerted in the Cabinet of Vienna? Were they tired of a fruitless war, in a country where the numerous cavalry of the Imperialists were almost useless, where the strength of the enemy's positions allowed of little progress, and where in a few weeks the season would put an end to military operations? Was it, on the contrary, in the original plan of Austria to fix the principal theatre of the war elsewhere, and to carry it into the circles of the empire that had been

been dismembered by the French? Or, in fine, has the irruption of the latter into the Palatinate of Suabia, been the immediate cause of this change?

Whatever be the object and origin of it, we may suppose that it is exclusively owing to the Cabinet of Vienna and to circumstances; and not the result of any previous agreement between Austria and her Allies.

No advices since this evacuation having informed us of its consequences, we are ignorant whether the combined army has preserved its defensive or not through the whole of its line, whether the French have endeavoured to take advantage of its diminution at the Archduke's departure, or whether it has attempted any new operation. There are at least 80,000 French under *Massena* in Switzerland.

On the 24th of August a French army assembled a few weeks before beyond the Rhine, passed the river at Manheim, stretched into the Palatinate, and ascended the Neckar, directing their march to Heilborn and Stutgard. Fifteen or sixteen thousand men at most were employed on this incursion, while five or six thousand more, with General *Baraguay d'Hilliers* at their head, left Mayence, extorted a contribution as they passed from the neutral town of Francfort, and directed their march to Aschaffenburg and Wurtzburg.

No

No opposition interrupted the first successes of this expedition. General Sztaray, at the head of a body of Imperialists, consisting of from eight to ten thousand men, was in the Upper Suabia, and consequently too far to come up immediately with the enemy; but the approach of the Archduke soon put an end to the inroad: on the second of this month, this French band repassed the Rhine.

It is plain that the enterprise was merely a diversion to draw a part of his Royal Highness's army into Suabia; but the Prince has not returned to Switzerland since the retreat of the French. In a proclamation which he has addressed to the States of the Empire, in requesting their contingents, he tells them that the moment is arrived for restoring *Germany to her former limits.*

Should we be mistaken were we to see in these few words a design of recovering the left bank of the Rhine, and the fortresses on that river which have been lost, and of conducting the war with an object very different from that which warm imaginations adopted as certain, when they supposed that the restoration of a king of France was the first ambition of the Court of Vienna?

If we compare the summary we have been giving, with the gigantic reveries of those who subjected France herself in six months to an invasion

vasion, and the French Republic to the sword of the conquerors, we should in future be less in a hurry to prophecy, and to consider the present war as at the eve of its conclusion.

If we compare it with reasonable wishes, and the situation from which we have been extricated, the mind is soothed; for now it would require a series of disasters to re plunge Europe into such days of anguish and of mourning as it has seen; and we must shut our eyes against probabilities to reject that of seeing the countries, whether incorporated or not incorporated, which have been enslaved by the French Republic, restored to their former independence.

Italy has broken her chains; the deliverance of Switzerland remains doubtful; that of the United Provinces approaches, and it now remains for us to trace the efforts making for their restoration.

### **THE UNITED PROVINCES.**

IT is well known that of all the vassals of the French Government, none have been more servile than Holland. No revolt had there opposed the public slavery, or the authority of the obscure

persons whom the French Directory permitted to conduct the Republic at the Hague under the name of Directors and Representatives of the People, and whom it is needless to say were elected without the assistance of the people.

It is true that in these Provinces the rod of modern liberty has been less heavily laid on; they have been treated with more civility; property has not been so violently or so generally attacked, nor personal safety so much exposed to the despotism and caprices of the governing demagogues, or to the fury of the factions. No proscription, no popular crime, nor any of those unspeakable horrors of ferocity and French savagery stained this tranquil subversion. Every thing demonstrated that the nation was not adapted to such a revolution.

Although its navy, which was in a declining state, had become in fact only a division of the French fleet; and although this squadron completely exhausted the ruined finances of the State, still Holland was not the home, the treasury, and the prey of those immense armies of foreign leeches, which crushed Italy and Switzerland. It had only to bear the residence and maintenance of twenty-four thousand Frenchmen, whose number was never effective, and whose conduct in general did not excite daily complaints.

The

The national character, in which patience, reflection, and humanity united, caused the toleration of an order of things, completely odious to the generality of the Provinces, but for the subversion of which no succour was presented; Holland owes her best gratitude to the Stadholder and his adherents, who having the wisdom to judge rightly of this desperate situation, did not aggravate it by rash conspiracies, useless movements, and precipitate insurrections. The House of Orange and the nation depended for their salvation on time, and on the juncture which they foresaw, when an auxiliary commanding force would counterbalance that which remained the Republic under the yoke, and give a respectable support to all the friends of the country, of the legal constitution, and of the Stadholderate.

Europe has long been persuaded that the part of delivering the United Provinces would be undertaken by a Power, to whom, from many interests and motives, it seemed particularly to belong. A few years before the Revolution of France, she had judged it necessary and glorious to interpose firmly, and to put an end to that, into which the dupes, the factious, and the discontented abroad had led a party, whom their own adherents had carried beyond the original object. She had entered into a treaty with England and the United Provinces, which guaranteed

the dignities and prerogatives of the House of Orange, the preservation of the ancient Constitution, and the independence of the Republic. To what purpose then are these pompous transactions among Sovereigns, if at the moment for fulfilling the engagements of them, they hold themselves freed from the obligation?

They who doubted the will of Prussia to succour Holland with her arms, supposed that she would make it a point with the Directory to leave her neighbour and ally, whom she had taken under her protection, at liberty to conduct her own government, without applying for directions to the revolutionary jurists of Paris. People went so far as even to report the chimerical conditions on which Prussia consented to preserve neutrality. This negotiation appears to have existed only in the heads of speculative politicians. It is for England, assisted by Russia, and the sentiments of an immense majority of the Dutch, that the enterprise, on which at this moment the fate of the United Provinces depends, was reserved.

The British Government had secured a body of Russians to co-operate in this expedition. They had found in the Emperor and the persons appointed to represent him, that firm, cordial, and zealous will, which does not shrink at distances or other obstacles, and which convinced

of the necessity of the war, is not sparing of the means. 150,000 men are now sent off to Holland. At the beginning of the summer, the British regiments destined for the expedition were chosen, completed, and soon collected. It is very rare that Great Britain has assembled so considerable a force for foreign service. Captain Popham of the Royal Navy repaired to Revel to direct the embarkation of the Russian troops, and to the last moment the public remained quite uncertain as to this measure, and the extent and destination of the succours.

They remained equally uncertain as to the real point to which the British expedition was to be directed: some sent it to assist the Chouans of Normandy, and others dispatched it to the coasts of Belgium. Those who were better acquainted with the talents of the Cabinet and the interests of England, and were aware of the national wish generally expressed, did not doubt that the armament would sail for Holland.

The first division of the British army, consisting of from twelve to fourteen thousand men, assembled in the county of Kent, sailed from the Downs on the 13th of August, under the command of General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, amidst the acclamations of an immense crowd of spectators. A squadron of eleven ships of the line, two of which were Russians, several frigates and

and smaller vessels, sailed at the same time under Admiral *Mitchell* to co-operate in the descent.

They were kept at sea by contrary winds till the 27th of August, on which day, at day-break, they effected a landing at the Helder in the opening of the Texel, but not without resistance. The enemy, who had had some weeks to prepare a defence, had assembled a considerable body of troops, who immediately attacked the English on the long sand-beach where they landed, and before the cannon and cavalry were disembarked. After an obstinate battle, which lasted ten hours, the British kept their ground, and drove the enemy two leagues back into the country. In the night they evacuated Helder, leaving all their heavy artillery behind.

The first action, in which the English army had fifty-six men killed and three hundred and seventy-one wounded, was followed next day by the capture of thirteen Dutch ships of war left lying in the Channel, called the New Diep: the remaining and larger division of the Batavian fleet, under the command of Admiral *Story*, had fallen down to Vlieter in the Zuider-Zee.

They had no choice but of fighting or surrendering. The disposition of the crews, the vigour and activity of Admiral *Mitchell*, the suc-

cess of the 27th, the firmness acquired by the forces disembarked, and the landing of General *Dar* on the 28th with a reinforcement of five thousand men, promised new and speedy advantages; which Sir *Ralph Abercrombie* had taken farther care to secure, by circulating a proclamation perfectly adapted to the country and the situation of affairs: it deserves to be distinguished from the useless load of papers of this kind, which have been so vainly multiplied for some years past.

Lieutenant-General Sir *Ralph Abercrombie* being entrusted by his Britannic Majesty, the ancient and good Ally of the United Provinces, with the command of an army destined to undertake the important task of delivering these Provinces from the degrading tyranny of the French Republic, is charged to make a public and explicit declaration of the sentiments and intentions of his Majesty, and of the august Sovereigns with whom he is allied in this great work. He declares then that the English army come not as enemies, but as friends and deliverers of the United Provinces; and with no other view than to deliver the inhabitants of this once free and happy country from the oppression under which it groans, to re-establish their religion which has been violated by the infidelity and atheism of France, to restore the rights and the ancient laws and customs of the people of Holland, to rescue their persons and properties, to revive their trade and commerce which has been annihilated, their legitimate Government which has been overthrown, and that Constitution for which their ancestors fought and conquered under the banners of the Princes of Orange, and to renew that happy concord and alliance between Great Britain and these

these Provinces, which has been the source of so much benefit to both.

His Majesty does not doubt that, eager to regain all those advantages, the inhabitants of the United Provinces, thus animated by the courage and devotion of their ancestors, will meet equal success. The hand of Providence has already appeared in the deliverance of a great part of Europe from those miseries into which it was for a time thrown by the arms and principles of the French Republic.

His Majesty's forces, collected under Lieutenant-General Abercrombie, together with those of his august Allies, destined to the same service, are fully sufficient to protect all who shall stand forth in the cause of their country. It is the most earnest wish of his Britannic Majesty, and of his Allies, that the restoration to the blessings of a regular Government should be chiefly effected by the efforts of Dutchmen themselves. His Majesty advises them in the most pressing manner to agree and unite with one another, to forget and pardon the past, to exert themselves in defending from all acts of violence, and revenge the lives and properties of their fellow-citizens, even of those whose mistakes and errors have, perhaps, assisted in increasing the miseries of their country; but who, now yielding to the irresistible conviction of experience, are ready to make a common cause with us in this great undertaking.

It is according to these principles, and in this spirit, that the British army will conduct themselves amidst a people whom the English nation has been long accustomed to consider as friends and allies. But if, after this declaration, there shall yet be found Dutchmen, who, at the approach of the deliverance of their country, devoted to its oppressors, shall show themselves unworthy of the invaluable enjoyment of the tranquillity and security of a lawful Government, as well as of religious and civil liberty; those, and those only, shall be regarded and treated by the troops of his Britannic Majesty.

jefty as the obstinate and irreconcilable enemies, not only of his said Majesty and his august Allies, but also of the happiness of their country, as well as of the general interests and safety of Europe.

(Signed) R. ABERCROMBIE,  
Lieut. General.

By order, FRED. MAITLAND,  
Secretary to the Commander in Chief.

On the 30th Admiral *Mitchell* entered the Channel of the Vlieter, bore down upon the Dutch squadron, and sent a summons to Admiral *Story* and his Captains to surrender. He declared at the same time, "that such ships as should hoist their old flags should be considered as being in the service of his Britannic Majesty and her Allies, and under the command of his Serene Highness the Prince of Orange, Hereditary Stadholder, Captain General and Admiral of the Seven Provinces."

In his report to the Executive Directory, sitting at the Hague, *Story* confirmed the account of the cause which prevented all resistance, and made him give up his ships to the British squadron. He says, that at the moment he gave the order for repelling the attack with which he was threatened, the crews revolted, and disarmed the gunners. He wrote to Admiral *Mitchell* in these words: "The traitors whom I commanded have refused to fight, I therefore deliver up

" to you the fleet that was under my command."

Admiral *Story* was far from participating in the sentiments of his squadron : he was known to be entirely devoted to the illegal system ; but he should have reflected that there are never *traitors* in Revolutions, in which every thing is effected by violence, in which forced obedience is but a duty of prudence, and in which they who have thrown off allegiance to the laws, have no right to expect it from those whom they compel to share the fickleness of their conduct. The natural punishment of those who absolve the people from their oaths, is to experience their inconstancy, and to be the victims of it.

The possession of the Dutch squadron securing the Zuider Zee to the English, the expedition was established ; a second embarkation was to take place in the Downs and follow the first ; and General *Abercrombie*, after fortifying his position, waited for the reinforcement; before he proceeded to take the offensive.

After their retreat from the Helder, the French and Batavian troops united under the command of a Dutchman named *Daëndals*, established their line from Avenhorn to Alkmaer, the centre being at the village of Schermershorn. From this point, on the 10th instant,

instant, they renewed without effect their attack in three columns against the position of the English: they were driven back to Alkmaer, with the loss of eight hundred men, and their situation rendered worse by the arrival of the second division of the British troops, and the auxiliary army of eighteen thousand Russians, under the command of General *d'Hermann*. His Royal Highness the Duke of *York*, the Commander in Chief, landed on the 13th, and set off the very next day for Schagen, where General *Abercrombie* had been established since the 10th.

The Hereditary Prince of *Orange* arrived at Helder a few days before the Duke of *York*. In landing on the territory of the Republic, his Royal Highness issued a proclamation, which we will insert hereafter; and in which, while he removes the fears of all those who have shared in the Revolution and its Government, he orders the present functionaries to quit their places, and the old authorities to be restored. The Prince is occupied in assembling under his banners all the soldiers who wish to return to their duty, and the faithful inhabitants who are inclined to concur in the deliverance of the State.

To an army of forty-five thousand men, full of emulation, from the Generals to the last soldier; to a squadron commanding the Zuider

Zee; to the support which there are hopes of obtaining from a great portion of the inhabitants; and to the ancient and unalterable attachment of the Dutch regular troops to the Stadholder, what do the Batavian Directory, the revolutionary faction, and their extravagant guardians on the banks of the Seine oppose?

About twenty thousand French, commanded by a printer's boy of Limosin; by that *Brune*, who juggled and pillaged Switzerland, and who has been seen displaying at the Hague the fruit of his rapines, and the pomp of a Nabob; a person who received his military and political education in the tennis-courts of the French Revolution. The Dutch army, whether troops of the line, or national guards, neither are, nor can be estimated with precision, and are wavering between their present chiefs and the leaders whom they aspire to recover.

In default of sufficient and immediate succours, the French Directory have dispatched compliments, promises, and sermons, to their pupils at the Hague. *Brune*, repeating his fustian of 1798, has written thus to the Municipality of Amsterdam: “Look at the shades of the *Van Tromps*, the *De Witts*, the *Ruyters* and the *Barnevelds*! Open their respected tombs, that you may observe the first beatings of your hearts for liberty.” It is with this mountebank style,

style, with these epic evocations, with these frightful stale sentences, that citizen *Brune* thinks of converting the oyster-wenches and porters of Amsterdam.

The nature of the country, that of the season, the shocking resource of the inundations, the union of several parties hitherto opposed, but jinimical to the Stadholder, and lastly, the reinforcements detached from Belgium, will perhaps raise more obstacles than the elegant periods of a *Brune*, or the everlasting proclamations of the revolutionary regents.

But if these resources prove insufficient, is it likely that the French should run the risk of ruining their army, in order to defend a country impatient to be delivered from them? Will they not, after retarding the conquest of the Northern Provinces as much as lies in their power, and without exposing themselves too far, finish by passing the Waal, by establishing there their line of defence for the next campaign, and by enclosing themselves in that formidable cordon of fortified places in that part of Brabant, and in Grave and Nimeguen? And, plausible as this opinion is, will it not like many others be belied by the event?

## THE END OF TIPPOO SAIB.

DURING this terrible, complicated, and still uncertain though less dangerous struggle, which arms three civilized Powers against the ravages of a conquering, barbarous, and destructive Republicanism, the influence of its genius has been felt as far as Malabar.

France had dispatched officers and agents to awaken the restlessness and ambition of *Tippoo Saib*. At the departure of *Bonaparte* his Government did not dissemble that they connected his expedition with enterprises on the English possessions in India: *Tippoo* was flattered with speedy succours, and instructions were sent to him which he was secretly preparing to execute.

All these designs were well known to the Power against whom they were planned. The Company's Government at Bengal not obtaining from *Tippoo* either the security or satisfaction they had a right to require, the war broke out and was speedily concluded by an event, which has overthrown the Empire usurped by *Hyder Ali*, and deprived his son of his States and of his life.

Lieutenant-General *Harris*, who was Commander in Chief on the Madras establishment, and who was appointed to conduct the campaign,

had shut the Sultan up in Seringapatam, his capital. Towards the end of April, the trenches were opened before this place, and the moment the breach was practicable the British troops made the assault under the fire of the works, surmounted the resistance of the besieged, and on the 4th of May made themselves masters of the town. It was also necessary to carry *Tippoo's* entrenched palace : no opposition could resist the intrepidity of the British troops and of the Seapoys. The body of the tyrant was found among the dead, and his family, made prisoners, were conducted to the camp with all the attention due to their misfortune.

They who are acquainted with the force, the admirable organization, the discipline, and the character of the English army in India, will be the less astonished at so speedy and so brilliant a success.

Never was there a more important service rendered to the British Empire in this part of the globe. It has put an end to the dominion usurped over the Mysore, the legal Sultan of which *Hyder Ali* and his successor dethroned and imprisoned, and making use of his name reigned in his place as Prime Ministers of their prisoner.

*Hyder Ali*, of a strong and exalted mind, lived with his soldiers, rendered himself popular, and was

was not cruel. Although he could neither read nor write, he maintained his usurpation, governed with glory, rendered his new power formidable, and died tranquil.

His son, acquainted with letters, affected devotion; but he was harsh and inhuman, revengeful and systematically avaricious: his turbulence and ambition were punished in the last war, by Lord Cornwallis, who nevertheless granted him peace. His character and the intrigues of France have led him to his destruction.

Neither in India nor in Europe will the atrocity of his conduct in 1783 to the English officers, his prisoners, whom he poisoned or suffered to die of hunger in his dungeons, ever be forgotten. Some of the officers who survived that terrible captivity of three years, have served as guides in the siege of that capital where they had languished in torments. The moral, political, and eternal justice, which watches over this world, has also its *re-actions*, and more inevitable ones than those of the Jacobins or of the Aristocrats.

The treasure found at Seringapatam is estimated at 3,000,000 sterling; an estimate rendered probable by Tipoo's avarice, and the riches he was known to possess.

Let men intent on their own misfortunes, and who imagine that out of the corner of the earth where

Where they are suffering there can be no other examples of the instability of human grandeur; reflect awhile on the King of Mysore, imprisoned, he and his children, for twenty years, by an adventurer who afterwards became one of the most powerful Princes of India; and whose heir, still more powerful, fell in his capital, which was taken by assault, and in the heart of his Empire, which has been overthrown by the son of an English clergyman:

### *GREAT BRITAIN.*

His Majesty having convened the Parliament on the 24th, went in State to the House of Peers, and opened the Sessions with the following Speech :

*My Lords and Gentlemen,*

I HAVE called you together at this unusual season, in order to recommend it to you to consider of the propriety of enabling me without delay to avail myself to a further extent of the voluntary services of the militia, at a moment when an increase of our active force abroad may be productive of the most important and beneficial consequences.

We have seen the happy effects of the measure which you adopted on this subject in the last Session; and the forces which I was thereby enabled to employ have already displayed, in the face of the enemy, a courage, discipline, and Readiness, worthy of the character of British soldiers.

In the short interval since the close of the last Session, our situation and prospects have, under the blessing of Providence, improved beyond the most sanguine expectation. The abilities and valour of the commanders and troops of the Combined Imperial Armies have continued to be eminently displayed. The deliverance of Italy may now be considered as secured by the result of a campaign, equal in splendour and success to any the most brilliant recorded in history; and I have had the heart-felt satisfaction of seeing the valour of my fleets and armies successfully employed to the assistance of my Allies, to the support of our just cause, and to the advancement of the most important interests of the British Empire.

The kingdom of Naples has been rescued from the French yoke, and restored to the dominion of its lawful Sovereign, and my former connections with that power have been renewed.

The French expedition to Egypt has continued to be productive of calamity and disgrace to our enemies, while its ultimate views against our Eastern possessions have been utterly confounded. The desperate attempt which they have lately made to extricate themselves from their difficulties, has been defeated by the courage of the Turkish forces, directed by the skill, and animated by the heroism of a British officer, with a small portion of my naval force under his command; and the overthrow of that restless and perfidious power, who, instigated by the artifices, and deluded by the promises of the French, had entered into their ambitious and destructive projects in India, has placed the British interests in that quarter in a state of solid and permanent security.

The vigilance, decision, and wisdom of the Governor General in Council on this great and important occasion, and the tried abilities and valour of the commanders, officers, and troops employed under his direction, are entitled to my highest praise.

There

There is, I trust, every reason to expect that the effort which I am making for the deliverance of the United Provinces will prove successful. The British arms have rescued from the possession of the enemy the principal port and naval arsenal of the Dutch Republic; and although we have to regret the loss of many brave men in a subsequent attack against the enemy, whose position enabled them to obstruct our progress, I have the strongest ground to expect that the skill of my Generals, and the determined resolution and intrepidity of my troops and of those of my Allies, will soon surmount every obstacle; and that the fleet which, under the usurped dominion of France, was destined to co-operate in the invasion of these islands, may speedily, I trust, under its ancient standard, partake in the glory of restoring the religion, liberty, and independence of those Provinces, so long in intimate union and alliance with this country.

While you rejoice with me in the events which add so much lustre to the British character, you will, I am persuaded, as cordially join in the sentiments so justly due to the conduct of my good and faithful Ally the Emperor of Russia; to his magnanimity and wisdom directing to so many quarters of Europe the force of his extensive and powerful Empire; we are, in a great degree, indebted for the success of our own efforts, as well as for the rapid and favourable change in the general situation of affairs. I have directed copies to be laid before you of those engagements, which have consolidated and cemented a connection so consonant to the permanent interests of my Empire, and so important at the present moment to every part of the civilized world.

*Gentlemen of the House of Commons,*

The ample supplies which you have granted to me, in the course of the last Session, will, I trust, so nearly provide for the exigencies of the Public Service, even on the extensive scale which our present operations require, as to enable me,

without further aid, to continue those exertions to the close of the present year :—But in order to afford you the convenience of a longer recess, I recommend it to you to consider of providing for the expence which will be necessary in the early part of the ensuing year ; and with this view I have ordered the proper estimates to be laid before you.

*My Lords, and Gentlemen,*

In pursuance of your recommendation, I judged it proper to communicate to my two Houses of Parliament in Ireland at the close of their last Session, the sentiments which you had expressed to me respecting an incorporating Union with that kingdom. The experience of every day confirms me in the persuasion that signal benefit would be derived to both countries from that important measure, and I trust that the disposition of my Parliament there will be found to correspond with that which you have manifested for the accomplishment of a work which would tend so much to add to the security and happiness of all my Irish subjects, and to consolidate the strength and prosperity of the Empire.

The address, which was moved in the House of Lords by the Marquis of *Buckingham*, seconded by Lord *Amherst*, and in the Lower House by Mr. *Sherw Le Fevre*, seconded by Colonel *Elford*, passed without opposition. The Parliament and the Public have participated the sentiments expressed by his Majesty, his generous confidence, and in particular the eulogium as just as brilliant, bestowed upon the Emperor of *Russia* ; but the silence preserved by the King respecting the restoration of the King of *Sardinia*, while

he

he spoke of that of the King of the Two Sicilies, seems to warrant the apprehensions circulating through Europe on that subject.

After the true and flattering picture drawn by his Majesty, it is not without pain we add a summary recital of a check experienced, on the 19th, by the English and Russian troops in North Holland, an account of which has been transmitted by his Royal Highness the Duke of York to the Secretary at War, in a dispatch dated from Schagen the 20th of this month.

We have already described the general position occupied by the two armies. On the 19th the Duke of York attacked the enemy, his army marching in four columns. The nature of the land, which is confined, and of the country intersected with ditches and canals, the roads destroyed and covered with ruins, three fortified villages, and the elevation of the heights occupied by the French, presented the greatest obstacles. Twelve Russian battalions, the brigade commanded by General *Manners*, and the seventh regiment of light horse, formed the first column of the right, commenced the attack with an intrepidity which, in spite of the obstinate resistance of the enemy, made them masters of the village of Bergen about noon; but their impetuosity exposing them afterwards to a terrible fire kept up by the Republicans, they were compelled

elled to retreat. Their Commander, General *d'Hermann*, and General *Tchertchekoff*, who was dangerously wounded, were made prisoners.

The second column of the right had carried the village of Walmenhuyſen, re-taken that of Shoreldam, and preserved their advantage. The third column led by Sir *James Pulteney* had penetrated to the environs of Alemaer; the left of the army under General *Abercrombie* had pushed on to Hoorn, and had taken possession of it; but the issue of the central attack determined the retreat of the army, which has returned to its former position.

The battle began at three o'clock in the morning, and did not end till five o'clock in the afternoon. The loss of the Russians is estimated at fifteen hundred men, and that of the English troops at one thousand and thirty killed, wounded, and prisoners. Three thousand of the enemy, among whom are 60 officers, were taken by the British.

In a bulletin published at Dunkirk, and written by *Florant Guyot*, the French Minister at the Hague, the loss of the Russians was exaggerated to two thousand killed, a like number made prisoners, and twenty pieces of cannon taken. The writer adds, that the English were not in the action: a tale that at least proves they have been hurt very little by the enemy.



THE  
BRITISH MERCURY.

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N° XXVI.

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*October 15th, 1799.*

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*F R A N C E.*

*Of the State of Affairs and Parties in this Republic since the end of August.*

**H**AVING devoted the preceding Number to a general recapitulation of military events without giving room to what was useless, exaggerated, or fabulous, let us now inquire into the interior situation of this country, whose fluctuating destiny lies between the chances of war and the talons of the Revolution.

VOL. IV.

Without

Without this historical review what judgment can be formed of the future, what accurate idea of the present? It is the narrow politics of a Serjeant to perceive only armies in a war, in which the prominent points are led by passions, interests, factions, and systems; in which a bad argument may occasion the loss of an empire, a delusion destroy the fruits of a campaign, and a moral error prepare defeat in the very moment of victory.

As the centre of all this motion, the French Republic occupies the chief place in the picture before us. It is necessary to combat at once her principles, her examples, and her armies. Subdued on one point, still strong on others, resisting on all, agitated at home, and carried along by the force of circumstances like most Governments, her preservation or her fall essentially depends upon the concurrence of external causes with those which, at home, affect her system, her resources, the energy of authority, and her means of power and administration.

We left the Directory last month in a state of uncertainty, contending for the wrecks of their prerogatives, and equally dreading the enemies of the Republican Government and the Revolutionary fanaticism. The Jacobins, driven from their first club-room, erected their tribune in another quarter without appearing intimidated by that check.

check. They were supported by a large party in the Council of Five Hundred; but the Council of Elders participated the fears, and seconded the measures of the Government. The dismissed Directors, attacked and expecting daily to be impeached, were inundating Paris with their apologies, without convincing any body; but they found a more effectual defence than that of their pitiful rhetoric, in the union of their interests with those of their old colleagues, in the danger which threatened them all, and in the dread conceived by the majority of the Legislative Body that an impeachment might go round, and be the signal for unlimited persecution.

Every courier that arrived brought the news or the apprehension of a defeat. The Government without strength, union, or credit, applied to the Councils for measures, but the Councils only gave them harangues, declamations, and projects. An intestine war of reproach, recrimination, and calumny, attested the general distrust, and seemed to presage a worse confusion still.

This general picture is little altered, but the enormous subject has become more distinct upon the canvas: we now see anarchy among the parties and rulers, but an anarchy in which the Nation has only a passive share.

An executive power in the hands of men not sure of retaining their places a month together, can form no fixed plan, and must give way to circumstances.

An executive power composed of five persons divided in their affections, principles, and object, must submit their determinations to the fluctuations of the majority.

The same division reigning in the Legislature will produce more negative resolutions than active measures: the Government may receive succours from them that shall retard the fall of their authority, yet not enable them to repair the breaches of the State, or provide for its safety.

Such, at this moment, is the situation of the Directory. Two of the members, *Gobier* and *Moulins*, who are devoted to the Jacobins, form an opposition to *Sieyes* and *Barras*. The majority is usually determined by the fifth Director, *Roger Ducos*, who maintains his neutrality.

No system of conduct can be traced in this regency; they display a series of inconsistencies. They declared war against the Jacobins, after suffering themselves to be beset by them, after filling all the offices of administration with them, and after investing them with their authority, by spreading them as agents over the whole surface of the Republic.

The

The moment their Society, organized at Paris, displayed the standard of 1793, the Directory renounced the dangerous alliance, and caused the very men, to whom they had just restored their confidence, to be denounced as conspirators : Sieyes, more clear-sighted, more alarmed than the others, and bold through very fear, had declared himself their enemy in all his speeches. The second Club, in which they exercised their eloquence, and sharpened their stilettoes, was shut up, and the Society dissolved. Neither the clamours of their partizans in the Council of Five Hundred, nor the rhetoric of their writers, seemed to move the Directory, whose system was thought to be changed, although it very soon proved that they had none.

A dread of the Royalists very soon succeeded that which had been inspired by the Jacobins : and indeed the latter retained over Barras's mind an influence resulting from menaces, promises, recollection of the past, and apprehension of a future moment, when these ruthless *friends of humanity* might again make themselves masters of the sceptre and the guillotine.

Thus of a sudden the vigour of the Directors relaxed. They dismissed, indeed, from office some wretches of so atrocious a character that they might fear being assassinated by them, but they soon left the Jacobins to pour forth unmolested

molested their execrations, and meditate the ruin of the Government while they themselves persecuted the Royalists.

They enforced the execution of the horrible law respecting hostages, in ten or twelve departments, in spite of the melancholy consequences that had attended it in the South. They sought out the shattered remains of the forgotten and vanquished party of the 4th of September 1797.

Lost in obscurity and political non-existence, sixty poor creatures, who had escaped the proscription at that period, were devoted to transportation.

Far from reconciling the Jacobins, these hateful measures, insufficient in their opinion, made them but the more impatient. Becoming bolder in proportion as they saw the Directory intimidated, the chief leaders of their first Club assembled at the *Hotel-de-Salm*. Paris daily resounded with their calumnies: every absurd accusation that the rage of party-spirit could devise was repeated day after day in their public papers, those collections written for savages, and by men in the paroxysms of a fever. To complete this mad-house scene, at the moment that the Jacobins were representing Sieyes as a Royalist conspiring with the Monarchs of Europe to re-establish the throne, the Directorial declaimers were

were making the Jacobins pensioners of the Emperor of Russia and Mr. Pitt.

These extravagances, on which many uninformed foreigners and Frenchmen venture such fine commentaries and happy predictions, are not all pure inventions. Whoever has studied factions, knows that their hatred, like that of variant sects in religion, is the more furious the slighter the difference of their tenets: he knows too, that, after a certain degree of separation, their distrust is supported by chimeras conjured up in the effervescence of suspicion, and admitted with that eager credulity which ever reduces evidence to improbability. Most of the political sects, who make divisions in a party essentially the same, would very soon agree, if they could understand and would believe the intentions of each other.

The late Directory were accused of the system of opposing one party to the other, by which, while they gave a blow to the Anarchists, they also struck the Royalists: and indeed the Government are so confined in their politics, that, after seeming to abjure this system for some days, they hastily resumed it.

It is not, as we may well imagine, in the alternate opposition of one party to the other that they seek their security: on the contrary, in order to render themselves entirely independent

of them, while they crush the one they take care at the same time to crush the other, to keep them on the same level of depression, and to prevent either of them from gaining the power lost by the opposite party.

Such a game could not be played by any Government, however vigorous and confirmed, without endangering its existence; but so incompatible is the existence of the Directory with the views of the Anarchists and the Royalists, that they prefer having both as enemies to the danger of taking one of them as auxiliaries. The strength of the Government then resides exclusively in the part of the nation unconnected with the principal factions, and devoted to tranquillity or attached to the constitutional Republic.

This artifice could not save the old Directors: will it succeed better with the new, who are embarrassed with greater difficulties, and are deprived of the despotic authority with which their predecessors invested themselves?

The Jacobins, who after the changes made in the Directory seemed to be stepping into the supreme dominion, have become doubly furious at the obstacles thrown in their way. They have been as eager in pulling to pieces the Government they have just formed, as that which they have destroyed. Sieyes, who was lectured

lectured by them before his elevation, dreaded, even before he appeared formidable, and accused of reviving the system of equally keeping the different parties under, is become the principal object of their fury. As they have no foundation for a legal impeachment against him, they call for his being dismissed on the ground of an informality in his election, and it is by the very persons who were his electors that the cavil is advanced; a cavil worthy of the times and of the country, and of all the countries abandoned to the abominable logic of such factions.

*Sieyes*, in all his speeches, was at open war with the Jacobins. The removals, the appointments, the measures of which they complained, were his work. At first he pretended to court them. On being reproached for this weakness, he answered, *There is a ~~self~~ still more formidable than the Jacobins, that of the impatient.*

Receiving little or no assistance from his colleagues, and forced by circumstances into an uncertain conduct and a course of incoherencies, he, nevertheless, rallied above two hundred Deputies, who, wavering amidst alarms, changes, and perplexities, both at home and abroad, laid hold of the reputation of *Sieyes* as an oar in a storm. For want of other support they rest upon him through a sentiment of vague hope,

and thinking that he will conduct them by a plan which they are unable to form themselves : but in order to preserve this species of personal party, (a remarkable novelty in the history of the Revolution;) it is necessary to maintain confidence by distinguished acts, and by success ; without which this ephemeral credit would soon disappear before the necessary causes of instability, and by the activity of the popular accusations, which are daily produced by the Anarchists.

We remember with what violence and with what design they urged an impeachment of the dismissed Directors. That prosecution might have been coloured with legal motives. Never were public Officers more criminal ; never did the national justice in a Republic punish more serious offences against liberty, the laws, security, the welfare of the State, the respect due to public compacts, political morality, and the sacred rights of Nations : but these grievances made very little impression upon the Jacobins ; who were much more occupied in increasing criminals, removals, and scaffolds. They likewise pressed too close upon all who were involved in the responsibility of the Directors, and upon every person who in that impeachment beheld the first link of an endless chain of accusations and proscriptions.

The Legislative Body gradually recovered from the enchantment into which their act of ostracism and emancipation had thrown them. *Lucien Buonaparte, Boulay de la Meurthe, Poulat Grand Pré*, and many other *Thermidorian*s of the month of June, deserted the Jacobins, and went over to the Directory. This reconciliation completed what the sanguinary language and indiscretion of the Anarchists had begun. When the act of accusation against *Rобеспierre, Merlin, and La Réveillière*, was debated in the Council of Five Hundred, the discussion was very short; and, from being prejudged, their innocence was pronounced by a great majority. The same spirit and the same motives produced a similar indulgence to the *Warm of knaves, public peculators, and scandalous Commissaries*, on whom the voice of the public, in this case the real voice of the public, was calling for punishment.

The new Minister of Police, *Fouché*, who, till then, was seated in the first rank of the most abandoned Revolutionists, turned his back upon them, and denounced them. But the inconsistency of the Directory, the defeat at Novi, the execution of the forced loan, the insurrections in Languedoc, and the dangers which were continually increasing, very soon revived their audacity, their clamors, and their enterprizes;

and emboldened their associates in the Council of Five Hundred.

Notwithstanding the unbridled licentiousness of the public prints, the Legislative Body have not been able to agree upon a regulation for limiting the liberty of the press. The Directory, denounced by name, slandered every day in those archives of insolence and imposture, solicited in vain for such a regulation. To common place arguments upon the question succeeded endless reports and plans for decrees, the discussion of which was continually adjourned. In order to remedy this, the Government, reverting to Merlin's precedent, proscribed twelve Gazettes. Ten of these belonged to Royalists, who impudently believed themselves on the eve of a counter-revolution; their authors submitted and were silent. Two others, published by the Jacobins, changed their title, and appeared again the next day with their usual virulence. This impunity showed the strength of the party, and they tried it on the 19th of September, in the Council of Five Hundred by a motion, the success of which would have led them far.

On that day General *Jourdan* ascended the tribune. After recapitulating the losses, the misfortunes, and the dangers of the Republic, he affirmed its ruin to be inevitable, if the Patriots should continue to be neglected and oppressed.

" It

" It is," says he, " by stifling the Republican  
 " energy that the nation is rendered indifferent,  
 " I may say even insensible to the dangers which  
 " threaten it. In vain shall you make laws,  
 " they will remain unexecuted; in vain impose  
 " taxes, the public treasury will remain empty;  
 " unless at the same time traitors and knaves  
 " are punished, unless the Royalists are kept  
 " under, and unless the Republicans are strongly  
 " supported and excited to that patriotic enthu-  
 " siasm which leads men to make the greatest  
 " sacrifices.

" What! can the executive Directory persist  
 " in thinking, that, with the assistance of a few  
 " timid sailors, they can save the vessel of the  
 " Revolution? It is only by the help of intrepid  
 " men, men familiarised to perils, that the vessel  
 " can escape danger."

" Representatives of the People! the country  
 " is in danger. To delay any longer proclaim-  
 " ing this melancholy truth would be to reject  
 " the means of saving it. Let this proclamation  
 " be followed by the appointment of a Special  
 " Committee to present you with *measures of*  
 " *public safety.*"

*These measures of public safety, this declaration  
 of the country in danger, brought to mind the  
 horrible scenes which, in 1792, followed a similar  
 appeal to the patriotism of the Anarchists, mad-*  
 men,

men, and murderers. The Government would have been, in fact, dissolved after the Proclamation; and would have been succeeded by the Revolutionary violence, under the direction of this Committee charged to save the State. It was known that, among the measures proposed by the Jacobins, the following stood foremost: the permanence of the Legislative Body, an armed association under the name of *Federation*, and a terrorism, invested with some forms, to be exercised without pity or rule by all the fanatics of the Republic.

As soon as *Fourdan* had stated his conclusions, one of those tumults arose which formerly characterised the debates. Thirty Deputies disputed with threatening gestures who should speak first, and besieged the tribune. Some, hoping to carry the proposition by assault, moved that the urgency of it should be acknowledged, and that it should be immediately decided: others called for the previous question, the rules of the Council, the help of the President, and an adjournment. The clamours of the galleries were mingled with those of the Deputies. An hour passed before any speaker could be heard, and the uproar put a stop to all debate.

On the next day it was continued with less agitation. Some reasonings were mixed with the theatrical exclamations, with the pathos of description

description and declamation, both in opposing and supporting *Fourdan's* motion. Among his opponents *Lucien Buonaparte* expressed the prevailing opinion, by declaring that the only resource of the Republic *consisted in the force to be given to the Executive Power.*

On calling the votes, the resolutions moved by *Fourdan* were rejected by 245 against 171.

This decision did not discourage the Jacobins: their light troops spread themselves about the hall of the Council of Five Hundred, insulted several of the Deputies, and repeated the shouts, menaces, and evolutions which precede a crash. After the sitting of the 19th, Paris was in constant expectation of a commotion. Whether the Directory had foreseen it, or whether they were resolved to terminate a crisis so pernicious, they ordered a great number of troops into the town, and into the department. The majority of the Councils declared in their favour; and they have nothing to dread from the public.

The Republic is reduced to the alternative of investing its Government with all the authority, confidence, and support which its dangers require, or of suffering the Jacobins to triumph, and with them all the desperate resources they have in view: but the present anarchy cannot last long without accelerating their dissolution.

If

If the past had not already shewn us the phenomenon of a State in revolution, torn by wild factions, divided in its Government, agitated by intestine broils, vanquished abroad, and plunged at home into inexpressible confusion, we might now suppose France upon the eve of some great event.

Her position in 1792 and 1793 was nothing to compare with her present situation. Foreign armies, it is true, had obtained great advantages, even that of combating France in her own territory; but, at that time, there existed the treasure of assignats, an enthusiastic emulation in the troops, and the popular fanaticism with which half the nation were still infected. The Republic was divided by two parties only; numerous malcontents under the dominion of terror, and the triumphant Jacobins, who made their enemies tremble; all agreed on establishing a new system, and were masters of the Government. At present they have lost the support of, the general fervour and the reins of authority: the Directory have lost the support of this horrid confederacy, and find themselves under the necessity of crushing it.

Whatever may be the approaching result of the discord the progress of which we have now been tracing, it would be another prodigy to add to the wonders of our age, if the Republic should

should continue to exist without unanimity among those whose interest it is to maintain it. The Directory have endeavoured to enforce this truth by an address to the French, very different in its style and reasoning from the common places, as gross as burlesque, hitherto used by the Government.

### PROCLAMATION.

*The EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY to the FRENCH PEOPLE.*

*Paris, 17th Fructidor, September 5.*

"FRENCHMEN !

" It is in the name of the public safety, in the name of your country's interest, that the Executive Directory now address you. It is for these sacred objects that they endeavour to rally you all round the standard of the Republic.

" In vain factions struggle, in vain guilt conspires, in vain foreign bribes are scattered, in vain our external foes exert every effort to exasperate animosity and to excite insurrection.

" People of France ! the voice of your Magistrates will borrow from you an energy and force that must secure attention, and to circulate the sound of truth to the utmost extremities of the Republic.

" Republicans ! listen to the depositaries of authority. It is on your own behalf they address you ; it is for your own sakes that they are anxious to persuade ; it is your nearest concerns that they wish to bring home to your minds.—Learn from the Directory the nature of the dangers by which your country is threatened. The Directory are thoroughly satisfied that the immense majority of Frenchmen are resolved to ward off from the Republic the calamities by which it is menaced ; that personal interest prescribes this determination

to those in whom it would not have been produced by the love of Liberty, and of their Country ; but this disposition will be unavailing and fruitless if we do not acquiesce in the sacrifices which the law demands, if we do not silence faction, if we do not renounce selfish views, and if we do not join our whole strength in a common effort to dissipate our fears and realize our hopes.

“ Know, that never did any confederacy of tyrants triumph over a great people, unless a part of that people became the accomplices of the tyrants, by neglecting to exert their means of defence—or unless they were enfeebled by their own divisions.

“ Know, that the resentments of your enemies threaten you all—that you will *all* be the victims of their revenge.

“ Know, that the return of Royalty would multiply ten-fold the calamities and the sacrifices of which you complain ; and that the only means of abridging their duration and diminishing their extent, is the resolution to support them with energy, and to submit to them with courage.

“ Know, that you are placed between the ignominy of defeat and the glory of vanquishing.

“ If you are overcome, infamy will not shield you from wretchedness. If you are victorious, happiness and repose will banish the recollection of your sufferings and your disquietudes ; peace and plenty will repair every loss, and be the reward of every sacrifice.

“ Doubtless the Republic contains a considerable number of Citizens who disinterestedly love, who generously venerate Liberty.

“ Doubtless in many souls the pure flame of Patriotism burns ; doubtless there are many breasts in which prevails a lively and profound impression of French Honour and of National Dignity.

“ These men are indignant at the very thought of seeing the territories of our Allies assailed by the presence and desolated by the arms of Despots. They do not weigh whether

Liberty

Liberty requires their exertions in its defence ; they feel that Liberty is necessary to their very being. They love the laws of the Republic : they cherish its principles, and equally hate the maxims of tyrants, the degrading forms of their Courts, the ignominious servitude of their courtiers and their slaves.

" Men of these sentiments are ready to sacrifice every thing to their country. Their fortunes and their lives are devoted to the defence of Freedom, as they have been devoted to its acquisition.

" To these ardent Republicans are to be added a number who have given pledges of their attachment to the Revolution, having signalized themselves only in the ranks of the friends of Equality, having been reckoned among the number of its defenders, know that their names are proscribed by the tyrants.

" How many Citizens, then, are there who forget or dissemble their titles to the hatred, their right to the resentment, to the vengeance of the friends of the Throne, should it ever be restored ?

" Let them renounce an illusion equally fatal to themselves and to the country ; let them know, that among all Frenchmen, a very few excepted, there exists a common responsibility for all the events of the Revolution.

" Those shades of opinion, those disastrous denominations which have consigned to the scaffold, and doomed to the poniard, patriotism and courage, talents and virtue, and which still divide Republican France in the eyes of observing men at home, are not understood or admitted by Foreigners, by the Emigrants, by the followers of Royalty. The coalesced Powers would convert the three-coloured flag into the winding-sheet of all those by whom it has been raised, as well as those by whom it has been followed ; of those who planted it on the walls of the Bastille upon the 14th of July, as well as those who reared it on the Tuilleries on the 10th of August. The Members of the Constituent Assembly, the Legislature of 1791, and the Conventionists of 1792, are

equally responsible, in the eyes of the Coalition, for the overthrow of Despotism and for the subversion of the Throne. The oath of Liberty, taken at the Tennis Court is, in their eyes, a crime as atrocious as any that has been committed since the foundation of the Republic.

" You little know how vigorous are the Royalists under whose dominion the coalesced Powers wish to replace you, in the examination of conduct, in the judgment of opinion !

" How very few among you would be pure and innocent in their eyes ?

" You little know how they have treated even those among the Emigrants who did not profess their religious respect, their profound submission to the absurd dogma of *absolute despotism* !

" You are ignorant, perhaps, that several of these protesting Monarchy-men have been obliged to purchase, by very singular conflicts, the shameful distinction of a place in the ranks of the army of *Condé* !

" You have no conception with what fury the writers in the pay of England and the Council of the Pretender, inspired by a rancour peculiar to Nobility and the Priesthood, proclaim resentment, and cry for vengeance ! If the bloody pages of the History of England, during the reigns of Charles II. and James II. are not sufficient to give you an idea of the fate destined for France by those who labour to re-establish the Throne ? if the scaffolds of Sidney and Russell are not sufficiently eloquent to convince you, profit at least by the example of the manner in which recovered power is exercised at Naples and Milan. Neither infancy nor age have been regarded. See the fate which awaits those who have loved or served Liberty; those who have spoken, as well as those who have fought in its cause. Some have already suffered death, others await it in chains !

" If you are not victorious, Frenchmen, behold what you have to expect ! and do not flatter yourselves that you will escape by the obscurity of your condition, by the little celebrity

bility attached to your services, the little publicity of your opinions, from the active animosity of a royal and sanguinary re-action.

" The first blows, no doubt, will reach the men who are best known; and strike the heads of the most ardent Republicans. But after the first objects of vengeance which Royalty shall choose, there will be more obscure victims assigned to inferior passions, and more slow-paced animosity, whose progressive operations will traverse every rank, reach all conditions, and comprehend every epocha.

" Then will punishment overtake the soldier who refused to fire upon those who called for the States-General; the members of the States of Dauphiné and Bretagne in 1788, as well as those who would not imitate Lambeuf in 1789; him who promised to serve the Nation when the King fled in 1791, as well as him who afterwards swore fidelity to the Republic.

" Then would be punished the subscribers to those numerous addresses of adherence which came from all parts of France to the States-General changed into a National Assembly, and which would be drawn from the archives to form the ground of proscription, as well as those addresses which have approved other proceedings in the course of the Revolution.

" Then would be attacked all those plebeian Generals who organized, armed, and commanded that National Guard, with which, in a moment, the soil of regenerated France was covered.

" Then would be sacrificed those honourable deserters from the privileged cast who ranged themselves in the ranks of Freedom, and did homage to Equality.

" Then would be delivered over to the sacerdotal anathema the priests who in 1790 shook off the yoke of Rome, as well as those who abjured that religion in the year 1793; those who have preserved in the functions and sworn to be faithful to the laws of the Republic, equally with those who have changed

changed their condition and have submitted to the laws of marriage.

" Then would be persecuted all those Magistrates who have been honoured with the people's choice, who, after having sat on the *fleur de lys*, have been judges in the popular tribunals. Their integrity would be no justification in the eyes of their enemies, irritated for want of pretence for their cruelty.

" Then would be hunted out all the Administrators of Departments, of Districts, all Municipal Officers, whether they had distinguished themselves by their zeal and civism, or had only the title without performing the duties; whether they were in favour of the Constitution of 1791, 1793, or 1795, all equally odious and criminal for having borne the colours of liberty.

" Then would be exposed to ecclesiastical censure, as well as to civil degradation, the husband who had been relieved by divorce from an unfortunate connexion from the danger of injuring morals—then the beloved progeny of a well asserted union would be without name, without condition, without parents, driven out of society in the name of God and of the Monarchy.

" Then would private animosities redouble their activity—then would royal agents eagerly receive denunciations, and be the instruments of vengeance. Republicanism would be the crime of every man who had an enemy, who was exposed to envy and jealousy. Calumny would reach even the Royalists themselves, and no citizen would enjoy personal safety.

" Property would no longer be respected. The overthrow of private fortune would be universal; the immediate and necessary consequences of the return of royalty.

" The first effect of its restoration too, would be a demand of the ecclesiastical tythe by the priests, with the bible in their hands, while the nobles would reclaim their seigniorial and feudal rights. The right divine, the feudal right, the throne and the altar would renew their ancient alliance—would again

again bring the first-fruits of the territorial productions of France, the profits of the proprietor, and the sweat of the labourer ; and in order to re-establish that grievous and unequal burden, the soil of the Republic would again present to the eyes of degraded Frenchman the hideous spectacle of prisons and gibbets, chains and the pillory. Frenchmen ! conceive to yourselves the convulsions, the distraction, confusion and havoc, by which such events would be accompanied ! and if you doubt their reality, cast your eyes over the allied Republics.

" The first step of the conquerors has been to despoil the purchasers of national property. A proclamation of the enemy's general has been sufficient to consign to beggary and despair, thousands of citizens who look forward to your victories to restore them to their possessions.

" And can Frenchmen be destined to such calamities ? Could they submit to such ignominy ?

" Ferocious strangers, barbarian hordes then would substitute the insolent mandates of their chiefs to the sovereign will of the nation !

" They would dispose of the lives and fortunes of citizens ; they would, as at the time of the conquest of Gaul, assign property to their soldiers, carry off all moveable wealth, strip our museums of their ancient monuments, and those we have acquired by the blood of our warriors !

" Frenchmen ! These evils will never be realized, your courage will prevent them ; but let the review of them serve to re-animate the patriotism of sluggish souls, to enlighten unthinking minds, to bring back every heart to unanimity of sentiment, to the common desire of vanquishing our enemies, and rendering the Republic triumphant.

" Citizens of every condition, be assured that the Directory, whose Members lived lately among you, have accurately observed your calamities and your wants, and have reflected with sorrow upon the extent of the privations and the

sacrifices

sacrifices which the imminent danger of the crisis has compelled the laws to impose.

" They know what is felt by the farmer, deprived for a season of the hands by which he was assisted in his labours ; by the widow regretting the absence of the son who solaced her misery ; by the soldier who has so often called in vain for arms, subsistence, and clothes ; by the artisan in want of employment ; by the manufacturer whose business languishes ; by the artist whose talents receive no encouragement ; and the proprietor whose estates have fallen in value. Be assured that even the most remote evils, misfortunes, and sufferings, are equally the objects of their solicitude.

" Indulge the hope with the Directory, that the exertions they are called upon by the law to direct, which they demand in the name of the country, which they intreat in the name of your dearest interests, will be the certain pledges of success, of glory, of peace, and of happiness.

" These efforts are expected by the armies to secure victory to our standards. The brigands of the south and west need but to see them, to fly and conceal their infamy and their guilt. The allied republics expect in them the restoration of their liberty ; the Powers at amity to be confirmed in their fidelity : the whole Republic to be delivered from its alarms.

" These efforts (which will be the last, because they will render our triumph certain) national pride will be sufficient to inspire ; but they are imperiously prescribed by the personal interest of all. They are necessary as the barriers to secure the French people against the calamities with which the return of Royalty is fraught.

" Frenchmen ! direct your serious attention to the incontestable facts, to the certain details, to the important reflections which the Directory have submitted to your consideration. If your minds are struck, if your hearts are moved by the dangers of your country ; if you are desirous to put an end to them, execute the laws with punctuality and zeal ; rally

Rally round the Republican standard ; sacrifice your resentments ; abjure your animosities ; banish every irritating recollection ; proclaim war only on the guilty ; attack only the enemies of the Republic ; let integrity, patriotism, and courage, cordially unite and co-operate. Concentrated forces are immense—nothing can resist the omnipotence of yours ; and by their means the Directory will obtain abroad the peace which is the consequence of victory, and at home the tranquillity which is the pledge of justice."

(Signed) SIEYES, President.

*Comments on the above Address.*

We have observed in another place, that Sieyes's talent has had a very sensible influence on the Republican style of office. Very different is the piece we have been now reading from the silly witticisms of a Barrère, the bombastic barbarisms of a *La Reveillère*, and the grotesque insolence and revolutionary logomachy of all the hypocritical and fanatic phraseologists who, for eight years past, have expounded the will and opinions of this scribbling Government.

Here, at least, we find them speaking to men whom they suppose to have common sense. They study their situation, seem to be engaged about their interests, and dexterously alarm them for their future personal safety, if it be not secured by their own and that of the Republic. By applying generally and indiscriminately a Royalist terrorism to all classes, who may have argued, erred, ruled, or acquired any advantages since 1789, they invite them to join in a general

resistance. Hitherto the Government only expressed themselves as the chiefs of a ruling faction, now we have them appearing as the counsellors and guides of all the passions, all the errors, all the prejudices, and all the fears, to which the succession of events for ten years past has given birth.

It belongs to those who are invested with the right and the trust of re-establishing the French Monarchy to give the lie to the assertions of the Directory. It is theirs to prove by their conduct, still more than by insignificant proclamations, that these men are imposing upon the French nation. It is theirs to attest to that nation, that the maxims of a King of France are not those of a choleric, absurd, and vindictive emigrant: it is theirs to demonstrate that Royalism is not a *coterie* into which no man can be admitted who does not produce his sixteen quarters of political rectitude, from which all proselytes are excluded, where repentance itself can find no pardon, and where, notwithstanding the disadvantages of the smallness of their circle, no partizans, no allies will be acknowledged, but the very few who cannot be reproached with having deviated for a minute, during ten years of confusion, from the creed of the society\*. We, to keep within our sphere,

\* It would be difficult, I believe, for the ablest Secretary of France, to compose a more august, or a more persuasive and affecting proclamation to the French people, than the TESTAMENT

sphere, shall confine ourselvēs to a very few observations on this remonstrance of the Directory's.

One would have supposed that, from the desire of appearing consistent, they would not have lost a moment in pardoning all who had been hitherto the objects of the persecutions of the Republic; for not having embraced the Revolution in all its parts. Nothing showed more clearly the impolitic and unjust rigour of the emigrant aristocrats, than the consideration of the French Government towards the victims of that rigour, that is to say, towards those different classes of *incorrect* Royalists, whose destiny the Directory paint as so dreadful, should the Monarchy be re-established.

So far, however, were the Government from troubling themselves about consistency, that they had scarcely stated and sent forth their case, when they renewed the proscriptions against those who had escaped the 18th of Fructidor (Sept. 4.) ; celebrated the anniversary of that proscription, by loading the proscribed Deputies with abuse and calumny ; enforced their atrocious law of hostages beyond measure or consideration ; re-

MENT OF LOUIS XVI. would be, if printed on the standards of the Royal army, and posted up wherever they came, as the pledge of the sentiments and plans of the new Monarch.

fused an asylum in France to M. *de la Fayette*, who was forced out of Holland; and confirmed in most of the offices of Administration the villains who, since 1792, have condemned to death or flight Constitutionalists and Royalists for mere opinion, as well as the most active Aristocrats.

Supposing the sentiments and projects imputed by the Directory to the expatriated clergy and nobility to be real, what a charming consolation do they give to France, by leaving to her inhabitants the alternative of being oppressed and slaughtered under the Monarchy, or of annually changing laws, tyrants, leeches, executioners, and calamities, under the Republic! On whom should the national execration fall, but upon them, who, from error to error, from delusion to delusion, and from crime to crime, have been leading the people for these ten years to so lamentable a state!

I shall make no observation upon the stale sophism of generalising exceptions, of imputing to whole classes of citizens the mistakes of a few, and of judging of *Louis XVIII.* and his Councils from the pamphlets of some frantic simpletons. Neither will I attempt to spoil that rhetorical figure by which the author of the address represents thirty or forty thousand ecclesiastics and gentlemen returning to France, each with a gallows, to hang twenty million of Frenchmen, who  
have

have sworn to be true to the Republic, or to the Constitution of 1791, or to the Instructions of 1789, or to the principles of the *Result* settled by the Council of *Louis XVI.* on the 27th of December 1788.

Did the French Nation, struck with a dread of this kind, give credit to the mournful picture drawn by their conductors, would not experience, reason, and interest dictate to them the following reply?

“ We are of your opinion, that a counter-revolution will not place us upon a bed of roses, but, in the mean time, we are upon burning coals. Your fancied horrors may be realised, &c. your promised Republican de-lights have been the daily romance ever since you overturned the Monarchy. Grant that the emigrants are planning to seize our property, to establish the Inquisition, to strangle us all one after the other, to revive the aids, the gabelle, tithes, and mortmain; but, Citizen Directors, these terrible distributors of Royal justice are in Germany, Poland, and England. Very different are the thoughts that enter a wild head establishing, at the distance of one hundred and fifty leagues, the French Monarchy by the might of tongue in a dining-room or tavern, from the thoughts that would strike the same madman.

" madman should he come into our country of  
 " metamorphoses, where he is scarcely remem-  
 " bered to have existed.

" Although your supposition be vexatious, it  
 " is too extravagant to vex us long: it is only  
 " from you that we hear what we have to dread  
 " for the future, and your authority is too suspi-  
 " cious; the present weighs us down, the past  
 " urges us to break away from the narrow field  
 " in which you have pent us up between your  
 " bugbear of Aristocrats and the bloody Club  
 " with which you bruise us.

" We have patiently submitted to all the trials  
 " to which your ingenious tenderneſs for the  
 " People has doomed us since 1789. Your  
 " pulled down our old house, to lodge us  
 " in palaces of ſulphur which you every year  
 " ſet fire to, in order as you ſay to provide  
 " us more commodious habitations. That  
 " of your Republic, to the delights of which you  
 " exhort us to ſacrifice our harveſts, our ſavings,  
 " our children, and our lives, has been only a  
 " slaughter-house. You have, as it ſuited you,  
 " led us from massacres to massacres, from Con-  
 " ſtitutions to Constitutions, from Conventions  
 " to Legislative Bodies, from Committees to  
 " Directories, from executioners acting the part  
 " of ſovereigns to Senates of Philosophers, who  
 " kept those executioners in couplings to let

" them loose upon us at the first murmur,  
 " Inconsistent innovators ! you have never been  
 " able to govern us a year together by the same  
 " rules : you punish us unmercifully for our in-  
 " stability, while you are yourselves the most  
 " random legislators and inconsiderate sophists.

" It was entirely left to you to build this Re-  
 " public in ruins, from which you made us hope  
 " miracles of felicity. There is nothing we have  
 " not granted you to complete your work ;  
 " time, submission, credulity, assignats, taxes,  
 " guillotine, transportation, despotic power, our  
 " very heads, which you struck off at pleasure,  
 " or left to rot with our bodies in dungeons.  
 " What use do you make of this immensity of  
 " power and of resources ? Have you settled a  
 " single institution ? What basis of government  
 " is there that you have not successively kicked  
 " from before you ? Which of you has not, in  
 " turn, presented himself first to our admiration  
 " and confidence, then to our contempt and  
 " horror ?

" What ! you pretend to govern an Empire  
 " and cannot manage a Club ? We were first  
 " ruined by your theories and inconsistencies,  
 " and we are now the victims of your differ-  
 " tions. We become the prey of your factions  
 " one after the other. There was but one mis-  
 " fortune wanting, that of being slaves to con-  
 " tending

" tending brothers, of being sacrificed to your animosities, and of seeing our masters chosen at the foot of the scaffold to which they are to return after a few months of disputed authority.

" Your wants are endless. When Revolutions are undertaken, Nations should be relieved : but here our burdens become heavier every day. You respect property with the civility of a highwayman, who returns half-a-crown to the traveller he has robbed to carry him to the next inn.

" While you have been promising us peace for six years past, you have been plunging us into war after war. At one time, it is to insure the Constitution you have framed, and which, without laying down your arms, you abolish ; at another, it is to secure your independence, that is to say, your impunity, and the power of violating the liberty of other nations. You proclaimed by a decree that you renounced conquests, and the very next year you were seen making them. Now for the purpose of usurping, then for extending and preserving your usurpations, you have constituted us in a state of permanent war ; and this is the only stable Constitution we have had. It has cost us an entire generation, our colonies, our manufactures, and our commerce ;

" merce ; it has deprived us of all our sources of  
" wealth, of safety, of sleep, and even of the opera.

" You stand convicted at the tribunal of Com-  
" mon Sense and public Notoriety. Wicked  
" or unskilful workmen, your mechanic politics  
" crush without directing us. We desired a  
" popular State; instead of which you have  
" produced an undefinable, monstrous some-  
" thing, for which you have not been able to  
" find even a name. Your République is a juggling;  
" you no more believe in its principles than in  
" its durability; for if you did you would not  
" labour at its destruction from the first moment  
" of its existence. You do not believe it; for  
" your only plan is to increase its enemies, and  
" to render them irreconcileable; you no more  
" believe in it than in the Legend and in the  
" virtues of your Apostles, whom you proclaim  
" villains the moment they give the least dis-  
" turbance to your wild ambition.

" Cease then to mock us with your feigned  
" adoration. You are seeking how to terminate;  
" not how to guide the Republic. We will  
" seek it too; with you if you are prudent, and  
" without you if you are not.

" You have never been able to solve the pro-  
" blem of a society of civilized men, living  
" without a political system. What your abili-  
" ties have afforded us is worse even than no

" society at all. As the Republic is not de-  
 " sensible, we ought not to bury ourselves for  
 " you by a resistance, which, even if successful,  
 " would but leave us in the shameful savage  
 " state in which we groan. There must be an  
 " end, and not transitions ; there must be an end  
 " and not a change of calamities.

" It is, therefore, the judgment of Heaven it-  
 " self that leads us back to the Monarchy, be-  
 " cause neither you its destroyers, nor we the  
 " passive witnesses of its destruction, have been  
 " able to substitute for it aught but an anarchy  
 " of seven years, from the roots of which period-  
 " ically spring all the poisons of tyranny, dis-  
 " cord, and licentiousness.

" But, wiser than you, we will not wait till  
 " force comes to convince us of the necessity of  
 " this new Revolution, and to add to it the  
 " dangers which you paint with the pencil  
 " of terror. The Monarchy is inevitable, and  
 " to oppose its restoration is to increase our  
 " troubles. The inquisition, vengeance, and  
 " executions with which you threaten us, are  
 " inconsistent with the duties of a King *Most*  
*Christian*, and with those of his adherents who  
 " all call themselves true Catholics. Should  
 " they, however, not be animated with the spirit  
 " of the Gospel, with the spirit of *Henry IV.*,  
 " and with the spirit of wisdom which dictates

" to them to be indulgent in order to be loved,  
 " and to consult the interests of the people in  
 " order to be obeyed by them, it is still better  
 " to raise the Crown ourselves than to see it rise  
 " in spite of us out of the dust to which you  
 " have reduced it, irritated by our opposition,  
 " and taking the rights of conquest over a Na-  
 " tion that refused a free and enlightened ad-  
 " herence to Royalty without slavery.

" We invoke a Deliverer; but we know how  
 " to prevent that splenitive despotism with which  
 " you frighten us in order to keep us blind to  
 " your own excesses. Rebellious slaves may fur-  
 " render at discretion; but Frenchmen, de-  
 " ceived and misled, return to prudence and  
 " loyalty by securing their future existence from  
 " the consequences of submission. We will pre-  
 " sent our hearts to the King, not our heads to  
 " the axe. We will embrace the sceptre to  
 " govern not to enslave us. Leave to us the  
 " care of our future safety, and even of yours.  
 " In abdicating our chimerical sovereignty we  
 " shall not abdicate the right of defending our-  
 " selves from the abuses of resentment, or the  
 " excesses of authority."

This is, perhaps, the language which the situation of things would dictate to a people discreet, courageous, and free in their deliberations. The Directory have mistated the case. They should

have said to France—" As a horrible experience  
 " renders the support of the Republic very un-  
 " certain, and has condemned this system among  
 " us; as sooner or later we shall return to the  
 " Monarchy, let us take care that it is restored  
 " without injuring or disgracing us."

The English references, made so much of in this address, are not more fortunate than the Grecian and Roman ones, which hitherto formed one of the ornaments of Revolutionary eloquence.

Never was an example more unfortunately chosen than that of the reign of *Charles II.* and his brother's. To what amount those *bloody pages* so falsely quoted by the Directory?

To the execution of thirteen Regicides and of the Republican *Vane*, who were excepted from the amnesty, not by the King, but by the Parliament, and a Parliament the majority of which was still composed either of Presbyterians or the abettors of the former commotions. All the other judges of *Charles I.*, who were arrested, had their lives granted to them. Some exasperated peers having proposed in the Upper House that an inquiry should be made concerning all who had sat as judges, or had contributed in any manner whatever to the death of the King, it met with general disapprobation. *Charles II.* immediately removed all fears by confirm-

confirming the act of indemnity in its full extent. While the seals were held by *Clarendon*, the King and the Council constantly repressed the desires of vengeance manifested by the Royalists.

All judgments passed during the Republic were confirmed. The Presbyterians, formerly the enemies of their Sovereign, were not only exempt from prosecutions, but the chief of them were admitted into the Council. *Annesley*, *Cooper*, and *Hollis* were made peers; Lord *Say-and-Selby* was appointed Privy Seal, and *Manchester* Lord Chamberlain. Nay, *Charles* even admitted two Presbyterian ministers into his chapel.

This system of prudence was carried so far, that it gave room for a *bon mot*, which has been transmitted to us by historians. “The act of indemnity and oblivion,” it was said, “is an act of indemnity for the King’s enemies, and of oblivion for his friends.”

The execution of *Algernon Sidney*, and that still more odious of Lord *Ruffel*, did not take place till three and twenty years after the Restoration, and for causes totally unconnected with the events which preceded it. *Sidney*, who had been an enthusiastic promoter of the Republic, banished himself after its fall. In 1677 he solicited a pardon which he obtained, and returned to England, where he remained equally

equally unmolested with the other supporters of the Commonwealth. He was accused of being concerned in the Rye-House plot in 1683, and morally convicted ; he was, however, condemned without sufficient legal proofs and in contempt of all form : but this sentence, though disgraceful to his judges and to *Charles II.*, was in no shape the punishment of *Sidney's* conduct under the preceding reign. He abused the pardon he had received, and died a victim to the obstinacy of his Republicanism after having abjured it.

Neither the atrocious and absurd executions which were the consequences of the Popish plot, nor the abominable cruelties that followed *Monmouth's* rebellion, were violations of the act of amnesty passed by *Charles II.*, or the result of prosecutions against the old Republicans.

No doubt the conduct of *Charles II.* and the attempts of his brother, created a wish of seeing new limits fixed to the royal authority. No doubt the imprudence of those monarchs, and the ambitious perverseness of their Councils, made the friends of liberty regret the re-establishment of the Crown ; but why do not the Directory point out to their fellow citizens the issue of those violations of the laws, and of that tendency to arbitrary power ? Why do they pass over in silence those Parliaments continually dissolved by *Charles*, yet invariable in their opposition

tion to him ? those Royalists, even the stanchest, taking part in the discontents, and aiding the efforts of those Parliaments ? those disgusts and contradictions which made the King, towards the close of his life, presage the destiny that awaited his successor ? Why do they not tell the whole truth ; and show, that for attempting to extend the consequences of the counter-revolution, and to abuse the power it had restored to his family, James II., deserted by the whole nation, was constrained to desert the Throne, which was then established, together with public liberty, by a memorable Revolution that should serve as a lesson to all Kings ?

Were *Louis XVIII.*, his Ministers, and his friends, to act according to the madness which the Directory attribute to them, it would be committing suicide. Were they to reign in that manner, we need consult no oracle to ascertain that they would not reign long.

Did *Henry IV.* exterminate the Leaguers ? Did he establish the religion which had afforded him the means of recovering his Crown ? Did he reserve places, favours, and governments, for the Protestants and Royalists, who had shared his adversity, fought his battles, and partaken his glory ?

When the late King of Sweden re-established in 1772 the rights of the monarchical power, did

did he put to death the senators and nobles who had oppressed his father and himself? Had his heart been a stranger to clemency and moderation, reason and necessity would have guided him to them. Where is now the sovereign so blind and so ignorant, as not to be sensible of the danger of treating an empire, which had been torn from him by a revolution of ten years, and restored to him by another revolution, in a manner in which the most settled monarchs dare not treat their subjects in the most tranquil moments of authority?

All these analogies then of the Directory, are for many dissimilitudes. We have no accurate accounts of what is passing at Naples and Milan. We hold in horror all murder and injustice, whether committed by kings or people. We think that it is the factions that proscribe, and that a Government ought to sentence.

The surest means of making the restoration of their authority detested, is to confound in their vengeance the innocent with the guilty and the suspected: but what analogy is there between the severities exercised against traitors who invited and aided a foreign invasion, opened their country to the plunder of its enemies, and to please those foreigners, accumulated every human calamity upon their countrymen;—I say, what analogy can there be between such punishments,

and

and the treatment that may be merited by twenty million of men, most of them hurried away by a thousand different causes, irresistible in the course of a Revolution; which was in its origin desired by the whole nation, and commenced by the head of the State, and the frightful progress of which was neither reckoned for by the shrewdest villain, nor foreseen by the crowd who gave themselves up to it without reflection.

As to the impudence with which the Directory, forgetting the history of the Republic, transcribe the iniquities, spoliations, frenzies and enormities of it, as forming a future view of France under a king ; it shall be answered in the words of a celebrated writer : “ Are you in quest “ of choice barbarities fully proved, of striking “ massacres verified, of streams of blood ? Per-“ secuting monsters ! seek these facts only in “ your own annals.”

If the sermon which has given rise to these remarks has had any effect upon the minds of the French, at least it is not upon those of the Jacobins. Far from giving their influence to the Government, they have employed it to disturb and weaken it. Far from joining the Republicans, more reconciled to the Constitu-

tion, they have persisted in their defamations and projects. Never has discord been more busy than since this pathetic exhortation to concord.

In this chaos, every thing becomes an incident, and a very serious incident. Whether *Bernadotte's* connection with General *Jourdan*, caused his being suspected of the same views, or that from some other reason he displeased his superiors, they removed him from the office of Minister of War, publishing officially that he had desired to resign. On this the Minister took up his pen, and wrote to the Directory in these words: " I have received your order and the obliging letter that accompanies it. You accept the resignation which I have not given in." This scoff being rendered public, a great number of qualified Jacobins suddenly, by consent, gave up the places they held in the Administration of the capital. This manœuvre, whatever be its object, indicates a subsequent project; for these abdicators are not people to give up their offices without plotting to recover them in spite of the Government. So perplexed indeed are the Directory, that they have appointed one of the most execrable Jacobins, *Du Bois de Crancé* to succeed *Bernadotte*.

There is, moreover, neither plan, consistency, energy, nor talents to be discovered in the Councils. The most urgent business remains buried in Committees. We do not find that they have yet been

been able to agree upon a law on the liberty of the press; and the regulation which is to prevent the abuse of clubs or political societies is still to be made, though two months have elapsed since it became requisite. The time is spent in motions of order, that is to say of disorder, in declamation, complaints, and miserable details which show the situation of the Republic.

The legislative body have fixed the army for the current year at five hundred and sixty-two thousand men of all descriptions. As it did not amount in the month of August to more than two hundred and twenty-five thousand, the proposed establishment must be far from being filled. However, notwithstanding the numerous desertions of the conscripts, it is affirmed, that in the three last months, ten out of sixteen recruits have joined the armies: and this proportion appears verified upon unsuspected authorities.

The Government preserve a hope of raising their forces to at least four hundred thousand men, if new disasters do not expose their frontiers before the winter, and if the state of their treasury permit them to raise, equip, pay, and feed that multitude of soldiers.

The situation of the finances combines with dissension to deepen the gulf of the Republic. She is again plunged into the distress in which we saw her some years ago, without daring, indeed without being able, to resort to the system

of robbery, assassination, and paper, by which she supported herself.

The Government now experiences the value of Revolutionary laws in finances. The forced Loan of one hundred millions, to which they have had recourse, has failed through the public inability and the general discontent. The mode of gathering it has shocked even the Republicans. On the estimate of a jury called from the Sections of the towns the Citizens are arbitrarily taxed, and at random. One man was rated at 100,000 livres, which was more than he was worth in the world. It is said that a bankrupt banker, a fortnight after he had given up his books, found himself charged 50,000 livres to the loan rates. The collection of the two first tenths has not amounted to the half of what they were stated to produce. At Paris, where the greatest fortunes are that have outlived the general wreck, very few of the possessors of property have made the declarations required by the law, which must either be altered or given up, or enforced by compulsion.

The obligations subscribed by a mercantile body, composed of bankers who have lent the Government a credit of thirty millions, are the only mediums of payment with which the most sacred debts are discharged. They are made payable by seven instalments: those that have twenty days to run lose 30 per cent. To this is

Is the credit of the *Great Nation* come : yet its Representatives are erecting pyramids, which cost 50,000 livres, to the memory of a General, who, like many others, had been killed.

This forced Loan immediately lowered the receipt of the usual contributions, and almost stopped that of the uncertain taxes, such as the stamp and register duties. The little money received by the Government is sent away to the armies : no other public service is paid.

Representatives, ministers, and the lowest in administration, have received no salary for four months past : to these arrears, amounting to four millions, may be added four millions more due to the troops quartered in Paris and its department. The arrears to the hospitals and other public institutions amount to five millions. This difference of thirteen millions in the daily circulation of an impoverished capital is farther increased by the subtraction of the cash produced by the forced Loan, and the concealing of money through the fear of being suspected of riches.

A crisis like this cannot last long : either the Government will recover from it by some unlooked for expedient, or by violent measures render the agitation and perhaps resistance general.

Such is the circle they are doomed to run, that they cannot provide against one danger without

without creating another. Their measures of finance, and the law respecting hostages, had very nearly set the South of France in flames, and actually enable the Royalists of the West to bring over and stir up the different classes of malcontents to insurrection.

That which appeared in the higher parts of Languedoc was principally supported by Royalists threatened with proscriptions, and country people disgusted at the military conscription and other Revolutionary laws. These poor people had assembled at different points. Some mild measures would have been enough to quiet them; but the Jacobins, who were masters of the Upper Garonne, preferred exterminating them. Nay, the exterminators are even charged with having fomented those commotions, sometimes by metamorphosing their emissaries into the agents of Royalism, and at others by displaying in the country the whole train of terror. The Jacobins by thus alarming the Directory, and rendering themselves necessary to their vengeance, have been able to resume and exercise the most atrocious authority in the province.

Led by one of their brothers, General *Aubageois*, they have destroyed by cannon and musketry three thousand peasants armed with rusty guns, scythes, and sticks. When they had dispersed those that had assembled, they fell upon the

the villages and plundered them, and they are even said to have murdered women big with child for their crosses and ear-rings ; but this is not very likely, as the trinkets of a country woman may be forced from her without proceeding so far.

This however is certain, they have cleared the country and driven the insurgents into the Spanish Pyrenees. They say the Department is quieted ; but mark what kind of quiet : at Toulouse, the capital, a Jacobin has only to lodge a complaint to have a man immediately arrested ; at six o'clock in the evening the streets are deserted ; in the last month upwards of three thousand five hundred persons were confined in the prisons of that town, and of that number one thousand six hundred were country people dying of the plague and shut up together in one church.

These patriotic and philosophic manœuvres were more likely to extend than to extinguish the conflagration. The Directory felt this, and therefore, in spite of the zeal of the Jacobins and of their own, they have given directions to be milder in the execution of the forced Loan and of the law respecting hostages. How long will this moderation last ? And whither tends a Government who are disunited, abhorred by one half of the Nation, and regarded with indifference by

by the other half, despised by all, even by those they employ, and reduced to the alternative of suffering disobedience to go unpunished, or to raise a civil war by chastizing it?

I cannot judge; but only the genius and annals of the French Republic can excuse this dilemma of judgment.

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### S P A I N.

To all the embarrassments of the strange situation in which this Monarchy is placed, a new one has been lately added which will not a little augment the anxiety and disorder reigning at Madrid.

Hitherto the Powers armed for the defence of Europe have felt no resentment at the support given by Spain to the enterprises of the common enemy. Although her immoderate jealousy of the naval successes of England was the principle of her error; although the efforts of the partizans of France to feed that ruling passion prevailed over wiser considerations, allowances were made for the cruel necessity of an unnatural union, much less easy to break off than to form. This servility of the Spanish Monarchy to an alliance

alliance, the consequence of which, in any event, could not fail to be injurious to it, was ascribed less to an evil intention than to the pain and consciousness of its own weakness.

Great indulgence was shown to this Power in the hope of alluring her back to neutrality. England disturbed none of her possessions, and only required of her to have no naval communication with France.

It is impossible to doubt that the Court of Madrid was sensible of these attentions, and of those it received, after the renewal of the war on the Continent, from the States where it still had ambassadors residing. Spain then, by this forced inaction, enjoyed the transient tranquillity granted her by the French Directory, and the indulgence allowed by Europe for her difficult position.

But by a strange caprice, the period, when the accumulated defeats of the French Republic lightened the yoke of its alliance, and might have encouraged Spain to convert her ill-concealed passiveness to a real neutrality, was precisely that at which she chose to give up her fleet to the French, and resign herself to their direction.

Politicians, who predict for a certainty the resolutions of Cabinets according to the ordinary rules of probability, must be a little

puzzled to explain the wise reasons which have induced the Council of the King of Spain to adopt such a resolution. They very soon repented it, and the result of that repentance has been the disgrace of the author of so imprudent a combination.

The honour of it is generally ascribed to the Chevalier *d'Azzara*, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris. This Minister has served his Court as he formerly served the Pope. He is one of those statesmen who, depending upon the immortality of the Revolution and its triumphs, thought it dangerous to resist it, and that he should certainly secure himself by yielding to all its pretensions. Had this fine system prevailed in Europe, Europe would soon have contained only the puppets or slaves of the posterity of *Ravaillac*.

M. *d'Azzara*, having seen an end put to the pontifical authority, obtained an appointment to represent his Master in that Revolutionary metropolis, whose agents and usurpations his prudence had so much befriended.

He was received at Paris as a sure and zealous proselyte. The National Institute celebrated his *philosophic mind*, that is to say, probably, his contempt for the religion of his country, and his respect for those potent truths, the discovery and application of which have reduced the French

French once more to the condition of the Sicambri, and given them the habits of the Moors of the desert. The Directory perceived that the Spanish Minister had still more ambition than philosophy, and they made use of both.

While they made him their instrument at the Court of Madrid, they were themselves the instrument of the Chevalier *d'Azzara*'s views of greatness, who aspired to the ministry of Spain by the patronage of the French Government. Citizen *Talleyrand* set to work with the double view of serving his Republic and his friend.

The intrigue was carried on with perseverance and activity: M. *d'Azzara*, under full sail before the wind, relying on the friendship of the Directory and the subjection of his own Court, hoped very soon to take the place of the young *Urquijo* his enemy, who was some time ago appointed to the office, though without the title, of Minister for Foreign Affairs. The business was carried so far that the physician *Guillemardet*, the French Republic's Ambassador to the cousin of *Louis XVI.*, was employed to extort the destruction of M. *d'Urquijo*, and the appointment of his rival. Thus the murderers of the elder branch of the *Bourbons* played the same part in Spain that was played under the reigns of *Philip V.* and *Louis XIV.* by the French Ambassadors, who were charged to make and unmake Ministers.

The very Jacobins of Paris expressed their contempt for the obsequiousness with which a Spaniard, the Ambassador of a Crowned Head, and honoured with the confidence of his Master, crouched at the feet of the Directory. Never could any apology be made for his choosing such a road to fortune; but M. *d'Azzara* added also the shame of courting without decency or reserve the favour of his patrons. He lavished on them adulation, public praises, a feigned admiration, and a submission to their views, far beyond what he owed to the interests of his country.

While he revived the prejudices of his Court against England by suppositions and calumnies, he did not spare the other Governments of Europe. He was accused of making himself a sentinel and a spy for the Directory in Foreign Courts, procuring them intelligence by his correspondences. He was suspected of having accelerated the misfortunes of the King of Sardinia, by the pretended discovery of an imaginary project.

Thus he made himself the servant of the enemies of all Europe, and conducted himself less as the Ambassador of a Court in alliance with France than as the private Minister of the Directors. His revolutionary ecstasy disgusted men of sense of every party; and at last, losing all sense

sense of shame, he prostituted his character, his King, and his Country, so far as to assist on the 20th of August at the commemoration of the execution of *Louis XVI.*!—This is what the mistaken reason of some madmen from the schools of *Diderot* and *Condorcet* call *philosophy*.

Before he suffered the penalty of his folly, M. *d'Azzara* completed it by determining his Court to sacrifice the Spanish fleet to the Directory. It has been reported and maintained, that, after having extorted by constant intreaties the consent of the Cabinet of Madrid to allow the squadron to sail from Cadiz, he took upon himself the final junction of the two fleets; and banished that of Spain to Brest.

This charge wants probability; but it is not the less certain that the dismissal of M. *d'Azzara* was occasioned by the success of this naval manœuvre, so anxiously and so long desired by the Regents of the French Republic.

M. *d'Azzara*'s devotion to their interests, his own views on the Minister's place, and his indecent intrigues to obtain the appointment by force through the Directory, by means of the empire fear had given them over the Court of Spain, had, no doubt, prepared this event. As soon as the snare into which they had fallen was perceived at Madrid; when it was found that the Spanish navy had become the prey of the French

French to fall into the hands of the English, they dismissed the dangerous agent to whom they owed this measure. M. *d'Arraza* was recalled and sent into Arragon, where he may meditate at leisure on the vicissitudes of fortune and of the Revolution.

He had previously experienced a humiliating and fatal one in the fall of those Directors, the objects of contempt and public resentment, whose servile courtier he had been. Their disgrace inspired the Court of Madrid with sufficient courage to pronounce his, without the fear of exasperating the successors of the *Rewbells* and *Merlins*.

Nor is it improbable that another circumstance, not less serious, may have concurred in opening the eyes of the Court of Madrid. Deaf to the remonstrances of the Emperor of Russia, it has at length roused his resentment, and produced the following Declaration of War :

“ BY THE GRACE OF GOD,

“ WE PAUL, Emperor of all the Russias, &c. &c. &c. to all our faithful subjects :

“ WE and our ALLIES having resolved to overthrow the usurpation under which France at present groans, we have, for that purpose, employed all our strength ; and God hath already blessed our arms, by granting to us a continued series of success and repeated victories.

“ Among the few European Powers who appear to be devoted to that impious Government which is drawing towards

its end, but who are really impelled by the terror it inspires, Spain has, more than any other, shown her fear and servility to France, if not in acting with her, at least by preparations to succour her. After having vainly employed all the means in our power to show that Court the only road which can lead it in concert with us to honour and to glory, and finding that it persisted in its fatal blindness so dangerous to itself, we have thought proper to manifest our displeasure, by sending away its Chargé d'Affaires *d'Onis* residing at our Court.

" Now, that our Chargé d'Affaires our Counsellor *Butzow* has also been sent away from the States of the King of Spain, and allowed but a few hours for his departure, we consider such proceeding as an offence given to our dignity, and we declare war against that Power.

" We order that all Spanish vessels in our ports be seized and confiscated, and that orders be sent to all the Commanders of our forces by sea and land henceforth to treat the subjects of the King of Spain as enemies.

" Given at Petersburg, July 15th, in the third year of our reign, and in the year of our Lord 1799."

### *Military Affairs.*

FROM the Zuyder Zee to the Tiber, Europe is now covered with armies, almost contiguous, embracing one of the most extensive circles ever heard of in the history of wars ancient or modern. Never were weightier interests contended for, or by efforts more proportioned to their importance: there is scarcely a point in this immense line

line to which curiosity may not turn in expectation of events.

While we wait for intelligence respecting the last operations, which is retarded by the delay of the Mails, let us go back to the middle of September, and briefly view the general state of the campaign at that period.

Beginning in the south of Italy, we find in the end of August a Neapolitan army about to enter Rome, where the partizans of the Republic still appeared to domineer, and to make some opposition. In a Proclamation issued by the Neapolitan General M. *de Rodio*, the Romans were invited "to send a deputation composed of the honestest men of the Capital, and who had taken no part in the affairs of the Republic."

But if the honest men had had it in their power to send Envoys to the Neapolitan General, it should seem that they might have opened the gates to him. If, on the contrary, the Republicans and French among them could suspend the submission of Rome, it was not likely that they would suffer a negotiation from which they were excluded.

In the same Proclamation the Romans were enjoined "to receive the triumphal standard borne by the soldiers of the King of the two Sicilies, to fix a cross to the right side of their

" hats; and wear the Neapolitan cockade in the left. The women to wear the cross on their breasts." M. *de Rudio* said nothing of the Pontifical Government; but he promised the old subjects of the Apostolical Chair "that they should enjoy the abundance of the fine kingdom of Naples, and be provided with necessary provisions."

Despair alone, and the certainty of not obtaining any pardon, could have prolonged the resistance of the Revolutionists, who probably made a show of defending themselves in the hope of obtaining a capitulation.

Ancona and Civita-Vecchia were still in their hands.

No essential alteration had taken place in the affairs of Piedmont. The Imperial army extended its line from Asti to Turin. The division under General *Klenau* gained ground on the eastern river, and occupied Spezzia. As to the French, they still kept their last position. There were some grounds to believe that they would retreat from Genoa and the country adjacent, or rather that they meant to concentrate their forces, and enable General *Moreau*'s army to act in concert with that commanded by General *Championnet*.

The latter, which was very weak in the beginning of August, had received considerable aug-

mentations, and amounted to upwards of thirty thousand men in the beginning of September. His diversions in the valley of Upper Piedmont were attended with no advantage of consequence. Neither of the French generals seem to be in a situation, or likely to run the risk of offensive operations.

No official account has confirmed the reduction of Tortona, nor even the conditional capitulation that depended on its not being relieved at the end of some days: but there was no doubt entertained of a speedy surrender.

Magazines were formed in the Duchy of Aost for a division of the Allies destined to act in the Alps of Savoy and Switzerland, and to scale one of the St. Bernards.

The general opinion is, that the commander of the allied army had determined on this project, the success of which would open a communication between the Imperial army in Switzerland and that of Italy, and would compel General *Massena* to divide his forces and weaken his present position in order to cover Geneva and the *Pays de Vaud*, or oblige *Championnet* to succour that country and Savoy himself.

According to reports, which from their authority and their repetition have gained credit, Marshal *Suvorof* himself was to pass the Alps with the army of Russians from Italy, and form a junction

a junction in Switzerland with the army under General *Korsakof*. We will not determine whether this opinion deserves credit or not; but they who represent such a measure as an excursion unattended with difficulties, have probably no very exact idea of the places, nor of the power of resistance which the French have long ago prepared in those passes. While we write they are already buried under new snows which are more dangerous to cross in autumn than in winter. No doubt Marshal *Suvorof* will do all that can be done, but if this enterprise has been delayed, natural obstacles will perhaps compel the postponing of it till the return of spring.

Since the departure of the Archduke *Charles*, the left wing of the combined Imperial army, left in Switzerland, has lost the Canton of Glacis, after some hard-fought battles. General *Hotze*, who has the command of it, has fallen back behind the Linth, established his line on the right bank of that river, and protects the Grisons, the county of Sargans, and the southern extremity of the Lake of Zurich. The efforts of the enemy, till the 15th of September, were confined to attacking and dislodging this left wing, and gaining ground in the east of Switzerland.

As to the grand army, led by the Archduke *Charles*, it extended in divisions from the Brisgau to the Palatinate. The French retired at

his approach: one of their divisions which remained on the right of the Rhine was attacked and beaten on the 27th of September at Neckerau. The Austrians took twenty pieces of cannon, and eighteen hundred prisoners, among whom were two Generals, and entered Mannheim without resistance.

The question is, will his Royal Highness immediately cross the Rhine, or will he only defend it and support the allied army, which forms in Switzerland a central and intermediate army? We discover the object, if not the plan, of the campaign undertaken by the Archduke, in his circular letter of the 19th of August, as *Commander in Chief of the Army of the Emperor and of the Empire*, to the Princes of the Circles, relative to their contingents. His Royal Highness expresses himself very clearly in this letter, in which he informs the Empire of his designs, and of which the following are the most striking passages:

" A great work yet remains to be completed by the Empire; that is, to consolidate the advantages obtained, to drive the enemy out of every part of Germany, and to secure its limits. Fortified towns of the Empire on the frontiers are still in the power of the enemy: there are still under their destructive yoke countries which form a great part of the strength of Germany and which languish for the moment of their re-union with their old country. The negotiations of Rastadt showed how much France wished, and how ardently

she

*she strove, to secure means of falling upon Germany, whenever it should be thought proper, and without having any thing to fear.*

" The present period, when so much has been already done for the security of *Germany*, is a propitious moment in which the political body may restore its antient limits, and recover its former dignity, its liberty and its independence ; in which the countries of the German Empire may be delivered from the most shocking oppression ; in which Princes and private individuals may be re-established in their rights, possessions, and property ; and in which, in fine, we may procure, in the sense of the resolutions of the Diet, *a safe, honourable, and lasting peace*. In order to attain this great object, conformable to the decisions of the Empire, it is absolutely necessary that the States of *Germany*, who have been equally menaced, should no longer suffer themselves to be insulted and bullied ; but on the contrary it behoves them to assemble all their forces in a state to act, and to march without delay and in concert against the common enemy, and towards the point where a danger equally great menaces all the integral parts of this confederacy, so strong, so powerful together, which the valour of our ancestors has shewn, and which is invincible when its forces remain united.

" If each State of the Empire scrupulously fulfils the engagements imposed upon it by the nature of the constitutional league, by raising the contingent to the quintuple, it is not to be doubted that the enemy may be very soon forced to accept conditions fully conformable to the basis of peace irrevocably decreed in the decisions of the Diet of September 22d, 1794, and of February 10th, June 3d, and November 19th, 1795. It may also be considered as certain, that the enemy will then not only be forced back to their ancient limits, but likewise compelled to renounce, for the future, all projects and enterprises against the liberty, safety, and independence of the *Germanic Body*."

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Since the action of the 19th of September, between the allied army in West Friesland, under the command of his Royal Highness the Duke of York, and the French joined by a Dutch division of troops, a fresh attack on the intrenched lines of the enemy was daily expected, with an impatience which was increased by the advanced period of the season, and the great rains which have fallen.

The French had detached several divisions of troops from Brabant, the country of Liege, and Flanders, for the defence of Holland. A painful suspense cast a gloom over the satisfaction which the disembarkation and its happy consequences had created.

As soon as the weather permitted, his Royal Highness renewed the attack on the French lines, and on the 2d of this month forced them, after a battle which lasted twelve hours, and of which he has given a summary account in a dispatch to Government, dated the 4th, from the *Zuyper Sluys*.

The attack was begun on the 2d, at six o'clock in the morning upon the enemy's whole line, and continued till night. Their obstinate resistance at length yielded to the valour of the British and Russian troops; they abandoned their strong position, and retired, but to no great distance, having halted at Beverwick, and Wyck-op-Zee, between Alcmaer and Haerlem.

The point most strongly disputed was that which, from the sea-coast before Egmont, extends along the sand-hills to the heights that command Bergen. It was carried by the English columns commanded by General Sir *Ralph Abercrombie* and Lieutenant General *Dundas*. The villages of Egmont and Bergen were taken possession of. Alcmaer opened its gates, and several Dutch regiments came over to the Prince of Orange's standard.

The Duke of York states the forces of the enemy to amount to from twenty-five to thirty thousand men: the Dutch formed the smallest part of this army—their commander, General *Daëndals*, was wounded.

The loss has been very considerable on both sides: but not being ascertained his Royal Highness was obliged to postpone the particulars of it till another dispatch. No officer of high rank has been killed. Among the wounded are the Russian Major-General *Emme*, and Major-General *Moore*, whose distinguished intrepidity, talents, and ardour, had been admired in the preceding actions, as they had been the year before in Ireland.



THE  
**BRITISH MERCURY.**

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N° XXVII.

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*October 30th, 1799.*

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**G E R M A N Y.**

*Of the Political Situation of this Country.*

RARE and difficult as it is to maintain harmony and uniformity of opinion in a Republic of Commoners, it is still more rare and difficult in a Republic of Kings, Princes, and Sovereign Prelates. It has never yet been known that any war, any public danger was able truly and for any length of time to unite under the same command that confused league called the German Empire.

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It is true that something like an exception to this remark might be adduced from the year 1792, when the transient union of the two principal Powers engaged the whole of Germany in their cause; but, not to mention the impediments occasioned by several of the Princes in the levy of the contingents, we need only observe, that this fleeting concord and its consequences became almost immediately the principle of a political schism which still exists, and the continuance of which not all the Diets in the world could prevent.

The same cause which disunites and dissolves general leagues when they are not supported by a *Gustavus Adolphus* or a *William III.*, renders precarious and insufficient this alliance of two hundred Sovereigns, whom no common interest can fix, who are bound by no duty solemnly acknowledged and observed, and over whom there is no coercive power.

We have no reason then to be astonished at having seen the German States robbed by the French in 1790, invaded and plundered by their armies in the following years, infested by their Missions and their Emissaries of rebellion, losing the territories and fortified places which they possessed beyond the Rhine, reduced to argue for fifteen months in a Congress against concessions which they always concluded with granting,

ing, entering into truces of the breaches of which they did not dare to complain, and exposed to periodical invasions, or to submissions as dangerous as resistance; nor need we wonder now to see this assemblage of discordant sovereignities still regarding the present war with the same eye with which they formerly beheld the quarrel of *Charles V.* and *Francis I.*

The Diet of Ratisbon, however, after several months of laborious deliberation, at length decided, on the 18th of September, by a majority of votes, that “the Empire is thoroughly “convinced that it is again at war with France; “that in consequence its former decisions impose on each State the strict obligation of “uniting most zealously for the defence of “the country; and that it is incumbent “on every Member of the Empire to raise his “contingent to the quintuple, in order to put a “stop to the enterprises of the enemy, and to “obtain a just, honourable, and lasting Peace. “In order to attain this great end, the Empire “grants 100 *Roman months\** for the expences “of the war,” &c.

To

\* It is probably superfluous to inform the readers of this work, that the Roman month is a rate either in men or money, and that the term is derived from the ancient custom of furnishing a certain number of men, or of paying a sum

To the sanction of this decree there wants only an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men to see it executed.

It will not be obeyed in the north of Germany. The Elector of Brandenburg, that of Saxe, and several Princes of his House, those of Hesse, Hanover, and most of the other States already chained by neutrality, persist in it. The engagements which the Diet endeavours to lay upon them have no force equal to that which keeps them from sharing in the war.

Austria, who sways the majority of the Diet, has fixed the southern circles in her interest, or rather influenced them by her arms and her successes. The Elector Palatine has given up his distrusts, his fears, his arrangements with France, and all the political plans he appeared to have formed. Yielding to circumstances, he has submitted a part of his troops to the disposal of two Powers whom he was under the necessity of obeying because he could not resist them. The Duke of Württemberg, against the wishes of the States of the country, has pursued the same line of conduct; and it became indispensable

*monthly* to furnish them, in order to attend the Emperors when they made a journey to *Rome* to receive the Papal coronation. It is said that a Roman month should be equal to 58,280 florins.

for

for the Sovereign Prelates, who, having escaped secularization and *Secret Treaties*, have found it necessary to join the protecting Power which promised to secure them from the French Republic with its system of indemnities, and from the temptations of the secular Princes. The three Ecclesiastical Electors, one of whom has lost the whole of his States, and the other two the greater part of their territories, have been the most active in seconding the views of the Emperor, and the levy of the contingents which they can no longer furnish themselves.

We see then from this account, that one half of the Empire will remain spectators of events; and this half comprehends Powers who have the command of two hundred and sixty thousand of the best troops. In the other half, the contingents of Bavaria and the Palatinate, those of Wirtemberg, of the Bishops of Wurtzburg, Bamberg, Munster, and of some Principalities of less importance, will be armed. This auxiliary army will probably not be assembled before spring, if the arming be not altogether frustrated by new invasions, or the retreat of the Austrian army to the Danube.

We know from experience that the existence of this succour depends entirely on the prosperity of the Imperial armies. All the countries, which they can neither defend nor restrain, will

will escape their federal obligations. The laws of necessity and fear will always be superior to those of Ratisbon and the Aulic Council.

The vicissitudes anterior to the war, the impression which has been left by the notion, and even by the knowledge of clandestine conventions signed or planned, secret jealousies, the distress into which several States have been thrown by past events, the old maxims that inculcated in the Empire that the support of France was a necessary resource against the House of Austria, the obscurity in which the Imperial politics have been wrapped since 1797, and lastly, the fluctuations of confidence in the future, now unite with the many other fundamental causes to prevent the present crisis from being considered by the Germans as a national war.

As such serious disasters, so many oppressions, humiliations, and fruitless negotiations have not been able to change the bent of the Empire, would it be moved by remonstrance or reasoning? Is any man so weak as to hope that warmth, harmony, and energy can be given to the scattered members of a nerveless body, and that too when the patient is as much afraid of his physician as of his distemper?

If the Austrian army triumph, it will serve as a coercive army to settle the intentions and the succours

succours of the South of Germany : if it be defeated, or if its fortune only appear to waver, we shall see most of the Governments seeking safety in new treaties with the French Republic.

The world is still but imperfectly acquainted with the nature of the concealed stipulations which have been forced from several Princes of the Empire, by adversity or ambition. The influence of these strange conventions was seen at the Congress of Rastadt : they secured for the French Republic a party interested to obtain by a general peace a confirmation of the concessions made to them by separate acts. At the time that the Diet were deliberating whether they should or should not declare themselves at war, and when the Sovereigns who were bound to France by these clandestine transactions were, on the success of the Allies, dispatching Envoys to Vienna to apologise for their former conduct, two of those secret treaties were made public.

This publication seems to be a new source of discord opened in Germany by the Directory. As the authenticity of these disclosures has not been called in question, we will here insert that which presents the greatest latitude.

*Secret Articles of a Treaty of Peace with the  
Margrave of Baden.*

THE underwritten Plenipotentiaries, in addition to the treaty of peace by them agreed to and signed this day, have agreed to the following Articles, which are to remain secret as long as the interest of the contracting Powers demands it :

ART. I. When the treaty of peace with the Emperor and Empire takes place, the French Republic shall use their good offices in favour of his Serene Highness the Margrave of *Baden*, that the following ecclesiastical possessions, with their rights and appurtenances should be secularised and ceded to him.

1st, The Bishopric of Constance and the Abbey of Riechemau, with the Priory of Ochringen, together with the lands and revenues of the Grand Chapter and the Chapter Priory, a distinction made in the lordships and jurisdictions of the Bishop and of the Grand Chapter, situated in the territories of the Swiss and their allies, and which shall be reserved at the disposal of the French Republic.

2dly, The Bailiwick of Scklingen formerly belonging to the Bishopric of Basle.

3dly, That part of the Bishopric of Spire, situated on the right bank of the Rhine, including the lands of the Grand Chapter, the Priory, and the Chapter Revenue of Odenheim; in which case his Serene Highness shall hold himself bound to demolish and raze the fortifications of Philippsbourg, and never to suffer them to be rebuilt, unless he chooses rather to have them occupied by the troops of the Republic, who alone should have the power of repairing the bridge upon the Rhine for the service of that place.

4thly, The Bailiwick of Ettenheim, formerly dependant on the Bishopric of Strasbourg.

5thly,

5thly, The town of Selingenstadt, and the small portions of territory dependent on the Archbispopric of Mentz, situated between the left bank of the rivers of . . . . and Maine, as far as Ruffenheim, and on the right bank of the Rhine from Elberfeldon as far as Germesheim, in exchange for part of the county of Haman Lichtenberg, situated along the right bank of the Rhine, the Lordships of Lahn and of Geroldack.

6thly, The secularization and union with the Margrave's domains, of all the estates, revenues and rights, possessed in the Margraviate, or in the Ecclesiastic States which are to be united with it, by the ecclesiastic communities, of which the chief place is situated on the right bank of the Rhine.

7thly, On his part his Serene Highness binds himself to make known, and to transfer, to the French Republic to dispose of, as they shall think proper, all such estates, revenues, and rights, situated in the territories which appertain or shall appertain to the Margraviate, as were in the possession of the communities, of which the chief part was on the left bank of the Rhine, except, nevertheless, the estates and rights which the Bishoprics and Grand Chapters of Basle, Strasbourg, and Spire, possess within the territory of the Margraviate.

**ART. II.** The French Republic will also use their good offices in favour of the Margrave of *Baden* to procure him,

1st, The unlimited privilege of *non appellando*;

2dly, The abolition in his States of the post of *Taxis*;

3dly, The exemptions from all feudal duties and dependence on the Bishops of Basle and Spire, as well as from their temporal authority;

4thly, The rights attached to the Bishopric of Constance, relative to the convocation of the States, and all management of the affairs of the Circle.

**A R T . III.** The articles of the present treaty, relative to the Rhine, its navigation, its banks, and the islands in it, shall be executed for all the districts situated on the borders of that river, which, in the end, shall belong to his Serene Highness, his successors and assigns.

**A R T . IV.** His Serene Highness cedes to the French Republic all the rights that he may have to the towns, fortifications, and territory of Kehl. He also cedes to them, on the right bank of the Rhine, at the old bridge of Huningen, a territory of fifty acres, the acre to measure one hundred rod, the rod twenty-two feet, &c. The ground shall be taken from the spot that shall be judged the most convenient, and bounded according to lines to be drawn by a commissioner appointed by the Executive Directory, in the presence of one chosen by his Serene Highness; there shall, moreover, be granted a road to pass into the said territory, if it shall be judged necessary.

**A R T . V.** His Serene Highness renounces for himself, his successors, and assigns, all contingent rights which may hereafter appertain to him, to the territories situated on the left bank of the Rhine, the islands and courses of that river, which may be ceded to the French Republic, on which he may have any claim of succession or reversion.

**A R T . VI.** The Margrave engages, as far as it may be necessary, to guarantee the French Republic against all suits and demands, on the territories, rights, and revenues, ceded by him, that may be brought against them by the auditors of his Serene Highness. He also engages to guarantee the rights of the same objects against the Princes of Germany with whom he may have any agreement of succession or reversion.

**A R T . VII.** The Margrave of Baden binds himself particularly to pay all his personal debts, of what descriptions soever

soever they may be, to the inhabitants of the countries ceded by him, and to reimburse in the space of five years the monies he may have taken up upon loan, and for which he has granted annuities to public bodies or individuals in the said countries.

**ART. VIII.** The Margrave binds himself, as a Member of the Germanic Empire, to agree by his suffrage in the Diet, when the treaty of peace to be concluded between the French Republic and the Emperor and Empire shall be opened, to the following particular's :

1st, That all the territories dependent on the Empire on the left bank of the Rhine, with the islands and courses of that river, shall be united to the French Republic.

2dly, That the different Ecclesiastic Estates of Italy shall be discharged from all feudal connexion with the Empire.

3dly, That a sufficient number of Ecclesiastical Principalities, on the right bank of the river, shall be secularised to indemnify the temporal princes for the possessions lost on the left bank of the Rhine.

**ART. IX.** The Margrave desiring to live in perpetual good understanding with the French Republic, engages to observe in all future wars that may break out between them and any other Power whatever, the most exact neutrality, and not to furnish against them any contingent or succours, under any title or pretext whatever.

**ART. X.** In all wars that may hereafter be made against the French Republic in Germany, their troops may pass into, and remain in the States of his Serene Highness the Margrave, and there occupy all the military positions necessary for their operations, observing the most exact discipline, and conducting themselves in all respects as in a neutral and friendly country.

**ART. XI.** All persons that shall have been arrested in the States of his Serene Highness, or prosecuted for their political opinions, shall without delay be set at liberty, and all prosecutions against them cease ; their goods, if seized or confiscated, shall be again delivered to them, or the price of them paid, in case they have been sold ; and it shall be lawful for them to dispose of the same, and either to return and remain in the States of his Serene Highness, or to quit them.

**ART. XII.** All sentences passed against any of the inhabitants of the Margraviate, for having sold horses, oxen, and other effects, to the French army, shall be regarded as null and void ; and the fines paid by virtue of those sentences, and remitted to the treasury of his Serene Highness, shall be returned.

**ART. XIII.** It is expressly agreed that all civil disputes, which French citizens in the States of the Margraviate may have among themselves, shall be tried by the diplomatic Agent of the French Republic.

**ART. XIV.** His Serene Highness the Margrave engages, that he will not in future take any title of the Principalities, given up by him to the French Republic, by the treaty of this day.

**ART. XV.** The conditions of the armistice, concluded on the 17th of Fructidor last, shall be fully executed, in all that is not contrary to the arrangements of the present treaty.

**ART. XVI.** The whole of contributions therein stipulated shall be entirely paid, except the exchanges which may be mutually agreed upon, and the deductions on the said contributions for articles duly proved, which have been furnished for the armies of the Republic, on account of his Serene Highness, since the signing of the said armistice ; there shall also be paid a contribution of 20,000 livres a month, beginning

ning from the first of Vendemiaire next, to be continued till the signing of the preliminary articles of peace with Austria.

**ART. XVII.** The Margrave binds himself to furnish as a farther indemnity to the French Republic in the space of three years, at stated periods of the year, eight thousand feet of timber, proper for the construction of ships, to be chosen and marked by the agents of the French Republic, and carried at the expence of his Serene Highness to the borders of the Rhine, by the canals or navigable rivers running into it, the most contiguous to the wood felled, and the most convenient for carriage. All officers, civil and military, have received orders necessary, for giving every assistance to the said agents of the French Republic, and for procuring them all possible conveniences for the execution of their commission.

**ART. XVIII.** His Serene Highness binds himself to preserve or restore to the inhabitants of the different parts of the States, as well as of those territories which may be ceded to him at a general peace, the rights and privileges which they do, or did enjoy, and especially those that concern the interior administration of the country. He binds himself also to abolish all personal bondage and mortmain existing in the ecclesiastic possessions, which may be secularized in his favour, and to regulate the rights and services with equity and mildness.

Paris, the 5th Fructidor, 4th year.

(August 22d, 1796.)

(Signed) DELACROIX; — Sigismund Charles, B., &c  
REIZENSTEIN.

The Executive Directory agree to and sign the present secret treaty, in addition to the open treaty with the Margrave of Baden, agreed and signed this day.

Paris, 8th of Fructidor, 4th year.

The secret treaty concluded with the Duke of Wirtemberg, dated the 20th of Thermidor, anno 4., (August 7th, 1796) is signed *Charles Delacroix* for the French Republic, *Charles Baron de Wollwartz* and *Abel* for his Serene Highness. By this treaty, the Bailiwick of Oberkirchen, appertaining to the Bishopric of Strasburg, on the right of the Rhine, the Abbey of Zwifalter, and the Principality and Provostship of Elwanguen, which was under the Elector of Treves, were adjudged to the Duke, who ceded all his possessions on the left bank to France, and bound himself to political compliances, similar to those imposed upon the Margrave of Baden.

The want of power, compulsion, and unavoidable danger, may oblige weak States to submit to hard conditions, as the price of the existence which the conqueror suffers them to retain; but to accept indemnities at the expence of their neighbours, of their confederates, and of the Empire to which they belong; and on such a bargain to raise views of aggrandizement, and hopes of safety, is surely a strange mode of adopting neutrality.

Several of these secret articles are derogatory to the rights, and dangerous to the existence of the Germanic Body. In other times the Princes who subscribed them would have been put under the ban of the Empire. On the contrary, we

we have seen this system about to take a larger sweep ; even Austria publicly accused of it by the Directory, without a single word advanced in contradiction ; and suspicions but too reasonable pervading the different Courts of Germany.

The Imperial sword has cut off these shameful treaties, but it has not re-established among the Members of the Empire the confidence lost : and this is proved by the perseverance of the greater number in neutrality. Let but the position of the others once more change in the Circles near the Rhine, and we shall soon see, from the same causes, defections multiplying.

Of the daily wonders we see in modern politics, few are so lamentable as this sight of a league of Sovereigns persisting in the notion that they are at peace with a Power, who has employed by turns, and without intermission, the force of arms, and perfidious arts in negociation, to disorganize them, to set them at variance, and to destroy them ; who has deprived them of the barrier of a river that protected them ; who has taken by force or by stealth the fortresses on either side of that river ; who confiscates and incorporates with her dominions those great German provinces, without any formal act to ground the usurpation ; who considers herself, in short, so much at war with the Empire, that she sends her

armies

armies into its territory at will, without pretence and without request; besieges and bombards its forts, oppresses it with contributions, treats its inhabitants as rebels, and has not relinquished one of the pretensions with which she has harassed their Sovereigns, both as a body and separately, ever since they have been seeking her friendship.

The *Empire*, the Army of the *Empire*, the Laws of the *Empire*, the Diet of the *Empire*, are then mere sonorous words *et præterea nihil*; for the peculiar and independent Cabinet of each of its Members are at liberty to refuse all support to the *Empire*, and to sacrifice the general interest to its own.

The want of good understanding between the two great Powers of Germany, and the deficiency of a disinterested system, purely founded on liberal considerations and the general danger, have made this feudal anarchy worse. Each embraces a local standard. From the moment it was seen that the Courts of Vienna and Berlin could not draw together and to the same point, they privileged every State of the Empire to follow their example.

Men have long flattered themselves that the King of Prussia would change his politics; for they reasoned thus: here is a Prince cotemporary with the Revolution of France, at an age when

When the love of glory, or even the mere desire of great consideration, usually triumphs over the cold calculations of policy, instructed by experience, certain of powerful Allies, brought up in camps, tempted by favorable junctures, having before him, on the one hand, the noblest field to act in, the fate of the world to fix, an epocha with which his name would have been forever gloriously united, and on the other the obscure part of a timid king, whose two hundred thousand soldiers could scarcely insure him the petty distinction of an arbitrator or mediator; reduced, in a stagnate prudence, to be a spectator of one of the greatest contests that ever agitated the earth, and to see, in the issue of this contest, either the triumph of the Powers, whom his separation had dissatisfied or incensed, or the triumph of a dogmatic and revolutionary Republic, at whose feet his crown must crumble into dust as soon as she has overthrown, disunited, or weakened, the very Monarchies which he refused to succour.

All the worn-out arguments, tiresome because useless, against neutralities, against the spirit, principles, and invariable object of the French Government; all common-places, all representations on the necessity of a general union of Kings to annihilate a regicide Republic, prophetic views, lessons of experience, and the most

persuasive incitements have been again and again handled and unfolded to Prussia, who was quite as well acquainted with the subject, and perhaps more than her preceptors.

Two Powers of the first order offered her their alliance. The first connexions might have led to more permanent and more general ties, and to guaranties which, while they made Prussia easy as to the ascendancy that a successful war might secure to Austria, would have left no hope to the latter of making an ill use of her successes.

Other observers, quitting rejected truths, were astonished that the Court of Berlin, holding the balance of events, should choose to be the puppet, and perhaps the victim of them. Its indifference about a war, the issue of which tended to throw Europe, and particularly Germany, beneath the yoke of the French Republic, or to invest the enemies of that Republic with the glory, influence, and authority of a deliverer, appeared to them equally inconsistent with honour, policy, and reason.

Against these reflections the partisans of neutrality advanced the sacredness of the Treaty of Peace which binds Prussia to France. "Why," said they, "should a conscientious King, who, "at the beginning of his reign, ought to establish a reliance upon his faith, set an example, "without

" without provocation, of breaking so recent an engagement? Why should a Sovereign, who needs and who seeks popularity, expose his people to the risks of a war which is by no means indispensable? Why should he expose himself to the public reproach and discontent that would be the consequence of a defeat?"

If we replied that the pacific conduct of the French Government towards Prussia was nothing more than the temporary suggestions of prudence; that their perfidiousness was written in the archives of the Empire, of Italy, Switzerland, the Porte, and Portugal, as well as in their own code and annals; that by taking care not to combine the Powers generally against them, and to have to combat with them all at once, it was their plan to caress some, in order to lay their clutches upon others with impunity, and to devour all in time:

If we added that the question was not now about Prussia, England, or Austria, individually, but about the preservation of public civilised order, of the immemorial titles of property, of the general compact which binds all States and all Nations to maintain inviolate that social charter which was sanctioned by common consent, and without which all public confidence, all arguments, all institutions, all peace, all security would be banished from the earth:

If, lastly, we observed that the right of war and peace belongs to the King of Prussia, and not to the primary Assemblies of Brandenburg and Silesia; that war could never be more popular and more necessary than at a juncture when the repose, industry, ease, laws, religion, and even the reason of every nation, are in danger from the invasion of an enemy who spared no State; and that if a people were so deceived as to be blind to the justice and urgency of such a war, the very mistake would render it incumbent upon the Sovereign to begin it without delay:—these arguments indeed weakened the *ostensible* motives for neutrality, but without affecting the more intrinsic objections kept back, and less easily understood or refuted.

By those undivulged reasons, we do not mean the pretended Court-intrigues, nor the opinions freely attributed to some Ministers, nor the imaginary influence of the genius of Sieyes, nor many other similar fancies, to which the stubborn perseverance of Prussia in preserving peace has been ascribed.

Her resolution has appeared, in the eyes of decided politicians, to result entirely from an essential difference of opinion upon the effects of the war, and upon the nature of the motives of its being carried on against France.

These

These defenders of Prussia have argued thus :  
 " Experience has woefully demonstrated the insufficiency and defect of extensive confederacies. They stand in need of a supreme leader possessing at once, power, pre-eminence, and talents; without this, every association among equal and independent Powers perpetually tends to jealousy, discord, and misfortune.  
 " The more you multiply the associates, the more you weaken their force and the principle of harmony. There will always be more union and vigour in two congenial Powers than in six, especially against a single enemy.

" The constant and insurmountable inconvenience of great leagues would certainly be diminished, if beforehand, with a firm and unanimous intention, with an interest at once simple and powerful, and with an obligatory agreement of subordination, the Allies should form an exact and invariable plan; if the nature of their object were so evident and uniform as to serve them for a sure and rallying point; and if, in fine, they agreed upon the use of their means, upon the duration of their efforts, and never to act separately either in the field or the cabinet.

" But is there any thing yet like this in the new Coalition? If the necessity of defending herself has united the arms of Austria with those

" those of the Russians and English, has she  
 " united with their politics? Where is the con-  
 " geniality which determines their engagements,  
 " the object of their efforts, the bounds of the  
 " war, and the conditions that are to render  
 " their alliance indissoluble?

" What security is there, that while one of  
 " these Powers aims at the confirmation of the  
 " order, tranquillity, and independence of Eu-  
 " rope, another shall not expose its confederates  
 " to the hazards of a war that is to last till the  
 " overthrow of the French Republic, or the  
 " total ruin of Europe; and that a third, less  
 " generous, shall not make peace with that  
 " Republic on an offer of terms adequate to its  
 " victories?

" If a complete good understanding be want-  
 " ing in the plans, the operations will also want  
 " harmony, and the most extensive resources  
 " will produce only disasters. How would our  
 " concurrence prevent the consequences of such  
 " a confusion of views? It would but aggravate  
 " them.

" Doubtless, no war ought to be more truly  
 " *social*: of this we are as much convinced as  
 " the dogmatic ranters, who are daily repeating  
 " it to us as if it were a vast discovery: but  
 " begin by inculcating it to all Governments, or  
 " do not expect that we shall readily participate  
 " in

" in this *social war* before we see the contract  
 " which declares it such, with the signature of  
 " all the parties interested.

" Who shall answer to us for the continuance  
 " of this alliance? Who shall insure us that  
 " triumphs or defeats will not create a disunion,  
 " of which the pages of history are replete with  
 " examples, and that we should not be, in our  
 " turn, deserted on the field of battle at the  
 " moment when the Allies should find it con-  
 " venient to lay down their arms? It is not  
 " enough to agree upon a general war, it is ne-  
 " cessary also to agree about a general peace;  
 " and how is that to be done if the object of  
 " that peace be not determined? Shall we draw  
 " the armies of the Revolution upon our States  
 " to facilitate conquests in Italy for the Em-  
 " peror, and his accommodation with the French  
 " Republic? We have considerable apprehe-  
 " sions of this Republic, but quite as many of  
 " some of her enemies, who, with sufficient  
 " power to conquer her, might not perhaps  
 " have sufficient moderation to refrain from  
 " making an ill use of an ascendancy against  
 " which we should have no guaranty.

" There may, besides, be found a medium  
 " between the triumphs of the Monarchical  
 " Powers and those of the Democracy of France.  
 " It is very possible that events may be equally  
 " balanced;

" balanced; that by force of mutual victories  
 " and ineffective defeats, each party may be  
 " obliged to put an end to the war in conse-  
 " quence of being exhausted. In this case our  
 " mediation might perhaps prove more useful  
 " than our troops would have been. The  
 " French Directory would then have some-  
 " thing else to do than to quarrel with us, and  
 " we should by neutrality have saved a hundred  
 " thousand men, and a hundred million of trea-  
 " sure, without exposing ourselves to the enmity  
 " of the Revolution."

This is nearly the sense of the different arguments by which political reasoners have endeavoured to explain, to justify, or to combat the determinations of the Cabinet of Berlin.

It was thought, for a moment, to have been staggered, but this was probably only a variance of opinion among its members. It appears that the King's opinion remained inflexible; although that of several of the Ministers, of the Generals of the army, and of a great part of the Public differed from it.

As the brilliancy of the campaign, the temptation of opportunities, the solicitations of the Courts of London and Petersburg, and the difficulties into which the French Government have been thrown in the course of last summer, have been able to effect no change in Prussia, are

there any new motives to be found by which she may be torn from her neutrality? Those that have chained her to it have, on the contrary, gained new force, whether it be owing to the late events, or to the deplorable causes which now render the fate of the present war fully as uncertain as was that of the preceding one.

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### F R A N C E.

IN the convulsive state in which the French Republic has been ever since its commencement, and in which it has involved a great part of Europe; it is surely rash, to say no more, to advance positive judgments and predictions upon its destiny. There would be less danger in losing three battles, than in conducting plans according to the weak confidence placed by a multitude of dotards and enthusiasts in the romantic descriptions which other enthusiasts or dreamers dispatch from Paris and the Departments of France. In vain have these romances, repeatedly told since 1792, been confuted by experience; they multiply at the least glimmer of prosperity.

As far as local obstacles will permit, we will, as we did in 1793 \*, in spite of the clamours, the libels, and the conceited ignorance of party spirit, warn the Public against the specious appearances which have several times shewn the French Republic falling beneath the weight of her intestine difficulties, or that of foreign arms.

Her dangers were never greater than they have appeared to be this year. On whatever point of her situation we cast our eyes we saw signs of ruin, distress, and even want of power; but the degree of distress which presages the speedy fall of an ordinary State may become the source of double vigour in an Empire under the influence of a Revolution. This distinction, which has been very often discussed and demonstrated, is unfortunately never attended to by most of those who study the fate of France by comparing her strength with that of other Governments, and the agitations that convulse her with the internal tranquillity of the States opposed to her.

In six months her political barometer can run through the whole scale of degrees. From ten different abysses she again extricates her fortune without confirming it, removes her dangers

\* Considerations on the Revolution of France, and the Causes that prolong its Duration.

without

without surmounting them, and resumes at home, as well as abroad, a countenance the reverse of that degradation of every kind, to which her preceding Government, her corruption, her mad ambition, her disasters, and her disorders had led her.

Before we trace the first symptoms of this change, we will present our readers with an opinion formed at Paris, in the middle of September, on the critical situation, domestic and foreign, of the Republic, by an observer free from the prejudices of party, and of whose sagacity we have had ten years proof. The following are the terms in which he took a view of the opinions, parties, hopes, and elements of confusion, of which the moral and political state of France is composed;

*Paris, September 19th.*

" We may distinguish in what is passing,  
 " public actions generally known, and private  
 " actions. Men are very frequently inclined to  
 " give more importance to the latter than they  
 " have; as for myself, it has always appeared  
 " to me in the Revolution, that they were of  
 " little consequence, and that private worth and  
 " private wickedness were but feeble springs of  
 " action when they were not the instruments of  
 " party, of passion, or of the ruling inclination;

" for one does not know what to call this rage.  
 " for destruction, for change, for follies, which  
 " has so often convulsed us for ten years past,  
 " and always with a persuasion that it is for the  
 " last time."

" Nothing, for example, could appear more con-  
 " clusive than the 18th of Fructidor (*Sept. 4.*) ;  
 " and the triumph of the strongest seemed to  
 " every body a durable, an immutable triumph;  
 " it was believed to be so: by the 30th of  
 " Prairial (*June 18th*) four kings are over-  
 " thrown, and nobody wonders at it; but  
 " Sieyes's elevation is considered now as a set-  
 " tled thing, decisive, and not to be shaken.  
 " Every body, it is true, does not think in this  
 " simple manner; but all the Republican *beau*  
*monde* do, and these form a class of men, and  
 " women too, not easily to be defined. These  
 " people do not exactly consider things as good  
 " or bad; that's not to the purpose: the idea  
 " is that they are to last, and consequently that  
 " it is requisite to adapt their notions, tastes,  
 " and opinions to that order of things which  
 " cannot change. Before the late misfortune  
 " of the Directory, it would have been easier to  
 " persuade these folks that it was night at mid-  
 " day, than that *Merlin* or *La Reveillère* could  
 " have fallen to their present state. This class  
 " of fools is numerous, extremely infatuated,  
 " and

“ and extremely vain : a motley group of ancient bourgeois, gownsmen, &c. become; I will not say Revolutionists, but *Republicans*; “ for although these denominations appear synonymous to you, they are very different as to “ the external conduct of those who take them, “ or to whom they are given.

“ We next have the party of regenerating philosophers: these are a milder sort of Jacobins, who, in the Revolution, see nothing local, nothing that is the result of the passions, of the rage and hatred of men without fortune against the wealthy; who see regeneration commenced in America by *Franklin*, and going on in Europe to make the tour of the world. This class of madmen is dangerous; but it is not so numerous as it was, and is daily losing some of its partisans. Among them may still be reckoned the *Benjamin Constants*, the *Salavilles*, the *Garats*, and the *Chapelles*; some simple Theophilanthropists, and stringers of arguments like those of 1789.

“ Upon the heels of these tread the Jacobins, the true Revolutionists; men capable of every thing, and much more numerous than it is thought, though decreased within a few years: but, for the sake of truth, we must observe, that those who have ceased to be Jacobins were

“ not

" not real Jacobins possessed with the guilty  
 " lotine rage and the fervour of *regicide*; they  
 " were merely regenerating philosophers, who  
 " were frightened at the *excesses* (that is the  
 " word) of the Jacobins, and who, recoiling  
 " every day, at last fell into the class of indiffer-  
 " ents, that is to say of irresolute Royalists.  
 " There are many of this kind.

" The distinguishing character of the Jaco-  
 " bin consists in his passion for *the destruction of*  
 " *kings*; this is the basis, not of his doctrine,  
 " for the furious passions know no doctrine, but  
 " of his ferocious instinct. This class of men  
 " are to be traced in history, from *Brutus*, the  
 " assassin of his friend and benefactor, down to  
 " *Nicolas*, the common murderer of the 2d of  
 " September. They have no uniformity of  
 " opinion among them, but congenial feelings,  
 " a toleration of each other's faults, union, and  
 " confidence. Mean people in towns have a  
 " great tendency to the nature of this band of  
 " assassins, finding in it food for the hateful pas-  
 " sions that torment them.

" You will no doubt be as much surprised as  
 " I was, to hear that there are men, and sen-  
 " sible men, who can think and persuade others  
 " that it is in this class of the agents of the *Revo-*  
*lution* that Royalty may find avengers, and the  
 " Monarchy restorers. This wild idea has  
 " blinded,

" blinded, and continues to blind the most distinguished of those attached to their country and their laws. This mode of judging, against all evidence, is as absurd as dangerous, and has been very injurious. It is not a month ago that foreigners had a notion that the meetings of the *Manege*, and of the *Rue de Bacq*, were led by Jacobins sold or devoted to the Monarch. A moment's thought will suffice to destroy this illusion; for grant that there should have been in these regicide and furious Assemblies some men sold to the King, as *Antonelles*, *Marbot*, and others were said to be, they would not have had it in their power to have kept their engagements; their brethren would soon have detected their schemes, and given them up to the executioner. Besides, they never could, as individual Jacobins, have thought of being of any service; it must have been by being able, through the means of a powerful patronage, to compel the Directory to place them in situations suited to the purpose. But even in that case, the fanaticism and jealousy of those whom they would have been forced to employ would have been a complete bar to their services. *Marbot* was two months Commander in Chief of the seventeenth Military Division, that is to say, of the forces of Paris " and

" and its neighbourhood. Did he do any thing?  
 " No, he could not; nor was it his intention:  
 " but it is a fact that the Royalists extolled him;  
 " and that the Directory deprived him of his  
 " post for his Jacobinism.

" I do not mention the Royalists to you as a  
 " party, for they cannot be accounted one;  
 " they are, as ever, a great part of the Nation  
 " who desire the Monarchy; but observe, I  
 " distinguish between the Royalists properly so  
 " called, and those who wish more or less purely  
 " for a King, but a King appointed by the  
 " Nation, governing according to Constitutional  
 " Laws, and on the terms of the *pacte conventionnel*.  
 " In this numerous class of Royalists are some  
 " of the victims of the 4th of September, Con-  
 " stitutionalists of the year 3, and Convention-  
 " alists. We meet in company some philo-  
 " phical *beaux esprits*, declaring themselves at-  
 " tached to the Revolution, who profess this  
 " doctrine; and we find it again among the  
 " opulent in office, and purchasers of National  
 " Domains: they do not scruple to say openly  
 " that the Republican State is attended with too  
 " great instability in the places of the Govern-  
 " ment, and too little security in the enjoyment  
 " of property; that a great State ought to be  
 " governed by a King according to esta-  
 " blished laws; &c. but that they will not have  
 " Louis

" *Louis XVIII.*; that they fear vengeance, and  
" dispossession of the domains purchased since  
" the Revolution.

" There are many who would persuade us that  
" the present Direct<sup>or</sup>y is in this class of Monarchs:  
" ists: they say it is not possible that such a man  
" as *Sieyes*, or that *Barras*, can have any de-  
" pendence on the continuance of the Republic;  
" and that *Sieyes* has certainly a project of placing  
" a Prince of Spain, or of Prussia, upon the  
" Throne of France. This is again one of the  
" thousand fancies of those who mistake the  
" character of the Revolution, and the delusion  
" of the glory of ruling. *Sieyes* might, perhaps,  
" have had this idea as a private individual, and  
" drop it on becoming Director; or he might  
" have it while a Director without being able to  
" put it in execution. It is the nature of the  
" Revolution not to be able to put an end to  
" itself; it will take a hundred different forms,  
" but will never work its own destruction. The  
" Monarchy must owe its re-establishment to  
" an extraneous cause, to the force of foreign  
" arms, as Holland in 1787, Belgium in 1791,  
" and as Milan, Naples, and Turin now.

" As to the Royalists, properly so called, that  
" is to say, attached to *Louis XVIII.*, their  
" hopes seem to be openly manifested. The  
" successes of the Allies have produced a serious  
" ferment.

" fermentation, which is kept up by the approach  
 " and presumed support of a formidable assist-  
 " ance ; to this cause are we to ascribe the com-  
 " motions and insurrections which have taken  
 " place in our provinces. It was not to be  
 " doubted that Royalism, supported by the dis-  
 " content of Citizens of all conditions, would  
 " appear rashly in the South and West. I say  
 " rashly, because reflecting men see this conduct  
 " in that light, while the armies on which the  
 " insurgents depend are still at such a distance  
 " from them. The Directory were alarmed at  
 " this intestine flame, which might be kindled  
 " from Bayonne to Rouen, passing by Auvergne,  
 " Gascony, and the maritime Provinces. They  
 " depend, however, upon the future contingents  
 " to dissipate the storm ; and they are very busy  
 " abroad endeavouring to retard the approach  
 " of the armies, and to weaken the union of the  
 " Imperial Courts.

" It is certain, for example, that they are  
 " tormenting Madrid. About a month ago  
 " the Chevalier *d'Azzara*, the Spanish Am-  
 " bassador, sent several dispatches to his  
 " Court to inform them of the Directory's  
 " desire, that the King would, by the medium  
 " of his Ministers at Berlin, Dresden, Munich,  
 " and other Courts of the North, try overtures  
 " of pacification, &c., and it is no less true  
 " than

" than extraordinary, that, at the very time M.  
 " d'Azzara was writing thus to his Court, he  
 " was informed, that a meeting had been held,  
 " in Paris at the houses of distinguished per-  
 " sons, in which it had been determined that  
 " advantage should be taken of all the oppor-  
 " tunities that offered to carry the Revolution  
 " into Spain; that it should be constituted into  
 " the Iberian Republic (*Republique Hispanique*),  
 " in order to extract aids of money, which could  
 " no longer be obtained from Italy, &c. Whe-  
 " ther M. d'Azzara paid any attention to this  
 " information or not, whether he apprised his  
 " Court of it or not, the fact is not the less  
 " certain; and as certain is it that, if the French  
 " Revolution continue for eighteen months  
 " longer, there will be no King at Madrid, at  
 " least if the Court does not change its  
 " conduct.

" But let us return to Paris, the centre of the  
 " Revolution. Here the events of the war  
 " cause neither surprise, nor general alarm, at  
 " least in public. The Directory themselves  
 " have an apparent unconcern, which it is dif-  
 " ficult to sound, but which however must arise  
 " from the hope of the invasion not taking  
 " place, of its being ineffectual, and of France  
 " being strong enough to weary out and disunite  
 " the invading Powers.

" The Public in general; and especially those  
 " whom the Revolution has harassed and  
 " tormented, or who are not satisfied with it,  
 " believe there will be a counter-revolution,  
 " yet do not seem to expect it. Thus we hear  
 " a man demonstrating that, towards the month  
 " of October, the King will be acknowledged  
 " in France, and, at the same time, we see him  
 " making pecuniary arrangements and compacts  
 " of every kind which imply the existence of  
 " the Républic for four or five years. This is  
 " what I call the belief without the expectation  
 " of a counter-revolution. This total want of  
 " confidence, in the events that are passing, is  
 " owing to several causes, and, above all, to the  
 " experience of the past.

" It cannot be denied that the Directory  
 " would have been very ill prepared for an in-  
 " vasion had it taken place in this month, as it  
 " was hoped by simpletons. Certain it is that  
 " they have no credit; that the loan of one  
 " hundred millions will not produce fifty, and  
 " not fifteen between this and the end of  
 " October; that not a half of the conscripts  
 " will join the army before that time, and that  
 " even a great number will join the insurgents,  
 " if they continue in arms. You must not sup-  
 " pose however, as some do, that the great  
 " towns, and particularly the walled towns, will  
 " take

" take up arms in haste ; this is a mistake, they  
 " will wait the arrival of the foreign armies.

" As for Paris, it will continue the same to  
 " the end of the chapter. The Revolution is  
 " not perceived in this great city but by the  
 " vexations of the Government, the clamours  
 " of the journalists, and the declamations of the  
 " discontented, or of the different sects against  
 " one another. Everywhere there are feasts,  
 " gardens, and amusements : the Theatres are  
 " crowded, and the women there vie in luxury  
 " and extravagance ; the public walks are fre-  
 " quented, and the Decades punctually ob-  
 " served ; and with all this, commerce is at a  
 " stand, spécie is rare, and nobody has any  
 " money.

" I must add, that the Directory's successful  
 " resistance of the Jacobins (for though the  
 " Directory themselves be a Jacobin produc-  
 " tion, they choose to throw off their masters)  
 " has a little rallied men to the Government  
 " without making a single convert to the Re-  
 " volution, or frightening the Jacobins, who  
 " will be even with them, if they have time for  
 " it."

The more the confidence of the malecontents  
 was raised, and that of the Republicans shaken,  
 the more has the unexpected news of the suc-  
 cesses,

cesses, obtained almost at the same moment, in Switzerland and Holland depressed the spirits of some, raised the enthusiasm of others, and astonished the Public. Nothing more strongly proves the belief of the Republic having been in danger than the transports that broke forth on the first report of the advantages which seem to place it in safety.

This return of fortune, by disarming the Jacobins and removing the illusions of the Royalists, has moderated the effervescence of the parties, and reproduced that of the Government. By rendering the future chances of the war more doubtful, and the inviolability of the Republican system more probable, it has again produced in the partisans of the Republic security and courage, in its enemies their stupor and distrust of the future, in the wavering their prejudices respecting the invincible ascendant of the Revolution, and it has bestowed on the Executive Power the means of recovering its position, and the opportunity of weakening its opponents. The influence of the late events will very soon appear in the military levies, in the collection of the public contributions, in the spirit of the Legislature, and in the agitations which already began to take place in some of the Departments.

All the show that the pomp of gasconading, the swell of vanity, and the stock of college decla-

declamations can furnish, has been exhausted by the orators of the Councils. *Hail! Friends of Zurich! Rivals and glorious remembrancers of those of Fleurus and Arcole!* — Let these confederates, these pygmies in politics, tremble! — *Hail, Maffena!* all hail, triumphant army! Peace to the world we wish; but we wish it in a manner worthy of the Great Nation, and signed by her immortal trophies!

Some days before, Garat exclaimed, “How noble is our destiny! If we conquer, the world will be changed and improved by us; if we are conquered, it will certainly be so by our example. In the very silence of oppressed humanity,” added he, “its secret blessings will attend our tombs like the mute hymn of ages. *The Hero of Barbarism, Suvorof, is vanquished! Glory and Love to the Preservers of Knowledge and the Arts!*”

If Citizen Garat be the preserver of the arts, he is not the preserver of elegance; his knowledge, his glory, and his bombast, are fitter for the tongue of a mountebank on the banks of the Garonne, than for that of a *saviour of the Liberty of the world*. These silly emphatics of a student of rhetoric could only be excusable in the mouth of a people, to whom the reply of the French Plenipotentiaries to the Deputies of Holland in the conferences of Gertruydenberg might be applied:

*applied; Gentlemen, it is plain to be seen that you have not been accustomed to conquer.*

We cite the foregoing passages in order to leave no doubt of the unalterable rage for universal Revolution, which still actuates and will for ever actuate those incendiary Orators; but justice bids us to observe, that, through the invectives and impertinencies of every kind which have distinguished even most of the more moderate speeches, a wish for peace has appeared to prevail in the Councils. The members have disgraced themselves and been ridiculous, according to custom, by volumes of alehouse apostrophes addressed to the Allied Powers, but without speaking of reducing them to powder. Even that House of Austria, whom six months ago a solemn decree devoted to the *infernal Gods*, has been distinguished with peculiar civility; England and Russia bore away all the richness of the majestic language of the French Republicans.

We may see in these less haughty dispositions of the Councils the intentions and projects of the Directory themselves. Though Fortune has returned to two of their armies, they know that she is not secured by them; they know from their own experience that wounds do not always kill, and that battles may be gained without gaining a province from the enemy at the end

of three or four years. They have been for some time thinking of mediation and negotiation.

In consequence, under their influence and according to their instructions, the Council of Elders are going to reject an extravagant decree of Revolutionary pacification, rapturously adopted on the 25th of September by the Council of Five Hundred, which inflicted "the pain of death upon those traitors to the country, Negotiators, Ministers, Directors, Generals, Representatives of the People, and all French Citizens who should propose, accept, support, or sign a Treaty of Peace, derogatory to the Constitution of the year 3, and to the integral state of the territory of the Republic as united by the laws."

This statute was produced in the brain of one *Garrau*, an intrepid Jacobin, Conventionalist, formerly a Commissioner at Milan, and the vilest of reasoners. A distrust of the secret negotiations of the Directory, an absurd rumour of some transactions in agitation against the Constitution, the jealousy of the Jacobins, and their frenzy for an eternal war, had given rise to this political demarcation, to which the patriot *Garrau* and his gang would readily have sacrificed four or five millions more of their countrymen.

The reporter of the Committee of Elders, charged with the examination of this decree,

has very judiciously exposed the absurdity, illegality, and danger of it. It can hardly be doubted that the Council has refused to confirm it;

We shall have occasion to inquire hereafter what degree of sincerity these pacific approaches are susceptible of. We should perhaps be deceived were we to consider them as a cheat for the moment; we think that a terrible lesson, serious embarrassments, and the imperious necessity of pacifying the Nation, and of reconciling it to the Revolution by a truce to this scourge of war which they support with horror, have cured the delirium of ambition and of making proselytes under which the late Directory laboured; but does this softer tone tend to disunite the Allies by separate treaties of peace, or to conclude a general one? Would it outlive new successes? Would the Government itself be sufficiently powerful to bend the Revolutionary frenzy and the spirit of the Republic, hitherto immutable, to the conditions of a peace which prudence and justice should dictate to them? Such questions are still far from being ripe, nor can they be treated in public with impartiality, without clashing with passions, interests, and prejudices, which experience alone can set to rights.

Let us again attend to our sensible Correspondent, whose observations we have just been

been reading. His first letter was previous to the successes of Massena; the following was written at the time. This comparative view will give a better idea of the impression and consequences of the late events than long dissertations would, and likewise of the most recent situation of the interior affairs of the country.

October 8, 1799.

" You perhaps imagine, that at the report of  
 " the different events which are passing in Swit-  
 " zerland, Italy, Holland, and on the Rhine,  
 " Paris must be in a daily fermentation, and the  
 " minds of men elevated in one sense or another.  
 " Hitherto, no. Men crawl with resignation in  
 " the track of the Revolution, and talk *pro* and  
 " *con* very coolly; only a few *beaux esprits*, and  
 " some persons in place, or hoping to get in,  
 " speak of the Republic as of a grand thing, and  
 " make a merit of belonging to it. The rest  
 " fear it, coax it, obey it, and do not know  
 " whether they ought to hope to see an end to  
 " it or not. As to the common people of this  
 " town, except a few persons, the Revolution  
 " continues to be their idol: it is among them  
 " that the ideas of destroying kings, hatred to  
 " royalty, and the frenzy of equality are rooted.  
 " It is chiefly among the lower sort of Parisians

" that these sentiments appear; and of course  
 " when they complain of distress and the want  
 " of work, their complaints are not directed  
 " against the Republic, but upon *traitors, bad*  
 " *governors, engrossers, &c.* There is no rea-  
 " soning with such a wild beast. These people  
 " never fail the Republican feasts: about five  
 " years ago they were seen dying with hunger,  
 " yet always ready to cut the first man's throat  
 " who should speak of restoring abundance with  
 " royalty. There is nothing will frighten them,  
 " or convince them that their reign is not ever-  
 " lasting, but a great superiority of military  
 " forces.

" What is passing in Switzerland and else-  
 " where is considered here as a proof of in-  
 " coherence in the views of the coalition, or of  
 " a weakness not easily accounted for. Perhaps  
 " the coalesced Powers are not sufficiently ac-  
 " quainted with the character of the Revolu-  
 " tion; perhaps, in their plan, they depend  
 " upon commotions, intrigues, and agents in  
 " the country: but that would be madness, a  
 " dangerous blindness. The commotions con-  
 " sist of blood spilt without success; the in-  
 " trigues are the simple artifices of school-boys,  
 " or the arts of people who take the monster of  
 " the Revolution to be nothing more than the  
 " common plots of rogues, or ambitious men;  
 " and

“ and the agents are visionaries, often fools; and  
 “ sometimes busy bodies, who pass their lives  
 “ in getting themselves arrested, and in spending  
 “ money to obtain their liberty ; foolish men  
 “ who think of effecting a counter-revolution  
 “ by the means of pamphlets, or who see it in  
 “ all the events passing at Paris. It is impos-  
 “ sible to find more foolish guides, if we except  
 “ some of the Counsellors of the German Courts,  
 “ who will not understand the Revolution till it  
 “ has reached them.

“ I do not know whether it be possible to  
 “ believe, that the murderers of *Louis XVI.*  
 “ intend to second a counter-revolution ; but  
 “ certain it is, that there is no feast or treat, no  
 “ public or private meeting of those gentle-  
 “ men, where a thousand imprecations are not  
 “ poured forth against royalty, and where all kings  
 “ are not devoted to death. It is impossible that a  
 “ spontaneous counter-revolution can be effected  
 “ by a party ; the Directory themselves, were  
 “ they willing, could not effect it. Let fo-  
 “ reigners then give over expecting to hear of  
 “ the restoration of the Monarchy by every mail  
 “ that arrives.

“ Whatever be the penury of the finances,  
 “ the distress of the Directory, the clamours of  
 “ a worthless or revolutionary crew, be assured,  
 “ that the Republican Citadel is far from being

" ready to fall of itself. Even the public calamities, and the want of work, facilitate the recruiting of the armies : it is true a number of conscripts refuse to go, but a much greater number join and march to meet the enemy ; some are refractory, but many are fanatic and force the rest to go. France, notwithstanding her losses, has a great many men, and her harvest has proved very fine ; thus the war no longer alarms the Directory, and ought not to alarm them.

" Add, that the atrocity and injustice of the Regents of the Revolution do not prevent their conceiving and ordering bold and well-combined plans for a campaign. It must be so, as under so many disadvantages they support the war against three great Powers, and keep them off their territory. For example, their system for the two preceding months was to contend for every inch of ground in Switzerland and Italy, that they might weaken the combined army in those countries, and gain time. The thing that they were afraid of was, that, while one army occupied their forces in Italy, General Suwarrow, after the capture of Turin, would boldly come down upon Lyons, remove the seat of war into France, and endanger the Republic. But they are no longer afraid, as after the battle

" of

" of Novi the conqueror did not even march  
 " to Genoa, which was said to be ready to open  
 " its gates to him. Probably there, as in Swit-  
 " zerland and Holland, their enemy would have  
 " been deceived; by depending upon intelli-  
 " gence and promises, without reflecting that  
 " in a country in a state of Revolution, scarcely  
 " one out of ten thousand such promises suc-  
 " ceeds. There must be no reliance but upon  
 " victory and boldness.

" There is no longer then any uneasiness as  
 " to the result of the campaign; the Republic  
 " is considered as saved. Hence the plots of  
 " the Jacobins engage the attention of the Di-  
 " rectory and all the adherents of the mo-  
 " derate Republic much more than the opera-  
 " tions of Prince *Charles*, at the distance of one  
 " hundred and fifty leagues from Paris. So  
 " little is a counter-revolution feared, that  
 " their thoughts are already turned upon the  
 " next elections, to remove the terrorists.  
 " The projects of *Sieyes*, of which so much  
 " is said, have no connexion with the great  
 " interests of Europe. I have traced this re-  
 " port to its source; there are no grounds for  
 " it—it is a fabrication of some busy bodies, be-  
 " lieved by idiots who call themselves Roy-  
 " alists. The Directory cannot intend a coun-  
 " ter-revolution, nor can one or two of the  
 " Direct-

" Directors ; and if they did, they could not effect it. It is said that *Sieyes* intended and still intends to effect one, in the manner of the 18th of Fructidor (*Sept. 4th*), against those he calls the Jacobins. There will be a struggle, you need not doubt it : but this is all mere domestic strife ; the Monarchy has nothing to do in it. Nay, the Republic, as such, gains by it a certain force, which only people well versed in Republican politics can perceive, but which is real.

" According to our directing Committees, Europe is now come to such a point, that it is necessary to concentrate the States, to incorporate several Principalities with the Austrian dominions, several with Prussia, with Spain, &c. as the means and arrangements of pacification. We should not laugh when hardy usurpers are deliberating upon the means of plundering us, and particularly when they are fortunate.

" The character of the Révolution is not sufficiently known among foreigners : all its projects are big with ruin. But for the boldness of *Nelson*, Constantinople would have been overthrown, the Southern States of Russia invaded, Paris would have domineered from Madrid to Petersburg, Poland re-established, &c. You may with certainty consider, among

" the

“ the present views of the French Republicans,  
 “ the carrying the war into the Tyrol and the  
 “ heart of Austria, as soon as Switzerland is  
 “ evacuated by the Allied troops : while a large  
 “ army keeps Prince *Charles* engaged upon the  
 “ Rhine, an attempt will be made to penetrate  
 “ the Hereditary States.

“ Paris is still the same ; profound sub-  
 “ mission, crowded theatres, luxury and di-  
 “ stress, boasting and cowardice, madness and  
 “ bold enterprises, games and follies. They  
 “ who yesterday cried *Vive Suwarof!* to-day  
 “ consider the Republic as invincible, and to-  
 “ morrow will say nothing more on the subject.  
 “ It is, however, certain that the Directory are  
 “ inclined to take advantage of a moment of  
 “ success to seek a peace. One is so tired  
 “ among sensible people, that one dares no  
 “ longer introduce politics : the Gazette regu-  
 “ lates the conduct of every one, and victories or  
 “ defeats are the only arguments made use of.”

In some passages of this letter we find a pre-judice exactly similar to that which prevails among most foreigners. While the latter depend periodically upon millions of Royalists being ready to show themselves, upon the poverty of the Republican treasury, the desertion of the conscripts, anarchy, chimerical intrigues, and anti-republican explosions ; in France the coun-

ter-revolutionists take the Allies for irresistible giants who can go from one end of Europe to the other in two strides, and dart into France with the velocity of swallows. The consequence of arguing thus is, that those in the country, and those out of the country, must always find themselves differing very much, and be entirely disconcerted when experience comes to dispel the illusion.

The Bourgeois of Paris, who reason on the war, should consider, however, that it was necessary to fight six or seven battles, and besiege ten fortresses in Italy, before the Allies arrived on the confines of Piedmont; that one half of Switzerland is become a desert, without any inroad being made upon the other half; that it is not for want of torrents of blood that the armies of the Allies are not on the frontiers of the Republic; that the progress already made, and which was everywhere obstinately disputed, has cost the lives of a hundred thousand men; that the French armies can be recruited in a week, those of their enemies scarcely in six months; and, in fine, that if the Directory govern a volcano, it is not an easy thing to manage and keep in order the mechanism of the vast engines designed to extinguish the flames of it.

### *Summary*

*Summary of the principal Military Events since the  
20th of September.*

THE brilliancy of the first months of the campaign was succeeded by a relaxation in offensive operations, of which the causes and the effects became daily more felt. Disasters, as serious in their consequences as in their sources, have arisen to dim that magic mirror, in which inexperience and enthusiasm were contemplating a series of future and uninterrupted successes, leading to a rapid and complete decision.

To have offered doubts to imaginations so heated, would have been attempting to allay a hurricane with a fan. Besides, in our happy times, the moderate observer who advances an objection is immediately declared to be *Philosopher* or *Jacobin*; the common place of every dull slanderer, who, being unable to make any impression by the abortions of his brain, endeavours to terrify by the abuses of his vocabulary.

It was surely a great error of judgment, to hope that the French Republic would be reduced in the course of a year, without hazards, or checks, and by the force alone of fighting; but now, laying down these gigantic ideas, it would be folly to deny the extent of the resources still preserved by the Allies: the balance is become more equal, the future more problemati-

cal, the field of advantages more circumscribed ; but immense is still the distance between a war that is to dissolve Europe, and a war that is to dissolve the present Government of France.

The dissolution of Europe is to be effected only by a disastrous peace, the conditions of which should be imposed separately on each Power, which would re-invest the Revolution with its exterior empire and its conquests, and which would again sink us to the depressed condition of 1798, as well as subject us to the infamous despotism then exercised by the Directory over the Continent. The confederate Governments will prevent this sad issue, by taking care that discord, the weakness of the armies, and want of foresight, do not aggravate their disasters, the continuance of which would deprive them of the power of putting an end, in time and together, to so dangerous a struggle.

Before the Archduke *Charles* left Switzerland, they who had dived into the secret of the inaction to which his Royal Highness found himself bound, and the effect of the political and military measures which followed his taking possession of Zurich, had but feeble hopes of the deliverance of that country. After his retreat, they who did not wish to deceive themselves with their eyes open, foresaw the total and speedy evacuation of the Cantons, either from the inferiority

riority of the Allied army, or from the manifest advantage which experience insured the enemy over the Russian troops, in a country absolutely new to them, and so unlike the ground where their known firmness rendered local tactics of less importance.

It was, in a manner, entering upon a new campaign towards the close of autumn, in a region where the winter frequently sets in at the end of October. The first plans being given up, they were succeeded by a vast and bold design of filling the void left by the Austrian army with the Russians employed in Italy. From the plains of Piedmont, this little army was transported over the precipices of the Alps, to the east of Switzerland, and that by a march of several days, which it was necessary to conceal from the enemy. This unexpected diversion upon his right wing tended to drive him speedily out of the Democratic Cantons, and then, by coming out at Lucerne, to turn the French positions on the chain of the Albis.

But the execution of this plan still depended upon a punctuality in dates and motions, upon a harmony, if I may so express myself, symmetrically true, between the operations of General *Korssakof* and those of Marshal *Suvarov*. The least delay, local obstacles, great rains or snows, the difficulty of passing narrow and steep roads, where

where an accident dependent on the weather can stop an army for four-and-twenty hours, all rendered the simultaneous concurrence of the two armies, and the punctuality of their respective attacks, more uncertain. Besides, it was treating *Maffena's* vigilance with unjust contempt, to suppose that he would remain quiet and suffer the turning of his eastern positions, and the scheme to be effected, which at the same moment was to fall upon his right flank and on his centre.

However, (and it is inexplicable,) we shall see that *Maffena* did not stir till he was perfectly certain that he should himself be attacked in six-and-thirty hours, and not till Marshal *Suvorof* had passed St. Gothard. Was he mistaken in his calculations? Was he deceived in his idea of the rapidity of the enemy's march? We cannot discover his motives for continuing inactive for more than three weeks, without daring to attack an enemy, with whose weakness he was acquainted. By that unaccountable delay he endangered his army and all Switzerland. If he foresaw his danger, is it conceivable that he would have postponed preventing it till the moment when it should become desperate? If he was not aware of it, what are we to think of his information and his judgment? Lastly, is there any more foresight to be discovered in this constrained

strained resolution of attacking at the last moment, to prevent his being attacked himself, and undertaking what he had had three weeks to avoid, that is to say, to give battle precisely at the period when, instead of a single enemy to conquer, there were two ; thanks to the perseverance of his inactivity ?

Success, no doubt, has excused the singularity of this conduct ; but the French Government will perceive, that if *Maffena* has saved Switzerland for them, it was after having endangered his positions, his army, and France herself, by his incomprehensible continuation on the defensive with all his advantages in the East, and notwithstanding his great superiority.

It was on the 25th of September that this General at length determined to repair his error, to profit by his advantages, and to prevent the Allies from being able to co-operate with the succours which Marshal *Suvorof* was leading to them.

It is impossible to form an idea of the nature and of the particulars of this action from the statements of the official accounts. It appears rather to have been several distinct engagements, than a general battle ; and we find exact and happy dispositions taken by the French General, but not by the Russian. In a long dispatch of the 9th of October, *Maffena*, recapitulating the various successes since the 25th of September,

tember, confines himself nearly to the result of that day and the next. In order to form a judgment upon the accounts given by the conquerors and the conquered, and to reduce the exaggerations to their proper standard, we must have recourse to the testimony of impartial and credible spectators, whose recital will assist us in discovering the real character and consequences of those unfortunate days.

In retiring with forty thousand men, the Archduke *Charles* had left the line of defence to the protection of an army, inferior by one half to that which had gone into Swabia. From twenty-two to twenty-four thousand Russians occupied this position which, from the confluence of the Aar and the Rhine, extended by Zurich to the town of Rapperschwill near the eastern extremity of the Lake. General *Hotze*, who had been dislodged a little before from the Canton of Glaris, lay with his division on the right bank of the Linth, extending from Rapperschwill and Uznacht to the Lake of Wallestadt ; it consisted of from twelve to fifteen thousand Austrians, behind whom to the east was posted the little army of General *Jellachich*, on the frontier of the Grisons.

The real number of effective troops under *Massena* has been disputed, and is still. For eight years past, these disputes have been renewed.

newed every campaign, and almost at every action. By an excess of incurable confidence, and in listening to the flattering calculations offered by busy bodies or hasty people, the public have always been pleased to reduce the French armies to imaginary estimates, and not till after defeat have they been willing to agree to a more accurate enumeration of the enemy, before whom the opposed armies are obliged to retire.

All the advices worthy of belief, that is to say, those that come from the interior of Switzerland, all, without exception, concur in stating the number of men under the command of *Maffena* at eighty thousand. This army, which was laid out in nine divisions, was not altogether employed at the first positions. A corps of seven thousand then occupied Bafle and the works constructed before that town; General *Thureau* commanded a division in the Upper Valais; some detachments were posted at Oberland; and lastly, the right under General *Le Courbe* took off a part of this army. It is very probable then, that at the line itself, which was led against the Russians and General *Hotze*, *Maffena* had not more than forty-five thousand men. The event has proved that even that number was too many.

This central body extended from Frickthal on the left, to the lower part of the Canton of Glarus, crossing the chain of the Albis.

In order, apparently, to support Marshal Suwarof's enterprise, and to enable the left of the army to preserve its positions, General Korsakof had detached five thousand of his centre towards Uznach and the eastern point of the Lake of Zurich. This corps set out on the 25th before the engagement: and the Russian General, still depending, no doubt, on the immediate arrival of Marshal Suwarof, intended to begin the attack the next day. He was anticipated. The enemy better informed than he, and apprized of his motions, did not lose a day. Early on the 25th, the French General's dispositions were taken and executed.

While Maffena diverted the attention of the Russians by a feigned attack to his left towards Bruck on the Aar, he ordered one of his divisions to cross the Limmat at the village of Dietikon. A second column marched directly in front of Zurich, and a third to the right of that town, while to the East, General Soult's division crossed the Linth, and surprised the advanced posts of General Hotze.

It was soon perceived how little the Russians expected this attack. The French column, which marched rapidly, and with scarcely any opposition from Dietikon on the right bank of the Limmat to the village of Weinengen and the hills called Hong-Berg, cut off eight Russian battalions

battalions that were posted between those heights and the Rhine. Thus separated from its centre, this body, commanded by General *Markof*, and roughly handled, made a precipitate retreat, and did not halt till they arrived at Eglisau.

While the French column, which was very strong, advanced by two divisions, one of which re-ascended the Limmat and marched towards Zurich, and the other made themselves masters of the Hong-Berg, different corps were engaged in front of Zurich and to the right. They were at first repulsed by the bayonet, but, recovering their advantage by manœuvring and the use of the artillery, they gained ground, and by this collateral attack prevented the Russians from assisting their right wing.

General *Korsakof* had immediately recalled the six battalions who had set out in the morning for Uznach; but only a part of them returned towards the end of the day: this delay was a less evil than the uncertainty and confusion which began to appear. In falling back upon Zurich the Russians had totally neglected the heights that command the town: no corps of observation was stationed on those eminences, no precaution was taken to secure them, and with them the road to Winterthour. From Hong-Berg the French marched without opposition, and before sun-set, to the western summit

of the Zuricksberg; no attempt was made to dislodge them from it, and being masters of this post, they surrounded the town to the North as it already was to the West.

It was in this critical situation, and almost shut up in Zurich, that the Russian General, who had been long irresolute, determined upon a retreat. Night had suspended the operations: the enemy foresaw a bloody battle the next day, if it were necessary to force the town, and fourteen thousand Russians who defended it. In consequence they withdrew the division posted at the Zuricksberg, opened the way to Winterthour, and contrived to leave an issue free to this army, which retired on the 26th in the morning. During the night the unfortunate town of Zurich was given up to excesses, which could only be stopped by the firmness of the Russian Generals.

But instead of taking the safe road to Winterthour, from which the French had withdrawn, General Kersakof, in leaving Zurich, turned to the left, and took the road to Eglisau by which he had come a month before. This direction brought him up with the French column which occupied the heights and the base of the Hong-Berg: the column, its batteries, and light artillery, were soon in motion; this unexpected attack threw the Russians into disorder, who thought themselves absolutely cut off, and every one

one made the best of his way. The greater part of the baggage, artillery, camp equipages, waggons, one of the military chests, and many prisoners were taken. On the same evening the rest of the army reached Eglisau,

The success of the Eastern attack upon the Linth completed *Massena's* victory. At the beginning of the action the brave General *Hotze*, who had not been able to prevent the enemy's crossing the river and dislodging his advanced posts, was wounded mortally and taken. This misfortune aggravated the first losses. Although they might have been repaired, and little ground had been lost, General *Petrascb* who succeeded General *Hotze*, ordered a retreat, and never halted till he reached Feldkirch. All the North of Switzerland as far as Constance became the conquest of the French.

Some days previous to these events, Marshal *Suvorof* had arrived at the foot of the Alps with an army said to amount to twenty thousand men. Unfortunately some show made by General *Championnet* and General *Moreau* to relieve *Tortona*, had retarded the departure of this little army, which, notwithstanding the celerity of its march from *Asti* to *Bellinzona*, made in five days, did not arrive at the latter place till the evening of the 15th of September. Another day passed

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in collecting the beasts of burden requisite for crossing the Alps.

On the 22d and 23d they passed St. Gothard, whence the French General *Gudin*, who commanded the advanced posts, fell back, not without loss, to Altorf; without thinking of defending the valley of Urseren, by which the Russians descended, and came out upon Altorf on the 25th through the valley of the Reuss, and upon the Canton of Glaris by that of Schachen.

To this rapid and unexpected operation General *Le Courbe*, commander of the right wing of the French army, and who, far from expecting the Russians, was preparing to invade the Grisons, could make but a short resistance: his positions were carried, two of his detachments defeated, and he himself having narrowly escaped being surrounded, made his way with difficulty to Altorf, which he immediately evacuated, flying to the left of the Reuss, in order to cover the passes of the Grimsel.

He was pursued by Marshal *Suvorof* into the interior of the Cantons of Glaris and Schwitz. When we reflect that at this date (September 26 and 27) the grand army had been defeated, and had withdrawn to the Rhine; that, ignorant of the defeat, Marshal *Suvorof* was pushing forward through deep and narrow valleys, surrounded,

rounded by enormous mountains of which every issue formed a defile; and in fine, that before a powerful and victorious enemy this enterprise was executed almost without artillery, without horses, with scarcity of subsistence, and in a country ruined and depopulated, we have reason to congratulate ourselves that this little army has been saved by a firm and skilful retreat.

As it commanded the upper part of the Canton of Glaris, it had penetrated into that of Schwitz, where it occupied the great valley called *Muttenthal*; here the progress of General *Massena* was bounded.

On the 30th at night, he arrived in person at *Aktof*, with a division of eight thousand men, which joined that of *Le Courbe*. While he thus secured his position to the South, and covered the road to *St. Gothard*, he stationed at *Wesen*, on the northern extremity of the Lake of *Wellestat*, a strong column, which to the East defended the Canton of Glaris; at the same time, a third body was posted to the Northwest near *Schwitz*. These arrangements left General *Suvorov* only the alternative of advancing to the Lake of *Zurich* by *Enfielden*, or of retiring to the *Grisons*.

He maintained his positions, however, for five or six days. Several engagements took place in the

the Valley of Muttenthal; that of the 2d of October was favourable, and compelled the enemy to fall back beyond the Borough of Schwitz; but their superiority of strength the next day, the increasing of their forces, and on the other hand want of provisions, and the fatigue endured by the Russian troops, and in fine, the intelligence that must have been received of the defeat of the grand army, decided a retreat.

It appears to have been made on the 7th of October from Glaris through the frightful Valley of Flems, which opens on the Upper Rhine nearly opposite to Reichenau in the Grisons. On the 8th, the whole army, harassed on its rear and flanks, passed the Rhine and entered the Grison country.

The general effects of these disasters are, the loss of St. Gothard, of the valley around it, of the whole of Switzerland, if we except the Grisons; all the plans and advantages of the Helvetic campaign destroyed; confidence restored to the enemy, and the magic dread of the Russians removed; the Swiss not less disaffected to the Allies than to the French; their last resources and population again fallen into the power of the latter; their Jacobins triumphant; the good Citizen and the Nation for ever disgusted with delivering invasions, and now considering

sidering war as a scourge still worse than the Revolutions; such is the result of misfortunes which we may well term a catastrophe.

In giving them this name, we judge of them by their causes and their consequences still more than by their extent; for we must not be so simple as to give credit to the puerile tales with which the Generals, Orators, and poetic Newsmongers of France have embellished their narratives. We can affirm, that the twenty thousand men, whom they boast to have killed or taken on the 25th and 26th of September, amount, at most, to seven or eight thousand. The Austrians have suffered very little; and to say the truth, these battles which have been so decisive have not been very bloody; they have not cost the French a thousand killed and wounded.

As to the particular loss suffered by Marshal Suvarof, it has not been yet estimated, except by the romancers of Paris: they state it to be six thousand men; "Two thousand wounded," says Massena, "ate in our hands."

One of the most deplorable misfortunes attending these battles is the loss of General Hotze. He was the son of a husbandman in the neighbourhood of Zurich, and was promoted in 1792, for his merit, application, and talents, to be second in command of the Austrian regiment of

cavalry of *Hohenzollern*. His activity and zeal never relaxed through the whole course of the war : wherever he was stationed, he discharged his duty with honour. He was a sincere Patriot as well as a skilful General, and cherished the hope of being the Saviour of his Country : Providence has spared him the pang of seeing it again fall under the yoke after suffering the most horrible calamities. He has not even found a grave in his native soil ; the French carried off his body, which is interred at Feldkirch. His memory is clear of all reproach ; his counsels were rejected, and he had ceased to give them.

*Maffena*, who takes as much care to suppress the dates of events as others do to be accurate in them, in his dispatch of the 9th of October, confirmed by a bulletin of the 12th, talks of a new brilliant victory, that is to say, some success in Turgovia. According to his account, General *Korsakof*, hearing of Marshal *Suvoroff*'s danger, passed the Rhine, and advanced towards Thour : being attacked in this position, and repulsed with a loss of three thousand men, he had returned to the right bank of the Rhine, destroying the bridges of Constance and Diesenhoffen.

[*The conclusion in the next Number.*]

E R R A T U M.

No. XXVI. Page 115. for execution read debrouling.



THE  
**BRITISH MERCURY.**

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N<sup>o</sup> XXVIII.

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*November 15th, 1799.*

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*Summary of the Military Events, concluded from  
the last Number.*

Of the different parts of the French line of defence none had given the Government more anxiety, and with great reason, than the central point at Switzerland, with which the immediate safety of the Republic was connected. They had to fear, besides, that the loss of that formidable advanced post would remove the uncertainty and variance which might still exist in the plans of

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the Allies, who once upon the frontiers of France would be induced, even supposing they had no other design than that of pursuing the war there in a mere military point of view, to seek in the interior of the Republic the assistance of a political counter-revolutionary war, the explosion of which might shake the roots of the Revolution.

Therefore, so early as the end of July, constant and considerable reinforcements were dispatched to *Massena*, and by these he had recovered from the weak state into which he had been thrown by the first months of the campaign. Nor was less activity used in forming the army of the Alps, to the command of which General *Championnet* was appointed, and of which the left wing protecting the little St. Bernard and Mount Cenis was attached to the operations of the grand army in the Helvetic Alps.

The Archduke Charles, on the contrary, found himself deprived of the two divisions under General *Bellegarde* and General *Haddick*, after they had acquired a knowledge of the mountains in the Tyrol and Engadine. His left wing remained constantly too weak in proportion; and this paucity of strength rendered the detachments advanced to the Upper Vallais, and the inadequate and late succours led by General *Haddick* to the duchy of Aosta, almost useless; for as the French carefully guarded the Grimsel and the Oberland, these

these little armies could not open a direct communication through the Alps with the Canton of Uri, to which the Imperial army extended.

*Massena*, paying the greatest attention to the preservation of his Oriental positions, and to the recovery of the whole chain of the summits and grand valleys, bent his efforts on this decisive point. Here he constantly employed the same troops, the same general, the same officers, all inured to the physical obstacles of the country, and trained to battle amidst fields of ice, torrents, and precipices.

The Austrians were totally deficient in this grand advantage. Perhaps, from foreseeing their approaching retreat, and Marshal *Suvorof's* expedition, they neglected to repair the checks they had received in the middle of August, and but feebly contended for those commanding rocks, to the possession of which the French justly annexed the fate of the whole of Switzerland. The latter rigidly adhering to the system of keeping their line on Albis immovable, were continually moving and strengthening their right, of which their enemies could neither support the manœuvres, nor counterbalance the superiority.

The effect of this was, that after re-entering the Cantons of Schwitz and Glaris, *Le Courbe* was preparing to invade the Grisons and Appenzell at the moment when Marshal *Suvorof* ap-

peared at St. Gothard. By that operation the French General would have forced the left wing of the Allies to abandon the position it occupied on the right of the Linth, and probably the whole army to evacuate Zurich.

From these observations, authorised by military men, we may conclude, that if the tardy plan of transporting an army of 20,000 men from Italy into Switzerland across the Alps had been put into execution in the month of July or August, it would probably have removed the seat of war to the frontiers of France.

It was besides no slight disadvantage to substitute to troops more familiarized with the country a foreign army, whom no talent whatever could possibly teach what a constant practice had engraved in the head of the lowest officer of the French staff. Nowhere is bravery sufficient in the battles of these days, much less of course can it be in a war of positions, and of mountains piled upon mountains, where military genius cannot supply topographic science, the forecast it gives, the confidence it inspires, or the accurate ideas obtained by the use of situations and the daily exploring of those frozen bulwarks raised by the hand of Nature.

On hearing of Marshal Suvarof's march towards Switzerland, and that of the Archduke Charles towards the Rhine, this sudden change  
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of the operations was eagerly ascribed to a plan concerted between the Allies ; a plan by which, leaving an army fixed in the centre sufficient to keep General *Massena* in check, the Archduke should turn him upon the left flank by turning Switzerland itself through Alsace, while the Russians, detached from the army of Italy, should enclose the French to the East by turning the line on the Reuss.

This supposition, like so many others built on probabilities, was chimerical ; the removal of the troops had been the result of very different motives. Neither was the central army protected from the enterprises of the enemy, nor the operation on their right expected from the Austrians executed.

From the Black Forest, where he had halted till the 5th of September, the Archduke *Charles* marched into the Duchy of Württemberg and the lower Margraviate. The advanced divisions of his army delivered Philippsburg, which was defended with unshaken firmness by the Rhingrave of *Salm*, and which a bombarding of six days had reduced to ashes. The enemy driven from the Margraviate fell back upon Heidelberg, whence they effected their retreat on the 15th of September to Manheim, and across the Rhine. We have already related the brilliant and rapid movement by which the Archduke on

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the 17th overtook at Neckerau the rear-guard of the French army commanded by General *La Rocbe*, and destroyed or took near the half of them. The rest of that division evacuated Manheim precipitately. Passing to the left of the Rhine, the army to which it belonged separated into two divisions, one of which marched to reinforce the troops that covered Mentz, and the other which was the more considerable joined the lines of Spireback.

The Imperialists being masters of Manheim pushed their advanced posts over the river nearly as far as Neustadt, six leagues from Landau. A few days before a magazine of powder had blown up and destroyed one side of the fortifications of this fort, which had neither a sufficient garrison nor provisions.

To the Imperial army, which, by the junction of the divisions under General *Staray* and Count *de Meerfeld* with the Archduke, amounted at least to fifty thousand men, was added the forces of the National Militia of the Odenwald, the Bergstrasse, and the Spessart. These rustic soldiers, already trained to defend their native soil, and who had more than once given proofs of their courage, had just been formed into a regular body, under the direction of the Baron *d' Albini*, Grand Referendary of Mentz.

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This Minister, deputed by his Sovereign to the Congress of Rastadt, appeared towards the conclusion of that Congress to have been shaken by the artifices of the French Negotiators. By his opposition to the Imperial Plenipotentiaries, his deference to the pretensions of France, and the motives to which this conduct was ascribed, he merited disgrace with the Court of Vienna, which had not yet been forgiven by that of Mentz for the cession of its capital : but the breaking up of the Congress, the renewal of hostilities, the fresh plundering commenced by the enemy on the right bank of the Rhine, and the dangers to which the Electorate was exposed, effaced those impressions. To the activity of M. *d'Albini* the Public was indebted for this force, consisting of 15,000 of the inhabitants, who successively kept up that number for actual service, headed by the brave and faithful defender of Erenstein, General *Faber*, and more or less disciplined by Austrian officers.

As soon as the French had repassed the Rhine, the Electoral militia crossed the Mayne, marched towards Mentz and there blocked up the enemy. A hope began to rise of being delivered from them for a long time, and even of seeing the Archduke *Charles* acting upon the left bank ; but drawn by some operations towards Kehl, he was re-ascending the Rhine when the events in

Switzerland recalled him to the confines of that unfortunate country.

Once again then was it necessary to change the plan, to divide the army, and to return to the point from which they had set out. Switzerland lost, the Lower Rhine no longer protected from fresh inroads, and every project of diversion by Alsace annihilated or suspended, were the lamentable effects of the alterations in the first system of the campaign, or rather of the extension of political views which produced those alterations.

The moment that the French were informed of the retreat of the Archduke towards the heads of the Danube, with fifteen or twenty thousand men, they left Mentz in the beginning of October, attacked the Electoral militia and drove them over the Mayne to Seligerstadt. The neutrality of Frankfort was a second time within six weeks impudently violated, and a contribution extorted from the town upon the infamous pretext of the army of the *Great Nation* being in want of money. In the middle of October, a large division of the army of the Rhine, of which the command had been just given to General *Le Courbe*, again crossed the river between Mentz and Manheim, and entered the latter town and also Heidelberg.

This division is not so considerable as to create apprehensions of an extensive and lasting invasion,

ion, while the Imperial army is at hand. The chief object of it indeed seems to be fresh plunder of provisions and money; but it deprives the Archduke and the allied army of those forces that might be drawn from the defence of the Lower Rhine; it prolongs the state of anxiety, and renders the right wing of the Austrians constantly floating, if I may so express myself. There is no doubt that the enemy will take care to keep up this diversion, by occupying the attention of the Archduke *Charles* at once in Switzerland and on the Lower Rhine.

It was in the beginning of October that the Archduke removed his head-quarters to Dorneschingen, and till the 20th of the same month, he had had neither the time nor the means, and perhaps not the intention, of recovering, by a general action, his former positions on the Helvetic territory. Even the advanced posts and the bridge-head which had been preserved between Constance and Schaffhausen had given way on the 9th, in an action, the nature of which we know only from the highflown and laconic reports of *Maffena*.

Amidst the mysteries, contradictions, and falsities which fill the German Newspapers, we find that the advantage has in fact remained with the French: after some very hard-fought battles they succeeded in forcing the Allies to cross the

Rhine. The army of *Condé* and the Russian regiment of *Bauer* which defended Constance, were compelled to evacuate the town in spite of their courageous efforts, and after honourable losses. Nor could the posts of Businguer and Disenhoffen be maintained.

The allied army has returned completely to the line they occupied in the end of April, but encroached by the country of the Grisons as far as the heads of the Rhine. Will they continue there on the defensive, or will they attempt, before they are forced to close the Campaign on this theatre drenched with blood, to fix their winter-quarters in Switzerland? This question will not long remain undecided.

If we carry our attention to the other side of the Alps we shall perceive a counterpart of the reverses experienced in Switzerland. It is true that the Austrian army obtained new advantages: all the attempts of the enemy who had descended from the valleys into the plain of Piedmont were defeated; but by recovering the possession of the upper chain of mountains and of the grand-passes as far as the Grisons, they deprive the two grand Imperial armies of a speedy communication, expose the western part of Italy to inroads, and will compel the Austrians to station Divisions at the foot and on the flank of the Alps to protect Piedmont and Lombardy.

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The execution of this system of Divisions was confided to several columns of the subsidiary army which had been raised in Savoy and Dauphiné by General Championet. These detachments began in August to make their way through the great longitudinal valleys, following the courses of the rivers by which they are formed and watered. To the south, from Mount Viso and Château-Dauphin one of these detachments marched to Saluzzo; a second going from Fenestrelle made themselves masters of Pignerol, and of the valleys inhabited by the Vaudois; and a third took possession of Suza and even of the little town of Rivoli, only two leagues from Turin. At the same time on the right of these parties, a Division of the army of Italy, setting out from the neighbourhood of Coni, entered the plain of the Stura, menacing Fossano and Savigliano. On the left, to the north of Mount Cenis, another column rushed from the little St. Bernard into the Duchy of Aosta from which they drove the Imperialists, and were hardy enough to advance as far as the fort of Bardo, which closes the valley on the side of Ivrea. Lastly, General Thureau, who was stationed in the Upper Valais with a Division of the army which again assumes the title of the Danube, passed the Simplon, invaded the valley of Domo-d'Osola, and approached Lake Major.

These different collateral attacks met little resistance: they were effected with forces not equal to the enterprises, had not the Austrians been still weaker. In a short time, however, the balance was restored, the progress of the inroad stopped, and most of those columns driven back to the Alps.

General Thureau, informed of Marshal Suvarov's march, and being attacked and beaten on the 22d and 23d of September by Prince Victor de Roben, who defended the issue of the Vale of Domo-Dossola, re-ascended the Simplon, lost it, and did not halt till he was beyond Brleg, in the Upper Valais: but Massena's successes have facilitated his return to Domo-Dossola, and replaced him in his former positions.

In the end of September, General Kray, leading a strong detachment into the Duchy of Aosta, saved Ivrea and Fort Bardo, by repulsing the enemy in the higher Valley, which, however, was still in their possession on the 15th of October.

The French column which had made themselves masters of Suza and Rivoli, were compelled to retreat on the 24th of September towards Exiles and Mount Cenis, after an obstinate battle with the divisions under General Bellegarde and General Kaim, who were completely victorious.

On

On the same day (Sept. 24th) Prince *Lieb-stein*, who had marched from Savigliano on the 22d, took Pignerola, and dislodged the enemy from the neighbouring valleys.

These fortunate expeditions had been preceded by a victory of greater magnitude gained over 12,000 French encamped on the plain of the Stura. On the 14th of September the latter had driven the Austrian advanced posts beyond Fossano and Savigliano, and kept possession of those places, while two other Republican corps, one from Pignerola the other from the environs of Geneva, were advancing to join them. Marshal *Melas*, without loss of time, struck his camp at Bra and marched on the 17th to Savigliano, while General *Kray* attacked Fossano. At the former point the resistance was obstinate and the event of the action long doubtful; at length the enemy being turned on his right retired to Coni, and Fossano was abandoned.

From that day the Austrians have maintained their superiority; the French have undertaken nothing new to disturb the security of the Upper Piedmont, but on the contrary General *Cham-pionet*, now Commander-in-Chief of the two combined armies of Italy and the Alps, has since those disasters removed his head-quarters as far back as Final, on the western River, but, without abandoning his former position in the Apennines

nines, whence he covers Genoa, and watches over Genoa.

The last dispositions taken by General *Melas* seem to foreshow that this fortress, celebrated for the attacks it has sustained at different times without having ever fallen, will very soon be besieged. To the difficulties of its approaches, and the new fortifications with which it was surrounded by King *Charles Emmanuel*, who saved it, the French have added some works and provided it with every means of defence. They have been successful in having long postponed the commencement of the siege; the proximity of their army will disturb the operations of it, and probably a new battle will determine its fate. The lot of Genoa has grown worse and worse by the daily progress made by General *Klenau*, on the eastern river. This city almost famished, a prey to discord, and deprived of all commerce, waits in consternation to know what master it is to belong to.

The territory of that Republic, the country of Tenda, that of Nice, and a part of the province of Mondovi, are at present the only and very precarious possessions of the French Republic beyond the Alps; for, at length, after so many delays, proclamations, and movements, the state of Rome, with its metropolis, and Civita-Veccchia are delivered from the tri-coloured

loured standard and from the vultures that were  
fættering in that country beneath the foliage of  
the trees of liberty.

For six weeks a handful of Frenchmen and  
Roman *Patriots*, at the head of whom were the  
two young Princes *Borghese* and *Santa Croce*, de-  
fended themselves in Rome in defiance of the  
Neapolitan army, their General *Rodio*, their tri-  
umphant standard, and emphatic manifestoes. It  
is unknown to what period this strange resistance  
would have continued, had not an able officer,  
*M. Bourcard*, a Swiss general in the service of the  
King of the Two Sicilies, taken the command  
of the Neapolitans, and put an end to this eternal  
blockade with the assistance of a small Austrian  
corps under General *Frolich*, and a part of the  
British squadron which appeared before Civita  
Vecchia.

This petty war was less bloody than those of  
the ancient Romans and Samnites. Some skir-  
mishes, metamorphosed into battles in the rho-  
domontades published at Paris, preceded the  
peaceable surrender of Rome, the Castle of St.  
Angelo, and Civita-Vecchia. On the 28th of  
September General *Bourcard* and Captain *Trow-  
bridge* signed the capitulation proposed by Ge-  
neral *Garnier*, having first made some alterations  
in it. *Garnier* had no more than 1600 French  
troops mixed with the National *Patriots*. This  
little

little corps obtained the honours of war, and permission to return to France. As for the *Brutuses*, *Scipios*, and *Catos* of modern Rome, they fought no battle of Philippi to defend aspiring liberty ; they contented themselves with the liberty of following their protectors, of deserting the scenes of their civic exploits, and of embarking at Civita-Veccchia for France, there to bewail their consulship and their Capitol, and to beg charity.

On the 30th the Neapolitans took possession of Rome : Civita-Veccchia surrendered to the English squadron. Ancona, which held out, must certainly have capitulated a few days after. Thus, from Geneva to the point of Calabria, that Italy which has for eleven centuries served as a prey to foreigners, and as a theatre for their usurpations, escapes once more from the noble descendants of the Sicambri and Visigoths.

Let us pass to the other extremity of this line of carnage on which democratic fanaticism and war have let loose all their scourges ; and here we find still less ground for consolation ; no hope of seeing a speedy termination of the general calamity.

Few expeditions have been incited by motives more powerful, or begun with appearances more favourable, than that against Holland. A great political and commercial interest urged England to restore

restore the independence and ancient laws of that Republic; for which reason, however repugnant, and very justly, the Nation be to continental enterprises, this was universally applauded; nor does its failure invalidate the propriety and utility of it.

An army of thirty-five thousand men, a squadron, a first debarkation effected with hardly any trouble, the Zuyder Zee and its fleet surrendered at the first moment, the eagerness of the troops, the proximity of succours; the difference of opinion, and perhaps of plan, which appeared among the Batavians and their tyrannical allies, the comparative weakness in which their resources of defence still languished, all seemed to give an earnest of successes more or less rapid. Indeed, no doubt appears to have been entertained of the issue, by concentrating the whole attack on one point, a slip of sandy mud almost under water, where it became impracticable to spread the forces.

Confidence likewise was placed in the dispositions of the inhabitants, the majority of whom regretted the Stadholderate as much as they hated the domineering strangers who held the sceptre of the Republic. The presence of the Hereditary Prince of Orange, and of a number of officers estimable for their zeal, and possessing influence from their birth, rank, and property, with proclamations and correspondences, kept

up the hope of a grand movement in the interior as soon as the army approached.

But there, as in Switzerland, and as in all wars where aid is sought from the intestine divisions of a country, experience has proved what little dependence is to be placed upon this fragile alliance between a foreign army not yet victorious, and malecontents who have no power, and are obliged to acknowledge the law of the strongest.

"The hope of success," observes a writer worthy of attention and credit as well for his military knowledge as the sagacity of his remarks, "may much more reasonably be founded on the wisdom of plans, the valour and experience of the troops, the talents of the Generals, the confidence they inspire, and their activity in pursuing their enterprises, than on correspondences often suspicious, accounts exaggerated by prejudice or interest, or on the promises of the dissatisfied who, strictly watched by the ruling party, find themselves frequently compelled by a motive of self-preservation even to fight under the standards of their enemies, and to show the more ardour the more they are marked for their disgust and opposition to the established Government\*."

These

\* *Précis des Evénemens Militaires.* Published at Hamburg by Pérthes and at London by Debrett in Piccadilly. This periodical

These reflexions drawn from history and the study of the human heart cannot be too often considered. However usurped, however unjust be a Government, it possesses as a Government alone all the force in which a majority of malecontents is deficient. If to the advantage of the public authority it add that of being the chief and the centre of a considerable party attached to its cause, partakers of its dangers, and combined in its resistance from a conformity of principles or situation ; if, in short, this Government, instituted by a violent and popular Revolution, should have received from it the energy and the terrible resources which the passions inspire, rarely will that passive portion of the inhabitants whom it has condemned to submission, and who risk every thing in a premature revolt, be armed against it with any success.

Thus, no district of the United Provinces, even among those in which the House of Orange

periodical work, six numbers of which have appeared, deserves to be distinguished from the ever-increasing multitude of compilations and publications of the same kind. It presents an accurate view and critical investigation of the military operations, written with great impartiality as well as knowledge : the official accounts are compared, reduced to the standard of history, and connected by a general and methodic narrative, illustrated by the observations of the author, who may say, *Ed io ancora son pittore.*

has retained the greatest number of partizans, has risen. At first, a commotion broke out in Guelderland, but it was immediately quelled by the *Patriots* only, and has not since appeared. Very few of the inhabitants of North Holland have even dared to run the risk of declaring themselves and trusting to the success of their deliverers.

His Royal Highness the Duke of York, receiving no assistance from the country, now found that he had every thing to do by the sword. His position, the state of the climate, the rains, the reinforcements received by the enemy, their entrenchments, and their activity, were great obstacles, which were daily increased. In enterprises which depend upon the concurrence of political and military means, when success is chiefly expected from the suddenness of the first operations, from the confidence given to the malecontents, and the dread with which the threatened Government is struck, the favourable juncture is very fleeting, it is here and gone in a few days; and once gone is rarely recovered. Not fifty thousand men would have effected in the beginning of October what twenty thousand would probably have done in the end of August.

At the earlier of these periods, the French auxiliaries did not amount to more than twelve thousand men; the little Batavian army was in  
part

part neutralized ; a number of the soldiers were wavering and on the point of defection ; serious differences between the Regency at the Hague and General *Brune* impeded the determination of the measures to be taken ; the French, distrustful of their allies, almost treated them as conspirators, and had surrounded their General, *Daendels*, with spies. To put an end to this discord two negotiators were sent from Paris to the Hague for the purpose of reconciling the Batavian Government to their Guardians.

But all these disadvantages were removed by the uncertainty of events, the balancing of the respective forces, and the slowness of the operations. In the beginning of October fresh reinforcements joined the French army, the Batavians were fixed, and everybody foresaw an end to the expedition.

The enemy's line, it is true, had by the action of the 2d been driven to Belevych ; but that position was no less confined and formidable, and the troops defending it were augmented. The Duke of *York*, however, attacked it on the 6th. In this battle the British army displayed their known ardour and firmness, which was apparent through the whole of this short campaign ; but the enemy were not to be dislodged. By this action, and that of the 2d, there were near 7000 English and Russians lost to the army.

army. The loss of the enemy was not less, but it could be more easily repaired, and their defensive suffered little by it.

As every new effort would but expose the combined army to no purpose, it was led back to its former position behind the dykes of the Zuyp: Alkmaer was evacuated, and it soon became necessary from circumstances to abandon the whole of North Holland and the Texel.

But the re-embarkation could not be effected without weakening the defence of the Zuyp, which, as soon as the line had been weakened, the enemy would infallibly have attacked with superior force. If carried, the regiments left to defend it must have been sacrificed, and the remaining part of the army, not embarked, exposed to the like danger. Probably this consideration determined the Duke of York to enter into the following convention with the French General on the 18th.

**ART. I.** From the date of this convention all hostilities shall cease between the two armies.

**ART. II.** The line of demarcation between the said armies shall be the line of their respective outposts as they now exist.

**ART. III.** The continuation of all works offensive and defensive shall be suspended on both sides, and no new ones shall be undertaken.

**ART.**

**ART. IV.** The mounted batteries taken possession of at the Helder, or at other positions within the lines now occupied by the combined English and Russian army shall be restored in the state in which they were taken, or (in case of improvement) in their present state, and all the Dutch artillery taken therein shall be preserved.

**ART. V.** The combined English and Russian army shall embark as soon as possible, and shall evacuate the territory, coasts, islands, and internal navigation of the Dutch Republic by the 30th of November 1799, without committing any devastation by inundations, cutting the Dykes, or otherwise injuring the sources of navigation.

**ART. VI.** Any ship of war or other vessels which may arrive with reinforcements for the combined British and Russian army shall not land the same, and shall be sent away as soon as possible.

**ART. VII.** General *Brune* shall be at liberty to send an officer within the lines of the Zuyp and to the Helder to report to him the state of the batteries, and the progress of the embarkation. His Royal Highness the Duke of *York* shall be equally at liberty to send an officer within the French and Batavian lines to satisfy himself that no new works are carried on, on either side. An officer of rank and distinction shall be sent from each army respectively to guarantee the execution of this convention.

**ART. VIII.** Eight thousand prisoners of war, French and Batavians, taken before the present campaign and now detained prisoners in England, shall be restored without conditions to their respective countries. The proportion and the choice of such prisoners for each to be determined between the two Republics. Major General *Knox* shall remain with the French army to guarantee the execution of this article.

**ART.**

ART. IX. The cartel agreed upon between the two armies for the exchange of the prisoners taken during the present campaign shall continue in full force till it shall be carried into complete execution; and it is farther agreed, that the Dutch Admiral *De Winter* shall be considered as exchanged.

Concluded at Alkmaer, October 18, 1799; by the under-signed General officers, furnished with full powers to this effect.

(Signed) J. KNOX, Major General,

(Signed) ROSTOULANT, General of Brigade:  
Approved,

(Signed) FREDERICK Duke of YORK, Commander  
in Chief of the combined Armies of His  
Britannic Majesty and the Emperor of  
Russia,

(Signed) A. MITCHELL, Vice Admiral of the Blue, &c.

Approved by the Commander in Chief of the French and  
Bavarian Army,

(Signed) BRUNN.

This termination, compared with the outset of the enterprise, the state of the chosen forces to which it was entrusted, and the favourable auspices under which it began, has created no less surprise than vexation; but it proves the great uncertainty there is in the fortune of war, what a concurrence there must in these days be of precaution and means, and that a single error in the best concerted plan may overturn designs which every appearance seems to favour. Had the difficulties of the expedition been foreseen in their

their full extent; probably the advantage of the season would have been secured; which was rendered the more necessary by the place chosen for disembarkation. There has been no decisive action on either side; the honour of the British troops remains unsullied: none of those defeats which are followed with great disasters have tarnished their conduct, or caused their retreat; but the result of the attempt increases our regret for the loss of the noble fellows it has cost.

In concluding this summary of the general events of the war, we are led to an observation which may be of use to those who are fond of conjectures.

This campaign presents only the common sequel of the vicissitudes which accompany most campaigns: they who were conquerors when the sun was upon the line, are the conquered by the time he gains his summer height, and again recover themselves by the autumnal equinox, or have the winter before them to prepare for future vicissitudes. Unfortunately, war, ever since men have appealed to it for the settlement of their differences, has rarely determined otherwise than by this alternative of good and bad fortune.

But the present crisis bears a character so terrible in its nature, its causes, and its effects, that the mind calculates the accidents of it with all the impetuosity of imagination. No man is or ought to be indifferent to it; every one according to his passions or his interest enlarges or diminishes the scope of it; now, if events do not attain the line he traces, the scale of regret quickly preponderates and that of hope kicks the beam. This man holds all victories in contempt till one be gained in Burgundy or under the walls of Paris; that, the moment a reverse is experienced in Swabia or Holland, sees the revolutionary armies recovering their former ascendancy; a third class of men, more tenacious, a sort of machines wound up by visionaries, think nothing of impediments and checks, and are persuaded that the Republic in the midst of her greatest successes is upon the brink of ruin.

Good sense calls us from these magnifying and multiplying glasses, and turns us to the faithful mirror which reflects objects as they really are. We are to consider the nature of things, and not that of our desires.

We see that the reverses which the Allies have experienced stop the effect of those successes which were hurrying the Russians to the re-establishment of *Louis XVIII.* on the throne of his ancestors. This justly afflicts those who are anxious

to see the plunderers of Monarchies and Republics excluded from their conquests and forced back into their own country ; but whoever coolly observes the grand spoils that have been torn from them, the extent of the resources by which Europe is still defended against new usurpations, and the means by which it may be secured from the snare of separate cessions of peace, as well as from the irreparable misfortune of a disgraceful and burdensome peace, will not yield to a premature despair.

He will not be alarmed at least by any dangerous disparity between the two armies. The forces of the Allies are in proportion to those which the Directory employ beyond their frontiers. The major part of the Austrian army is still as uninjured, as admirably organised, and as formidable as it was in the month of August.

Let us take a view of the approximate numbers of the combatants. We say approximate, for we do not pretend to arrive at the arithmetic precision of the remembrancers who repeat the Gazettes, and at hap-hazard tell you to a certainty the very number of the draught horses used for the conveyance of provisions and ammunition.

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OCT 1

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FF 2

*Armies*

Oct 2

*Armies of the French Republic.*

The army of the Danube, comprehending all the forces in Switzerland under General Massena,	75,000
The army of the Rhine, from Strasbourg to Mentz, comprehending the garrison of the latter place,	30,000
In Holland, on the Meuse, Moselle and Lower Rhine,	35,000
The armies of the Alps and Italy, under the command of General Championet,	55,000
	195,000

*Allied Armies.*

The Austrian army in Italy,	70,000
The army of Swabia, under the Archduke Charles, including the detached divisions of Staray and of Meerfeld,	60,000
The Russian army, composed of 12,000 men, forming the division with Marshal Suvarof, and 18,000 remaining with General Korsakof,	30,000
The Bavarian Corps, that of Condé, and troops of the Empire,	18,000
	178,000

These

These estimates are rather above than below the real state; for it is well known the effective troops of armies are much lower than the fictitious complement displayed in public statements, particularly at the end of a campaign.

From this enumeration it appears that if the French armies employed in the defence of Holland and on the Meuse and Lower Rhine, had been fixed to those points, the Allies would have had the superiority of number in the East and South. Twenty thousand Austrians would have been enough to face the army of the Rhine, and there would have remained 80,000 men to be employed against *Massena*.

But as it cannot be doubted that the greater part of the army of Holland will be sent to Mentz, whither the corps cantoned on the Meuse and the Moselle are already marching, the enemy will assemble on that point about 45,000 men, which will compel the Archduke *Charles* either to detach a considerable division to defend the Circles of the Upper Rhine and Franconia, or to remain with his troops, as an army of observation, in his excellent position of Doneschingen, without taking an active part in the operations which may be planned for the war in Switzerland.

It seems then very improbable that the Russians alone, and the weakened divisions of *Petrash*

strach and Yellachich, posted to the left of the combined army, should be in a state of resuming the offensive. Were the respective forces even equal, the French have the advantage of occupying a much shorter line than those of the Allies, and also that, the importance of which we again find experience demonstrating, of forming one and the same army under a single Chief.

Notwithstanding these differences, we still perceive in the opposed forces a sufficient equilibrium to remove the apprehensions of Europe as to the issue of events. In a few months, willingly or by compulsion, an army of contingents, or subsidiary troops of the Empire, will be raised, which may be reckoned at twelve thousand men : besides which, in the Circles of the Upper Rhine and Swabia they are endeavouring, at this moment, to generalize and to organize those levies in mass, that *Landsturm*, of which we formerly spoke.

If the importance of this succour, as a means of defence, had been sooner attended to ; had the German Princes been less scared at the idea of seeing their people under arms than at seeing the French every year devouring both people and princes ; and had such disastrous and such long lessons impressed on the minds of the sovereigns and their councils, that a conquering Revolution, supported by the most extraordinary and most extensive

extensive means, required the resistance to it to be *nationalized*, there would have been no occasion for congresses, writings, and secret treaties.

But it will be long before this too tardy measure can be useful, from the want of skill and experience in those popular levies. To form them into a solid bulwark for the public preservation and security, it is necessary to be able to sacrifice the little jealousies of authority, and to give to those masses the character of the old Helvetic militia, of the national guard of France, or of the militia of England.

It is less easy to calculate the additional strength that may be received by the French armies. More than eighty thousand men guard the interior, and will not be removed from it, while the royalists in the West, the mal-contents repressed in the South, and the Jacobins in the centre, menace the Government; but the pressing of the conscripts is still carried on without intermission. If, whether by plunder abroad, or by the success of one of those expedients which the Republic calls her system of finances, the Directory should be able to support and pay, in any manner, their embodied defenders, we may expect to see them perhaps with four hundred thousand of them under arms in six months.

Whatever

Whatever may be their military situation in future; it becomes very evident that the Allies, at this moment, scarcely counterbalance their efforts. The preceding superiority of the combined armies has vanished, because it depended upon circumstances, upon a rapid and powerful impulse, which has not been supported, or which unexpected disagreements have slackened; and because, in short, a single defeat in the contest against the Revolution is more fatal in its consequences than one or two victories can possibly be favourable.

Would it be rash to presage the consequences of this state of things? Would it be a heresy deserving of the Inquisition to imagine that far from carrying the war into France, far even from reaching the democratized colonies and territories she has usurped in Europe, her enemies will not find it easy to defend the actual *status quo*, while their forces continue in the present proportion, or unless some explosion in the interior of the French Republic paralyze her resources, her armies, and her projects.

Now, as it would be one of the most pernicious visions to depend upon such a contingency, it only remains to choose between peace and an augmentation of forces more proportioned to the object proposed in continuing the war.

Nor would such an augmentation suffice if the Parliament Government were left in the exclusive possession of unity, of harmony between those who order and those who execute, and of an invariable good understanding between the movements of the armies, the subordination of the powers, and the simplicity of the end to be attained. Every league which does not take such a character as this, which does not own one supreme and absolute chief, which is not bound by a sacred engagement not to deviate either in its intentions, its projects, or in the management of its means, and of which the armies are not employed in a direction expedient for all its members; such a league I say will make those recede whose interest would be to join it, and will conclude a peace as unfortunately as it conducted a war.

Any other termination would be a novelty in history. Let then a confederacy be formed more compact, more harmonized, and which shall bring into the field more powerful forces against France, or let a peace be concluded before more serious dissensions, or disasters less retrievable, make it an event of compulsion.

One might be induced to think this moment near, and the want of resources complete, by the late proclamation addressed, on the 10th of October, to the Circles of the Empire by the

**Archduke Charles.** The exhortation it contains is really a signal of distress. After representing to the Empire in colours as strong as true the danger which threatens it, his Royal Highness invites the States to furnish provisions for the Imperial army, and calls upon private individuals to make patriotic gifts, even of their linen and trinkets. It is before the expiration too of the first campaign that it is found necessary to have recourse to expedients so disproportioned to the demands of the juncture !

But these embarrassments will surprise none who reflect, that for twenty years Austria has been constantly at war ; that she carries it on at present without any foreign subsidies ; and that, notwithstanding so ruinous a situation, she has recruited, supported, improved, and raised to the highest rank those armies which are as much to be admired for their composition as for their discipline, for their labours as for their patience and their firmness, and which have not been conquered since the renewal of hostilities ; which are immoveable columns of safety for the Continent, and without which the Revolution would have spread its frightful monuments over the North and over the South.

## FRANCE.

We avoid as much as we possibly can entertaining our readers with the arithmetic conjuring-book, the varied fictions, the wise calculations, and the dissertations which compose the history of the finances of the French Republic; but, all at once, the Directory have laid by their bombast and their lamentations and sent the Legislative Body a message, with the singularity of which many have been struck.

In this message the Directory urge the Councils, "to secure for the year 8 receipts equal to the wants of the Government, and to complete those of the last year;" but, as before the Councils determined upon this *complement*, they required a *real statement* of the receipts in hand, the Executive Regency have thought proper to send them the following:

Receipts of the first nine months as *Livres*.

appears by the Report of the Minister of Finances of the 7th Thermidor (July 25th) a-

mounted to - - - - - 310,612,183

Those of the three last months, including the requisitions to be charged on landed property, about

- - - - - 165,300,000

Total received in the year 8, L. 475,912,183

From this summary view, the Directory conclude that the difference between the receipts and expences, which are estimated at 725 millions, is nearly from 240 to 250 millions; and they conjure the Councils not only to provide for this arrearage but also to take care that it may not happen again in the ensuing year. "It belongs to your wisdom, citizens representatives, to resolve this problem in a manner worthy of the national justice."

However, they do not conceal from the councils that the commotions in some of the departments will occasion a *necessary diminution* in the direct contributions, and that it will be difficult to prevent a temporary *great loss* in the produce of the indirect taxes. For example, the duties of the customs, which last year produced 3,800,000 livres, are estimated at no more than 4 millions for the year 8.

To settle such accounts it would be necessary to be in possession of the vouchers, and to be able to ascertain the truth of them. For want of these indispensable documents, the opinions upon this new account are as opposite as black and white: some have accused the Directory of designedly exaggerating the *deficit*, while others suspect them of having lessened it. Ever since the existence of the Republican finances there has been the same difference of opinion.

Some

Some remarks which I shall here present to my readers will serve to ascertain the meaning of the Directorial message : they are addressed to us by Sir *Francis d'Ivernois*, who has constituted himself the real Comptroller-General of the French finances and grown familiar with the official gibberish of them.

" SIR, St. James's Place, Nov. 6, 1799.

" As you wish to have my opinion upon the degree of credit to be given to the last report of the Directory, I must first tell you, that after having compared it with all the preceding, it appears to me to be arithmetically exact: but this is not to say, that when they state the amount of their receipts at 476 millions, they have not found the secret of swelling them to nearly a fourth more than the real sum.

" When they state those of the nine first months at 310 millions, they refer simply to a report of the minister of finances, dated the 7th Thermidor, (July 25,) a report that has not been published, but which we do not want since the letter written by *Ramel* to the deputy *Genissieux* on the 5th day of the ninth month, in which is the following passage : ' You compel me to publish it; I declare that the *active* receipts do not exceed 220 millions. What! have

- have the revenues, which you thought sufficient,
- yielded in the two first thirds of the year only
- 220 millions ; whereas, to have been sufficient,
- 466 millions ought to have been collected ; and
- yet you say there is little or no deficit !'

" After such a discovery, we may ask, How is it that 310 millions can have been collected at the end of the ninth month, when only 220 millions had been received during the eight first ? *Ramel* himself shall explain the mystery : ' If the treasury,' adds he, ' has IN APPEARANCE paid a larger sum than these 220 millions, it is because 50 millions have been borrowed upon the arrears of the contributions ; it is because about 17 millions of *annuity notes* (*bons de rentes*) have been carried to account ; it is because the contributors have had the benefit of negotiating delegations.'

" These delegations are real anticipations, or a new kind of orders to be received as cash in payment for taxes or national property. Now, though by the lenders they were never taken for above the half of their nominal value, they figure for the whole value in the books of the treasury on their return thither. As 60 millions and probably much more have returned, one half of that sum, in the first place, is to be deducted from the apparent receipts.

" The

“ The *loan* upon the arrears of the contribution can only signify in plain language, that fifty millions have been clandestinely applied to the expences of the year 7, out of those arrears which were solemnly mortgaged to the lenders of the year 6, who have thus unscrupulously *lent* that sum. It may strictly be placed among the receipts collected during the year, but not among those that belong to the year, for the Government was not authorised to dispose of it for the current service, nor did it appertain to the budget of the seven hundred and twenty-five millions.

“ As to the *annuity notes* (*bons de rentes*) received in payment for the direct contributions, the treasury no doubt is in the right to place them to account in the statement of receipts, as it places the eighty-nine millions of annuities and pensions on the column of expences: yet as the notes with which it pays them become useless to it the moment they return, which is very quick, they are rather receipts *effected* than *effective* receipts. As the annuitants have this year received only six months of their annuities, there is yet forty-four millions and a half to be deducted from these pretended receipts, or *recettes disponibles*.

“ You

" You see, that by means of these three deductions, the four hundred and seventy-six millions of *apparent* receipts are reduced to three hundred and fifty-two millions *Tournois*, or fourteen millions sterling of *active* receipts.

" As of these three hundred and fifty-two millions there are a hundred millions or more that were produced by *extraordinary* resources, which are nearly exhausted for the ensuing year, such as national domains, sales of personal property forfeited, partitions with the parents of emigrants, or with the mortgagees of the royal demesnes, &c. there remain of course for the regular and permanent *ordinary* revenue of France only two hundred and fifty millions. This is about thirty millions more than it produced last year; but this augmentation is not in consequence either of the new taxes or the additional duties: very far from it, for the indirect contributions have been less productive since the increase of the tariffs. It is entirely owing to the army being upon the frontiers, from which they have been able to gather *in kind* the land assessments, and thus to recover a value of near forty millions, which would never have been got in but for the assistance of those military providers.

" These

" These *requisitions* being better *organized*  
 " than heretofore, they will no doubt last as long;  
 " as the war: but this resource is not nearly so  
 " considerable as it might be imagined; for in  
 " the *Moniteur*, No. 335, in which there is a cir-  
 " cumstantial statement of the expences of the  
 " army, it appears that those that may be sup-  
 " plied by *requisitions* in kind, as bread, ra-  
 " tions, forage, fuel, and even new horses, do  
 " not make up a fourth of those expences  
 " that are fixed at 333 millions. We must no  
 " longer then be surprised that *Creyze la Touche*,  
 " who was charged with the report of the last  
 " budget, had the prudence to open it in a  
 " secret committee, and that the Paris papers  
 " announce his statement to have been *afflicting*.  
 " He has apparently removed the rest of the veil,  
 " by showing the double expenditure, and ex-  
 " plaining to his colleagues the difference there  
 " is between receipts in crown-pieces and re-  
 " ceipts in *delegations* or in *bons*. There is no  
 " doubt of his having been furnished with  
 " vouchers necessary for these explanations, for  
 " the Directory have no interest in concealing their  
 " distress from the Legislative Body, though much  
 " to keep it from the knowledge of those Powers  
 " whom they are endeavouring to detach from  
 " the confederation. It is even with the view of  
 " drawing them the more readily into the snare  
 " VQL. IV. H H C " that

" that they have now been doubling their  
 c<sup>on</sup>demnations while they exaggerate their  
 c<sup>on</sup>tributions - so that their contributions are  
 nice To gain a just idea, therefore, of the problem,  
 " the solution of which they propose to the  
 c<sup>on</sup>wision of the councils, let us see to what their  
 c<sup>on</sup>sideration is now confined. It is ;  
 " 1<sup>st</sup>, To reduce the effective expences  
 " below a thousand millions; which is absolutely  
 " impossible if the fleet and armies are put into  
 " the effective state required by the decrees;  
 " 2<sup>dly</sup>, To provide about 300 millions to  
 " discharge the surplus of the expences and  
 " services of the laff year;  
 " 3<sup>dly</sup>, To keep up the receipts of the year 8  
 " at the same rate as those of the year 7,  
 " and for that purpose to find some extra-  
 " ordinary resource to supply the place of those  
 " which have been exhausted;  
 " Lastly, To grant an additional subsidy, suf-  
 " ficient to save the Directory from struggling  
 " with such a deficit as that of the last year.  
 " To perform this task, the only means they  
 " have hitherto been able to discover is the  
 " forced loan of a hundred millions, and which,  
 " if they extort a tenth of it from the lenders,  
 " will certainly cost the treasury double or  
 " treble.

" Some deputies begin at length to suspect  
 " that the best, or rather the only way of pro-  
 " viding for the *deficit*, would be to renounce  
 " some confiscations, take off most of the se-  
 " questrations, and even revoke in a mass all  
 " the fiscal measures which have been adopted  
 " since the year 1. It is certain that they were  
 " admirably calculated to complete the disor-  
 " ganization of the finances; and if any man  
 " shall ever have the courage to undertake the  
 " history of them, this monument of extravag-  
 " ances would not fail to possess a peculiar  
 " kind of instruction, and to offer some new  
 " *data in political economy*. This would throw  
 " a new light upon the intemperance, incurable  
 " presumption, and rooted imbecility of the  
 " reformers to whom the French people now  
 " trust their fortune and their fate."

These observations seem very plausible, and several of them are incontrovertible. Unfortunately, however, whether the effective receipts have produced four hundred and seventy-six millions, or only three hundred and sixty millions, whether the deficit be enormous or moderate, the Republic, her levies, her armies have continued nevertheless to exist. The wonder is, not that the finances are in disorder or in a state of poverty, but that neither order,

abundance, nor credit are indispensable to the duration, or even the force of the State. *Voltaire* said of his times, that France must have a tough constitution, as all the mistakes of her physicians had not been able to kill her. What would he say of the phænomenon, far more inconceivable, which she has presented since the year 1789?

It looks as if it were to laugh at the public that this Government has attempted a regular system of finance, by which the receipts are to balance the expences; but the public are not imposed upon by the joke. They know very well that it governs a Revolution, and not an empire, and that the expedients of the one are resorted to when the other is radically exhausted.

Besides, it imitates on a great scale and in a revolutionary style, the usual practice of unskilful monarchical ministers, when they find themselves overwhelmed by the expences. How have they extricated themselves from embarrassment in all wars? By anticipations, by paying in bills, by suspensions in payment, by contracts with farmers of the revenue, by a hundred forced and shameful circumstances, the enumeration of which since the time of *Francis I.* formed in France a curious monument of modern financiering. The Directory and the Councils are following this track; but enlarging upon it.

But

But we are not to admit literally the statement of the expences. Retrenchments have lately been made in all the departments of the administration. The war will not cost three hundred and thirty-three millions. Why? Because that sum is equal to the employment of five hundred and sixty-six thousand four hundred and twenty men for the year 8; and not more than two-thirds of that number, if so many, will be raised.

### STATE PAPERS.

*The King of Spain's Answer to the Emperor of Russia.—The Emperor of Russia's Declaration to the Diet of Ratibon.*

We reported in its place the declaration of the Emperor *Paul* against his Catholic Majesty *Charles IV*. As these sovereigns are situated at the opposite extremities of Europe, their rupture can be attended with no very serious consequences to either of them. The dismissing of the respective envoys, the seizure of the Spanish ships in the ports of Russia, and the interruption of the commerce between the two states, form nearly the circle of possible hostilities.

But as the conduct of the Emperor *Paul* appears to proceed from a general system of attacking

ing the French Republic even through her allies, and to consider as such almost all the governments which refuse to oppose her, the declaration against Spain has perhaps given less uneasiness to that power than to those which exhortatory or menacing warnings may cause to fear the resentment of the Emperor.

Nothing is more common in the annals of war, than this kind of constraint exercised by powerful Sovereigns over secondary States who are compelled to espouse their quarrels. These infringements upon the independence of nations are often made on the most frivolous pretences : in the present instance, at least, this species of dictatorship may derive its title from an unheard-of circumstance, a general danger proved by the desolation of one half of Europe, the projects of a political fanaticism still oppressive and menacing even when subversions are suspended, and lastly the common interest which seems to call upon Sovereigns to save themselves.

That these coercive measures, these obligatory crusades may hurt only the disturbers of the public order, and that they may be efficacious without exciting distrust, it is requisite that the Powers who prescribe these involuntary accessions to their alliance should furnish only examples of disinterestedness, that the unwilling may not have it in their power to censure and recriminate, and that they

they who embrace their cause may be conscious that they are embracing the cause of justice itself.

In the next place, the authority of such acts is absolutely owing to the concurrence of those who are called upon to execute them. If one of the confederated Powers sets the example without being followed, what influence can these declarations acquire? The silence of the other Allies is an implied disavowal of them. All determinations of this kind which are not unanimously sanctioned or supported by the coalition may become injurious, by discovering to the enemy that there is a difference of opinion in the league, and by assuring the States whose alliance is to be compelled, that they have nothing to fear from a refusal.

It is to this character of divisibility and incoherence in the actions of the first confederacy that the complete ineffectualty of most of their political manifesto's was attributed.

If all the combined Sovereigns had signed the declaration of the Emperor *Paul* to the King of Spain, surely the Council of his Catholic Majesty would have thought better than to have replied in the following terms:

*The Answer of the King of Spain to the Manifesto of the Emperor of Russia.*

The religious fidelity with which I have endeavoured, and shall ever endeavour, to preserve the alliance I have contracted

ed

ed with the French Republic, and the bonds of friendship, and good understanding that subsist between the two nations, and which the *obvious analogy* of their common political interests has cemented, have excited the jealousy of some powers, particularly since the new coalition was formed; the object of which, instead of the chimerical and ostensible strife of re-establishing order, is rather to distract it, by domineering over the nations who do not join in their ambitious views. — Among those powers, Russia has been desirous of rendering herself particularly conspicuous towards me. Her Emperor, not content with arrogating titles which cannot in any manner belong to him, and thus manifesting his views, has, in consequence of not experiencing on my part the condescension he expected, issued a Declaration of War, which need only be published to demonstrate his want of Justice. — This decree, literally translated is as follows. (*Here follows the Emperor of Russia's Manifesto.*)

I have seen the above declaration without surprise, because the conduct held with regard to the Charge d'Affaires, and other proceedings no less extraordinary on the part of this Sovereign, long since announced what was to happen; therefore, in dismissing from my court the Russian Charge d'Affairs, M. le Conseiller Barnev, I have been less influenced by motives of resentment than by the imperious considerations of my own dignity. In consequence of these principles, I am far from retorting what the Russian Manifesto contains of incoherent and offensive matter towards me, as well as all other sovereign powers of Europe; and knowing the nature of the influence of England over the present Czar, I begged it as beneath me to reply to this Manifesto, having to render an account of my political relations to the Almighty only, by whose assistance I hope to repel every unjust aggression which presumption and a system of false combination may direct against me and my subjects, for the protection and security of whom I have taken and continue to take the most efficacious precautions; and in making known to them this Declaration

Declaration of war, I authorize them to act hostilely against Russia, her possessions, and her inhabitants.

(Signed by the King's hand.)

St. Ildephonso, Sept. 9th, 1799.

This declaration bears the character of loftiness which no doubt becomes a Sovereign whose honour is attacked. However his Catholic Majesty's secretary would have more skilfully displayed the magnanimity of his master, if in expressing his resentment he had not added that of his tender friendship for a Republic which decapitates kings, which consecrates regicide by a periodical celebration, and which in the effusions of its frankness takes annually an oath of hatred to Royalty. A pleasant *analogy of interests* between such a government and one of the most absolute monarchies!

Very different from jealousy is the sentiment that should be excited among the other Powers by so unnatural a connexion. It is more with pity than apprehension that they see the forced vassalage to which Spain has submitted under the fine name of alliance : an alliance so far from being free, that Charles IV. could not break it off without endangering his crown and the very existence of his monarchy.

But is it by arming eighty thousand men in order to restore that of France to the house of Bourbon that the Emperor of Russia has disturbed

*public order?* Can this absurd reproach be found signed by the pen of a grandson of *Louis XIV.*? It is to the memory of that monarch to whom the king of Spain owes his throne, it is to his posterity, it is to reason, to general justice and decorum, that the Court of Madrid ought to render the account which it reserves for the Almighty. This is the first time, I believe, that a Roman Catholic Sovereign has dared to call upon the Deity to witness *his good understanding and religious friendship* with the destroyers of Christianity, with the murderers of his family, with the enemies of all civil and moral institutions.

As to the *dignity* of his Catholic Majesty, is it to be described in the functions of the *Sbirri* of the French Republic lately exercised by the Spanish Ministry, and by the Commandants of Arragon, Navarre, and Catalonia, against the royalists of Languedoc?

Those unfortunate insurgents, after their dispersion, confiding in *Castilian honour* took refuge in Spain. The Directory immediately claimed them; they claimed them just as they had required the Regency of Basle in 1797 to deliver up to them *Richer Serisy*, who had not been guilty of any State crimes, but had merely written some pamphlets; and just as they had ordered the Helvetic Corps, after sending *Richer Serisy* to the dungeons of Rochefort, to give up to their vengeance

vengeance the proscribed Deputies of the 18th of Fructidor, (September 4th) who were to be found on the territory of the Cantons.

This consistent government, whom we now see impudently invoking the *Law of Nations* in favour of *Napper Tandy*, was obeyed at Madrid with the most servile readiness.

And as if this atrocious violation of hospitality in the persons of the French who were martyrs to their zeal for the House of their Sovereign, were not sufficient to satisfy their persecutors, his excellency my Lord D'Urquijo, the minister at the head of the department for foreign affairs, exerted all his powers to convince *Guillemardet*, the Republican ambassador, of the infinite joy it gave the king of Spain to deliver up the adherents of *Louis XVIII.* to the executioners of the Directory.

" It is to me a peculiar satisfaction," says the generous *Urquijo* in his letter to citizen *Guillemardet*, " to assure you in the name of his Majesty, that his direct interest in the tranquillity of the French Republic, and in THE PRESERVATION OF ITS GOVERNMENT UNALTERED, are of such weight in his eyes, that your hints were not necessary to stimulate his desires."

After giving an account of the measures ordered for causing all the refugee Royalists to be seized and given up to the tribunals of the French

*Republic*, he adds, on the 4th of September;

" Precautions have been taken to detect the  
 " frauds and arts of such *Royalists* as may appear  
 " with Republican passports. I flatter myself  
 " you will perceive in the employment of these  
 " means a strong desire and constant attention  
 " on the part of his Majesty to contribute with  
 " all his power to the interest of the French  
 " Republic and to the solidity of its Government."

In fact, it was in consequence of these *honourable* means that different refugee Royalists were arrested, delivered at the frontiers, and shot at Toulouse.—Never did the Republics of Geneva and St. Marino descend to such ignorance.—This is the degree of glory attained in these days by the inheritance of *Charles V.*! All the speeches of the revolutionary declaimers against monarchy, the writings of the Paris *philosophers*, and the victories of their armies, are less fatal to royalty than the degradation into which it has precipitated itself in several States.

Let us now compare the late Declaration of the Emperor of Russia to the German Diet with the Gallic fawning of the court of Madrid. In that paper we see the Emperor taking the character and using the language one would have supposed belonged to a king of Spain, as he had taken his place by stepping forward to succour the unfortunate Duchess of *Orléans*, whom Spanish dignity suffered to languish in indigence in Catalonia,

*Declaration made by His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias  
to the Members of the German Empire.*

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, ever animated with zeal for the cause of Sovereigns, and wishing to put a stop to the ravages and disorders which have been spread by the imperious government under which France groans, to the remotest countries, has fully determined to dispatch his sea and land forces for the support of the sufferers, and to restore royalty in France; without however admitting any partition of that country; to re-establish the ancient forms of Government in the United Netherlands and in the Swiss Cantons; to maintain the integrity of the German Empire, and to look for his reward in the happiness and tranquillity of Europe. Providence has blessed his arms, and hitherto the Russian troops have triumphed over the enemies of thrones, religion, and social order.

His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias having thus declared his views, and the motives by which he is guided, addresses this declaration to all the Members of the German Empire, inviting them to unite their forces with his, to destroy their common enemy as speedily as possible, and to found on his ruins permanent tranquillity for themselves and their posterity.

Should his Imperial Majesty of all the Russias perceive that they support his views, and rally around him, he will, instead of relaxing his zeal, redouble his exertions, and not sheath his sword before he has seen the downfall of the monster which threatens to crush all legal authorities. But should he be left to himself, he will be under the necessity of recalling his forces to his States, and to give up a cause so badly supported by those who ought to be the most interested in its triumph.

Catschina, Sept, 15th, O. S.

(Sept, 26th, 1799.)

Surely

Surely there can be nothing more explicit than this address. Nobody can mistake the intentions of its august author: if distrust should dispute the sincerity of it, let the indignation and enthusiasm which break forth in all the actions of the Emperor be the answer to so hasty a reproach. Hitherto, we repeat it, no proof of ambition has sullied the reign of this monarch. However singular it may appear to many politicians that a Greek emperor should assume the supremacy of a Roman Catholic Order of chivalry, we are called upon by justice to observe that in fact the Order was dissolved; that, deprived of a considerable part of its property, it was upon the point of losing all that remained; that several potentates were going to take advantage of its misfortunes and its state of confusion, to convert the estates of the Order situated in their dominions into alienable property; and that it wanted a powerful and effectual protector to save it from annihilation, and to enable it one day to recover the seat of its authority. Are we to dive into futurity, determined to presage injustice, in order to tarnish a conduct which, to this day, has been attended only with advantages to the lawful proprietors of Malta, without injuring any person whatever?

But with respect to the Declaration itself, it has the disadvantage we have already spoken of.

It

It is the separate promise of a single monarch, and of the monarch who is farthest from the dangers of the Revolution and of the war, the greatest stranger to all preceding connection with the French Republic, and who has the least experienced the power, resistance, and scourges of it.

Austria, in binding herself to this Republic by the treaty of Campo-Formio which expunged from the sovereignties of Europe the most ancient, the most irreproachable state, and the more respectable too from the cause of its subversion; Austria, I say, has precluded herself the power of declaring the Government of France to be illegal and null. The title to the superb domination she has received from it would be shaken were she ever to exclude this Government from the rank of legitimate powers.

Thus, *Paul I.* will find in the Empire none to follow his example. Thus, preceding events, passed experience of very great misfortunes, and the late disasters, will probably prevent the war from taking the character which this monarch is anxious to give it, and which no other State on the Continent will think itself in a situation to support.

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*Of the Return of BUONAPARTE and the accounts  
he gives of himself.*

WERE Europe still in possession of an *Ariosto*, he might, in the poetical adventures of *Buonaparte* in Egypt, and in his narratives, find a sufficient harvest of whim, ridicule, and romance; jumbled with incontestible proofs of courage and talent, to compose an heroic-comic poem.

*Buonaparte* has justified all the different opinions respecting him. Sometimes his operations seem fit subjects for caricature, sometimes they appear to be actions worthy of memory. Able and powerful in action, he becomes ludicrous when he attempts to speak. Here he gives us the idea of a *Hercules*, there of a mountebank. Never were human valour and contemptibleness, capacity and false-greatness, understanding and the shifts of ignorance, insolent immodesty and brilliant qualities, so mixed as in this man, who may be rather called an extraordinary than a superior being.

He has been in a state of exile for thirteen months in a country of Africa, where the elements, wants, dangers, and his enemies conspired his ruin. It was generally thought that he must perish in those regions, to which the destruction of his fleet seemed to confine him. Ten times has the report of his death, and of the

the destruction of his army, been brought to Europe. An obscure end among barbarians would have buried all his renown; already had his party begun to forget him. His disgrace before St. John d'Acre, his retreat through Syria, the defection of his Allies, the approach of the Ottoman army sent to besiege and reduce him, the diminution of his forces, and the discredit into which he was thrown among the natives by his defeats, authorised the opinion that he had arrived at the catastrophe of his Odyssey.

While we thought him lost in the deserts we suddenly hear, first that he has obtained a victory over the Ottomans, and then immediately after that he himself is arrived. He landed on the 1st of October in Provence with several of his principal officers, and two of the *wise men* who accompanied him on his expedition. This unforeseen and un hoped return forms a remarkable episode in the epic poem of the Revolution.

Instead of perishing in the desert, or being exposed to the fury of his mutinous troops, as was predicted in Europe, Buonaparte, flying from Syria, quietly rejoined the half of his army which he had left in Egypt. There new dangers awaited him. Six weeks after the return of the French General to Cairo, the pacha of Natolia with a considerable army entered the

road of Aboukir. The fort of Aboukir, carried by assault, fell into the hands of the Ottomans, who being masters of the coast, had disembarked without obstacle, and were preparing to besiege Alexandria.

*Buonaparte* assembled his forces, and quitting his camp at the Pyramids on the 11th of July, came up with the enemy after a march of fourteen days, defeated them, compelled them to re-embark, and took the pacha himself, his tents, cannon, baggage, and a great number of his officers. The castle of Aboukir was reduced on the 2d of August, after being bombarded a week : it was defended by fifteen hundred Turks, who surrendered themselves prisoners.

Will it be believed ? It was at the moment of so brilliant a victory, and when he was writing an account of it to the Executive Directory, with a pomp of expression truly worthy of the East, that the conqueror, so confirmed in his conquest, was meditating his escape.

Taking advantage of the relaxation and tranquillity which he had produced, and of the vicinity of the sea, he plotted his departure unknown to his army and even to the companions of his flight. Those whom he chose to associate in his fortune received a secret order to repair to the shore : the ship set sail on the 25th of August, while these Argonauts and the forsaken

troops remained still ignorant of the real design of their General.

His star, which had protected his person in his first passage and followed him in the course of his expedition, saved him from the English and Ottoman cruisers, from the squadrons in the Mediterranean, and from storms. The passage, including a week's stay in Corsica, was made in five weeks.

To the magnificent view painted by *Buonaparte* and his composer *Bertbier*, of their scientific, political, hydraulic, and military works, there only wants the companion; namely, a painting of the countenance and sentiments of the army at the point of time when they are informed of the desertion of their General.

The various journalists have, each in his way, investigated the motives of such a resolution. The boldest of them, supported by the crowd of simpletons, have not failed to ascribe this return of *Buonaparte* to his zeal for the *public good*, and to his desire of repairing the defeats of the Republican armies. Without pretending to dive into his secret thoughts, it appears to us clear enough that he eagerly seized the favourable moment of his return to the coast to put an end to his captivity. However delightful the sittings of the National Institute of Cairo, the philosophical education of the Copts, Arabs,

and Mamelukes, and the admirable municipal constitution with which these new elect had been endowed, the future was big with anxiety, and the clouds that hung over it augmented the regret felt for the loss of the charms of the metropolis at home, the hurly-burly of applause, and the more brilliant lot which *Buonaparte* had deigned to sacrifice for the part of the legislator of a naked and stupid people.

However, if the accounts of the Egyptian Ghosts be not a tissue of fables, the situation of their army must be flourishing. No more Turks to throw into the sea, no more seditions to fear; all hearts are conquered, all rebels subdued. The Grand Vizier who does not travel like Marshal Suwarof, had not got beyond Damas in August; the rapidity of his march may even make us doubt whether he will pass it soon. Before the Porte can assemble a new body of troops for a maritime expedition, the preceptors of Egypt will have time to enjoy their conquest peaceably. We predicted, eight months ago, that it would be long before the country were rid of them, if they had only the efforts of the Ottoman monarchy to contend with. The event has but too well justified the prediction.

As for the dramatic and voluminous Journal of the Expedition into Syria, published by General *Bertbier*, there is no fear of its being bound

bound up with Cæsar's Commentaries. This Narrative is disgraced by that rhodomontade style, that insulting contempt and fiction, from which few Republican Generals have been able to keep clear. It confesses, however, the fruitless siege of St. John d'Acre for sixty-one days, all the assaults made without success, the loss of a number of general officers, and the unremitting obstinacy with which the reduction of the place was pressed. Nevertheless, in the face of these confessions the historian adds: "Buonaparte saw that the object of his expedition was attained, and did not think it right to continue longer before Acre." His prudence is the more admirable as the citizen Berthier assures us, that a few days more and he might have hoped to take the Pacha himself in his palace.

*Le galant en eût fait volontiers un repas,  
Mais, comme il n'y pouvoit atteindre,*

*Ils sont trop verds, dit-il.*

LA FONTAINE.

The grapes were sour.

The arrival of Buonaparte is very far from being an indifferent event. His genius, thirst of glory, talents, and reputation have a weight in the destiny of the Republic; they will have an influence on the fate of the war, and perhaps on

on that of the negotiations; for we must not forget that Bonaparte was a negotiator, nor where and with whom he negotiated.



*M. Bertrand de Molleville* will very shortly publish, in four large volumes 8vo. a work intitled *Annals of the French Revolution*, translated from his manuscript by the Translator of the *British Mercury*. The Author, in the Memoirs he has already given to the Public, confined himself to the last year of the reign of Louis XVI.; but these *Annals* have been composed for the purpose of forming with those Memoirs a complete period of history, and they embrace the four preceding years, beginning with the convocation of the States General, and terminating with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, at which period M. De Bertrand was appointed Minister of State.

Although the Author carries his history only to the death of his unfortunate master, he has given a concise and rapid sketch, in an introduction to his work, of the several revolutions which have since been the scourge of France.

The name of the Author, the offices he has held in France, his means of information, together with the variety and number of the facts contained in these annals, must render them highly interesting and worthy of peculiar attention.

Those who wish to possess this work may have it sent to them by leaving their address at Mr. Gardant's, No. 38, Brewer Street, Golden Square, before the 1st of December next, on which day it will be published.

The price is 1*l.* 10*s.* There are copies printed on vellum paper at 2*l.* 8*s.*



THE  
BRITISH MERCURY.

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N<sup>o</sup> XXIX.

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November 30th, 1799.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

The Author having been informed that editions of the BRITISH MERCURY are printed at Paris and Venice, in which the editors take the liberty of suppressing some passages and adding others according to their fancies, has thought it necessary to disavow those surreptitious editions; and to declare that he acknowledges none as authentic but those printed in London, and sold by the persons mentioned on the cover, and those distributed on the continent by the directors of the Imperial posts, and the house of Fauche and Co. Hamburg.

VOL. IV.

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## SWITZERLAND.

*The Disasters of this Country,—Conduct of its Inhabitants and of their Deliverers during the Course of the Campaign.*

FIFTEEN months ago, when we were tracing the armed Revolution by which the Helvetic league was crushed, we considered its overthrow as the principle, and not as the accomplishment of the calamities of Switzerland. Plundered in a merciless manner and dreadfully impoverished, she found herself condemned to support in future the weight of her own wretchedness and that of the foreign soldiery sent by an indigent Government to keep her in subjection. An alliance, as impolitic as faithless, with her oppressors devoted her to be the rampart of their frontiers, the fosterer of their armies, the theatre and the victim of the first hostilities. All the elements of discord having been let loose upon her, she was doomed to see civil war added to a foreign one; the citizens taking opposite sides, some rising in favour of the national independence, others to destroy these insurgents, and all fighting obstinately either for their country, or for a party who were the slaves of France: lastly, their

their land, bathed with blood, and covetous of the ruins of its liberty, population, and ease, was doomed to be the image of a camp intended for by foreign armies; nor could the horrors of a double invasion effect the deliverance of its inhabitants.

Ever since the French have been exercising their philosophy on the human race, La Vendée alone has experienced a like terrible fate; but the wounds of Switzerland have been deeper still. It is hard to say whether its situation or the causes that have aggravated it is most to be lamented. Some of those causes are to be found rising from the alteration of the national character, and in the nature of the public institutions; others must be attributed to the political and military arrangements by which this country is again become the prey of its merciless ~~merciless~~ <sup>generators</sup>.

As the invasion of the Austrians was not followed by a general insurrection in their favour, the Swiss have been accused of having disappointed the hopes that had been formed of their courage, their resentment, and their patriotism. The interest they inspired was weakened; their degeneracy, previously suspected from the events of 1797 and 1798, seemed proved by their want of decision in a

campaign to which it should appear that ~~not~~  
any of them ought to have been indifferent.

It is but too true that these Cantons, which had been long and gradually imbibing all the vices of the foreign nations with whom they mixed in military service and in the course of commerce, no longer evinced that masculine genius, that energetic simplicity, that passion for their country, or those talents which distinguished their ancestors. It is but too true, that although they maintained the military forms, their dispositions, enervated by the soft habits of so long a peace, led them to avoid national wars. It is but too true, that the imperfection of their federal system was no longer counterbalanced by the ascendancy of some superior men, or by the spirit of disinterestedness, harmony, and fraternity which more than once preserved the league from dissolution. And it is also but too true, that the disorder of the Revolution had strengthened in some the desire of sway, personal consequence, and vanity, that mother of all folly; in others selfishness, intolerance, animosity, and pretensions; and among all had sown the poisonous seeds of dissension.

However, although these moral causes threw great obstacles in the way of public safety, they were by no means insurmountable.

Between

Between interests, as between opinions, there were links by which an able man would have formed an united chain. By art, zeal, local knowledge, patience, and authority, their hearts and wishes might have been blended, and the Swiss retrieved from chaos.

As Austria, by her vicinity, her armies, and her victories, was the preponderant power in the project of re-establishing the Helvetic corps, the principal part of conciliation and arbitration seemed to belong to her. It should have been hers to settle differences, re-organize with prudence those dissolved Governments, and urge measures the most proper to inspire the people with a confidence in their deliverers, to convince them that their happiness was the chief object of the invasion; and to animate them one and all to fly to arms for the purpose of restoring to Switzerland her independence, her honour, and her repose. In these glorious offices the place of Austria could not be effectually filled but by herself; for no other State was so equal to it, or could without her concurrence acquire sufficient influence.

But it still remains doubtful whether the Cabinet of Vienna ever approved transferring the seat of war to the Helvetic territory. At least, it is an opinion generally established, that the Archduke *Charles*, in driving the enemy beyond the

the Linmat, rather consulted the <sup>110</sup>geheföity of his own sentiments and his bravery than the instructions or intentions of his Court. This conjecture derives the highest degree of probability from the determined inaction in which he persisted after the advantages he had gained, and from his subsequent retreat. The country of the Grisons alone seemed constantly to interest the Imperial Government, who thought the preservation of it of the utmost importance to the safety of the Tyrol, and the maintenance of a new and nearer communication with the army of Italy.

This strange indifference in respect to the deliverance of Switzerland consequently extended to the political re-establishment of the country. The Archduke, having no powers, left the anarchy in which it was plunged to take its course.

It seemed as if in general the Allies regarded the Cantons as a place to collect their recruits, the civil restoration of these Republics as an operation purely military and secondary, their territory as a bridge over which they were to pass to the frontiers of France, and the general interests of the country as subordinate to the assistance that might be drawn from it.

It was impossible for the most discerning observers to discover in the measures adopted, any political and uniform plan relative to the interior of Switzerland. Almost half of the country was freed

freed from the French yoke without any trace of a system being perceived for the purpose of rallying its inhabitants, conciliating dissensions, reconstituting the different States upon foundations laid according to their situations, uniting the scattered members of a confederacy without ties, and providing them with a centre of deliberations, and authorities capable of rekindling the extinguished principles of Government, patriotism, concord, and public power.

The minds of men were left to the agitations of uncertainty, the arts of intriguers, the promises of busy-bodies, and a whirlwind of doubts, fears, hopes, and projects, which heightened the discord.

Grant that several inconveniences would have attended the uniform re-establishment of the ancient systems of Government, without modification, choice, or limit; yet instead of establishing them on their primitive foundations, to begin by leaving the revolutionary administrations to subsist provisionally, was to dissatisfy the adherents of the old system without pleasing the abettors of the new, or removing the fears of those who judged changes in the different constitutions to be indispensable.—Shortly after, some districts returned to the old forms, while in others the new one was adhered to. This medley discovered hesitation; an inconsistency of views, and a total

total want of a well-considered system. The Democratic Cantons alone waiting no foreign incitement, abolished with enthusiasm all the laws of the Revolution, and solemnly restored the institutions of their ancestors.

The variety of these precarious and contingent arrangements was, it is true, accounted for by the respect which the Archduke *Charles* had promised, and was anxious to show for the independence of the Swiss. He was unwilling to interfere in their right to choose freely their form of Government, and the period of their differences on that head was postponed till the moment when the whole confederacy should be delivered.

This delicacy, however praiseworthy, seemed nevertheless not very compatible with the situation of things. The magistrates remained without power, the people without any fixed direction, and the League without a regulator, at a moment when the most urgent considerations called for the formation of a central and common power which should put an end to dissensions, impress a uniform energy, prepare for the future and provide for the present, without having to incur the shock of several authorities disunited and imprudent.

Unhappily, and it is with pain we say it, nothing of the kind has been done. Some enlightened magistrates, justly uneasy, remonstrated,

but

but without effect. The political exigencies of the country were sacrificed to those of the war : from not having begun by interesting the nation in it purely and simply for the recovery of their independence, exclusively of every foreign view ; from not having restored to them a bond of union and a political body to give stability to the will of the inhabitants, to obedience and public energy, most of the resources that might have been drawn from them have vanished.

These truths will be very evident to those who observe the public dispositions and events since the entry of the Austrians upon the Helvetic territory.

Those dispositions have been very erroneously estimated by the small number of refugees who fled their country before the war. Very few citizens, even among the most violent enemies of the French Republic, had any confidence in the pernicious resource of emigration, the most enormous, the least retrievable of errors that can be committed by a party, a Government, a majority, or even a minority overcome by a Revolution. Where were the emigrants to assemble ? In the dominions of the Emperor, whose councils had neither urged an expostulation, nor armed a soldier, in favour of the Cantons at the time of their subjugation ? They received no assistance, they were not formed into military corps, nor were

they supplied with subsidies to support them in Swabia while waiting the renewal of the war, which indeed was very uncertain and avoided by Austria with a studied patience. When at last the rupture afforded the expatriated Swiss a place for assembling, a military organization, and procured them succours from England, the outlets of the country were closely locked up, and it was almost impossible for the most determined of the inhabitants to pass the French army which separated them from the Austrians.

If their remaining at home rendered the little army of their countrymen embodied in Swabia less useful and important, it was a disadvantage well counterbalanced by the services which, as occasion arose, might be done in the interior by the malecontents who were ready to second the exterior movements; but instead of settling beforehand their means of concerting and acting, the sole dependence was placed upon the feeble flower of the army which it was hoped might be collected on the frontier.

At the time that the Archduke *Charles* entered the country every thing seemed to favour a general insurrection. The enemy vanquished, weakened, and intimidated, were losing their ascendancy with their fortune; their defeats had cooled their partizans; the most zealous had perished in battle, and although the rest were still fighting

fighting for them, the defection daily became more visible. In vain did the revolutionary administration exhaust their fallen authority and expedients to procure defenders for the tyrants of their country. Already, according to custom, did a number of the followers of the novelties perceive the hour of obtaining pardon for their errors, by renouncing their allies and seconding the party who they believed were about to triumph. Hope and courage once more animated the hearts of the despairing citizens: they held up their heads, planned their measures, and spoke out; nor did the astonished Government dare to make an attempt to repress the emotion!

It was one of those fleeting and precious moments when, to strike a decisive blow, it is enough to seize the combination of circumstances, and to employ its force suddenly, without suffering it to be worn off by the collisions of time.

General and national measures had been hoped, and were invoked. Had the alarm-bell been rung against the French by fifty thousand victorious Austrians entering Switzerland to re-establish the laws, liberty, and peace, it would have made the greatest part of the inhabitants run to arms. The only matter was to turn the first enthusiasm to advantage, to provide for the first necessities of this patriotic levy, to regulate their assembling, and make use of their ardour. A great many brave

and skilful Swiss officers had hastened from all parts of Europe to join the ranks of their countrymen, direct their movements, and assist in their deliverance.

The ill fate of Switzerland decided that this situation and these resources should be regarded with a different eye: they were given up for other measures. Instead of a national and federal armament, it was determined upon to recruit some privileged regiments and to substitute stipendiaries levied for the advantage of certain chiefs, to that Helvetic nation, to that militia formed of the old race who were anxious to combat *pro aris et focis*. The volunteer legion of Swiss Emigrants, a corps respectable for their devoted attachment, their courage on every trial, and the losses they had suffered, a valuable body which might serve as a model to successive formations, had their pay reduced, and was on the eve of being disbanded.

The greater number of officers who had appeared and offered their blood and their talents were neglected, and experienced only disgust. Unjust pretensions satisfied, odious preferences, and unmerited favours, gave rise to complaints, coldness, and dissention. Among others, a general murmur arose against the superior rank over the generality of the new projected corps which was given to an officer of very great ability, but who,

who, far from having rendered any service to his country, was fighting under the colours of the French Republic at the moment that Switzerland expired beneath the crimes of the Directory and their armies. The people of the democratic Cantons were enraged, and the whole country manifested their aversion to a chief who was perhaps blameless, but whom appearance seemed to condemn \*.

After reducing the patriotic insurrection of Switzerland to a common recruiting service, the object of it was imprudently published, and it was made known that these levies, enrolled for the whole time of the war, would be employed for the purpose of effecting a French counter-revolution. No design could be more inconsistent with the general wish or public inclination of the country. Most of the Swiss who would have marched against the hateful strangers

\* This officer, who in the year 1793 quitted the French service to enter into that of the King of Sardinia, received the French at the time they dethroned that monarch from whom he had received the rank of general with the command of the Swiss brigade which was serving in Piedmont, and had the misfortune to subscribe a proclamation that was printed in the newspapers, in which he exhorted his corps to share the glory and the dangers of the *Great Nation*. It may be that the danger the brigade would have run if they refused to incorporate with the French army was the irresistible motive of their commander's conduct.

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who for two years had been contaminating the native land of *William Tell*, had no intention of going beyond their own frontiers to fight. Armed for the purpose of freeing their country, and of defending after saving it, most of the inhabitants were but slightly affected with any other concern. The general wish was fixed upon their former tranquillity, independence, and peace, not upon a protracted war with France. Many prudent men, and certainly the mass of the nation, confined theirs to the evacuation of Switzerland by the foreign armies, and to her neutrality. Exhausted as she was by the avaricious and atrocious tyranny of the French, stripped and picked bare, without trade, industry, or funds for agriculture, she dreaded to become a party in a quarrel, the unfortunate chances of which might have thrown her, as a conquest, under the merciless dominion of France, and perpetuated her calamities.

Notwithstanding this opposition between the measures of the Allies and the sentiments of most of the Swiss, their aversion to the French would have prevailed, and perhaps assembled forty thousand national warriors round the confederate standards, if the impervious politics of the Austrian cabinet had suffered the Archduke *Charles* to complete the glory of his first labours.

The

The unparalleled but disastrous efforts which the intrepid mountaineers of the Alps displayed in his favour, and the sure and known dispositions of the impatient yeomanry of the Cantons of Berne, Soleure, and Friburg, authorize this assertion; nor is it weakened by the less manly conduct, indecision, and connivance with the enemy, which marked other districts.

These lay in the Northern territory, between the Rhine and the Limmat. More Germans than Swiss, the inhabitants, divided between husbandry and the works of industry and commerce, resembled only by some general traits the rest of Switzerland; to which most of these little provinces were added a hundred years after the formation of the Helvetic league, or perhaps later still.

Almost all of them had been, and were at the time of the last revolution, in a state of vassalage: they were vassals to several Cantons united, as is the case when a league of Republics are master.

The Gallic innovations found among them profelytes and defenders. The communities bordering on the Lake of Zurich were animated with a revolutionary spirit still more active, more general, and more deeply rooted. Although equally oppressed by the infamous extortions and military insolence of their preceptors, and

and tired of their presence, they were afraid to return under the dominion of their former sovereigns without some composition, security, and privileges.

Less warlike, moreover, than their countrymen of the East and South, these nations neither felt the same resentment, nor possessed the like energy. The majority of them received the Imperialists coldly, and the smaller number went over to *Maffena*, in whose ranks they dishonoured themselves, by fighting with the most unnatural obstinacy.

Their prejudices against the Allies, however, gradually abated : it was neither impossible nor difficult to have secured their attachment entirely. The excellent discipline of the Austrians, their discretion and prudence, the civility they kept up towards the people, who were astonished at the difference of character between such orderly troops and the licentious habits of the French; in short, the example of attention, order, affability, and justice, constantly given by the Archduke, began to change the first dislike of the inhabitants into kindness.

But subjected to temporary or suspected authority, whatever their opinions might be, their obedience took no root, and those of patriotism were choaked by private interest, by the recollections, by the passions, and the selfishness which  
the

the Revolution had engendered. Not were the good citizens themselves exempt from jealousies, personal hatred, and dissension. The indulgence due to transient offences and errors was even extended to the most active and obstinate abettors of the French cause; who communicated with the enemy, took every measure to restore and support their interests, and laboured, with scarcely any opposition, to keep up the mistaken notions of the ill-disposed.

If the Allies had reason to complain of the lukewarmness or ill-will of this portion of Switzerland, they might have observed that in very few of these districts were the majority in favour of the French Revolution, or desirous of seeing its arms triumph; but the dread of returning to their old Governments without an amelioration of their fate, suspended in many unsettled minds the wish of being delivered from France, her constitutions, and her soldiers.

Besides, the event has proved how weak or constrained was that part of the inhabitants whom *Massena* had drawn to his standards. All the efforts of the Helvetic Directory to procure him an auxiliary army were insufficient: the battalions levied by force immediately dispersed; and it would, perhaps, be an exaggeration to estimate at four or five thousand men the number of Swiss really volunteers, who shed their

blood for the plunderers of their country; for the fiends spread fire through Unterwalden, Uri, and the Valais; for the exterminators of public liberty. Even in the Pays de Vaud, the cradle of Helvetic shame, madness and misery, the country people remained pure and devoted, except three or four hundred madmen who went to gather *civic* laurels in the camps of the French Directory.

Let us now to this handful of traitors and base deserters oppose the heroic devotion of the worthy descendants of the founders of Helvetic liberty. We are no longer confined to the fight of a few villages, a few legions enrolled by compulsion, or a few fanatics sacrificing their lives and property to revenge their country and punish its oppressors: it is a whole nation who are up in arms, who are braving every danger, who are perishing on the ruins of their laws and habitations. Here may we learn, better than from the rhetorical inanities of Paris, whither true enthusiasm and the habit of liberty may lead.

Even before the Austrians had penetrated into the Grisons, the inhabitants of the mountains, and those of the valley of Urseren, had advanced almost to the gates of Coire, and thrown the French into imminent danger: the attack of the Imperialists being delayed, these insurgents

were left to fight alone. Being repulsed in two bloody actions, and compelled to abandon their villages, which were set on fire, and their property, which was plundered, they retired into the recesses of the mountains, carrying with them, through ice and snow, their wives, their children, their superannuated men, and their flocks: but no sooner did they hear of the first victories of the Austrians in the North than they redescended their rocks, seized the principal passes, opened them to the Imperialists, and relieved the whole Grison League.

At the same time, the inhabitants of the Canton of Glaris, having also assembled in the mountains, formed themselves into different divisions, and attacked the rear and flank of the enemy, whom they forced to quit suddenly his strong and entrenched position on the southern border of the Lake of Wallestadt. By this bold movement of some bands of peasants, the entrance into the Canton of Glaris was opened to the Austrians.

Three battalions only under Colonel *Gavissini* marched into the country: these would have been too few to secure it, had not the inhabitants made up for the insufficiency of the succour. They immediately called out their militia, and selected three battalions of them, who went and made themselves masters of the defiles of the

Schaekenthal, in the rear of the right wing of the French commanded by General *Le Courbe* in the Canton of Uri. He had just totally defeated Colonel St. Julien, taken twelve hundred men of the regiment of *Neugebauer* prisoners, and was preparing to reconquer the valley of Urseren and St. Gothard; but the movement of the troops of Glaris made him uneasy, and concurred in determining his retreat. While these three battalions were engaged in the Canton of Uri, a strong French column leaving the Lake of Zurich under the command of General *Chabran*, suddenly re-appeared in the lower part of the Canton of Glaris, threatening (what has been since executed) to ruin the country and exterminate the inhabitants of it. Immediately upon this, all who could bear arms joined the Imperial troops and the legion of emigrant Swiss: *Chabran*, shut up in a defile, was attacked and completely routed near Naefels, a place celebrated for the victory obtained there by the Swiss over the Austrians in 1388.

After restoring the old Government and choosing magistrates, the general and sovereign assembly of the nation re-organized the militia upon its former plan, and sent their contingent of four hundred men to the Austrian army. As all the funds of the Government had been exhausted or stolen by the French, the expences required for

for these troops were immediately provided for by a voluntary subscription.

The chief workmen of the Revolution having taken flight, the utmost moderation was observed towards those who had been guilty only of weakness or of error. A year was granted to the directors of the finances under the new system to make up their accounts. He who had harangued the people in 1798, when the tree of liberty was erected, was simply condemned to speak its funeral oration.

On every occasion, till the fatal catastrophe of the campaign, these mountaineers shared the dangers and the reverses of the Austrians : their native land has become the grave of its defenders and a curse to the surviving people, since the French army has returned to trample on the ashes of the victims, and to convert into deserts those valleys once the residence of peace, prosperity, and innocence.

The Canton of Schwitz presents the same picture, the same general eagerness in arming, the same services rendered to the public cause, an unshaken zeal in seconding the Austrians, the same virtues, the same disasters.

No where were the Republican French so completely, so universally abhorred, as in these Democracies. The fury of the people against those atrocious oppressors rose to such a pitch,  
that

that the Austrians thought it requisite to withdraw the troops of Schwitz from the advanced posts, as they were unable to restrain their impetuous animosity, and as their daily skirmishes led to general actions.

Commanded by peasants of their own choice, to whose ability and valour the Imperialists have borne testimony, they gave no quarter. "In the cruel and bloody war," said they, "which the French last year waged in our mountains, they did not spare a single prisoner; not one of them shall go out of our hands alive."—They were every day heard soliciting their deliverers to lead them into France, that they might there take vengeance upon the nation for the execrable outrages which they had received from them.—A single inhabitant had deserted the Canton to go and serve in the band of faithless Swiss; his house was burnt, and his wife and children turned out of the country.

The greatest offence that could be given to these Republicans was to suppose any analogy between their democratic principles and those of the French.—They never forgave the *Messieurs*, as they called those magistrates, gentlemen, and officers, who yielded to the Revolution, weakened the public resistance, entered into terms with the French, and accepted employments under the system of the *Regenerators*.

They

They had sworn never to be governed or commanded by them, and no consideration has been able to make them forget their oath.

Their confidence centered among their equals, and was placed on a man as extraordinary as the times. This person, animated with the double enthusiasm of religion and liberty, is a Capuchin, whose name is *Paul Stiger*. He had been the guide of the heroic resistance of the inhabitants of Underwalden. In every battle he was at the head of his countrymen.—When compelled in 1798 to fly into Swabia, he took the place of Almoner in the legion of Swiss Emigrants: none of them surpassed him in intrepidity, and his influence over the multitude was boundless.

When he returned to Schwitz, an immense crowd of inhabitants following him, he rode into the cathedral on horseback, carrying the banners of the Canton, and haranguing the people. “They are traitors to the country,” cried he, “and as dangerous as the French, who cannot, in times like these, exchange their shoes and stockings for boots and spurs.”—This warrior Monk inflamed the Swiss to such a degree, that the Austrians were obliged to have him sent to Zurich to reduce the fermentation and daily enterprises against the enemy, which his presence and discourses excited.

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The conduct of Glaris, Schwitz, the Grisons, and Unterwalden, was also pursued by the Canton of Uri and the valleys of Mount St. Gothard. From the opening of the campaign these nations, in permanent insurrection, harassed the enemy, and kept them in continual apprehension. The most dreadful retaliations could not deter them. While General *Bellegarde* was endeavouring without success to expel the French from Engadina, these Swiss issued from the woods and caverns whither they had fled, reconquered their native land, for a moment cut off General *Le Courbe* from the avenues of St. Gothard, routed several detachments, and were themselves in turn routed by the force of numbers, and from the want of power in the Austrians to succour them. It was a war of extermination: it lasted five months amidst the flames of burning towns and villages, the most horrible devastation, the most heroic sacrifices on the one part, the most savage fury on the other.

Such long and dreadful calamities did not shake the perseverance of these desperate Swiss. Being restored by the assistance of the Austrians to the ruins of their abodes, without peace, cultivation, cattle, furniture; having for shelter only crumbling walls, and for resources nothing but their fortitude, they hastened to levy and dispatch their contingent to the Archduke's army.

The

The rest of the people employed themselves either in reconnoitering and defending the defiles, or as labourers on the different works erected by the Imperialists. In the unfortunate actions of the middle of August, which for a third time subjected this theatre of desolation to the ferocity of the destroyer, these exterminated nations followed their confederates to death or exile.

The same persevering courage and devotion signalized the conduct of the Upper Valais. The inhabitants, still bleeding with the wounds of their first insurrections, and surviving massacre, plunder, and fire, were under arms so early as the month of April. Their long resistance was attended with the same effects, a mass of miseries, which makes even the most hardened of their oppressors shudder.

There is no point on the chain of the Alps where this spectacle of despair, of energy, and of mourning, was not ready to re-appear. From the limits of Unterwalden to those of the Valais, the mountaineers of the Canton of Berne waited only for succours, for a signal, for a possibility of breaking out. The French knew and were so apprehensive of the character and projects of those valleys, that in order to restrain the inhabitants, they stationed a small army, pitched

camps, and threw up batteries, in the valley of Meyringen, at the foot of the Grimsel, amidst the perpetual tracts of ice. It is therefore as inconsiderate as unjust, to excuse the errors and explain the mysteries which have lost Switzerland, by the indifference of the nation in seconding their deliverers. Are some thousands of creatures of the Revolution, extracted from the sink of the general population, who supported the enemy, to be put in competition with that mass of entire nations, who armed, fought, and died in communities, and who were well assured that neither pardon nor pity would be bestowed on them, their families, or their property, if they failed in so unanimous and noble a resistance? Where is the country in Europe which will have to shew such monuments of patriotism and national honour? It was among these mountains that the oath of *liberty or death* was truly fulfilled; that oath profaned by the coxcombs of the Parisian *philosophy*, by the wild beasts of the *one and invisible Republic*, and by all the vile puppets of the first impudent fellow who fixes them to his wires. If the south of Switzerland has suspended uniting in this sacred resistance, where is the blame to be cast, but upon those political divisions and unintelligible calculations, by which the victories obtained by the Imperialists were rendered fruitless?

When

When they were seen becoming suddenly stationary upon a defensive line ; for weeks, for months remaining immovable, removing uneasiness by fictions, and suffering the enemy to receive reinforcements, the number of which and their time of joining had been previously announced in the gazettes, surely it was incumbent upon the inhabitants to temporize also ; surely it was natural that the doubts respecting the private plans of Austria, and the farther operations of her armies, should abate enthusiasm and dictate prudence.

And when unexpectedly, at the moment that the arrival of twenty-five thousand Russians seemed to urge a general attack, or some attempt, the Austrian left wing was seen falling back, and no effort made to recover its positions ; when after a vain show of crossing the river Aar, the Imperial army was seen to strike its tents, to hurry away, to leave the frontiers, and to abandon the Helvetic territory to the chances depending on an entire new plan, on marching the troops of Piedmont to the Lake of Lucerne, on the inferiority of the Allied army, on the inexperience of the Russians in a war so foreign to their tactics or their knowledge, and on the complaisance with which it was hoped that *Maffena* would suffer the army in Italy to

join that cantoned in Switzerland, was it to be thought that in the whole thirteen Cantons a demoniac was to be found so mad as to cherish hopes or take a part in operations so incoherent, so critical, and so little conformable to the promises of the proclamations ?

Ages will not efface the effects of this fatal event. Would to Heaven that the Imperial Cabinet, leaving the Swiss to their fate, had never thought of attempting their deliverance, adding the scourges of war to those of the Revolution, the incalculable misfortune of a second fall, the torture of deceitful hopes, and the lethargy of death after the convulsions of despair !

All the eastern part of the country is sunk to what it was under *Julius Cesar*.—The ravages of Nature had not been able in the lapse of time to spread in these valleys, while concealed from human wickedness, wrecks to be compared to those which fifteen months of *reason* and French *magnanimity* have accumulated upon them. *Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant*. The traveller who, after passing with rapture over the fertile and smiling fields of Calabria, finds them on his return buried beneath the trembling earth, feels not more horror than will he who shall now revisit that amphitheatre of the Alps which was covered with inhabitants happy and at their ease,

ease, with commodious dwellings, with flocks, herds, neat farms, and monuments of skill, of affiduity, and labour.

All, all has been destroyed by the sword of the *legislators* of the world. We have seen them in the Upper Valais carrying on a war similar to those waged by the savages and Moors, driving the inhabitants to their woods and rocks, dispersing them among the abysses, setting fire to the cottages they were forced to quit, starving all they could not kill, destroying the very soil before they left it, burning villages, furniture, instruments of husbandry, wares, provisions, and even the woods, leaving a desert as a resource and as a country for the wretch who, after their retreat, should come to look for the place where he was born.

The desolation of the Canton of Uri and the valleys of St. Gothard was, if possible, still worse. While the French were fixed there, they oppressed them with requisitions and extortions : when driven away, they destroyed all that they could not consume or carry off. Treating the people of those regions as outlawed rebels, they spared them no calamity. Altorf, the chief town of the country, being burnt, the inhabitants without victuals or a shelter, made their way into the uninhabited mountains, where they met other

other partakers of their misfortunes who, like them, had been driven from their burnt and pillaged dwellings, and were wandering among the woods and precipices, with their old people and children. Almost all the cattle, the produce of the country, the beasts of burden, forage, and corn, were destroyed or carried away.

Who shall paint the situation of horror with which this fugitive people were struck when, in consequence of their courage and the assistance of the Austrians, they returned to this territory, drenched with blood, ransacked, without cultivation, and covered with ruins? Few of the inhabitants had the resolution to rebuild their cabins, or to return to the labours of husbandry. A ruin so complete, and the dread of fresh disasters froze the currents of hope and emulation. The flower of the youth had perished. From one end of the Canton to the other not a morsel of bread could have been found; and but for the bounty of the British Minister the melancholy remainder of these people must have fallen victims to famine.

While the generous Allies of *regenerated Switzerland*, the preceptors of her liberty, those paternal tutors of the *Rights of Man*, were devouring the Helvetic Democracies piece-meal, and destroying them by the sword, fire, and famine,

the people of Uri were receiving from Mr. Wickham an assistance of two thousand pounds sterling, and a hundred sacks of corn.

Alas ! this relaxation of their miseries passed rapidly away. Fresh torrents of voracious Brigands soon overwhelmed these solitudes : they are again fallen under *the right of war and of conquest*, exercised by those very French who had before exercised their Republican mission by reducing these tribes to the condition of the Chamois of their mountains.

The Canton of Underwalden has never been able to recover from the abyss of destruction into which it was precipitated in 1798. The enemy having there established their advanced positions the whole summer through, have completely drained it, gnawing the very flesh and bones of their victim after having drunk up its blood. Nor did the famine which depopulated this little nation relax their rapacity. There scarcely remains in Underwalden a third of the inhabitants it had in 1797.

From the description we have given of the sentiments and efforts of Schwitz and Uri, the reader may imagine the situation of these Cantons since the French have again made their way into the country and expelled the Austrians. It is the acme of human miseries : to paint them would be to give again an uniform picture of mourning,

mourning, depopulation, waste, and ruin. Here, as among the other tribes, the youth have perished, or shared in the defeats and retreat of the Allies. A number of families of all conditions have preferred exile to slavery. Ever since the end of August they have been scattered like dust before the wind over the surface of the North of Switzerland, having only God and public pity to depend upon. At the gates of towns, on the thresholds of cottages, and on the roads, the astonished eye is caught by wives in tears seeking their lost husbands, children, ignorant whether they are going, calling for their fathers, fathers wandering and alone without country, or relations, and without bread, yet fortunate in flying from their tyrants, and fallen from prosperity into the indigence of the state of nature.

Will it be said that this horrible metamorphosis is a fiction? Ask the very authors of these irreparable calamities; look into their public papers; take the testimony of some of their officers who have yet a spark of sensibility remaining, and who have shed tears over these desolated spots.

Although the North of Switzerland has not been so completely destroyed, yet property, and that of all kinds, has suffered incalculable damage, either from the residence of the armies, or the requi-

requisitions, and the provisions absolutely necessary for Massena's soldiers.

To signalize his victory, he called upon his Allies to bear the expences of it. He first congratulated them on the recovery of their liberty; and then, by way of loan, imposed an extraordinary contribution of two millions upon them, payable immediately. "The necessities of my army," says he, "force me to this measure, and your gratitude must see the equity of it." Thus, while the Austrians were paying the inhabitants for whatever they consumed, and the British agents were benefactors to them, the French reappeared like vultures, devouring the prey they pretended to deliver.

In vain have the towns that have been taxed represented, some their misery, and others their devotion to the *Great Nation*. In vain have the Helvetic Directory and Councils protested, thundered forth resolutions, and dispatched their memorials and lamentations to Paris.

*Facilis descentus Averni,  
Sed revocare gradum superaque evadere ad auras,  
Hoc opus, hic labor est.*

The goad of want has got the better of friendship, and the rights of strength have prevailed over those of treaties and alliances. The Government of France, as merciless as their general, confirmed his fiscal measures; but resistance, or

the want of power to pay has caused the tax to be abated. If the war continue, and this absorbing army fix their winter-quarters in Switzerland, there will be an end to the inhabitants feeding them, they will have to feed the inhabitants. Already has bread in the Northern provinces risen to seven pence sterling the pound: the granaries of Italy and Swabia are locked up; the very means of subsistence, the common resources of annual reproduction, have perished in the wreck.

Does the future present a less melancholy prospect? What is to become of these ruins of the old Helvetia? Who is to rebuild them? who to restore the appearance of the wealth she has lost? Is she, continuing to serve as a satellite to the French Republic, to espouse its quarrels, experience its convulsions and its despotism, and be given up in her laws, to the same inconstancy, to the same metamorphosis as her paramount?

The Revolution will no more be completed there than in France: whatever may be the public submission and depression, the total incapacity of the Regents, the depth of the wounds, the want of resources, and the necessity of heightening and increasing discontent, will fix poverty, disorder, and agitation on this ruined land.—Is it from her generous Ally that she will receive succours, indemnity,

demnity, and example? The French Republic is not deficient in the knowledge of doing mischief: party spirit sometimes revenges its outrages by personal punishment of wicked men, to whom other wicked men succeed; but the reparation of profitable acts of injustice has not yet been able to enter into her morals, or her maxims.

If other junctures, if negotiations, if peace between Austria and France, should be the means of Switzerland being evacuated and her neutrality restored, no doubt it would be an amelioration of her present situation, by delivering her from one of the scourges with which she is afflicted: but unless her independence be guaranteed, neglected in the balance of power among her neighbours, in the wisdom of her laws and administration, in the breaking of the tarnished chains which enslave her to the French Republic, what would this independence be but a forced or willing docility of the Helvetic Rulers to all the commands of their domineering Allies? but the price of a bargain between the Revolutionists who govern at Berne, and their institutors of Paris, the necessary instructors of these modern authorities and system, an alteration in which Switzerland would not dare to attempt without the approbation of a French Regency?

Even supposing an amelioration of this slavery, opinions and wishes set at liberty would

be divided : while the few who are interested in the Government would be for maintaining the present forms, others would be anxious to re-establish their former laws ; and others again, in returning to the old foundations, would desire to incorporate innovations more or less essential ; so that commotions and a civil war would perhaps mark the return of independence. Who would be the arbiter of those dissensions ? Need it be asked ? The melancholy question would be determined before the tribunal of the French Republic, and a new chain of calamities would lead the Swiss back to their slavery.

It would require talents with which Switzerland is entirely unprovided to prevent this catastrophe. The deplorable conduct of the old Magistrates, that of their worthless successors, the judgment of the nation and of Europe have proved it. Where are they to look for one of those great characters, deriving power from respect, influence, and virtue, founded on experience, a new *Nicholas Flue*, to interpose his mediation among his countrymen, and lead them to union ? Is it at the issue of a Revolution which has strengthened all the vices, weakened all the virtues, stifled the best qualities, and disunited the hearts of men, that they can flatter themselves with finding the instruments of so difficult a restoration ?

## FRANCE.

*Of the new Revolution that was effected on the  
9th of this Month.*

"GLADIORUM impunitate, jus vi obrutum,  
potentiorque habitus prior; discordiæque civi-  
um antea conditionibus sanari solitæ, ferro disju-  
dicatæ." — These words of a Roman Historian  
contain the History of France since she has thought  
proper to set herself up as an authority of *wisdom*  
and *legislation*. Whether it be that the im-  
petuousness of the national character does not suffer her  
to wait the tardy effects of moral and political  
springs, or that the spirit and violence of factions  
are incompatible with every means of acquiring  
the ascendant otherwise than by assault; or, in  
short, that the genius of the Revolution and its  
guides continually calls in plots and *coups-de-main*  
to settle differences, force has all along been the  
only legislator in this arena of Republican Gla-  
diators.

Abroad, as well as at home, it is the sole law to  
which the French have reduced every code. The  
power of the sword has made and unmade con-  
stitutions, has given and taken away powers,  
decreed the Republic, and determined its vicissi-  
tudes. When popular violence was worn out,  
military violence came to the support of the  
party

party aspiring to dominion : soldiery was substituted to assassins, who had succeeded to executioners : then did proscriptions and changes take a character more quiet and methodical ; and the acts of tyranny, of usurpation, or reform, required no more than a military movement.

Whoever was inclined to do evil, or tempted to do good, was under the necessity of reckoning the number of muskets on which he could depend ; for the people, wearied of combatants and combats, have long considered themselves as the stake of the game that is playing, and not as the party concerned.

Thus, the Republic and liberty have been mere lies and profanations. If the authors and their coadjutors of the events of the 9th and 10th of this month, who have demonstrated this in fine speeches, and proclaimed it in their manifestoes, had had the humanity to accelerate this demonstration, two generations would have been spared ; millions of citizens preserved to their country and their families ; France and Europe saved from a war as horrid in its cause as in its effects ; nor would the incendiaries, factious, fanatics, and villains of every country have risen *en masse* to aid and to imitate this *regeneration* now publicly condemned by its admirers, those sublime institutions now called a work of darkness, madness and ignorance, that succession of iniqui-

iniquities, robberies, executions, and crimes; to which a Revolution so badly wrought, according to the opinion of its new masters, owes its existence, its pretended laws, and its duration.

The shot from the cannon of *Barras*, directed by *Buonaparte*, solemnized, on the 6th of October 1795, (the year 3,) the *free* and *unanimous* consecration of the Constitution. On November 10th, 1799, this Constitution, to despise which was death for four years, fell beneath the sword of the same General, and perhaps of the same soldiers, who had enforced it in the soft heads of the Bourgeois of Paris by the arguments of powder and ball. They who had been its most enthusiastic panegyrists, the *Garats*, *Daunous*, and *Cbeniers*, now raise their voices against it in a chorus of curses: it is the priesthood breaking the ark of the covenant. Its defenders so intrepid, so rigorous upon the slightest attempt with which the discontented seemed to threaten it, now acknowledge that they have been fools and most unjust proscribers.

This repentance and contrast are, in our opinion, the most memorable lesson, and the most useful consequence of the political metamorphosis by which the dress of republican France has just been changed. We know not whether, according to the pompous expression of one of the orators of the day, it has taken the *toga virilis*; but

but let it wash out, if it can, the spots of blood and filth which stain its robe of glory and of youth. Let it appear, in short, if it were but for six months, under a human figure, and the artists of its new decoration will not be unworthy of gratitude. Then may the public opinion, which does not fly on butterflies' wings with the journalists, panegyrists, credulous enthusiasts, and prophetic poets, applaud the consequences of an operation, of which the nature, means, and several of the actors, far from encouraging, might alarm the friends of real liberty, justice, and permanent tranquillity.

Leaving it to the impatient and visionaries, to describe at the outset of this new establishment the whole circle it is to run, we shall dispense with opening the book of predictions and conjectures; to judge of the seed let us wait for the harvest: without entering upon the wilderness of suppositions, hopes, and fears, we will relate the chief particulars which characterize this Revolution, its differences and its analogies with those that have preceded it, and the first effects that have resulted from it.

Since the 30th Prairial, (*June 18,*) on which day the Directory were renewed, by reforming their usurpations and degrading their authority, the Republic dragged on its existence between a tottering Government and Legislature in confusion; it was in the path to a new order of things, which

which it could not be said to have attained. All the factions, anxious and discontented, were impelling it to a different issue. Although the Jacobins were not able to obtain success for their innovations and mad schemes, they had made themselves so formidable as to oblige the Executive Power to take care of offending them: if they did not reign, they curbed all other dominion. Two of the Directors, *Gobier* and *Moulin*, befriended them; a third, *Barras*, seemed to be neuter from policy, and perhaps from indolence. The offices and places of administration presented a monstrous medley. There were a few men tolerably select; the rest were banditti as ignorant as wicked, watching for the moment of new crimes, and commissioned to prepare them.

The dissension that agitated the Directory also divided the Legislative Councils. After setting in motion the reform of the 30th of Prairial, (June 18,) the politicians, intriguers, and moderate republicans separated themselves from the Jacobins, whose influence sunk in proportion as the fortune of the armies rose: they lost the majority in the Five Hundred, and were completely annihilated in the Council of Elders; but they had sufficient activity, support, and room left to embarrass the Government daily by their opposition, and intimidate them by their boldness.

Never did a deliberative assembly show such a deficiency of wisdom, of knowledge, of the most common capacity. The contempt in which it was held restored no importance to the Directory, whose credit and power were daily enervated by weak and unstable measures. Of the two principal laws, the work of the Government and of the Councils, which kindled the general hatred against them, that respecting hostages had raised the West of France, and that of the forced loan could not be put in execution. The contributions in arrear and diminished, the troops without pay, wild projects adopted one day, and succeeded by still wilder ones, a civil war ready to break out, rival factions conspiring the ruin of the Constitution and the State, the laws without force, the law-makers tearing one another to pieces, an unexampled corruption infesting the whole Republic, no stability either in their plans, statutes, or even their wishes ; in short, all the appearances of disorganization, all the elements of a shock by which the moveable pivot of the Empire must be changed, formed the internal situation of affairs, while the armies, uninfected with this discord and confusion, were combating with more advantage than is generally obtained by those of the best regulated States.

Every body saw plainly that a violent caustic would soon be applied to this gangrene, either

by

by the Jacobins seizing the public authority, or by those who still held the authority, and who were labouring to confirm it; to concentrate it, and to restore it credit and energy by reforming it. All parties invoked the Constitution, and swore at every turn to maintain it inviolable: this was a conspiracy of perjurors.

It is pretty generally agreed to give Sieyes credit for the first conception, the preparatory means, and the general outline of the last Revolution. Nobody doubted that it had long occupied his mind. It was impossible that a man so superior to the mob of incendiaries, intriguers and rulers to whom he saw France abandoned, should not contrive to secure the dominion over them. They who have only considered him as a political metaphysician and manufacturer of Constitutions, have taken but a side view of him. Fertile in expedients to execute, skilled in the art of holding his tongue and waiting, admitting no chimerical plans into his mind, and uniting dexterity with perseverance, nobody knew better, when a grand interest required it, to preserve the command of himself and obtain it over others.

Such a man could not, certainly, be the person to premeditate a year beforehand, an enterprise to which an union of unforeseen circumstances has given birth; to confide the design to a court, the Court of Berlin; to make use of such an absurd

confidence, and take a King as a confederate in reforming the French Republic. These extravagant suppositions are the work of that class of dreamers who, ashamed to account for events by their apparent and natural causes, are always prepared with some theatrical machinery, a mystery and a magician.

Ever since the middle of October all the subdivisions of parties (the absolute Royalists alone excepted) had been reduced to two general classes; the one consisting of the Jacobins, tending to return into the most democratic line, that is to say, to their right of life and death over their countrymen, and of disposing of their property; the other comprehending all persons who have taken a share in the Revolution, without participating in its principal enormities, and who ranged themselves around *Sieyes* and the Council of Elders, with the conviction and desire of an approaching change.

Although the mixture and variety of these auxiliaries did not inspire the able Head of this union with full confidence, he made his prejudices and even his aversions yield to the necessity of the alliance. He affected regard for the constitutionalists of 1791, who had formerly been publicly the objects of his contempt. He gained over the speakers, speculators, and the less ignorant agents of the party of the *Modérés* in the

the Five Hundred : he placed his confidence in the Elders, and in their body fixed the fulcrum of his levers.

A number of hazards, delays, and obstacles still lay in his way, when the unexpected return of *Buonaparte* caught the eyes, the thoughts, and the hopes of all.

It is absolutely false that this event had been premeditated, that *Sieyes* had sent for the *Solon of Egypt*, or that the latter had obeyed any order. He no sooner arrived than he proved that he wanted none, and that it was his part to command. He opened himself with an assurance and haughtiness which evinced the opinion he had of his own importance, fortune, and influence on conjunctures. Disdainful with his superiors in the civil state, cold, inquisitive, and close ; but fawning with the soldiery, and dissembling his views and passions, he found himself sought by both parties. The Jacobins flattered him, loaded him with marks of confidence and veneration, and hoped to secure him. The *Modérés* bid still higher than the Jacobins, and in a week had no doubt of the real sentiments of the General. They took pains to put an end to the coolness subsisting between him and *Sieyes* ; for though both knew the necessity for their being friends, each hesitated to make the advance, and three days passed after the arrival of the Argonaut

naut before *punctilio* permitted the two personages to meet. Indeed their respective partisans were upon the point of separating: the greater number still attached to the sentiments and duties of Republicans, decided in favour of Sieyes against the pretensions of *Buonaparte*, while they whose only ambition was to see an end of some kind to the Revolution, or who had personal views, declared for what they baptized, in their Asiatic language, the superiority of the rights of force and of glory.

The situation of the General and the designs of the Directory admitted of no temporizing. Once agreed upon their respective parts, and perhaps much more upon the employment of the means than upon their definitive object, they prepared the catastrophe in silence. A number of Generals and other trusty officers were assembled in the Capital, the troops wrought upon and easily gained, the directing Committees of the Elders instructed and disciplined, the anti-constitutional cabal in the Five Hundred informed and ready to favour this grand movement.

The public were in expectation of something of the kind, without suspecting the real nature of it. The Jacobins, uneasy and distrustful, were fluctuating in their suspicions, and not thinking of defending themselves. Two days before, on  
the

the 7th, the Directory and the Councils had given a splendid feast to *Buonaparte* and *Moreau*, in the Church of St. Sulpice, transformed into the *Temple of Victory*. It was the banquet of the *Atrides*: they embraced but to stifle each other; the fraternal solemnities of the French Republic have always been the signal of a proscription. The countenances and taciturnity of the guests betrayed their inward agitation.

At five o'clock in the morning, on the 9th, five persons, composing the temporary Committee of the Inspectors of Police of the Council of Elders, convoke clandestinely one hundred and forty-six of their colleagues, picked out among the conspirators. While the rest and the Republic are still fast asleep, they assemble in their Hall at the Tuilleries. One *Cornet* harangues the meeting, and lays before them the dangers of the country: he speaks of poniards raised, of conspirators, of general conflagration *on the ashes of which years* would be shed; then of saving the country and liberty by a decree for removing on the very next day, the 10th, the Legislative Body to St. Cloud, investing *Buonaparte* with the general command of every kind of armed force at Paris, and charging him with the execution of the Decree, as well as all measures for the safety of the national representation.

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The decree was immediately proposed and passed without a debate. Buonaparte being introduced, heard it read, approved it as a master, and swore to execute it like an emperor.

" Woe be to those who wish for commotion and disorder ! " exclaimed he before this senate of automation. " Assisted by my brave comrades in arms, I will put a stop to them. Examples are not to be looked for in past times. No thing in history resembles the close of the eighteenth century ; nor is any thing in the close of the eighteenth century like the present moment."

To support this eloquence ten thousand bayonets were collected at the Tuilleries. Their General reviews the ranks, and addresses them in a proclamation, in which he imparts to them the secret that for two years, exactly, the Republic has been badly governed ; " but that they had not hoped in vain that his return would put an end to all their woes."

The different commands were settled, the posts assigned ; there was no commotion, no uproar, nor a shadow of resistance. The Council of Five Hundred, convoked in the same manner as that of the Elders, received the decree for removal, and enrolled it without deliberation.

At the Luxembourg there was the same submission. Sieyes and Roger Ducos had repaired to the

the Council of Elders. *Barras*, a dupe or rogue, resigned his dignity. *Gabier* laid down his robe with the same docility. *Moulin* alone appeared something less mean than his colleagues, and escaped by flight from the renovators of the Republic.

Neither the day nor the night were disturbed by an appearance of commotion. Paris remained as peaceable as Constantinople after the dismission of a vizier. The public, delighted, were impatient for the next day; the people looked on with a cool curiosity; the Jacobins, with dread; and the authors of the business, with confidence.

On the 10th, about two o'clock, the Councils having removed to St. Cloud, opened the ceremony of their funeral: *Sieyes* and *Roger Ducos*, *Buonaparte*, his staff, and a sufficient number of select pretorians, had also taken possession of the palace, the courts, and the garden. About fifty prudent deputies kept away, among others *General Jourdan*, and *Angereau* who, a Jacobin the day before, and devoted to that faction while it appeared powerful, was not ashamed to offer his arm to *Buonaparte* against his colleagues and friends, and to assist in a repetition of the crime committed by himself in 1797 against the national representation, then proscribed by the Jacobins.

One is tempted to think that the projectors hoped to awe the Council of Five hundred by a military array, and to frighten them into following the example of the docility of the Elders, without making resistance or giving trouble; and by this means to give the appearance of a voluntary dissolution to their dismissal. The conduct and speeches of *Bonaparte* strengthen this conjecture.

He appeared in the Council of Elders, whether the order of convocation had brought some refractory members, who dared to ask for the reason of their removal, and for a full discovery of the plots which were pretended to have been the grounds of it. However natural and regular the question, its opponents urged against it the reason of State, the decree of the day before made irrevocable, the danger of rousing the conspirators, and all the common-place objections of this kind which are never wanting to falsehood when assured of the support of bayonets. Three hours were spent in this debate, and in discussing whether they should or not wait for a declaration from the Five Hundred before they pursued the business, when *Bonaparte* entered the Council and informed them, not without pain and incoherence, of his intentions and of their duty.

" You are walking over a volcano. The country has not a more zealous defender than myself.

"myself. Calumnies are heaped upon me. I am  
 " overwhelmed with disgusting reproaches. I  
 " hear the words, "Cromwell" and "military Go-  
 " vernment" circulating round me. That is  
 " an enterprise I might have attempted long  
 " ago. *Barnas* and *Moulins* proposed to me to  
 " overthrow the Government, and take the  
 " direction of affairs. But let me not be con-  
 " sidered as a vile intriguer : I am of no club;  
 " but the grand one of the French People."

" Do you appeal to the Constitution ? You  
 " violated it on the 18th of Fructidor, (Sept. 4,)  
 " on the 2nd of Floreal, (May 11,) on the 30th  
 " of Prairial, (June 18). The Constitution !  
 " All the factions have violated it; it is despised  
 " by all ! If any speaker, *in foreign pay*, should  
 " talk of outlawing me; I would appeal to my  
 " brave comrades in arms; to you, brave soldiers,  
 " whom I have so often led to victory; to  
 " your courage, my brave friends, and to my  
 " fortune."

This *valour* and language appeared unanswerable arguments. After this warning the General went out, and the Council began to talk over the merit and the demerit of the Constitution, and the absolute and relative force of the oath they had taken to maintain it.

While this talk was going on, some grenadiers were interpreting the oath and the law to

the Council of Five Hundred, by driving away those representatives of the people, like a set of rebellious school-boys who grumble at their chastisement.

Some speakers opened the sitting with propositions, the incongruity of which betrayed a total want of resources, resolution, and concert. One man moved for a report upon the situation of the Republic; another thought that the Constitution should be shielded under a new oath; an hour was wasted in determining this conceit, and in swearing individually the guarantee of a rational being, in the midst of pathetic exclamations. *Lucien Buonaparte*, the General's brother, President of the Assembly, preparing to surrender in, received and retorted abuse, and increased the agitation by endeavouring to moderate it. Bravadoes were followed by incoherent motions, and irresolution supported by shouts.

Amidst the storm comes a dispatch from *Barras*, giving notice to the Legislature of his resignation, by congratulating the Republic and Liberty with being saved by the illustrious warrior whose career he had opened; and who was stripping him of the Directorial robe. This unexpected incident increases the fermentation, without suggesting a plan or setting a measure, and these saucy Republicans become mere stupid brutes.

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In the height of their vociferations the Hall opens, *Buonaparte* advances uncovered, and attended by some grenadiers without arms. He has neither time nor power to utter a word, for the cries of, *Out now! Down with the Dictator!* To imprecations succeed tumultuous motions; about two hundred Deputies press round the General and shove him back. One of them draws a poniard which innocently grazes the grenadier standing nearest to *Buonaparte*, who orders a retreat, and quits the Hall with his body guards.

Wonderful! he quits it alive! with a slight bruise! No ides of March for the perpetration of the greatest outrage that a Republican assembly could receive! Among so many *Brutuses*, accustomed to shed the blood of weakness and innocence, not one was found with spirit enough to revenge the common cause. If the poniard scene is more real than so many other theatrical adventures with which the dramatic fertility of the revolutionary French has embellished the episodes of their *liberty*, the anonymous would-be *Brutus*,\*, who rushed with his drawn dagger upon the unarmed *Buonaparte*, must surely be a very timid assassin, and very pusillanimously

\* This motion and this dagger was at first ascribed to *Arena*, a Corsican Deputy familiar with those manual sports; but others have since had the honour ascribed to them.

supported.

supported. Hitherto when the Jacobins meant to kill their men they did not bungle.

The General having vanished, the astonished Council recovered a tardy glimmering of good sense: they resolved what they should have resolved the day before, and what they now resolved in vain, that the appointment of Bonaparte was illegal, that the Council of Elders had no right to bestow it upon him, and that the command of the guard of the Legislative body should be taken from him. The tumult continued: the President, *Lucien*, insulted and threatened, began his brother's defence without being attended to, and having finished his part, abdicated his dignity.

As soon as he laid down his official dress, twenty grenadiers opened the doors, surrounded him, and carried him out of the Hall; this, it is said, was to save him from the daggers, that he might go and whet the bayonets. While he harangued the soldiers in the Courts, informing them that the Council of Five Hundred were kept in terror by some Representatives with daggers in the pay of England, and conjured them to deliver the Assembly from daggers by bayonets, the Five Hundred in the delirium of anguish, fury, and discord, exhausted their agony in clamours, curses, and tumultuous debates.

The rolling of the drum is heard ; the Janissaries of liberty march to the beating of the charge against the Representatives of the Sovereign People ; the doors give way ; the spectators jump out of the windows ; a regiment of grenadiers crowd the sanctuary of the Legislature. *General Buonaparte orders me to clear the Hall,* cries their commander with a big voice. The more prudent Deputies go out in silence ; the less fearful keep together in one part of the Hall, around the tribune and the table : had these been altars they would not have saved them. It was a siege of five minutes : the citizen soldiers turn these rebel Deputies out one after the other, though two days before they had been their guards.

Thus dissolved by force, this august Senate is to re-appear in four hours. *Lucien Buonaparte* assembles a *Rump Parliament* from amongst its scattered members, the greater part of whom had fled towards Paris, or tacitly relinquished their functions. He proves to this handful of parasites and accomplices, what they knew as well as he, the defects of the Constitution, the necessity of amending it, and the horrors of terrorism : *Fathers of the country, he cries, you will give peace and happiness to France.*

*Boulay de la Meurthe*, in a speech more studied, less declamatory, but most strange in the mouth of its author, the same Boulay who, in

Sept.

Sept. 1797, anathematized the despisers of the Constitution as so many traitors, who to avenge it spoke a defence of the 18th of Fructidor, (Sept. 4th,) who pleaded with so much ardour and force for sacrificing the most respectable Representatives to the safety of the Code of the year 3; that *Boulay* pulled this sacred Code to pieces, made a repetition of all the censures cast upon it from its birth by thinking men, and by the anti-republican writers, and pronounced its funeral oration nearly as a libertine changing his taste, or becoming devout, pronounces that of his mistress. This poor Constitution received the last kick in the breech from a metaphysical Physician, a man ingeniously obscure, named *Cabanis*, who also wrote his treatise in favour of the innovations.

It only remained to decree the preface to them, that is to say, a mode of existing, a provisional arrangement to take the place of the Legislature and Government, till a new order. This was done by the following Statute, which was sanctioned by the Elders that very evening, and which may be regarded as the frontispiece of this new Revolution.

The Council of Five Hundred, considering the situation of the Republic, declare that the business is urgent, and adopt the following resolution :

ART. I. There is no longer any Executive Directory, and the following persons are no longer Members of the National

National Representation, on account of the excesses and the violent attempts which they have uniformly made, and particularly the greatest part of them in the sitting of this morning :

Jouibert de l'Herault, Jouenne, Talot, Duplantier, Arena, Garat, Quirot, Leclerc-Chappes, Briche, Poulain-Grand-Pré, Bertrand, Goupilleau, Daubermesnil, Marquesi, Guesdon, Grandmaison, Grocassand, Dorimond, Frison, Dessaix, Betgrasse-Laziroul, Montpellier, Constant, Briot, Destrem, Carrere, Lagartiere, Gauran, Legot, Blin, Boulay-Paty, Souillie, Demoer, Rigonet, Mentor, Boissier, Bailly, Bouvier, Beyts Brichet, Honore-Declerc, Bousset, Gaftaing, Laurent, Reitz, Pthathom, Porte, Truck, Delbret, Leyris, Doche Dehille, Stenonette, Lefage Senault, Chalemele, Andre, Demartelle, Colombel, Philippe, Moreau, Jourdan, Letourneur, Citadella, Jourdain, Bodas.

**ART. II.** The Legislative Body create provisionally an Executive Consular Commission, composed of Citizens Sieyes and Roger Ducos, late Directors, and Buonaparte, General. They shall bear the name of Consuls of the French Republic.

**ART. III.** This Commission is invested with the full powers of the Directory, and specially commissioned to organize order in all parts of the Administration, to re-establish internal tranquillity, and to procure an honourable and solid peace.

**ART. IV.** Is authorized to send Delegates with a power limited according to its own power.

**ART. V.** The Legislative Body is adjourned to the 20th of February. It is to meet at that period in full power at Paris.

**ART. VI.** During the adjournment of the Legislative Body, the Members shall preserve their indemnity and their constitutional security.

**ART. VII.** They may without losing their quality as Representatives of the people, be employed as Ministers, Diplomatic

plomatic Agents, Delegates of the Executive Consular Commission, and in all other civil functions. They are even invited in the name of the public good to accept them.

ART. VIII. Before their separation, and during the time of their sitting, each Council shall name from among their Members a Committee of twenty-five Members.

ART. IX. The Committees appointed by the two Councils, will, in conjunction with the Executive Consular Commission determine upon all urgent objects relative to the Police, Legislation, and Finance.

ART. X. To the Committee of the Council of Five Hundred shall belong the right of proposing, and to that of the Council of Elders that of sanctioning.

ART. XI. The two Committees shall also, in the order above-mentioned, regulate the changes in those parts of the Constitution which experience may have shewn to be inconvenient or vicious.

ART. XII. These changes can have no other object but that of consolidating and guaranteeing inviolably the sovereignty of the French people, the Republic one and indivisible, the representative system, the division of power, liberty, equality, and the security of property.

ART. XIII. The Executive Consular Commission may lay before the Committee their views upon these subjects.

ART. XIV. The two Committees are charged to prepare a civil code.

ART. XV. Their sittings shall be held at Paris in the palace of the Legislative Body, which they may convoke extraordinarily for the ratification of peace, or in case of great public danger.

ART. XVI. These resolutions shall be printed, and sent by extraordinary couriers to the Departments, and solemnly published

published and stuck up in all Communes of the Republic. It shall be immediately carried by a messenger of State to the Council of Elders.

LUCIEN BUONAPARTE.

After having named the members of the intermediate Legislative Commission, received the oath of the Consuls, and adopted themselves a new form of perjury, thus conceived; " I swear fidelity to the French Republic founded upon the Sovereignty of the People, the representative system, and the maintenance of liberty, equality, security, and property ;" the Council adjourned till the 21st of December, and set out for Paris. The Elders took the same steps.

We must not forget to distinguish among these nocturnal and premeditated deliberations a decree which confers civic honours upon the Generals and soldiers who degraded, violated, and dismembered the national representation. When Colonel *Pride* had assembled the *Rump*, we do not find that that legislative chip offered him any congratulations or attentions for his courage in annihilating the Parliament: but have factions, and particularly French factions, any decorum, discretion, or foresight? Did not the Legislative Body also declare on the 18th of Fructidor that the soldiers *bad deserved well of the country*? The next Brigands who shall seize

upon the Government, will turn the St. Cloud decree against its authors, in favour of the grenadiers who shall get rid of the legislator and legislation.

In this narrative, we have followed some particular communications previous to the event, and the account given in the French papers, but the reports of the latter cannot be admitted without suspicion and examination. What credit can be granted to annalists who write the day after the public powers are seized, displaced, and reformed sword in hand? Some infected with enthusiasm tinge their accounts with the colour of their sentiments; others, votaries of fortune, bow before the conqueror, and overwhelm him with the disgrace of their praises.

*The first day after a tyranny, says Tacitus, is the fairest.* The people of Paris, their historians, their sanguine and superficial minds, go no farther than this *first day*. Several reasonable causes excuse and even justify this fervour of transient idolatry.

In the eyes of a people soured and horribly governed, every novelty is a benefit. It is the case of the sick man, relieving himself by a change of posture.—The possibility of the Jacobins' ruling, petrified with dread the citizens of all ages and almost all conditions. The Government

vernment and legislature were objects of public censure and aversion. The administration was purified by the choice of persons worthier of confidence. Several parties perceived a distant ray of hope; the oppressed looked for relief, and the public listened to the promises of peace, justice, and prosperity, which were the more dazzling as they appeared to rest on a new order, a different system, something *unknown*, and on chiefs of whose power they had yet had no experience.

Although the Council of Five Hundred were occupied on the subject of converting the forced loan into an assessment upon the direct taxes, and essential alterations were about to be made in the Hostage law, yet the revocation of these tyrannical acts, which was demanded by the Consulate and decreed by the two intermediate Commissions, seemed an un hoped favour, of which the glory belonged exclusively to the Government of the day.

But in order to decide less vaguely the real grounds or the illusion of the popularity acquired by a Revolution so like in its nature to several of those which have preceded it, the means, the actors, the effects, the probabilities and consequences of its object must be investigated.

This

This inquiry demanding more authentic information than what the public papers afford, we shall submit it to our readers in our next Number.

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THE hope of receiving particular information, in time has been the means of delaying the publication of the present Number. Our packet is but just received, and does not support the opinion of the solidity and immutability of this Revolution; which has been conducted by a temporary confederacy of interests and sentiments. No. XXX. will appear on the 15th of December.



THE  
BRITISH MERCURY.

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N<sup>o</sup> XXX.

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December 16th, 1799.

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FRANCE.

REMARKS UPON THE EVENTS OF THE MONTH  
OF NOVEMBER CONTINUED.

*Of the Character, Means, Actors, and Consequences  
of the late Revolution.*

AMONG the causes which concur in perpetuating the instability, contentions, and inconsistencies of the French Revolution, there is no doubt that its origin is one of the most powerful. Nations had been known to rise against the usurpation of their political rights, and to throw off the yoke

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of a Government which no longer respected the laws. The Swiss in 1308 were not the subjects of *Albert*, whose officers treated them more as slaves than vassals. The Dutch were in the enjoyment of the greatest political immunities when *Philip II.* undertook to overthrow their civil and religious liberty. Like the Swiss they exercised the inalienable right of resistance, not to introduce innovations into their system, but to preserve their titles and prerogatives against a cruel oppression.

For several years before the English had recourse to arms, towards the end of the year 1642, there had been very serious disputes between the Crown and the Parliament respecting the limits of the royal prerogative, which continued uncertain, the privileges of the people, obedience and liberty: a civil war was kindled by those dissensions, and the fortune of arms decided the fall of the Monarchy, but the generality of the pre-existing civil institutions remained untouched.

Lastly, the American States were foreign and eccentric Colonies: they had charters and privileges, the claims and support of which formed at least a pretence for their insurrection, and the basis of a new Constitution.

But rarely, indeed I believe never, had a nation been found rising, arming, and leaguing against

against a lawful Monarch, whose virtues were unanimously acknowledged and respected, and who, far from encroaching upon the rights of the people, was of his own accord restoring them to the nation after an interval of two centuries, by sacrificing those which had devolved upon him from his ancestors.

Raised by him from the dust and oblivion, the first National Assembly tore his power from him, the second stripped him of his liberty and his throne, and the third struck off his head upon the scaffold.

The throne once vacant, the Government was in the hands of everybody and of nobody. Whatever bore a vestige of a former usage, custom, right, or principle, was rejected as superstitious. The empire, driven from the poize of its orbit, floated through space as impelled by whirlwinds, without the power of recovering a single point of stability. France became a new land of thirty-five thousand square leagues, whose twenty-five millions of inhabitants, levelled to a line of absolute equality, were contending for its property, government, offices, and legislation, with pikes and decrees, with assassins and codes.

Each made his essays upon the new *chaos*. Every kind of ambition, even those of which philosophy and history had never been able to conceive the idea or describe the devastation,

started and clashed. There was perfect agreement as to destroying, but not as to creating anew! The architect of the day crushed him of the day preceding with the materials of the new edifice, and was himself buried the next year under the ruins of his own building. All, however, harangued with eloquence to demonstrate the solidity of their work. *I am the real Puncbinello!* cried each Legislature.

As soon as they had huddled together their articles of a Constitution and seized the reins of the State, the prevailing party conjured the nation to trust themselves to them, and did not doubt that the force of reason would produce obedience. “Equality, liberty, order, perfect<sup>“</sup> affection, and happiness, all this you shall have,” said the simple *Brisotins* to the people, in the report of their Constitution of 1793, signed *Condorcet*; provided we have to deal with a nation attentive to the laws, with citizens obedient to the voice of reason. These poor innocents, as we see, were not disgusted; but what need would reasonable citizens, submissive to the laws, have for their talking and of their statutes? Such a nation would require no government.

Thus, had not a hundred different causes concurred in the instability of the Republican forms, it would have arisen from this circumstance, which, instead of recalling the nation to its primitive

primitive rights, and founding on some prior basis its new liberty, set it afloat in the ocean of hypotheses, enveloped it in the pride of avoiding whatever had been tried before, and threw it into the snares of the different factions who adapted their laws to the uncertainty of their situations, of their passions, and of their interests.

This arose from the force of things rather than that of men. In a nation accustomed for several years to popular commotions, there will always be found *Babeufs* and *Marats*, to sound the trumpet of disorder and murder, while the less furious votaries of ambition will be desirous of settling a form of Government which should put every one in his place, and themselves at the head of affairs.—France has been bandied from pillar to post, and perhaps this will continue to be her fate for a long time; for if an *imperishable* Republic is perishable like another, it is capable of receiving in twenty or thirty years a hundred different forms, from the Revolutionary Republic to the dictatorial Republic, from democracy to oligarchy, from the empire of the sans-culottes to that of the Generals, from *unity and indivisibility* to federalism.

It would be absurd then to reproach the authors of the last Parisian Revolution with having ingrafted it upon the ruins of a tottering Constitution,

tution, which, after having been the ridicule of all the jurists of Europe, no longer existed but as a vessel dismasted by the pilots, the hulk of which they endeavour to get on shore to avoid its destruction by fire or the waves.

But most of them will not be so easily pardoned for having lavished on that mis-shapen abortion a hypocritical or foolish admiration, and for having adored its vices and protected its iniquities till it became necessary to leave it to its fate. *Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes?* No doubt experience may have undeceived the enthusiasts, and converted the incredulous; but if it be just to admit this repentance, we must compare the lateness of it, and its confessions with the idolatry, the oaths, and tyrannical obstinacy with which the worship of this constitution, preached up at its commencement and every six months after, was served.

If there be any modesty or a shadow of sincerity in this crowd of decisive innovators, dogmatic cosmopolites, and eloquent encymasts, who at every new Constitution proclaim it to the nation and to Europe as the summary of the science of Government, and as the immutable and indestructible compendium of the art of composing public liberty, let them shudder at their presumption and blush for their incapacity.

Let

Let them in the archives of human folly and degradation find if they can a sight to be compared to that of those political transmutations of the French nation precipitated in the crucible, to the rapture with which each of those political metamorphoses was extolled, to the immortality decreed for them, to the abomination of the means employed to give force to their authority, and, in fine, to the contempt with which those works of genius were loaded when their authors and their disciples changed their tastes or their opinions.

In 1791, the Constitution is inaugurated with the pomps of paganism : it is no collection of laws made by the hand of man, but a sacrament instituted for ever, an immortal revelation committed to all generations. Sixty old men carry this *sacred volume* to the Legislative Assembly, who prostrate themselves with perfect recollection. *Four hundred and ninety-two Deputies,* cries the declaimer Cerutte, *have laid their bands upon the gospel of the Constitution, and sworn to maintain it to their latest breath.* AGES will hail its duration.

In eight months the Constitution expires in the arms and under the blows of four hundred and ninety-two Deputies *all in good health.* The gospel is denied ; it is buried in a winding sheet drenched in blood ; its funeral dirge is composed of trumpet flourishes and blasphemies ;

mies ; its authors and proselytes are proscribed, slaughtered, and driven to caves or foreign lands to seek shelter against the more expert philosophers who are to enlighten France with a new star.

The Republic is decreed : how is it to be constituted ? The *Girondists* present a fine manuscript, which in some hundred paragraphs is to settle the public prosperity, their comprehension, and submission. This new constitutional little code is received by the connoisseurs as a master-piece ; but this master-piece very soon vanishes, so soon as the 31st of May, 1793, and with it the artists of it. One poisons himself in a dungeon, another is worried by dogs : a third race of Legislators cut the throats of the second revised and embellished by the chiefs of terrorism ; and the third constitution supplants the theorems of *Condorcet*. By means of inquisitors, informers, assignats, confiscations, revolutionary committees, and executioners, it drags out its existence to the year 1795 ; at which period, damned by the nation and its representatives, who two years before had accepted it unanimously, as forming the grand era of the human race, it makes way for a fourth improvement, laboured seriously and maturely by the masters of the art, proposed solemnly as an end to changing, and invested also with the general consent.

All

All obstacles vanish before this new idol. Forms of oaths succeed, and none appear sufficiently binding for the maintenance of its inviolability. Professors of public law, literati, and orators, analyse its contexture, and search for defects in vain; conscience and reason discover in it only what is worthy of homage. Away fly the Generals of the Republic to institute, sword in hand, Directories, Councils of the Young and Councils of Elders, in Lombardy, Holland, and Switzerland. Must this Constitution be confirmed against the voice of experience, the censure of sages, and the opinions of reformers? The armies of Italy and the Lower Rhine deliberate and threaten; their Generals put themselves in motion against the sacrileges; they dispatch their soldiery; the Deputies of the people are driven from their seats in the name of the people and of *the law*; and proscriptions re-commence.

Then come forward the shameless sophists, the *Garats*, *Le Noir la Rocbes*, *Bailleuls*, *Gbeniers*, and a hundred others, and prove that it was necessary to cheat the Constitution in order to save it, that it is untouched though violated, that the Directory have saved the sanctuary, and that they must swear every decade to perish on the first breach.—*Vive la Constitution!* is shouted from the bottom of Gascony to the extremity of

Alsace, till the day of conviction, on which the oracle pronounces that the Constitution *has perished*, and that haste must be made to frame a FIFTH.

On these tedious and unaccountable conceits, however, have the Government and the nation, the doctors and the disciples, been occupied, without remorse, or pity, or reflexion, for ten years past ! The same round of admiration, the same sublime adoration, the same astrological assurances of the *unalterable perpetuity* of these several political Alcorans, accompanied their fabrication, and consecrated their emanation. No sooner are they framed than their framers and their guardians pronounce the French the ~~matchless~~ nation : and they are right ; for no one would think of disputing with them the merit of such originality.

It might, perhaps, be thought that the proof of this inconstancy, that this important demonstration of want of forecast, false views, mistakes of the understanding, and errors of reasoning, excited more modesty in the Legislators and diminished the credulity of the public.—Not at all : the language of 1795, 1793, 1791, is again repeated, and we hear that it is true that the preceding lawmakers were ignoramuses, but that now the sun of knowledge has risen, and that perfection

perfection and the golden age are at hand. It is too ridiculous even for the pencil of a *Molière*.

It should be engraved with aquafortis, translated into all tongues, and under all forms, for the shame of the *age of reason*, for the instruction of future ages, and for the punishment of political quacks.

We observe, nevertheless, in this burlesque variety of French Constitutions two distinct tendencies, according to the dates. From 1790 to 1795, the dogmas and institutions ran in favour of democratic anarchy against the establishment of any authority whatever sufficient to secure a respect for the laws. In 1795, on the contrary, the horrible times preceding turned the balance in favour of the Government. As the Constitution had placed no balance between the Legislative Body and the Directory, their usurpations were inevitable; but those of the executive power being able to rest upon the written rights, extensive indeed, which had been confided to them, and upon the unwritten rights which flowed from the former, it became clear that they would very soon be despotic. This, far from being complained of, was made a subject of felicitation: the nation was eager for any tyranny, provided it crushed the anarchists and blood-suckers. Thus, while the Legislators of 1791, in instituting a monarchical Government, had reduced the King

to the power of an Avoyer of Bemeyode of a Syndic of Geneva, the Legislators of 1795, instituting a Republic, delegated to their executive power the authority and influence of a monarch.

This absurdity prevailed in opinion as well as in the laws. It was in vain that the Directory violated these, heaped usurpations on abuses, and reigned arbitrarily; the Public, that is to say, the *Moderés*, the impartialists, the cyphers, the selfish, the indifferent, people that had property, people in trade, and artists, rallied around them, as around a wicked but necessary protector. To hear them speak, it was disturbing the public tranquillity to deny the Directors absolute power. The revolutionary literati, the legislative beaux-esprits, the National Institute, most of the journalists, and all who were looking for places, extolled, with the most indefatigable assurance, all the acts of the Government.

To the force of prejudices, which thus militated in favour of the supreme power and its excesses, were added the secret calculations of the factions and of the various cabals who were thirsting for the dominion. By cherishing the hope of obtaining it they beheld it without pain aggrandizing and concentrating, as an inheritance that was one day to belong to them. From the very origin of the Revolution, in the bustle of patriotic protestations, amidst so many popular effusions

effusions and devotion to the cause of the people and liberty, there never was in the different parties but one grand conception, that of seizing upon the power after having instituted it, of securing themselves in it by every means, and of excluding the greater number by confining it to a privileged committee. At first this was done by playing the demagogue ; but since the rabble have lost their pikes, their cutlasses, and their tribunes, it has been necessary to make way to the first places by a superiority of intrigue, of temporary credit, or boldness, and to secure them by soldiers.

These preliminary remarks are not foreign to the late vicissitude which the French Republic has experienced ; for they contain its genealogy.

If the late Directory had used their power with more discretion and ability they would probably have been still upon their legs, and with them that convenient Constitution which, without being formally abolished, was pliant to their caprices. Tired at length of their yoke, their violence, and futility, the Legislative Body awakened, and acquired a momentary reign.

The Revolution of the 30th Prairial (*June 18,*) even deserved to be excepted from the reproach cast upon all the others. It was effected without bayonets or brigands, and by the moral force alone

of legislative acts. The councils were empowered to order an impeachment of the Directors ; they had the indulgence to leave it to their choice to stand that trial, or resign. No physical constraint was resorted to in this ostracism, or to enforce the reforms that were made.

It should seem that this character of discretion ought to have secured them some duration : but no faction was satisfied with so incomplete a triumph. The partizans of the Executive Power seeing it in danger regretted its loss of force, the Jacobins were eager to complete its destruction and make a sceptre for themselves from its wrecks, and the terrorists proclaimed a speedy return to the Revolutionary system ; all who trembled, all who reflected, and all who had any thing to save, prayed for a refuge from anarchy. Nobody finding any longer in the Constitution of the year 3, either safety, or stability, or security, or a sufficient vehicle for personal or party ambition, it was abdicated by tacit consent ; every one fixed his ladders against its ramparts.

However, a balance of interests and of strength, the uncertainty of the chances, and the weight which authority and any establishment whatever mechanically preserves, might have prolonged this state of observation and clandestine war till the next elections. The public thought so,

so, notwithstanding the rumours which predicted an earlier change ; but it was not before the public that the preparations for the dénouement were made.

While the parties were deceiving themselves by oaths and protestations, the conspiracy was framing, and advanced apace. We repeat that it did not precede the return of *Buonaparte* ; and that if the project were conceived, meditated, and arranged previously between *Sieyes* and his confidants, the period, form of execution, and general character of the measures, received their sanction from the presence, concurrence, and counsels of the General. We are even assured that not a fortnight elapsed between the formation and accomplishment of the project : care had been taken not to admit too many into the secret, to conceal from those that were admitted a part of the details and the moment of the execution, the knowledge of which, it is said, was entirely confined to *Sieyes*, *Buonaparte*, and *Rœderer* \*. The last served as agent and mediator between the two chiefs.

On

\* *Rœderer*, originally from Lorrain, was formerly a counsellor in the Parliament of Metz : being appointed to the Constituent Assembly, he made a demi-reputation and aimed at popularity. He then became Procureur-Syndic of the Department of Paris, journalist, political writer, and lawyer-

On Friday the 8th, that is to say, the day before the *coup-de-main*, the conspirators became uneasy lest they should be discovered; they were apprehensive of a counter-mine or counter-conspiracy; it was suspected that a denunciation was going to be suddenly made in the Five Hundred, and that three of the Directors would cause *Bonaparte* to be arrested, but there was very little ground for apprehending a design of that kind, on observing the want of foresight, the docility, and the dishonour with which the Jacobins bore this defeat. The pretended conspiracies of which the real conspirators accused them, it should seem, then, are to be reckoned among the fictions in use on the like

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yer-general to most of the factions that succeeded one another in the Government. He escaped through them all, and cultivated the favour of those who were willing to employ him. His Republicanism assumes all forms at will: he has twisted and twined himself successfully through storms and parties, always reserving expedients for himself whatever were the event. Nobody has had a higher reputation for intrigue, pliability, artifice, and deceit. *Camille Desmoulins* said of him, that *his head was a sketch formed by nature to express the affinity of envy, perfidy, and roguery*. Whether such be his character or not, he is not deficient in the knowledge of men and business: he possesses penetration, and all the resources of Machiavelism. He is besides a Republican wit and admired writer, and has introduced into political discussions that metaphysical *Mariavaudage* and studied bombast which for some years has passed at Paris for depth of knowledge.

occasions :

occasions: no discoveries, no proofs have been brought forward. Thus the only plot of which the defeated party has been guilty, is that, which is dated from the existence of Jacobinism, of waging war with all Government, and of changing every Constitution which would fetter their audacity, tyranny, rapine, and popular fury: nor were these designs of subversion chargeable upon many of those on whom the chastisement has fallen.

If we cannot disapprove the principle of a Revolution, which suspends the progress of the monstrous disorder and *constitutional* anarchy prevailing in France, which to the most mischievous and most ridiculous of Republics substitutes at least a hope of an amelioration, and which in subverting the Constitution has subverted an object of dissension and of scandal, we cannot however accord the like indulgence to the choice of the means by which it has been accomplished.

To revive the example of passed violence, and set the factions that of seizing power by force; to enforce their will sword in hand; to drive away the elect of the nation with the but-ends of muskets, and to dissolve legislature and legislators to the beating of the drum, are to be sure neither Republican combinations, nor polished forms of liberty,

Two circumstances seem to have altered the original plan of this revolution; the unexpected resistance of the Council of Five Hundred, and the temper of *Buonaparte*.

The introduction of the enterprise might have been coloured with legal appearances. By the Constitution the Elders were empowered to remove the legislature to another place; the Article three hundred and thirty-six of the code even authorised them to propose a revision of it. It is true that, by an invention worthy of the genius of modern legislators, three affirmative resolutions of the two Councils in the course of nine years were necessary, to give authority to the Assembly, which was to be charged with reviewing and correcting the laws; but the meetings at St. Cloud might easily have found in the urgency of affairs, in the public dangers, and in the logic of the times, excuses for departing from the decree, by shewing that the revision could not be deferred. The military array might have been employed merely *in terrorem*, as the means of public tranquillity: the presence of the soldiers might have influenced the votes, without violating them by open force.

But for want of preparatory measures the conspirators were deceived in the confidence they placed in the obedience of the majority of the Council of Five Hundred to the impulse given,

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The assembling of so great a number of troops, the illegal appointment of *Buonaparte* to the chief command, and the style of an Eastern legislator which he affected in his speeches, had alienated that Assembly. Instead of following the example of the Elders, they appeared almost unanimous for renewing the oath to the Constitution; a great majority of them were even of opinion that *Buonaparte* should be outlawed; the appearance of the General served but to exasperate them the more, and then there remained no other resource against their resistance than the ministry of the grenadiers.

From the ease with which the most obstinate of the deputies were dispersed, the sudden defection of many on the very day, and the total deficiency of all manly opposition, it should seem that with address, some attentions, and more openness, recourse to the odious means of armed violence might have been avoided; but the impetuous and domineering character of *Buonaparte* determined the nature of the event. In his speeches and proclamations we discover his impatience to display his exclusive ascendancy, to deal alone the destiny of the Republic, and to prove that with aid-de-camps and soldiers, a hero like him could not experience a quarter of an hour's resistance.

If we compare this new revolutionary scene with those which have preceded it, we can see in its form only a magnified imitation of the 31st of May 1793, and of the 4th of Sept. 1797: the latter did not cost more blood, or meet with more opposition; but at those periods, while the Constitution was infringed, the outrage was coloured with an hypocritical respect for the laws; whereas now they are abolished with open violation: there has been no distinction made in the arraignment of the system and its guides, no reproach incurred of inconsistency and deceit.

Besides, those former outrages were but incidental: they were the episodes of the piece, which neither stopped the action nor changed the general sense of it: whereas the 10th of Nov. held out a complete metamorphosis of actors, scenery, plan, and denouement: it was conformable to the public sentiment, which was shocked at the 31st of May and 4th of September.

Although its first effects are neither so striking nor so important to each family, nor so consolatory as were those of the 9th of Thermidor, (July 27,) by which a pardon was granted to so many thousands of citizens condemned to captivity or death, they have revived many hopes, restored greater confidence, and engendered a multitude of illusions. As the nation,

nation, passive and sunk beneath ten years of woeful events, neither does nor can take any interest in its rights, liberty, representatives, laws, or any form whatever, to which it easily bends, it is a matter of great indifference to it in what manner, by whom, for what legislative system, or for what ambition, the innovations are effected, if it but derive some advantages from them.

These advantages are exaggerated by the warmth of enthusiasm ; but they cannot be denied with candour : for, is it nothing to be saved, were it but for a year, from the ravages of a faction under the dominion of which no one slept in peace ? and to find it driven from the offices of Government, at the moment when every one was in dread of its overrunning France a second time with its firebrands, assassins, conspirators, and Agrarian laws ?

Is it nothing to reflect that with it have disappeared those execrable and execrated Assemblies, in which, under the name of Representatives of the People, mercenary speakers, ignorant demoniacs, and vile accomplices of the most criminal factions, have for eight years been ruling the fate of Europe and of France, protracting their power and the public slavery ? At length there is an end to those meetings of folly and iniquity ; at length is that travelling Oligarchy

of seven hundred and fifty fabricators of contradictory and oppressive decrees dissolved, after a reign the remembrance of which will be similar to that of the deluge and the plague of darkness.

The Revolution was raised upon the basis of a corps of deputies ever active, ever permanent, ever masters of the leading-strings of a nation of puppets. No factious leader, no legislative manufacturer, no power, had yet dared, amidst so many usurpations, changes and removals, to make an attack upon the existence itself of those Assemblies, which opinion and the law had made inseparable from the Republic. In getting rid of that fundamental and indissoluble senate, by means of the military, and in reducing it to two secret Committees charged to prepare its final annihilation and a new system of representation, all the dogmas of 1789 are devoted to laughter, all the passed constitutions damned, and the scandal imputed to them by all men of sense is confirmed ; the High Court of the 10th of November has annulled the Decrees and committed to the flames the principles on which the Republic and its institutions were founded.

If we except the villains now crushed, and the very small number of Republicans sincere in their zeal for democracy, what class of citizens will lament the last establishment ? When to the vices of the Constitution the vices of Administration are superadded,

superadded, who can be alarmed at innovations? Short of the edged instruments of the *Marats*, *Robespierres*, and *Chaumettes*, can the imagination conceive a more vile, uncertain, and painful existence than that to which the Directory and Councils had led the Public, the Nation, and the State?

All men of property in despair, dealings suspended, the funds at an ebb unknown before, all confidence among individuals destroyed by public discredit, commerce without capital or emulation, and industry annihilated by the dread of making any effort within view of fiscal rapines, arbitrary regulations, perpetual war, and a confusion threatening general ruin; specie swallowed up, the interest of money proportioned to the risks of public affairs and uncertainty of events; the contributions spent before received, becoming progressively insufficient as they were multiplied, and rapidly decreasing; the public employments bestowed according to the spirit of faction on the most dishonourable of men, and the administration not less irregular, though changing its guides every month; discord among the governing; the public powers in conspiracy against themselves, and against the law which instituted them; a Legislation brutalized by ignorance, a Constitution become a public scandal, and the sport of its interpreters; famished armies compelled

compelled to seek pay and subsistence on foreign lands, and to repair their losses by completely depopulating towns and villages ; poverty reduced to indigence, competence to poverty, and wealth itself unequal to the exactions ; wretched in the present, and trembling for the future :— such was the lot of the citizens.

It is very doubtful whether three Consuls and two Legislative Committees can remedy disorders so deep, and calamities of which the roots are not even touched. It is neither impossible nor improbable that new convulsions may result from the shock of authorities, institutions, ambition, and systems still untried ; France, however, will have had some little respite under a more tolerable Government : she quits the state of terror and depression into which she had been plunged, since the month of September 1797, by the Directory and the Jacobins.

The concentration of the Government gives it a greater ascendancy over the factions, surer means of enforcing obedience and protection, and more energy in the maintenance of order ; its most secret determinations will be less exposed to contradictions, and if it acquires greater power to do evil, it will also, by more independence, be enabled to do good. If those who hold the reins possess understanding, it will cease to be clouded by incapacity, ignorance, and the innovating

vating and factious turbulence of a crowd of feeble Legislators, and colleagues perpetually renewed.

It was necessary to gain popularity for this system, which was instituted by an outrage on liberty; it was necessary not only for the public opinion, but also to secure defenders for it. This end could only be attained by acting in a manner that should be a contrast to the past, by testifying aversion for the maxims, the customs, and the men who had been lately disgracing, tormenting, and terrifying the Republic. Whether the intentions of the new rulers be honest or wicked, whether they are veiling mischievous views under the mask of justice or not, interest, experience, and necessity compel them to remove Revolutionary tyrannies, against the return of which they have raised their standard.

Hence the ostentation of promising peace, the first object of the national wish; hence the sudden abolition of the law of hostages, and the forced loan; hence the declarations in favour of property and civil liberty; hence the suppression of the oath of *bated to Royalty*, not, certainly, as some visionaries have imagined, through a principle of affection for Monarchy, but in order to obliterate an invention and a badge of Jacobinism, a form of conspiracy, an outrage.

against all Kings, several of whom it will be the plan to conciliate.

Hence the offers of pacification tried with the Chouans, and the embassy of delegates to the Departments for the purpose of dethroning the Jacobins, and restoring courage to all the rest. Hence, in fine, the appointments to places, of which the greater number has received the public approbation, and of which many of the persons appointed were deserving.

We have only to compare the list of the persons that were employed with that of their successors to be sensible of the effect which this Revolution has produced. The finances were managed by one who had been a member of the Committee of Public Safety in 1794, *Robert Lindet*, who had never known any other than the finance of confiscations. This office is now in the hands of one *Gaudin*, who was at the head of the office for superintending the taxes under the Monarchy, and afterwards a Commissioner of the National Treasury, a man who possesses application and the habits of labour, integrity, and experience. He had the prudence to decline this department under the preceding Government; and if, in undertaking it now, he does not enter upon it with grand talents and views, he does at least with rectitude, intelligence, the spirit of order, exactness, and fidelity.

*Dubois*

*Dubois de Crancé*, whom it is enough to name to give the idea of the union of wickedness and ignorance, had been raised by the Jacobins to the office of minister of war, and at a moment too when the burden of it required a Hercules. He is succeeded by General *Berthier*, who has been long accustomed to the details of this department, an officer respected by the army; laborious, active, and who remained untainted amidst the robberies committed in Italy, where his talents were no less useful to the Republic than those of *Buonaparte*, one perfectly fit under any Government for the place he occupies.

The administration of Justice has been put into the hands of *Cambacérès*, formerly a magistrate of Montpellier, and afterwards a Conventionalist; *magis extra vitia quam intra virtutes*, a learned lawyer and a man of integrity, but not possessed of courage to oppose daring folly and powerful wickedness; of a mild character and soft manners, incapable of committing injustice through interest or passion, but not capable of resisting the impressions of fear and the authority of force: more adapted to do good than to prevent evil, he has employed his leisure in digesting, in several volumes *in folio*, a civil code, the reception of which has always been opposed by the Legislatures, and which it is said,

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from its copiousness, would eclipse all the Justinian compilations.

The charge of the Home Department has been taken from a Conventional Jacobin named *Quinette*, and given to the geometrician *La Place*. It is very probable that this modest scholar, who has avoided all the errors and factions of the Revolution, did not aspire to this honour. An employment of so delicate a nature, and which requires so much knowledge of men and of business, seemed little congenial to the kind of life, the studies, and the merit of *La Place*; but celebrated names were wanted, and a respect for science was affected. As one would not choose academicians from the offices of administration, it appears singular to choose the administration from academies: this kind of inconsistency arises from the spirit of the times, the confusion of talents, and the views of the institutors of the new order, who fancy they shall ennoble the Republic, in making its Councils so many Lyceums, and its Rulers so many Philosophers.—But they talk already of dividing this department, and of leaving to *La Place* only the management of the Public education and of the arts and sciences.

Several other civil and military appointments have received the ratification of the public voice. It gave joy to see the offices cleansed of a multitude of intriguers, sharpers, detestable and inept

intruders, with which they were surcharged. The war department, in particular, has assumed a new force under the reforming hands of General Berthier; but what an association is that of the men we have been describing with a Fouché of Nantes, who remains Minister of the Police, although he had been the tool of the most execrable Revolutionary violences, and whose chief merit consists in having betrayed the brothers and friends who, depending on his services, had advanced him to the administration? The sincere friends of peace, honesty, and sincerity, lament that Reinbart, who was Minister for the Foreign Department, should be succeeded by Talleyrand.

The reform having extended to a cloud of Commissioners, Executive Agents, Municipal Officers, and subaltern oppressors, France has felt herself relieved, like the traveller who, expecting to brunt a storm, sees the rainbow form upon the black clouds that are surcharged with lightnings and with hail.

I should certainly not trust either to the mildness, the justice, or the moderation of the chief leaders of the present Government, if their passions were in opposition to their professions and their duties; but they have no choice left.

*On ne voit pas deux fois le rivage des morts.*

There is no going back. The implacable Jacobins will never forgive the authors of their ruin. If the

the present men were tempted to imitate them and to return to their measures, it would be necessary also to return to their protection, and resume the state of dependence upon them. It would have been as well to have continued in it. It is requisite then to form a bulwark and a party against them, and to admit the assistance of all those who are willing to preserve, or who tolerate, the Republic, without desiring that every year should be distinguished by proscriptions, every Legislature by institutes consecrating the caprices and the crimes of a ruling faction, and that a hundred thousand fierce fellows should in the name of the *rights of man*, do as they please with the multitude, the public tranquillity, property, law, and civil liberty.

Thus, the new arbiters of France, having but two classes of essential enemies, the anarchial Republicans and the absolute Royalists, they will associate, not in their authority but in its functions and security, those called the *Moderés*, that is to say, all who are terrified at concussions, who dread plunder, and who are not more courageous in resisting the oppressors, than indisposed to exercise oppression. Numbers of Constitutionalists, of Royalists in opinion, of softened Republicans, of theoretical people, of ambitious men and intriguers without ferocity against whom the Jacobins had shut the door to honours, and, in short,

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the multitude of peaceable citizens to whom all forms of Government are indifferent, provided they are secured from troubles, assassins, robbers, and merciless innovators, will be invited to this alliance. There will result from it a greater consideration for the classes of society on whom the whole tyranny of power had hitherto fallen.

Nay, even supposing that this grand movement tends to a usurpation of the sovereign power by one, two, or fifty individuals, reason and interest will always dictate to them to protect the docile portion of the inhabitants, who only want to breathe, and to make the sceptre bear heavy upon the faction of the fanatics and dethroned oppressors, who will seek vengeance and commotions.

Among the remarkable effects of this crisis, shall we omit the lie which has been solemnly given by its authors to the encomiasts of the system of the Republic with respect to other Nations, and to that torrent of declamatory impostures by which they and their echoes in foreign countries accused the Powers of Europe with refusing to listen to peace? The necessity of the conduct of those Powers is now demonstrated by memorable confessions. Could the Sovereigns at war with the French Republic sign a more justificatory Manifesto, or could those who have sought her friendship receive a more shocking reproach,

than

than in the words of *Boulay de la Meurthe* in the famous nocturnal sitting of St. Cloud?

"There has been still less stability and security," said he, "in principles and persons, since the Constitutional System, than there was under the Revolutionary one. The continuance of the war is chiefly owing to the want among ourselves of a prudent, regular, and truly Republican diplomatic system. If, in the present state of our political organization, we would establish such a diplomatic system, and stipulate treaties of peace, where would be the guarantee for them?"

"Before the 18th of Fructidor, the Government presented to foreign Nations but an uncertain existence; and none would treat with it. After that grand event, all the power having been collected in the Directory reservoir, the treaties of peace were very soon broken; the Directory, after alarming all Europe, and wantonly destroying many Governments, being neither able to carry on war or make peace, were overthrown by a puff on the 30th of Prairial."

"Thus, judging only by notorious facts, the French Government was to be considered as having nothing fixed, either in respect of men or things."

This

This is precisely the language we have heard, in the British Parliament from Lord *Grenville*, Mr. *Pitt*, and Mr. *Windham*; the summary of all the arguments so long and so uselessly offered to the Powers of the Continent, against their *separate* treaties of peace, and their dreams of accommodation with the French Government.

We have been confining ourselves to a view of the more immediate and evident consequences of the event of the 10th of November; the more remote political effects of it are beyond all calculation and foresight. It would not be so easy to divine what they will be, as to foretel what they will not be. This Revolution, of an order perfectly novel, appears to us as well laid as that of 1789. Here are new materials, means, results, architects, and times, which will probably impress on the future a character very dissimilar to that of the preceding commotions which, notwithstanding the variety of them, always threw the Republic into the same circle.

This is the first in which the military power has absolutely prevailed over the civil one. However *Bonaparte* may have seemed to receive the impulse, he gave it: though he received the truncheon from the hands of a hundred Deputies clandestinely convoked in the Council of Elders, he was previously in possession of it as chief of

the conspiracy: the Generals of the Republic were his adjutants, the soldiers of the State his executioners and his guard, the Hall of the Elders his chancery and that of the Five Hundred his field of battle.

The business, language, actors, all was in the style of a warrior. No Directory, no Legislature to conduct the operation and give it a show of legality. The public authority was altogether transposed, represented and exercised by an independent leader of troops, speaking as he acted, like the *Praefectus Praetorio* who, after dethroning the emperor, shews the multitude the new *Cæsar* who is to govern them.

From the character of this Revolution, the observer is led to examine the principal personages of it, their different parts, the motley partizans they have collected, the amalgamation or dissonance of interests, opinions, and ulterior views, which may distinguish the leaders and their coadjutors. This view will bring us back to some historical details, which will supply the silence of the public papers, and of which we have hitherto had but an imperfect knowledge.

The Revolution of the 10th of Nov. was the work of *Sieyes* and *Buonaparte*; but the latter would have effected it alone, which cannot be said of the former. There was difference enough in their characters, their pretensions, and their friends.

friends or flatterers, to have desired a thorough reconciliation. On this misunderstanding the Jacobins grounded their security without suspecting that there was an end to it. Within ten days of the event no direct and free communication had been opened between the two chiefs. Officious mediators diminished the difficulties, and were active and dextrous in negotiating the treaty between them as well as the project which was the result of it.

We mentioned Rœderer as the principal negotiator of this union; and he displayed in his ability for the conduct of affairs much beyond his reputation. This conspiracy for a triumvirate rested essentially upon him, who was the unreserved confident and counsel of the ruling personages.

There was not above four or five other persons admitted to the whole of the secret. *Buonaparte* had even concealed it from *Berthier*. *Volney*, *Talleyrand*, and *Renaud de St. Jean d'Angely*, another Constitutional of 1791 who was employed as commissioner in the army of Italy, and then at Malta, shared the confidence given to Rœderer, and were employed in preparing the enterprise \*.

Not-

\* We have been informed, that on the 9th, at seven in the morning, *Buonaparte* sent for General *Bernadotte*, and imparted the project to him, asking if he might depend upon him. "General," replied *Bernadotte*, "I think of liberty differently,

Notwithstanding some indirect and indistinct expressions which escaped at *Buonaparte's*, it remained impenetrable. The majority of the Councils and of the Directory, the War Minister and several others, and more than half of the agents of the police, or administration, found themselves threatened by the conspiracy; but their distrust did not go beyond vague suspicions, and was wide of the nature as well as of the time of execution.

*Buonaparte*, however, exposed the plot to the greatest danger, by causing the explosion to be delayed for twenty-four hours. All was ready on the 7th to be executed on the 8th, and the letters of coavocation addressed to the members of the Elders on whom he depended were going to be dispatched; but the Eastern Hero, against the unanimous opinion of the other conspirators, adjourned the affair till the next day,

If reason be at a loss to account for the want of vigilance, the security, and the inaction of the Jacobins, we are not less astonished at the serious errors and mistakes of which their ad-

" differently, and your plan is death to it."—" In that case," said *Buonaparte*, " as you are in possession of my secret; you will remain here all day."—" I will not be under an arrest," answered *Bernadotte*, " but I give you my word; you may depend upon it." *Buonaparte* allowed him to go

versaries were guilty. We conjectured, and we now affirm, that the conspirators by no means expected the resistance that was shewn at St. Cloud. It was supposed that the majority of the Five hundred, submissive or terrified, would instantly appoint the committees required, and that they would adopt the grounds of the decree which was passed on the evening of the 10th, among others the conversion of the Executive Power into a Consulate of two persons; for in the original plan no mention had been made of *Roger Dudos*.

The sitting of St. Cloud, then, had been regarded as a bed of justice, at which automatons should register the will of a Corsican and a Provençal, as the Parliament of Paris formerly registered the edicts of the Monarch at Versailles.

All the preparatory steps were disconcerted by an unexpected and general opposition. What a strange illusion was it to imagine that a Legislative Body, of which only ten or twelve members gained over were interested in the success of the business, would voluntarily destroy itself, and annihilate that National Representation which, soiled with violations, formed a buckler for the Revolutionists and still awed the Nation? How was it possible to believe that the majority, animated by the old Conventionists who, out of power,

power had before them only the prospect of contempt, horror, or death, would lay down that senatorial robe which was their safeguard?

Accordingly, few people in Paris doubt that, if after the call of names on the swearing of fidelity to the Constitution, and at the moment when a very great majority were about to outlaw *Buonaparte*, a hundred men led by *Jordan* had appeared at the opposite door, there would have been an end to *Buonaparte* and the conspiracy, and the Jacobins would have remained masters of the empire. Then should we have seen those very grenadiers of the Legislative Guard, to whose baseness the conquerors now prostitute their gratitude, those servile and corrupt grenadiers who, on the 4th of September turned their arms against the Councils, should we have seen seizing, imprisoning, and perhaps assassinating the leaders and their accomplices who dissolved the Legislative Body.

In every act of this drama we see and hear only *Buonaparte*: he engrosses all the scene. Is it from pride, ambition, or further views; that he has thus piqued himself upon eclipsing all his colleagues, giving a national event the character of a personal contest between his authority and that of the Legislature, assuming the gait and expressing himself as an Aga of Jaffissarie's coming

coming to set the Divan to rights, and force **is** decisions on the empire ?

Is there any prudence or skill to be traced in this affectation of a Republican General, who, puffed up with his military glory, can speak only of his soldiers, his brothers in arms, his bayonets, and the use he will make of them ?

Can we trace the man of genius in this sudden transformation of the new Constable of France into the Consul of a Republic, where they swear to respect the sovereignty of the people, liberty and equality ? Will not the fortunate Triumvir be accused of having drawn his sword only to cut off the robe from his superiors in the State, and to invest himself with that of the Dictatorship ? How long will that man be trusted, who, with his helmet on his head, after unmaking and re-making the political State, seizes the reins of the Government himself, usurps both the military and civil power, and leaves to his eclipsed colleagues only the prospect of being treated by him as their predecessors have been, if they oppose his will ?

Where, in a word, is the Frenchman so simple as to doubt that *Buonaparte*, at the head of an army, and political head of the Republic, does not possess in fact and for the moment an absolute power ? And is that the thought with which he wished to inspire the Nation ?

Lastly,

Lastly, do we perceive as much foresight as haughtiness and audacity in this ostentation of glory and power, in this adoption of an exclusive part, in these absolute and imprudent speeches, in which *Buonaparte* takes upon him to suppose a plot without giving any proof of it, and in which he seems to be afraid lest any other should take a share in the responsibility of his assertions and conduct?

The more we examine the conduct of this extraordinary man in the late transaction, the more we ascertain the elements of his genius and character to be the same as he displayed them in Italy, in Egypt, at all times and in all places. In a Republic wisely regulated, such a citizen would be thrown from the Tarpeian Rock; in a Republic like France he ascends the Capitol with power to set it in flames, if he be compelled to come down from it, or if the Consular sceptre be not sufficient for his security, or his dominion.

The conduct of *Sieyes* has been the reverse of that of his formidable associate. The more the latter affected to shew himself openly, and to engross attention, the more has the former assumed reserve in his manner, and external disinterestedness in the glory of participating the event as a chief.

His

His taciturnity has given greater brilliancy to Bonaparte : not a word has escaped from him : he might be taken for a spectator. Is it from policy or necessity that he thus conceals his importance ; taking shelter under the wings of the chief actor, and receiving from him his moiety of the supreme authority ?

The third Consul is but a figurante admitted to the honours through courtesy ; he serves merely as a stander-by to his colleagues, and has done nothing more in their work than given his assent.

As for the Legislative Committees, those ruins of the most formidable power that ever existed, they are mere docile officers. Soon punished for having sold and sacrificed their corps, they already feel their insignificance and the weight of the chain with which they have crushed the National Representation. The style of the former messages of the Government has given place to an imperative form ; it is now, *the Consulate propose to you this URGENT AND NECESSARY measure.* These few words carry the sentence and settle the deliberation.

These Committees are an amalgamia of revolutionary beaux-esprits, obstinate republicans, flexible republicans whose conduct is not the result of their opinions but of a calculation of circumstances, creatures of the Consuls, and a

few whose names are unsullied, but of scarcely any weight; Two distinct parties were immediately formed; the one consisting of *Lucien Buonaparte*, and the trusty friends of the General, the other of all those, who are dissatisfied at the dominion of a dictatorial family, and who regret their legislative existence \*.

Under another point of view we perceive in this heterogeneous coalition two sets of men who are the reverse of each other in their nature, habits, manners, and revolutionary principles. The one composed of military men, more frank, more decisive, and strangers to what was most odious and criminal in the Revolution; the other intriguing and envious, whose souls are racked with vanity, and who under all systems are incessantly disposed to return to the circle they have left.

Although no appearance of misunderstanding between *Sieyes* and *Buonaparte* has yet been mentioned, the dissimilarity of their respective battalions is enough to create a speedy division between these two leaders, in whose characters,

\* The Committee of the Five Hundred, a few days after their installation, in haste to enjoy themselves, passed a resolution for granting to each of its Members, and the Committee of the Elders, an allowance of twenty thousand livres, a coach, and secretaries. The Elders were wise enough to reject this scandalous resolution.

passions,

passions, talents, and perhaps views, there is also so little conformity.

Nor is there more in the systems, wishes, and opinions of the crowd who applaud the change, who expect and receive advantages from it, and who in the fall of a wicked and oppressive Government, see the last scene of the Revolution and the hope of a new order.

Some believe themselves in the path of a more perfect Republic, which is to put an end to commotions and maintain an invariable balance among the public powers. This class, in the attainment of this object, subdivide their hypothesis, extend or diminish the right of representation, keep between the popular system and an elective aristocracy, between the institution of a single chief and of several, and between the maintenance of original equality and the establishment of some civil and political distinctions.

Others believe the Government on the point of being so concentrated, that they place a constitutional monarch at the head of it; but in thus reconciling Royalty and the Republic, each draws up the compact of this union, and according to his interest or his theory names the head on which the crown is to be placed.

Lastly, others more indifferent to the fate of the public laws, tired of Constitutions and popu-

for troubles, without desiring a royal counter-revolution, in quest of fortune, place, and fame, and who are ever ready to devote themselves to the man who commands with any superiority, no longer see the state but in *Buonaparte*, no longer expect tranquillity and stability but under a military Government directed by a chief capable of awing all the factions.

This medley of inclinations, characters, private views, and parties confederated by circumstances on the discontinuance of which they would immediately separate, corresponds to all the common conjectures that men will take it into their minds to form upon the object and the final consequences of this Revolution. I believe the directors and co-operators of the event would be the most puzzled to satisfy the public on those points.

The position of the chiefs and the care of their safety were the immediate causes of the event. An accusation, a decree of the majority of the Councils in connivance with two or three Directors, would have been enough to displace Sieyes and hurl him from the Luxembourg to Guiana.

The greatest obscurity would scarcely have screened *Buonaparte* from a similar destiny. His elevation, his hopes, his fortune, his life, and even his glory, lay open to the first *sbirri*, who, with

with a legislative act in their hands, would soon have seized him and dispelled the uneasiness of a Government disgusted at his tone of mightiness, and unable to endure so formidable a rival.—It was a deadly contest; *Buonaparte* had to choose whether he would make himself Head of the Jacobins, or Head of the French Republic; he could not hesitate.

We will not even think of refuting the weak opinion which, confounding a change of the Republic and its rulers with a return to monarchical principles, so liberally supposes that the inventors of this political stroke are tending towards the re-establishment of Royalty. They are no more tending towards it than they wish it; and if they approach to a reasonable Constitution, it will be the means of burying the real monarchy a longer time, and of choking the seeds of its resurrection.

*Heroes* that can fight Austrians, Cossacks, and Mamelukes, are common enough; but *Timoleons* and *Thrazybuluses* are very rare. There is a great difference between that vulgar ambition which displaces and subverts Governments to seize upon the reins or sanction its caprices, and the generous and sublime spirit of a chief, great in power, talents, and credit, who takes advantage of an extraordinary moment in his fortune to lay down his power and restore to his country its

its lawful governor and laws which would secure its liberty.

*Buonaparte* was master, dictator, and sovereign of France in the avenue at St. Cloud. Perhaps on the day after he was not so in the same degree ; but preserving the elements of his greatness, it is upon his own head that he would place the crown, were a crown in question.

He has rejected it like *Cæsar*; yet not without letting it be known, that he could have taken it, but preferred resigning it to the nation. He appears only to have sought the glory of this refusal, and an authority sufficient to conduct him, under the laws he should dictate, to an illustrious repose.

This at least is the opinion of some acute observers ; but in giving this turn to his thoughts of the moment, they take care not to warrant his future opinions.

No doubt, in boasting that he refused the dignity of dictator, protector or prince, he boasted much more still, and his flatterers have repeated it to him that he might have been what he pleased.

Can he have reserved as a condition of this magnanimous renunciation, a consent to erect upon his plans the new order of things which he may permit to be substituted instead of his personal dominion ?

If

If there were any grounds for this conjecture, one might predict, especially when one reflects on *Buonaparte's* character, that whoever shall think of liberty in a manner different from himself will be considered as his enemy, and that all resistance to such acts of Legislation and of Government as he means to prescribe, will restore to his ambition the full flight to which it might have soared.

Will it be said, that reflexion, example, the view of precipices, and the inconstancy of public favour will check that flight? But do not the ambitious resemble highwaymen, who constantly attend at the execution of their comrades, yet return to the road with the hope of escaping from the hands of justice by more dexterity or greater good fortune?

In a situation of this kind, men have rarely a determined and limited object; they are guided by events. *Buonaparte's* head is in the clouds; his career is a poem, his imagination a magazine of heroic romances, and the theatre on which he acts an arena prepared for all the chimeras of the brain, or the deliriums of ambition. Who will draw the line where he shall stop? Is he sufficiently master of his sentiments, of things, of times, and of his fortune, to draw it himself?

There are stronger grounds for arguing that *Sieyes* is still less guided by a premeditated and

fixed plan. Dependent in the same manner as the whole Republic on him who has the military force at command, and to whom he owes his present existence, he neither enjoys the credit arising from popularity, nor the confidence inspired by brilliant services. Of what importance is the greatest Statesman at a period when the word of an absolute General decides the fate of the country ? Before Sieyes can resume his advantages civil authority must resume its empire, and the Legislative Magistrate an influence equal to that of the warrior whose efforts have established the Legislation and the present Magistrates.

It is not in a day that the civil power recovers from such a shock ; it is not in a week that jurists and philosophers re-gain, by the pen or by speech, the right of directing the sword which has just cut a Constitution to pieces.

Surely even the second place in a Republic of thirty millions of inhabitants is a tolerable sine post. The Consulate, or some other similar dignity, is better than an Abbey or Bishopric of the old system. Does not the eminence where Sieyes finds himself placed, give scope enough to the love of governing, appearing, and ruling ? Does his pride, interest, glory, or safety, require more ? What remains for him to wish but to be one of the principal managers of the Hope, and

and to secure his abode, influence, and safety in it, by institutions which may cement and improve the Republican establishment?

For ten years past Sieyes, always subordinate, has never been able to bring forward his Legislative mechanism. No Constitution, however, but one of his own will ever satisfy him : he no more concealed, in 1795, his vexation at the indifference with which the Committee of Eleven rejected his theory, than he pardoned the Constitutionalists of 1791 for avoiding it. Now his portfolio is opened again : his own disciples are the examiners of it ; with Buonaparte's seal his political regulations will become the law of the State ; and beyond this one can perceive nothing, but the apotheosis of *Numa*, wanting to his ambition.

As for the secondary agents, Legislative Committees, and Privy Counsellors of the Triumvirate, some are looking for places and honours, and others for a more solid security against the outrages of Jacobinism, and the projects of counter-revolution ; but all, probably, agree more or less in desiring to support the reformed Republic.

Besides, all are taken up with the present, and with the future of to-morrow ; but the future of years does not affect or trouble their imagination. If they were to be asked where

they expect to arrive in time; they would be struck dumb. They know very well what they are about for a week; but distant views and spacious plans belong only to those whom circumstances allow to command fortune, calculate obstacles, and surmount them beforehand.

Thus, this Revolution, formed rapidly, executed in the twinkling of an eye, and the collisions of which scarcely leave a mark, presents but a rough form of the mould in which France is to be cast; it is the opening of the piece, and not its intrigue, or denouement; but the two prospects for the moment are, the usurpation of the sovereign power on the one hand, and on the other, the reign of a Republican Constitution, totally dissimilar to those which have preceded it.

Whatever be the system preparing, the Jacobins have now no power to oppose it, and the means of perpetuating their fall will not be forgotten. It will require new commotions, new alarms excited by Royalism, to recall them to the scene: the seeds of those commotions are in the ambition of private persons, in the fragility of an infant Constitution, and in the difference of Republicanism among the coalesced parties which we have described.

The battle was scarcely gained when the alarm spread in the camp of the conquerors.

**L**

It was necessary to lay distrust asleep, and to remove the fears of the Republicans, the purchasers of national domains, the half-converted Revolutionists, and even the Jacobins themselves.

From the inconsiderate anger into which the resistance of the Five Hundred threw *Bonaparte*, his friends caused sixty-one Deputies of the opposition to be dismissed; their names were included in the decree of urgency, which was passed on the 10th in the evening, and these were reported in the last Number. This measure appearing insufficient, the Consuls, on the 17th, passed a resolution condemning twenty-five Jacobins, four of whom were Deputies, to transportation, and twenty-one other persons, almost all Members of the Five Hundred, to be confined to the Department of the Lower Charente.

In the first of the two classes were, Terrorists of the first rank, Septembrists, villains of the blackest dye.

In the second were the Deputies who were the most ardent supporters of the National Representation, but most of them strangers to the guilt of the preceding times, strangers to the National Convention, and whose only crime was the having attempted to maintain the principles, which had been forced upon all France since 1792. General *Jourdan*, who, in the eyes of

the Republic was irreproachable, figured on this list of proscription, where he was inscribed with as little respect to equity as to civil liberty.

There immediately appeared strong and numerous remonstrances. The *Moderés* regarded the resolution as a stain upon this pure and peaceable Revolution, which ought not to be disgraced by a return to the measures of tyranny. The Republicans were frightened at it as the beginning of *re-action*; and the very russians whose names seemed to justify the first list found defenders: all prudent people condemned the despotism of such a sentence, as well as that iniquitous association of Deputies disposed to democracy, with captains of assassins to whom transportation was an act of clemency.

This false step of the Consuls was soon retracted: a subsequent resolution commuted the arbitrary punishment inflicted by the former, into an order that the persons to whom it extended should remain under the inspection of the Police; by which General *Jourdan* was still left upon the same line of suspicion, in the eyes of a Government which professes the love of justice, as *Fournier* the assassin of the prisoners of Orleans, as *Jourdeuil* the colleague of *Marat*, as a *Mamin*, a *Charles Hesse*, and a *Soularie*.

We are also indebted to the uneasiness of the Republicans for a letter from the Minister of the

the Police to the Municipal Administrations, on the 27th of November, in which he unfolds to them the real meaning of the last Revolution :

" Let those," says he, " who still think that Royalty will be re-established, know that the Republic is now firmly fixed.

" Let the Emigrants find, if they can, repose and peace out of the country which they wished to enslave and ruin ; but that country rejects them for ever from its bosom."

We have in like manner seen an address from *Cabanis* to his colleagues, the present Legislative Commissioners, in which this Deputy, noted by connexions, his intimacy with *Sieyes*, and the part that has been given to him in the provisional arrangements, expresses himself thus :

" No, there will be no re-action ; the properties of the purchasers of National Domains will not cease for a moment to be as sacred in your eyes as those of the other citizens. Are not the men of the 18 and 19 of Brumaire the same who desired and planned the 18th of Fructidor, in order to put a stop to the assassinations of the Royal brigands, and and to repress the audacity with which the Emigrants then spoke of re-entering upon their ancient property ?

" You have shewn those Revolutionary fanatics, who know no courage but that of delirium

" rium and fury, what the courage of reason  
 " and conscience is; you have proved to them  
 " that the *Moderés* can dare when it is necessary,  
 " and that when they refuse to adopt their pre-  
 " tended strong measures, it is not as being  
 " strong that they dread them; but as being  
 " false and ineffectual that they reject them.  
 " You will now show them what ought to be  
 " the energy of moderation after victory: you  
 " will teach these men, who are vindictive and  
 " sanguinary from sheer cowardice and absurdity,  
 " what the character is of the sincere friends of  
 " liberty and real Republicans.

" No, the past will not be recalled; errors  
 " that may have been the result of example and  
 " thoughtlessness will not be inquired into. In  
 " the eyes of enlightened legislators and go-  
 " vernors there are no crimes but such as the  
 " morality of all countries and times charac-  
 " terise. Such alone ought to be prosecuted  
 " and punished: and it is with great grief that  
 " generous patriots find among their enemies  
 " criminals, to whom they are not permitted to  
 " hold out their hands.

" As for the Royalists who intoxicate them-  
 " selves at leisure with their senseless superstition,  
 " let them seek, even at this moment, in their  
 " meanness and insipid adulations, some re-  
 " semblance of the system they regret, they will  
 " not

" not infect with this intoxication those whom  
 " they fatigue with it. Noble and Republican  
 " spirits are more difficult of praise ; they ac-  
 " cept it only from free men : and it is not  
 " the adoration of valets but the grateful ap-  
 " probation of citizens that flatters, exalts, and  
 " warms the heart of him who has worthily  
 " served his country. Such is the real glory of  
 " real great men ; but one must almost be worthy  
 " of it to be fully sensible of its value."

In attending to these and other indications no less clear, we discover that if some leaders of the moment are in fact projecting narrower limits for popular liberty and a reversal of some past injustice, others will oppose that liberality and will not give up the old foundations of the Republic.

This contest has perhaps retarded the measures which were expected generally ; among others the revocation, or at least the modification of the laws of the 4th and 5th of September (18 and 19 *Froelidor*). As most of those who are now in power had moved, or seconded, or defended that proscription, is it wonderful that they should resist its repeal ? Probably several of its victims will be relieved from their confined spots or allowed to return from their banishment ; but will the decree which fell upon them all be annulled ?

The

The return of some emigrant Constitutionalists also enters into the views of the Consuls. M. *de la Fayette* and M. *de la Tour-Maubourg*, privileged by their captivity in Austria, have been authorised to return. The Duke *de Lancourt*, and several others have received or will receive the same distinction, which consists in remaining under the inspection of the police till their names are finally erased from the list of emigrants.

In general the new Government will endeavour to gain all those who having served the Revolution under the Monarchy deserted it under the Republic: a policy, the whole advantage of which has been left open to them by the intolerant spirit and resentment of the ardent aristocrats; a policy which good sense would dictate to every weak party wanting an increase of adherents, and to every strong party who should bring all they can over to their interests; a policy not disdained by *Henry IV.*, but which appeared too vulgar to M. *d'Antraigues* and other excommunicators like him.

Although doubts, secret fears, and mistaken impatience may have cooled the first enthusiasm excited by the fall of the Legislative Body, the Constitution, and the Jacobins, still the serenity spread by this event continues to prevail over the public.

Several

Several just ordinances, among others that of the 28th, which restores the Priests transported by the Directory to liberty and their country, provided they have taken the oaths prescribed, indicate a change of maxims.

Credit, which was dead, seems to have recovered a little motion, and some degree of confidence to have followed the slight impressions made by the first uneasiness, which the progressive confirmation of the hopes conceived can alone extirp and strengthen.

The opinion of the public is incontestably in favour of the last innovations; but we shall deceive ourselves if we see in these rapid demonstrations of the French any mark of considerate coherence or durable attachment. That nation so alive and prompt in their effusions, so ardent in their credulity, so accustomed to admire whatever astonishes them, to hope whatever they desire, and to pass from the fondness of specious novelties or famous names to the contempt and reviling of them; that nation will soon be tired of its flattering dreams of enthusiasm, if the promises of their new masters be not speedily fulfilled.

The provisional system to which it has been subjected, serves to moderate the fiery spirits, and to nourish enthusiasm. It is considered as

a happy passage to a still better order. The public may be likened to a traveller leaving a sandy desert, where he had nearly perished with hunger and thirst, and entering upon grounds covered with briers and bushes, which give him a hope that farther on he shall meet a watered and cultivated country. Among most other nations one is obliged to convince the mind in order to gain the judgment; in France it is enough to set the imagination or curiosity in motion: now, nothing is more proper to produce this effect than the expectation of new institutions, preceded by the public condemnation of odious institutions to which they are to succeed.

This work of a Constitution, new made, is entrusted to a twin Committee of twelve members taken from the two Legislative Committees. The names of these Lycurguses are as follows:

The Elders. *Gokat, Laussat, Le Mercier, Le Nigre La Roche, and Regnier.*

The Five Hundred. *Lucien Buonaparte, Ghazal, Daunou, Cbenier, Boulay de la Meurthe, Cabanis, and Chabaud la Tour.*

They have received from Sieyes the elementary book of the Law, the fundamental verses of the new Alcoran, that is to say, the Consul's original plan with the amendments circumstances may have suggested to him.

Some

Some public papers have already disclosed the grounds pretended or real of this Constitution; and where we find in fact the establishment and division of the Powers, such as Sieyes had formerly framed them. It is no longer the single authority of a Convention, nor two, nor three authorities, which composed the mechanism of the old systems.

Four Powers distinct in their attributes seem to the inventor, to compose the movement, perfection, and balance of political organization. An Executive Power, exercised by a single and elective Chief, a Senate to make laws, a small Representative Body to settle the taxes, and lastly a *Constitutional Jury*, to keep these weights and pulleys in equilibrium, was, as well as we recollect, the distribution of the functions of the Sovereignty and of the Government, in this learned theory of Sieyes's.

In the fictitious or authentic edition given of it in the journals it is reproduced with embellishments and combinations of a rare nature. Harlequin Legislator could not have done better in a farce at the Boulevards. That this masterpiece might not remain imperfect, the powers, dignities, and functions, put together in it like the timbers of a ship, are embellished with nicknames, and titles, which the merriest wag would never have dared to conceive.—We will wait

till this fine plan has been revised, corrected, and settled, to give an account of it and examine it. The Committees, it is said, are not agreed upon its excellence or adoption; if meets with great opposition, especially on the part of the austere and staunch Republicans; the chisel of the Committee of Legislature will smooth the angles, round what is too square, place pins where support is wanted, and when they have fashioned and varnished the statue, the statuaries will call out to it, *speak!*

If it be true that their genius is to be exercised in perfecting the bombast published in the *Gazettes*, we think that we ought to inform them that the publication has in England excited a great and general laugh, without distinction of parties, opinions, ages, or capacities.

Perhaps they will see in this laughter of the countrymen of *Selden*, *Sydney*, *Locke*, *Hume*, *Blackstone*, and *Adam Smith*, a new conspiracy of Mr. Pitt's against French liberty; but if they choose a less suspicious authority, let them listen to Mr. Necker. In enumerating the errors of the organizing Commissioners of 1795, he said: "They were not at liberty to take into their consideration, either a moderate Monarchy, or a federal Republic. Now, while they were obliged to give a Nation of twenty-five millions of souls an indivisible Government, with

"out

"but admitting any gradation of rank and without changing the principle of equality, it will  
 "be out of their power, I think, to concieve any  
 "political organization, capable of resisting those  
 "combinations of society, and the attacks of  
 "time."

This is the rock that lies in the way of the new, as it did in that of the former Legislators. Let them divide their political corps, into three, four, or forty dimensions; let them divide and subdivide, let them create a *Grand Elector*, or a *Pontiff*; or an *absorbant Jury*, and a *Tribunate*, *Consuls* or *Ministers*, *Primary Assemblies* of the Sovereign People, or a Representative Government representing nobody, all these political fictions must be wrecked upon the immensity of the Empire, the force of causes, and the national character and genius. Then it will be necessary to have recourse to one of the only means of preserving the Republic; either to have done with liberty and resolve the Government into a very circumscribed aristocracy, or to adhere to liberty by adopting the federal Government.

\* *De la Révolution Françoise*, par M. Necker, tome iii. page 163. This Minister, in the judicious and thorough investigation he then made (1796) of the Constitution of 1793, predicted, word for word, the history, defects, and consequences of that code, which the moment it should escape from the Directorial despotism could not but dissolve into anarchy.

It is proposed, say the doctors of Paris, to approach very near the American Constitution; but, to approach it without admitting its fundamental principle, which rests upon the independence [of the Confederate Provinces in all that does not concern the interest of the Union, is to be guilty of a very gross error.

However that be, we are to expect a studied and novel composition; for the masters of the present day determine to set an example, but not to follow any. Deprive them of the glory of inventors, and adieu to the delights and benefits they promise France.

*Buonaparte has characterised this renovation with an alliance between philosophy and the sword.* This is surely an incomparable novelty; and not altogether chimerical. The *philosophers à-la-mode de Buonaparte;* will, in fact, regulate all that it suits the sword to institute and protect.

A similar metamorphosis will pass from France to the Republican Colonies she has formed. At first, a Directory and two Councils made up the table of their political laws, not to be deviated from under pain of military execution. Now the hull of the Constitution is to broken up, and the worm-eaten timbers of it thrown into the fire. And it is at the end of the eighteenth century, of the age of reason and liberty, that we are witnesses

witnesses of these shameful masquerades, of this  
shocking carnival of Legislators and Re-  
formers!

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*The Author requests the indulgence of his Subscribers for the  
lateness of the Number, which has been occasioned by illness.*



THE

# BRITISH MERCURY.

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N° XXXI.

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*December 30th, 1799.*

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*Of the Uncertainty of the Duration of the War.*

THROUGH the dark cloud that conceals the future are there any points of light to be perceived by which the observer may be guided? While a great part of the public see in the declarations of the new Government of France, in the interest and conduct of Austria, and in the misunderstanding between her and her Allies, in short, in the critical situation of the belligerent powers, the probability of a speedy peace; others, on the contrary, are reconciling the cabinets,

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bringing a greater number of combatants into the field, affirming the incompatibility of a pacification with the existence, or at least with the invariable projects of the French Republic, and, without denying however the necessity of a termination in time to the war, postponing the period of it on account of the difficulties which lie in the way of speedy treaties.

These hypotheses might furnish volumes of useless arguments :

— *Chacun à ce métier*  
*Peut perdre impunément son encre & son papier.*

We will confine ourselves to collecting the *appearances*, that is to say, the few facts from which some inferences may be drawn.

The administrators and representatives of the French Republic having professed as many different maxims of foreign politics as there have been vicissitudes in the fortune of the reigning factions and in those of the State, their doctrine on this subject forms a series of contradictions; but till the present times it was an invariable and fundamental system to spread the Revolution abroad sword in hand, to perpetuate it by establishing Republics analogous and subject to the mother Republic, to involve in the same fate both popular and monarchical States, to continue war till the vanquished surrendered at discretion, and to renew it whenever it appeared that the advantage

advantage of the treaties would not be enough, without more fighting, to ruin the weakened and divided Powers.

From *Brieffot* to *Rewbell*, from the Girondist *Louvet*, who took for his motto *Parcere subiectis, debellare superbos*, to the *Modéré Thibaudeau* who was in raptures at the republicanizations effected in Italy, and from the first club of Jacobins to the chancery of the Directory, this kind of foreign politics has been uniform and constant, except in the short intervals when serious defeats would have rendered the display of it too ridiculous.

But the abuse of victories having caused their source to be misconceived and the period of them to be overlooked, the French Government, when their men, credit, and money, were exhausted, thought themselves still in the times of assignats, mandats, maximums, and levies in mass. Hoping at least that easy conquests and abundant plunder would replace those resources, they recommenced the war, which disappointed their avarice and ambition: justly sacrificed to the public hatred and calamities they have left a lesson to their successors, the impression of which has been deeply made by the dangers of the Republic. The cry of peace issued from the Luxembourg, from all the offices, and from the Legislative Bodies: it was the voice of distress, and the Jacobins,

backed by the public disgraces, vainly attempted to stifle it,

When afterwards the impediments arising from inertness, the desertion of the conscripts, the deficiency of the contributions, the emptiness of the treasury and failure of the projects of finance, the loan without lenders, (a loan declared to be forced, although the borrowers neither dared nor were able to compel the advance,) the insurrections in the west, and the necessity of feeding, cloathing, paying, and recruiting the armies driven back on the French territory, conspired to increase the anxiety of the Councils and reformed Directory; the dogma of eternal war was abjured: the advantages gained in Switzerland and in Holland even appeared poor compensations for so many preceding losses and such multiplied embarrassments; the French congratulated themselves upon them, but as a means of peace.

Previous then to the events of the 10th of Nov. experience and circumstances had amended, if not the hearts, at least the disorganized and disorganizing understanding of the regents of France. They regretted, no doubt sincerely, not having known where to fix the bounds of their fortune, in again staking the existence of their Republic against Crowns to be overthrown.

In

In consequence, the late Directory had been already attempting by means of the Court of Madrid and other indirect channels to seduce the Court of Vienna, to detach it from its Allies, and to lead it into a negotiation.

But the Jacobin, that is to say Revolutionary system, without moderation and without bounds, was so infused into the temperament of the Government and of the Legislature, that nothing but the policy of circumstances could induce either the one or the other to a peace, the duration of which would perhaps have been as transient as the necessity to which the Republic would have yielded. The slightest return of prosperity would soon have restored the old maxims.

In seizing the sceptre of France, the present leaders have professed peace as the principal object of their conspiracy. They have affected to insert this promise in all acts declaratory of their intentions. The Parisians gave such implicit faith to these declarations that they did not doubt that *Buonaparte* had a minute of the preliminaries of peace in his pocket, nor that the foreign Powers would immediately yield to his ascendancy. The fashionables of the capital, the merchants, and the Public, believed a general peace to be signed at St. Cloud; the People only,

only, some degrees less stupid, retained a distrust.

It is not unreasonable to suppose, however, that the consolidation of their new authority, the fear of the Jacobins, and the care of the novel Constitution to be imposed upon France, have occupied the Consuls and their adherents much more than foreign negotiations ; yet, far from their being given up, new nets are already spread, emissaries dispatched, and instructions circulated.

Never has the Government of the French Republic yet possessed such physical and moral power to shut the Temple of Janus ; but is its will on this subject in unison with its power, its interest, and its situation ? How far has it in contemplation to remove itself from the spirit of usurpation, turbulence, rapine, and universal domination, which animated its predecessors ?

We shall be in no haste to predetermine this question ; but, without resolving it, we may take some probabilities into consideration.

When one studies to penetrate into the real intentions of any Government, one commonly rests the enquiry on the knowledge of the character of those who compose it, of its political maxims, and its situation.

Under the first of these three points, the past conduct, the genius, and the former opinions of the

the chief leaders of the Republic would create little confidence. Although many of Sieyes's sentiments have remained enigmatical, he has never dissembled his jealousy of those who, before him, have devised a system of liberty different from his, nor his aversion to Monarchies and hereditary supremacies. If he did not contribute in kindling war, he never uttered a word or wrote a sentence in favour of peace. It is true that, being of opinion that the empire of reason ought to suffice for the naturalizing through Europe the principles of the French Revolution, he may have considered cannon and armies as superfluous means ; he took care, however, not to reject them : besides, resting the independence of the French Republic on the analogy of its institutions with those of the surrounding States, and its defence as well as its stability on the degradation of the Empires that were differently governed, the war of politics seemed to him inseparable from the war of arms. Passionate, proud, thoughtful, and inflexible, few characters seem to sympathize more than his with that spirit of confraternity, which, when nations have been divided and exhausted by hostilities, replaces them in their former relations of good will, whatever may be the dissimilitude of their Constitutions. Sieyes is supposed to have condemned the terms granted to Austria in 1797. He was

consulted by the Revolutionists of Switzerland; he has constantly expressed his animosity against England, and an inveterate hatred of her.

The peace-maker of Campo-Formio has at least a treaty of peace in his favour. He is said to have formed a permanent system of amity with Austria, at the expence of the other Powers which were to be sacrificed: it is very likely that he sincerely disapproved the mad rupture by which the Directory deprived the Republic of the advantages of the convention at Campo-Formio; the publication of the secret articles has opened to Europe the grand designs at that time meditated by the Imperial Plenipotentiaries and *Buonaparte*.

If that clandestine arrangement proves the French negotiator a friend of Austria, it by no means proves him to be the friend of general peace, or of justice. The ruin of Switzerland, to which *Buonaparte* was no stranger, his ardour for republicanizing Italy, his boasts respecting Great Britain which he was to *democratize in three months*, the expedition to Egypt which was to be followed by more extensive expeditions, and the excessive craving for renown, exploits, and innovations, which preyed upon this Consul, give no favourable indications of his desire of the tranquillity of the world. *Buonaparte*, to embrace pacific inclinations, must act in constant

stant opposition to his character, and to devote his military talents to obscurity he must sacrifice his genius to his philosophy. There are, besides, obstacles attending negotiators: peace is not to be made like a St. Cloud Revolution.

Is it likely that a man so impetuous, so flighty, and so puffed up with his renown and power, should long support irritations and contradictions? Is it likely, now that he is master of the field of negotiations, that he will be patient enough to be long in discussing conditions, and modest enough to receive them?

As for the subaltern Counsellors and Legislative Commissions, present or to come, their influence on peace or war does not deserve to be taken into consideration: they are servile hands ready to sign, not free heads with power to determine. However vehemently most of them at present call for a period of hostilities, many would very soon vote for a continuation of them, if the philosophic conquest of a kingdom or the regeneration of a Republican State were to be the certain price of them. What do I say? The National Institute and the political theorists of Paris would carry on the war for ten years were they promised that it should operate the reform of all the academies of Europe, and their re-composition on the model of the scientific club of the capital.

Will the *State maxims* of the French Republic furnish that security which the constitution, habits, and former opinions of the Consulate deny us?

Shall we look for maxims in a State which now confesses itself to have been governed only by tempests, entrusted only to unskilful and unsettled pilots, and subjected to the ebbs and flows of the most unruly factions?

Maxims result from the traditions of experience: they are to Governments what proverbs are to the People, reason founded on practice. Does it belong to an Empire of ten years, torn by convulsions, and abandoned to the frenzy of human passions, to form rules of conduct? Revolutions upon Revolutions, wars upon wars, changes upon changes form the circle, beyond which French foresight acknowledged no principles: it rejected those which composed the law of nations; and it annihilated the old balance of Europe without substituting any other. Not satisfied with immense aggrandizements, the Government planted in foreign countries Republican slips to form its first avenues, and whose roots attached to the existence of its own Republic, were to serve to shake those of its neighbours.

Oppressing those tributary Republics, vexatious to its allies and requiring much of them, and

and labouring to disunite the States which might attempt to resist it, its politics have never been the result of other motives than those of overthrowing all equilibrium, and all possibility of re-establishing any.

The reformers of St. Cloud have solemnly borne witness to the defects with which their *foreign politics were infested*: these they have charged to the instability of a Government always and necessarily factious, an unsettled system, and the uncertainty or contempt of all principles. Pursuing this reasoning, do we perceive any more valid security in the *provisional institution of the moment*? Is it upon the day of its birth that it can have adopted a doctrine less variable than itself and circumstances?

We will not deny that the spirit and object of the late Revolution may give room to presage some temporary modifications in the foreign politics of France, that the Government, in becoming more independent and concentrated, may, in time, prescribe to itself some rules, and respect some customs; or, in short, that whatever may have formerly been the conduct or doctrine of Sieyes and Buonaparte, it is possible that, in changing their situation, they may also have changed their views.

But probabilities so vague lead only to uncertainty: it is even very doubtful whether the

new Constitution prepared in the workshops of the Commissioners appointed for the purpose of Legislation, will or not promote more effectually than the provisional establishment the advancement of a system fundamentally pacific; for that Constitution, come when it will, will be made, not for the interest of the French Nation, but for that of the rulers who will place in it the key of their power, of their personal safety, and of the confirmation of their projects against their rivals and future innovators.

The problem, however, takes another shape, when we examine it under the third point of view, that of the interior and exterior position of the new Government.

The personal biases, opinions, and passions of those who compose it are constrained to yield to necessity. It is necessary that they should be subservient to the situation obtained, and that they should obey their impelling power, the evident interest of preserving what has been acquired.

If the late Directory and Legislature admitted the necessity of putting an end to the war, there are a hundred reasons more for impelling their successors to the same end.

To overthrow the Government and transfer the authority required only a company of grenadiers; but the enterprise, if it meet not the public

public approbation, will terminate in a transient essay. Between the Jacobins alienated and the nation dissatisfied, what would the armed usurpers do with the title of force alone? Would they govern by soldiers in the midst of a very burdensome war, and royalist insurrections in seven or eight Departments? They would certainly meet no active resistance either from the nation or the public of Paris, but they would experience that passive resistance experienced by their predecessors: after having abjured revolutionary measures they would be compelled to have recourse again to them, and to provide for the public wants by new trespasses upon property and liberty.

The continuance of the war would restore tyranny, tyranny would restore the Jacobins, and the Jacobins would overturn or enslave the Government. Thus war tends to perpetuate the Revolution which the prevailing party propose to terminate. If it continue unfortunate or only undecisive, they who have prolonged it after formally promising an end to it will be brought to their trial: the Jacobins will impute it to the subversion of liberty and the oppression of the Republicans; the nation will impute it to the impostors who shall have abused its credulity.

If there be not a peace all the advertisements of *moderation* are falsehoods. Will fathers be willing

willing to send their sons to the armies, and the citizens to suffer the extortions of the public treasury? All France, the Jacobins excepted, have implored a peace. Of little importance is it to her, in her slavery, whether she be muzzled by a Directory or a Grand Consul, whether her masters be Democrats or members of an oligarchy; but she expects to be delivered from the multitude of tyrannies and measures attendant on war, and it is upon the faith of the declarations of her new leaders that she has granted them some confidence. They must either keep their words, or look to be very soon as unpopular as their predecessors.

The nature, the time, and the causes of their elevation will not admit their being guilty of so palpable a piece of treachery. It is necessary to habituate minds to an unexpected political arrangement, to familiarize the nation to a system which overturns the very basis of its liberty, and to secure the intermediate classes in whose favour it is pretended that this Revolution has been affected: all these requisites will fail if the war goes on.

War renders the very existence of the Republic problematical; at the moment when its chiefs have to consolidate the Government, when confidence, shaken or disappointed by so many vicissitudes, is held in suspense, and when but to

doubt the duration of the last political transmutation would destroy the effect and weaken the authority of it.

This or that faction, the Jacobins or the Royalists, may have reasons for desiring war; but the compound faction, which has just crushed all the others in order to erect their power upon the national consent, cannot be willing to oppose the only public wish formed by France.

To reign by the means which the former factions employed, would be to devote themselves to the like fate and provoke their own fall. To confirm themselves now it will be necessary to act directly opposite to all that has been done before.

Thus then, the situation of the new Government, its dangers, enemies, partizans, all impose upon them pacific appearances.

Where, besides, are its resources to make head, even for one year more, against new reverses? Is the public treasury filled, are levies raised, and armies paid as easily as constitutional paragraphs are decreed? The finances are scarcely sufficient for a peace establishment; and whence are they to extract the enormous sums which the prosecution of the war will consume? Is the Consular genius of finance more inventive than the Directorial one? Will it find contributors more docile, proprietors more opulent,

opulent, or sources of revenue that have escaped the industry of the first comers? Is it the miserable credit of some bankers moved by *Bonaparte's* eloquence? Is it the paltry ransom of twelve millions, by which they believed themselves redeemed from a Jacobin pillage, that will support the armies all now to be paid by the Republic, not excepting even that of Switzerland, which is reduced to live upon a dried sponge?

Who will carry the deserters and conscripts back to those camps which victory has deserted, which are no longer enriched by booty, and where emulation is visibly decreased by wretchedness?

Will levies *en masse* be made, requisitions ordered, or recourse be had to paper-money? Will terror, robbery, bankruptcy, and confiscation be again resorted to?

The labour and talents of the most expert financiers, of a *Sully*, a *Colbert*, or a *Pitt*, would perhaps be unequal to the restoration of the Republican finances of France, even in the hour of peace: and is it during an oppressive war that they could be expected to succeed?

In the South, as well as in the West, the elements of a civil war are fermenting. If the commotions of Brittany and the neighbouring provinces, already so alarming, spread, and be aided by the absence

absence of the armies employed in defending the frontiers against the foreign enemy, the Republic would be reduced to a similar danger to that into which it was thrown by the war of La Vendée; and what a difference in the times and resources!

Nothing but an inconceivable blindness or mad presumption could render the Regents of France insensible to the force of these considerations. Their parade of peace is therefore by no means to be regarded as a pretence; for that would prove them much more madmen than hypocrites.

Beyond these general probabilities, we have nothing but a wild of conjectures before us: opinion does not yet repose either upon the extent of this project of pacification, or upon the nature of the conditions on which it is to be grounded. Now, while we remain ignorant of the price at which the Consuls mean to terminate the war, or with whom they mean to negotiate, we are under the necessity of suspending our judgment upon the efficacy of their protestations. The Directory in 1797 were also very loud in their professions of the love of peace: they opened negotiations, and all that was wanting was to prevail upon them to consent to some articles in which their enemies could concur.

Are the Consuls meditating a general peace, or only an accommodation with Austria? Has the system of separate treaties been given up by those very men who were among its most zealous defenders? Is the design really to establish tranquillity between France and the rest of Europe, or only to divide the confederate Powers, in order to select those against whom the war shall be prosecuted? Lastly, is it the policy to be easy and liberal to one of them, in order to lay upon the others the weight of very burdensome conditions?

It is fair to presume it so, till the French Government shall have proved in a more solid manner than by empty phrases, that it has in view a complete pacification founded upon justice, not upon usurpation and insolence.

Austria alone has received proposals from the Consuls; they have requested an armistice, and requested it only of the Cabinet of Vienna; their couriers, their emissaries, have all been dispatched to that Court. *Buonaparte*, it is true, has sent one of his aid-de-camps to Berlin, where that subaltern officer, it is said, was received, as *Turenne* or *Marlborough* would have been; but what can this mission have to do with the differences of the belligerent Powers? The Head of the Great Nation cannot have recourse to a mediator, nor does he want one. Would

it

It be very absurd to suspect that this message has a very different object from that of requesting the interposition of Prussia in favour of an accommodation with Russia, Austria, and England?

Whatever be the lure thrown out to the Court of Vienna, it is probably very much beneath the advantages which have been gained by the Imperial armies and such as the Emperor may very reasonably demand. Without the total sacrifice of the Italic Republics, the retreat of the French beyond the Alps and the Var, the surrender of the chief dominion in Italy to the House of Austria, and the evacuation and independence of Switzerland, any negotiation would but become a field of contention, and might probably be brought to no conclusion before the issue of another campaign.

Then would follow the claims of the Empire, the pretensions of its enemies, the revocation of clandestine treaties, and the disputes respecting restitutions.

Nothing has indicated that the Imperial Cabinet has yet acceded to the new overtures, or that the very powerful impression which the political stroke and supremacy of *Buonaparte* have made at Vienna upon the numerous partizans of peace has wrought any conviction of the war being nearly at an end; there is no remission in

the preparations for carrying it on. If we are to believe the last French papers, the general armistice solicited by the Consulate has been refused. In fine, the efforts used to keep the Russians in Germany, and to reconcile the unfortunate differences which had determined their retreat, show that Austria has not yet separated her cause from that of her Allies, and that she is still far from yielding to the desires of France, or breaking the ties which her honour, safety, and the security of the advantages she has recovered prescribe to her until a general peace.

It is true, that if she be looking to the issue of the war only for new acquisitions, and that this increase of territory is to be made from the spoils, not of her enemies but of her Allies, her ambition would find France more easily to be treated with than the other European Powers. It is true, too, that if harmony in the object and in the plans of execution do not take place of the incoherence and divisions, but too generally known, which concluded the campaign, the Imperial Cabinet will prefer peace to the renewal and consequences of discord between her and her Allies; and it is no less evident, that if those disagreements prove invincible, and the Emperor of Russia leave to Austria the burden of a war, upon the command, object, and period of which there might be as little good

understanding as in the preceding years, the hope of preventing a distinct accommodation between the Court of Vienna and France would be diminished.

Thus, on one hand, the nature of the proposals which the Consulate shall offer, and, on the other, the nature of the engagements by which her Allies may be desirous of uniting their interest with hers, will probably direct her final resolutions.

The reasons for continuing or for closing the war furnish a text of endless discussion and dispute, so long as the nature of the peace which it is necessary or possible to obtain, or the period at which it will become indispensable to discontinue hostilities, is left unsettled: but, in throwing by this contradictory and worn-out reasoning, over which prejudices and passions have too powerful an influence, we cannot help concluding that war or peace will be equally fatal, if it be not the result of a general agreement.

Private negotiations and separate treaties would again leave Europe at the mercy of the French Republic: they would throw on the confederations a contempt which ages would not efface: they would take from Sovereigns that respect which at present forms their principal safeguard.

There

There is neither safety, nor honour, nor stability, nor solid advantage to be expected from separate treaties of peace: to save the balance, independence, and tranquillity of Europe, as well as the means of preserving them in future, the peace must be a general one.

### F R A N C E.

THERE is nothing to be compared to the facility with which the French go from one Constitution to another, but the rapid talents of those who compose systems of law for them. The Legislators of antiquity devoted their lives to the instituting of a Government for a town, or a province; but the Legislators of Paris organize an immense Empire in less time than the geographer takes to make a map of it.

The Constituent Assembly lost two years in compounding Democracy with a nominal Royalty: the Convention took no more than six months to manufacture at two different times their immortal codes; and the alchymists of the day have, in three weeks, melted down all those institutions by their reverberated fire, and very sprucely moulded the new purified metal which they have now offered to the admiration of the universe.

These

These ingenious and neat workmen promised not to detain the Public long in expectation, and they have kept their word : their political opera, with entire new dresses, improved decorations, and a fable perfectly novel, now engages and delights the capital.

Armed cap-a-pee, like the Minerva bursting from the brain of Jupiter, the new Constitution has been promulgated spontaneously. The fresh tables of the Law, as we find them in the public papers that have been transmitted to us, are as follows :

*The Constitution of the FRENCH REPUBLIC.*

CHAPTER I.

I. The French Republic is one and indivisible.

Its European territory is distributed into Departments and Communal Districts.

II. Every man at the age of twenty-one years complete, born and resident in France, who has caused his name to be inscribed upon the Civic List of his Communal District, and who has dwelt from that period for a year within the territory of the Republic, is a French Citizen.

III. A foreigner becomes a French Citizen when, after having attained the age of twenty-one years complete, and after having declared his intention of settling in France, he has resided in it ten years without interruption.

IV. The quality of a French Citizen may be lost —  
By naturalization in a foreign country ;

By

By the acceptance of functions, or of pensions offered by a foreign Government; ~~or by any other means~~

By affiliation with any foreign corporation which would infer distinction of birth; by condemnation to corporal ignominious punishments.

V. The exercise of the rights of French Citizen is suspended in the case of a man's being an insolvent debtor, or being the immediate heir of an insolvent debtor, if such heir wrongfully detain the property of the said debtor, either the whole or part which shall have come to his hands by no other title than that of free gift or descent.

In the case of a man's being a hired servant, either menial or personal;

In the cases of judicial suspension, impeachment, or outlawry.

VI. In order to exercise the rights of Citizenship in a Communal District, a person must have gained a settlement or place of abode by a year's residence, and at the same time he must not have lost it by a year's absence.

VII. The Citizens of each Communal District are to point out by their votes those they conceive most proper to manage the public affairs. The number so pointed out forms a List of men worthy of confidence, amounting to a tenth of the number of citizens having a right to vote. Out of this List are to be chosen the Public Functionaries of the District.

VIII. The Citizens comprehended in the Communal Lists of a Department shall likewise point out a tenth part of their own number. Hence is formed a second List, called Departmental, from which are to be chosen the Public Functionaries of the Department.

IX. The Citizens whose names stand on the Departmental List, shall likewise name a tenth of their own number. Thus there is a third List formed, which comprehends the Citizens of the Department eligible to Public National Functions.

X. The

X. The Citizens having a right to assist in the formation of any of the Lists mentioned in the three preceding articles, are to be called upon every three years to supply the place of those upon the Lists who may have died, or who are absent for any other cause than that of exercising a public employment.

XI. They at the same time may erase from the lists those whom they think unfit to appear any longer upon it, and appoint as their successors other Citizens, in whom they have greater confidence.

XII. No person can be erased from any of the Lists, but by the votes of an absolute majority of the Citizens having a right to vote on its formation.

XIII. A person is not to be erased from one list of eligible persons, solely because he is not kept upon another list inferior or superior.

XIV. Inscription on a list of persons eligible is not necessary but for those public offices, for which this condition is expressly required by the Constitution or the Law. All the lists of eligible persons shall be formed in the course of the year 9.

## C H A P. II.

### *Of the Conservative Senate.*

XV. The Conservative Senate is composed of eighty Members, irremovable, and for life; they shall be forty years of age at least.

For the formation of the Senate, there shall at first be named sixty Members. This number shall be increased to sixty-two in the course of the year 8; to sixty-four in the course of the year 9; and thus be gradually increased to eighty, by the addition of two Members during each of the ten first years.

XVI. The appointment to the situation of Senator is made by the Senate itself, which chooses one out of three candidates

presented—the first by the Legislative body, the second by the Tribune, and the third by the Chief Consul.

The Senate may choose one of two candidates in the case that one of them is proposed by two of the presenting authorities. The Senate must admit a person who is proposed, on the same occasion, by all the three authorities.

XVII. The Chief Consul quitting his station, either on the expiration of his functions, or in consequence of resignation, becomes a Senator by immediate right, and of necessity.

The two other Consuls, during the month which follows the expiration of their functions, may take a place in the Senate, but are not obliged to avail themselves of this right.

They do not possess this right at all when they quit their Consular functions by resignation.

XVIII. A Senator is for ever ineligible to any other public function.

XIX. All the lists made up in the Departments in virtue of the ninth Article, are to be addressed to the Senate. They compose the National list.

XX. Out of this list the Senate choose the Legislators, Tribunes, Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal, and Auditors of Accounts.

XXI. They are to maintain or annul all the resolutions referred to them as unconstitutional by the Tribune or by the Government. The lists of eligible persons are comprehended among such resolutions.

XXII. The revenues of certain national domains to be fixed upon, are to be liable to the payment of the expences of the Senate. The annual salary of each Member is to be taken out of these revenues. It is to be equal to the twentieth of that of the Chief Consul.

XXIII. The sittings of the Senate are not to be public.

XXIV. The Citizens *Sieyes* and *Roger Ducos*, the Consuls quitting their functions, are appointed Members of the Conservative

servative Senate. They shall have a meeting with the second and third Consuls nominated by the present Constitution. These four Citizens shall appoint the majority of the Senate, which shall then complete itself, and proceed to the elections entrusted to it.

### C H A P. III.

#### *Of the Legislative Power.*

XXV. No new laws shall be promulgated, but when the plan shall have been proposed by the Government, communicated to the Tribune, and decreed by the Legislative Body.

XXVI. The plans proposed by the Government shall be drawn up in articles. In every stage of the discussion of these plans the Government may withdraw them. It may produce them anew in a modified state.

XXVII. The Tribune is to be composed of one hundred Members, each at least twenty-five years of age. They are to be renewed by a fifth part every year, and are indefinitely re-eligible as long as they continue on the National List.

XXVIII. The Tribune discusses the plan of a law, and votes for its adoption or rejection ;

It is to send three Speakers, chosen out of its own number, who are to explain and defend its views and motives in either case before the Legislative Body ;

It may refer to the Senate, but that solely on the ground of Constitutional defect, the lists of persons eligible, the proceedings of the Legislative Body, and those of the Government.

XXIX. It may express an opinion respecting laws made, or to be made, respecting abuses that require correction, respecting improvements to be attempted in all the parts of the public Administration ; but never respecting criminal or civil matters submitted to the Courts.

The opinions which it shall express in virtue of the present article have no necessary consequence, and do not bind any Constituted Authority to act.

XXX. When the Tribunate adjourns itself, it may appoint a Committee of from ten to fifteen members, authorized to assemble it, if thought advisable.

XXXI. The Legislative Body is composed of three hundred Members, each thirty years of age at least, who are renewed a fifth every year. It must always contain at least one Citizen from each Department of the Republic.

XXXII. A Member quitting the Legislative Body cannot be re-elected to it till the lapse of a year; but he may immediately be elected to any other public function, including that of Tribune, if in other respects he is eligible.

XXXIII. The sitting of the Legislative Body shall commence every year on the 1<sup>st</sup> Brumaire (Nov. 22), and shall continue only four months. It may be extraordinarily convoked during the eight remaining months by the Government.

XXXIV. The Legislative Body enacts laws by a private ballot, and without any discussion on the part of its Members respecting the plans of laws debated in its presence by the Speakers of the Tribunate and of the Government.

XXXV. The sittings of the Tribunate, and those of the Legislative Body are to be public. The number of strangers in either shall not exceed two hundred.

XXXVI. The salary of a Tribune is to be fifteen thousand francs (625 l.), that of a Legislator ten thousand francs (416 l.).

XXXVII. Every decree of the Legislative Body upon the tenth day after its passing, shall be promulgated by the Chief Consul, unless during that interval he has appealed to the Senate on the ground of constitutional defect. This appeal shall not be made against laws promulgated.

XXXVIII. The first renewal of the Legislative Body and Tribunate shall be in the course of the year 10.

C H A P. IV.  
*Of the Government.*

**XXXIX.** The Government is entrusted to three Consuls appointed for ten years, and indefinitely re-eligible.

Each of them is to be elected individually with the distinct quality of Chief, Second, or Third Consul. The first time the Third Consul shall only be named for five years.

For the present time General *Bonaparte* is appointed Chief Consul, Citizen *Cambaceres*, now Minister of Justice, Second Consul; and Citizen *Lebrun*, Member of the Commission of Elders, Third Consul.

**XL.** The Chief Consul has particular functions and attributes, which, when he is exercising, his place may be *pro tempore* supplied by one of his colleagues.

**XLI.** The Chief Consul is to promulgate the Laws; he is to name and supersede at pleasure the Members of the Council of State, the Ministers, Ambassadors, and other principal foreign agents, the officers of the army by land and sea, the members of local administration and the officers of Government in the courts of Justice. He is to appoint all Judges criminal and civil, except Justices of Peace and Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal, without the power of afterwards superseding them.

**XLII.** In the other acts of the Government, the Second and Third Consuls are to be consulted; they are to sign the register of the acts, in order to manifest that they were present; and, if they please, they may record their opinions; after which the determination of the Chief Consul is sufficient.

**XLIII.** The Salary of the Chief Consul shall be five hundred thousand francs, for the year 8. The salary of the other two Consuls shall be equal to three-tenths of that of the Chief Consul.

**XLIV.**

**XLIV.** The Government is to propose the laws, and to make the necessary regulations to ensure their execution.

**XLV.** The Government is to direct the receipts and expences of the State, conformably to the annual law which is to determine the amount of both; it shall superintend the coinage of money, of which the law alone shall order the issue, and settle the value, the weight, and the die.

**XLVI.** When the Government is informed of any conspiracies against the State, it may issue orders to arrest and bring before them the persons who are suspected as the authors or accomplices; but if within ten days after such arrest, they are not set at liberty, or brought to trial, it shall be considered, on the part of the Minister signing the order, as an act of arbitrary detention.

**XLVII.** The Government is to superintend the internal safety and external defence of the State; it is to distribute the forces by sea and land, and regulate the direction of them.

**XLVIII.** The National Guard on duty is subject to the regulations of the public administration. The National Guard not on duty is only subject to the law.

**XLIX.** The Government is to manage political relations abroad, to conduct negotiations, to make preliminary stipulations, to sign and conclude all treaties of peace, alliance, truce, neutrality, commerce, and other conventions.

**L.** Declarations of war and treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce, are to be proposed, discussed, decreed, and promulgated in the same manner as laws. Only the discussions and deliberations relative to these objects, as well in the Tribune as in the Legislative Body, are to be in a Secret Committee, if the Government desire it.

**LI.** The secret articles of a treaty cannot supersede the public articles.

**LII.** Under the direction of the Consuls, the Council of State is charged with drawing up the plans of the laws and the

the regulations of the public Administration, and to resolve such difficulties as may occur in all administrative matters.

LIII. It is from among the Members of the Council of State that the speakers are to be selected, who shall be appointed to appear in the name of the Government before the Legislative Body. There are never to be any more than three of these speakers sent to support the same plan of a law.

LIV. The Ministers are to attend to the execution of the laws, and the regulations of the public Administration.

LV. No act of the Government can have effect till it is signed by a Minister.

LVI. One of the Ministers is to be specially charged with the Administration of the public Treasury. He is to verify the receipts, direct the application of the funds, and the payments authorised by law. He is not to be at liberty to pay any thing, except by virtue, first, of a law, and only to the extent of the funds for defraying those expences such law has determined upon; secondly, of a decree of the Government; thirdly, of an order signified by a Minister.

LVII. The detailed accounts of the expence of every Minister, signed and certified by him are to be made public.

LVIII. The Government can elect or retain as Counsellors of State, or Ministers, only citizens whose names are inscribed in the National list.

LIX. The local Administrations established, whether for each Communal District, or for more extended portions of territory, are subordinate to the Ministers. No one can become or remain a Member of these Administrations, unless he is entered in one of the lists mentioned in the seventh and eighth articles.

## C H A P. V.

*Of the Courts of Justice.*

LX. Every Communal District shall have one or more Justices of the Peace, elected immediately by the Citizens, for three years.

Their principal duty consists in reconciling the parties they call before them, and if they fail in so doing, to decide their dispute by arbitrators.

LXI. In civil matters there shall be primary Courts, and Courts of Appeal. The law shall determine the organization of the one and the other; their competence, and territory forming the jurisdiction of each.

LXII. In criminal matters to which are annexed corporal or infamous punishment, a first Jury admits or rejects the charge. If it be admitted, a second Jury tries the fact, and the Judges of the Criminal Court pass sentence. Their judgment is without appeal.

LXIII. The office of Public Accuser in a Criminal Tribunal is to be filled by a person appointed by the Government.

LXIV. Crimes which do not amount to corporal or infamous punishment are to be tried before the Tribunals of Correctional Police, with an appeal to the Criminal Courts.

LXV. There is for the whole Republic a supreme Court of Appeal, which pronounces on appeals against judgments in the dernier resort, given by the Courts in cases referred from one Court to another on account of lawful suspicion, or the public safety, upon exceptions taken by the party against the whole Court.

LXVI. The supreme Court of Appeal does not inquire into the merits of facts, but it reverses the judgments given on proceedings in which form is violated, or which contain something expressly contrary to the law, but, sends the case back

back to be tried on the merits by the Court which has cognizance of them.

LXVII. The Judges who constitute the primary Courts, and the officers appointed by the Government in those Courts are taken from the Communal or Departmental List.

The Judges forming the ordinary Courts of Appeal, and the Commissioners placed with them, are taken from the Departmental List.

The Judges composing the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the Commissioners belonging to that Court, are taken from the National List.

LXVIII. The Judges, except the Justices of the Peace, retain their offices for life, unless they should be convicted of a crime, or should not be continued on the list of persons eligible corresponding with their functions.

## C H A P. VI.

### *Of the Responsibility of the Public Functionaries.*

LXIX. The functions of the Members of the Senate, of the Legislative Body, of the Tribune, and also those of the Consuls, and Counsellors of State, do not render them responsible.

LXX. Personal crimes, to which are annexed corporal or infamous punishments, committed by a Member of the Senate, Tribune, Legislative Body, or of the Council of State, are to be prosecuted before the ordinary Courts, after a resolution of the body, to which the person charged belongs, has authorized such prosecution.

LXXI. The Ministers arraigned, in their private capacity, of crimes to which are annexed corporal or infamous punishment, are considered as Members of the Council of State.

LXXII. The Ministers are responsible; 1st, for every act of Government signified by them, and declared unconstitutional

by the Senate; 3dly, for the non-execution of the laws, and of the regulations of the public administration; 3dly, for the particular orders which they give, if those orders are contrary to the Constitution, the laws and regulations.

LXXIII. In the several cases of the preceding article the Tribunate denounces the Minister by an act, on which the Legislative Body deliberates in ordinary form, after having heard or summoned the person denounced. The Minister to be put on his trial by a decree of the Legislative Body, is to be tried by a high Court without appeal.

The High Court is to be composed of Judges and Jurors. The Judges to be chosen by the Supreme Court of Appeal, and from among its own Judges. The Jurors are chosen from the National List: the whole according to the forms prescribed by the laws.

LXXIV. The Judges, civil and criminal, for crimes relating to their functions, are to be prosecuted before the Courts to which the Supreme Court of Appeal sends them, after having annulled their acts.

LXXV. The Agents of Government, except the Ministers, cannot be prosecuted for acts relating to their functions, but by virtue of a decision of the Council of State; in this case the prosecution is to be carried on before the ordinary Courts.

### C H A P. VII.

#### *General Regulations.*

LXXVI. The house of every person inhabiting the French territory is an inviolable asylum.

During the night no person has a right to enter it, except in case of fire, inundation, or the request of the person within.

In the day one may enter it for a special purpose, determined either by the law, or an order from a public authority.

LXXVII.

LXXVII. In order that the act which contains the arrest of a person may be executed, it is necessary, first, that it express in form the causes for such arrest, and the law in execution of which it is ordered; secondly, that it issue from a Functionary to whom the law has formally given that power; thirdly, that it be notified to the person arrested, and a copy of it left with him.

LXXVIII. No keeper or gaoler can receive or detain any person without having first transcribed on his register the act ordering his arrest. This act must be a mandate, given in the forms prescribed by the preceding article, or a warrant for taking the body, or a decree of impeachment, or a judgment.

LXXIX. Every keeper or gaoler is bound, without any order being able to dispense with it, to produce the person in his custody to the civil officer superintending the police of the place of confinement, whenever that officer shall require it.

LXXX. No person in custody shall be refused to his relations or friends, carrying an order from the civil officer, who shall be always obliged to grant it, unless the keeper or gaoler produces an order of a judge to keep the prisoner in close confinement.

LXXXI. All those who, not being invested by the law with the power of arresting, shall give, sign, or execute the arrest of any person whatever; all those who, even in the case of arrest authorized by law, shall receive or detain the person arrested in a place of confinement not publicly and legally designated as such; and all keepers or gaolers who shall act contrary to the regulations of the three preceding articles, shall be guilty of the crime of false imprisonment.

LXXXII. All severities used in arrests, detentions, or executions, except those commanded by the laws, are crimes.

LXXXIII. Every person has the right of addressing private petitions to every constituted authority, and particularly to the Tribune.

LXXXIV. The public force is necessarily in a state of obedience; no armed body can deliberate.

LXXXV. Military crimes are subjected to special tribunals, and particular forms of judgment.

LXXXVI. The French Nation declares, that it will grant pensions to all the military wounded in defence of their country, and also to the widows and children of such military as have died on the field of battle, or in consequence of their wounds.

LXXXVII. National rewards shall be given to the warriors who shall have rendered distinguished services in fighting for the Republic.

LXXXVIII. A constituted body cannot proceed to business except in a sitting at which two-thirds of its members, at least, are present.

LXXXIX. A National Institute is charged with collecting discoveries, and perfecting the arts and sciences.

XC. A Committee of National Auditors regulates and verifies the accounts of the receipts and expences of the Republic. This Committee is composed of seven members chosen by the Senate from the National List.

XCI. The Government of the French Colonies is to be determined by special laws.

XCII. In case of rebellion or commotion which menace the safety of the State, the law may suspend in the places, and for the time it determines, [the authority of the Constitution.]

This suspension may be provisionally declared in the same cases by a decree of the Government, the Legislative Body not being sitting, provided this Body be convened as soon after as possible by an article of the same decree.

XCIII. The French Nation declares, that in no case will it suffer the return of the French, who, having abandoned their country since the 14th of July 1789, are not comprised in

in the exceptions contained in the law regarding Emigrants. It interdicts every new exception on this point.

The property of Emigrants is irrevocably belonging to the Republic.

**XCIV.** The French Nation declares, that after a sale legally completed of National Property, whatever may be its origin, the lawful purchaser cannot be dispossessed, saving the right of third persons; if such there should be, in fact case he is to be indemnified out of the public treasury.

**XCV.** The present Constitution shall be offered forthwith to the French People for their acceptance.

Done at Paris, the 22d Brumaire, (Dec. 13, 1799,) in the 8th year of the French Republic, one and indivisible.

(The signatures of the Members of the Legislative Committee and Consuls follow.)

Postponing the examination of the mechanism, the spirit, and the object of this new Legislative theory till another Number, we shall at present confine ourselves to representing the impression made on the Public by this solemn apostacy from the maxims which the generality of the Revolutionists, as well as many friends of liberty, adopted in 1789, and by the insolent forms under which it has been prescribed to the nation.

Had Republicans, hostile alike to hereditary royalty and popular power, thought of securing the advantages of monarchy by the institution of

of a sole and supreme chief, whose prerogative should by law as well as influence sway the functions of the Legislature; had they invested him with authority not only far greater than that of the chief magistrates of the Republican Governments ancient or modern, but far greater also than that of most of the kings placed at the head of limited monarchies; had they for the aristocracy of birth and of transmissible and perpetual distinctions substituted an elective aristocracy, which, flowing originally from the people, should become absolutely independent of them, in the exercise of its privileges, and also in its progressive renewal; had they admitted a fiction of national representation in order to absorb the energy, power, and effects of it in bodies, to the appointing, superseding, and controlling of which the supposed *represented* persons remained utter strangers; had they, in their dread of commotions and innovations, deprived the power charged with making the laws of the right of introducing and proposing them, to bestow it on the power charged to execute them; had they at the same time invested the latter with a positive and *a priori* veto, upon the resolutions of the Legislature, fixed dumb and motionless on their seats till the Government thought proper to restore them action and speech; had they to this right of fettering their resolutions joined that

that of preventing all debate, and of attacking the legality of any law once passed under pretence of its being *unconstitutional*; in fine, had they conjured up an elective patrician state of five thousand citizens, a legislative body exclusively chosen from this patrician state by a perpetual senate, endowed also with the power of electing its own members and acting as censor, regulator, and balance of the constituted powers; and had they determined that this feeding of the aristocratic mill-hopper should receive its motion, direction, and support from an executive authority concentrated in the person of a *Stadholder* sufficiently powerful to keep all the branches of the State in subordination; such a system, however deceitful, would not have cast on its authors the reflexion either of usurpation or inconsistency:

Had experience and the horrible consequences of the first essays inspired the legislative preceptors of 1789 and 1792 with the thought of giving up their democratic extravagances, and of adopting a more reasonable measure between the rights of the People and those of the Government, one would not have been surprised:

The modification of their first doctrines, the formation of a Government more active and more concentrated, a division of the public powers, which, without openly infringing on the

foundations of political liberty might secure them from the ravages of popular factions, are changes which might have been considered as the production of wisdom:

But that the author of the first *Declaration of the pretended Rights of Man*, his disciples, assistants, speakers, and panegyrists, should be the persons to efface with a dash of the pen, that fundamental regulation !

That after having, with the most criminal, or the blindest, obstinacy, resisted all remonstrances, all examples, all complaints, all information ; that after having branded with the name of *advocates of Despotism* all who found fault with the degradation and enfeebled state into which they precipitated their executive power ; that after having defamed, condemned to the lantern, banished, plundered, and loaded with insult and contempt whoever opposed their dogma of the Sovereignty of the People, their application of it, their single chamber, their mob-electors, and their chimerical equality, that the very same men should now present themselves as teachers sent from Heaven to undeceive that France whom they had led astray !

That, after having professed the most determined aversion to mixed institutions, to the classing of citizens, and to allowing any executive magistracy a supremacy which might recall the

the monarchical power, they should abjure their writings, their harangues, their oaths, and re-compose the Republic precisely in the forms, the very mention of which was, in their eyes, treason against the Nation !

A contrast so monstrous inflames the mind with indignation. What respectable reformers truly are these fickle systematizers, who after spreading crimes and mourning over France and all Europe, in order to beat down all opposition to their first dogmas, coolly confess their folly, without testifying the slightest repentance; boast their inconsistency, renew and perpetuate the proscription of all their countrymen whose crime consisted of being before them in the opinion which they themselves now hold respecting their former works, and of opposing those institutions now blasted and entombed by the very institutors of them !

These men are now become equally odious and contemptible in the eyes of the partisans of absolute authority and in those of the disciples of liberty. By the former they will be declared guilty of usurping the ancient and lawful power, whose buried foundations they are digging up, in order to erect upon its ruins the oppression of their equals : by the latter they will be declared guilty of usurping the privileges and the

will of the Nation. Thus the result of the sublime Revolution of the 10th of November is reduced to a consummation of the double invasion of the rights of the throne and of the rights of the people.

They might, at least in the execution of this enterprise, have preserved some decency, shown some personal disinterestedness in this Legislation, the fabrication of which they arrogate to themselves, and made use of their authority and the confidence placed in them by the public credulity, to instruct France, to lay their motives before her, to solicit her voice and her election, and to shield with a free and general sanction this system run up clandestinely in their Committees,

But, these coblers of liberty have not blushed to impose their ordinances upon the Nation by an act of personal and despotic omnipotence. There has been no preliminary and public discussion, no appeal made to any meeting whatever of national agents, no convocation of primary assemblies consecrated by all former principles, those cradles of the public sovereignty where the preceding Constitutions received their definitive sanction.

What then is this impudence of a band of commissioners, enrolling the supreme statutes of a Corsican officer and an Abbé, and promulgating

gating them imperiously as the law of the State? If the Constituent Assembly, really the representative of the French Nation, if the Convention acting under the same character, thought nothing of the consent of their constituents, still the nature of their delegation might seem to authorise their forgetting that formality: but, what! fifty persons at the command of two party-leaders drive the Representatives of the People away with bayonets, dissolve the Constitution, consequently restore to the Nation its independence, determine the reception of its future laws under pretence of its concurrence, and without consulting it, without leaving it the power of investigating, choosing, or modifying their Legislative Acts, proclaim them as irrevocable ordinances. What do I say! Do they not add derision to despotism in permitting the citizens to register *in three days* their approbation or refusal?—*Their refusal!*

In fine, not satisfied with having imposed their form of Government on the Nation, they distribute its honours, and create its powers, in order to reserve for themselves its profits and its offices. One adjudges to himself a salary of 500,000 livres and the rank of an Archon or Dey; others instal themselves in the second rank with 50,000 crowns a year: their counsellors, agents, servants, stock the State junto,

Senate, tribunate, and legislative body, not forgetting exorbitant salaries... Let the reader figure to himself a band of attorneys and bailiffs with a captain of musqueteers for their president, introducing themselves upon a litigated estate, to reconcile the parties, then beating them off with clubs, and afterwards sharing among themselves both land and moveables; he will have a just idea of this privileged confraternity, who under the banners of *Buonaparte*, have just taken a new inventory of the French Republic, and wrongfully possessed themselves of all its places.

Let him then read the fine pamphlets of M. *Rœdérer*; observe his ready rapture and admiration, listen to the smooth periods of his brethren upon their *virtues* and their *genius*, take another view of the modest *Buonaparte* protesting at St. Cloud his taste for retirement, his indifference to grandeur, and his zeal for liberty. Let him follow this philosophical victor, meditating for three years past the subjugation of the Republic, concealing this ambition beneath a military garb, and seating himself under the canopy of state while he affects a contempt for grandeur; let him recollect the unspeakable homage rendered to his heroism and generosity; and let him study those men of letters, those writers, those academicians, those journalists of the moment, whose servile

servile and venal eloquence lavishes upon the, rulers of the day all the hyperbolical figures and deifications of oriental adulation ; *Acclamate Quirites ! acclamate dum licet ; jam enim impune vobis non facere licebit.*

This last act of the Revolution of the 10th of November unmasks the authors of it : their aim was as vile as their hypocrisy. They delivered France from a yoke to impose their own upon her : they form a faction as usurping and sordid as those that have gone before, and they have let us into their secret.

*Attendon' solamente al lor profio.*    **Ariosto.**

The two inferior Consuls who figure at the head of this Government are evidently *Buonaparte's* Chancellors ; they form a kind of jutting support, which appears to be placed about him like those temporary props about a building which are meant to be removed as soon as its equilibrium is secured. The Grand Consul has dictated, and very wisely, the appointment of his two Viziers : the one will manage juridical affairs for him, and the other the finances. They are not deficient either in capacity or integrity. *Le Brun\** possesses, in a very high degree, the talent

\* He was Secretary to the Chancellor *Maupéou*, and in 1770 composed the manly, concise, noble, and argumentative speeches

talent of writing and will supply the deficiency of his master, who can no more write than speak. Besides both of them have shown themselves in the different Assemblies to which they have belonged as timid, flexible, and submissive to the authority of the moment as their new situation requires. *Buonaparte* did not seek either contraditors or associates.

As we were drawing this article to a conclusion we received the following letter, which will supply the defect of the foregoing remarks. It seems to us to say every thing, and is written by a considerate and impartial man, to whom the late Revolution of Paris had at first appeared in very favourable colours.

" SIR,

" *Buonaparte* and *Sieyes* have at length shown themselves; their talents, character, views, and means are all known: there is nothing

speeches which were delivered by the Chancellor in the dispute with the Parliaments. He published a translation of the *Iliad*, which was more flowery than faithful, and a translation of *Tasso* more esteemed, and which, at the time, was said to be *J. J. Rousseau's*. He was a Member of the Constituent Assembly, in which he was very reserved; and in 1796 he became one of the Legislature. Having a family he lived long in retirement, devoted to study and the education of his children.

" uncertain, nothing remains obscure in the  
 " character of these great men.—Their Constitu-  
 " tion is promulgated, and they have each  
 " marked their place in it. The one, greedy  
 " of power, chooses to be despotic and inviol-  
 " able, and places himself out of the verge  
 " of the forms and laws he establishes; the  
 " other takes the post peculiarly suitable to him,  
 " that in which he can make himself feared, and  
 " move all about him without affecting his  
 " safety or repose. The mass of public officers  
 " will be composed of their agents, their crea-  
 " tures, and such as shall give them security for  
 " their allegiance; and this is their Constitu-  
 " tion.

" In this view it does not deserve either the  
 " contempt or ridicule which has been cast upon  
 " it. I think it far cleverer than that of the  
 " Mamelukes or the despotism of Algiers; but  
 " the most surprising thing is the audaciousness  
 " with which these two men impose their Go-  
 " vernment on France.

" The character of a conquering usurper is  
 " very well known; his sword and his army  
 " ate his title. The will of the people made  
 " known by their representatives is another  
 " kind of commanding power. The infamous  
 " Convention which overturned France and  
 " threatened all Europe, had a formidable ori-  
     " gin.

" gin. In fine, the factions in the Republican  
 " Governments have been seen attacking, destroy-  
 " ing, supplanting one another, without  
 " altering either the title or functions of their  
 " magistracy, or the constitutional forms; but  
 " what has never before been seen is, that with-  
 " out a battle or conquest, or any mission from  
 " the people, a private individual establishes  
 " himself the head and supreme Legislator of a  
 " great Empire, and composes a plenary court  
 " of his own delegates, from whom he receives  
 " his title and his powers while he enjoins them  
 " to promulgate his new laws.

" Can this degree of degradation be imagined  
 " for the French? Can it be believed, that  
 " they will be base enough to submit to it for  
 " any length of time?

" Although the word *Constitution* has been  
 " abused and profaned, what Frenchman will  
 " dare to give that name to the combinations  
 " of a Corsican and a Priest formed to subjugate  
 " the multitude whom they dread, and the dif-  
 " ferent parties by whom they are detested?  
 " The criminal folly, the wickedness of the  
 " Directory and of the Councils, merited no  
 " doubt the chastisement they have received; but  
 " and all Europe would have extolled ~~the~~  
 " party had he for the time seized the reins of  
 " the Government in order to restore ~~to the~~  
 " nationov

" nation the liberty of which for ten years past  
 " it has been deprived: nay, he might have  
 " been forgiven for being tempted by a less  
 " noble, less glorious object; and Dictator or  
 " Protector, his shame or glory might have de-  
 " pended upon the use he made of the supreme  
 " power: but this infamous alliance which  
 " he has now entered into with the leaders  
 " and the crimes of the Revolution, by  
 " following the principles of it, this horrid  
 " hypocrisy of a nominal Republic confined to  
 " a faction of five thousand *Conscripti* and the  
 " nation enslaved by this odious oligarchy, . . .  
 " we detect in them the crafty conceptions of  
 " Sieyes, but not those of a General whose talents  
 " and victories have rendered him illustrious.  
 " Buonaparte is in the present instance nothing  
 " more than an Arab-Chief plundering a Cara-  
 " van, distributing the booty, and taking the best  
 " part of it for himself.

" Whatever be the fate or duration of the  
 " Constitution, neither power nor success can  
 " again remove the disesteem into which their in-  
 " trigues have plunged them. Should they ef-  
 " fectually subjugate the French Nation, they  
 " will not even have the honour of that triumph,  
 " which belongs equally to all the revolutionary  
 " rabble that has gone before them, and whose  
 " place they now fill with their elect.

" Let us, however, observe what there is just,  
 " instructive, and valuable in their new institu-  
 " tions.

" 1st; It is the fanatic author of the *Declara-*  
*tion of the Rights of Man* who now acknowledg-  
 " es the danger of them, and who effaces  
 " them with the same hand still reeking with the  
 " blood they have caused to flow.

" 2dly; Democracy is proscribed by its own  
 " apostles and heroes, who no longer acknowl-  
 " edge in the sovereignty of the people, in their  
 " thirty millions of equals, more than five thou-  
 " sand citizens able to participate in the Go-  
 " vernment.

" 3dly; Responsibility is placed where it  
 " ought to rest, and the supreme Magis-  
 " trates are exempted from it, by the murderers  
 " of *Louis XVI*.

" 4thly; It is the authors of the assignats,  
 " and the horrible bankruptcy that was the con-  
 " sequence of them, who declare bankruptes and  
 " their heirs excluded from the rights of Citi-  
 " zens, and who thus exclude their own Govern-  
 " ment, until they reimburse the creditors of the  
 " State.

" 5thly; It is the proscribers of the factions,  
 " laws, and usurpers that preceded them, who  
 " punish as rebels those who opposed the very  
 " powers they have overturned.

" If

" If those powers were lawful, they who have  
 " destroyed them are the traitors and rebels  
 " against the Nation : if those powers were  
 " usurped, how can they who opposed them be  
 " guilty of a crime against the Nation ?

" Nothing great, nothing generous has dif-  
 " tinguished the late Revolution. One might  
 " have thought that in concentrating the powers  
 " and depriving the multitude of a fatal influence,  
 " the chiefs would have restored all the rights of  
 " property, and founded a stable Government on  
 " its preponderance : but no ; they wanted Legis-  
 " lators on wages, trustees of confiscations ; and  
 " with their own hirelings have they composed  
 " the body politic. Do they imagine they have  
 " only to appoint Tribunes and a Senate, to have  
 " laws and morals ?

" *Buonaparte* and *Sieyes* might have been se-  
 " cretaries to *Cromwell*, but not his colleagues.  
 " Fools are promising peace to France and to  
 " Europe : where is the security for that peace,  
 " and where the means ? I believe that the mass  
 " of the Nation, sunk in apathy, receives, even  
 " with joy, a government that overthrows that  
 " which was execrated, and which at least  
 " muzzles the ferocious Jacobins : yet all the  
 " parties by which France is divided must feel  
 " equally indignant. The discontents of the  
 " country will re-appear under every form : by

and "degrees, at the embiggenments of the administration shall require new resources, violence will become necessary; resistance will be irresistible, and other factions will again overturn the present one. Nothing but the hierarchy can ever put an end to this deplorable state of things; and as that will very soon appear necessary to the happiness of France, it would be as barbarous as foolish not to represent it under attractive forms."

*The chief of the late Events of the Campaign, to the Middle of December.*

ALTHOUGH the interest taken in the military operations, and even that of curiosity, is much weakened since their relaxation, this indifference is less owing to the nature of them, than to the political events which have absorbed attention. The changes that have taken place in France, the illusions of an approaching peace, the Russians preparing for their retreat, the two Imperial Courts on the point of separating their cause, were of greater importance than some fruitless battles fought on the Rhine and in Piedmont, which were not likely to decide a dispute, the discussion and conclusion of which the public opinion had already transferred from Generals to Plenipotentiaries.

In

In our twenty-eighth Number we left the French beaten in Piedmont in the end of September and repelled from the positions they had had taken at Rivoli, Fossano, and Savigliano. Falling back on Mondovi and the inner line of the Appennines, they still covered Coal and Genoa. During the month of October the Austrians could not approach those places; nor did they attempt to force the enemy to retreat farther. Several undecisive engagements took place in this interval, during which the French army received some reinforcements that induced the General to resume the offensive. In the beginning of November the army suddenly returned from the neighbourhood of Coni, where they were assembled, into the plain of the Stura, came out upon Fossano, and made themselves masters of Savigliano. There they were to be joined by other troops coming from Saluzzo and Pignerola. By this bold movement *Championnet* hoped to have secured the post of Bra, and by that means to have cut off the Imperial army.

This design was disconcerted by General *Melas*, who himself attacked the enemy on the 4th of November. In consequence of the action the French lost all the ground they had gained, and fell back to their former positions, leaving in the hands of the conquerors four thousand prisoners,

prisoners, and as great a number of killed and wounded on the field of battle.

Their weakened army separated into two divisions ; one of which, under the Generals *Victor* and *Le Moine*, closed upon Mondovi ; and the other, commanded by General *Grenier*, took possession of the post of St. Dalmatio behind *Conti*. General *Melas* lost no time in preventing their fixing, and in taking the advantage his victory offered him.

On the 9th *Grenier* was attacked at St. Dalmatio, driven from that post, and pushed as far as Limon, near the Col of Tenda : thither he was pursued by General Count *D'Auersterg*, who dislodged him, and forced him into the mountains.

The division at Mondovi was engaged on the 13th, and made a longer resistance. It had the advantage of the mountains ; from which the point was to drive it, either by turning it or attacking it in front. By a dexterous and bold manœuvre Field-Marshal Prince *Lichtenstein* made himself master of one of the commanding heights. The French, however, still kept their position, when night came on ; but it had ceased to be tenable. On the 14th in the morning, their army, roughly treated and exhausted, evacuated Mondovi, quitted the mountains, and retreated to the Western River.

It

It is upon this spent and meagre country, on the precipices of the Col of Tenda, and among the Alps of Dauphiné, that those deplorable remains of *Buonaparte's invincible legions* have sought their safety : there, amidst the snows, and suffering the cruelest wants, have those poor soldiers, without pay, bread, coats, or shirts, been consoled, and their sufferings charmed, by the announcing of the new Constitution, which is to remedy all their ills. On the 7th of December *Championnet's* head quarters were at Sospello, beyond the Col of Tenda.

Immediately after these events the siege of Coni was formed, and carried on with such vigour that there remained little doubt of a very speedy reduction of that fortress. Its fate gives a presage of that of Genoa, which, as well as Bochetta, is still occupied by the French, whose line from this post to the mountains of Dauphiné would require an army of more than eighty thousand men. The Ligurian Republic has turned its last moments to advantage in regenerating itself. In 1797, *Buonaparte*, with his pistol cocked, proved to it that without a Directory and two Councils every political system was mere extravagance : he now demonstrates to it that nothing can be less Republican than such a system. In consequence, every Genoese *Brutus*, *Aristides*, and *Confucius*, has hastened

had enough authority to facilitate and expedite the  
Constitution, and to institute a provisional Consul-  
facy, and that the Neckar was to be the Necker of the  
new France. On the 20th of November, the same day that  
General Mélac, with so much activity, skill, and  
resolution, compelled the enemy to retreat, Austerlitz  
was surrendered to the Austrian General Froissard by the French General  
who was shut up there with the wrecks of a  
division. All the South of Italy then is now  
entirely cleared, as well as Piedmont.

On the frontiers of Switzerland the allies  
have remained in a state of observation. Although  
the Russians have in some degree become bolder,  
and retired to the confines of Bavaria,  
*Massena* has not dared to cross the Rhine; he  
has continued on the defensive, while the army  
of Alsace have been trying in vain, by inroads  
on the Right Bank, to force the Archduke  
Charles to relinquish his defensive and impregna-  
ble position at Doneschingen.

That unfortunate part of Suabia through which  
the Neckar runs, has became the seat of war. The  
enemy, reinforced by troops from the Lower  
Rhine and Holland, had at first gained some ad-  
vantages; they again threatened the Duchy of  
Württemberg, and besieged Philippsburg; but these few  
partial successes, owing to a temporary superiority  
of numbers, were quickly obliterated by the late and  
operations

**Operations of General Sartorius.** He vanquished the French in the Palatinate, and drove them back upon the Neckereau and Manheim, where they applied for an armistice upon condition of recrossing the Rhine, if it were not ratified by the Archduke Charles. The Prince did not accede to it, and the enemy in consequence evacuated Manheim and returned to Alsace.

During the march, efforts, and checks of this army, that of Switzerland made no attempt to support it. This motionless state, however, has not hurt Massena with Bonaparte, who has called him to Paris, whence he is to proceed to take the command of the ruined Army of Italy. Moreau has succeeded him in that of the Army of Switzerland which they continue to name metaphorically the *Army of the Danube*.

The inability of the French Generals to prevent new disasters in Italy, to make use of their advantages in Switzerland, and to establish themselves on the right of the Rhine, prove at once the weak state of the military forces of the Republic, and the inadequacy of the extraordinary means which have been adopted for six months past to raise them.

Desertions have been increased by defeats and want, and they become more frequent as the proximity of the frontiers of France renders them more leasy. Whole bodies of conscripts have

deserted

3 L

left

left the army of Italy. The Generals racked by the reasonable complaints of their naked soldiers, cannot keep at their colours men for whom they have neither bread nor clothes.

The campaign will be over before any remedy can be applied to this ruinous state; the causes of which are to be traced to the horrible manner in which the Republic has abused its means of power. It is not from the transient fortune of arms, but from the resources found in the hour of adversity, that we are to judge of the real strength of a State, and the excellence of its administration.

The extent of the distress into which France has plunged and leaves the armies cannot be better shown than by reporting the following details, written from Nice on the 9th of this month, and transcribed as authentic in the Moniteur of the 23d.

" The army of Italy occupies a line of 143 leagues over mountains almost uninhabitable in winter.

" In the course of this line there are five-and-twenty out-lets, requiring each a force of about 3000 men.

" This army, when joined by those of Naples and the Alps, has never amounted to more than from 60 to 62 thousand men, and of those two thousand are cavalry.

" The country which it occupies has never been equal to the subsistence of the small number of inhabitants which reside upon it.

" To be sensible of all that it has suffered, and of its title to the national gratitude and the admiration of all nations,

" it will be enough to compare the wants of such an army,  
 " placed in situations so difficult, with its resources since the  
 " 11th of October, 1799.

*" Wanting for Subsistence,*

*Livres.*

" Bread, 100,000 rations a day,	
" 100,000 quintals of Corn. For three months past the head has required a sum of	2,000,000
" 100,000 rations of meat, at 4 sous, 6 deniers each, are for the three months	1,700,000
" 10,000 rations of forage were necessary for the cavalry, artillery, and transports, at 1 livre, 10 sous the ration, amounting to 15,000 livres a-day; and in three months to	1,300,000
" At the end of the year 7 the army had neither coats, cloaks, nor shoes: these articles required a sum of	2,400,000
" The number of the sick and wounded has never been less than 12,000: the expence attending these has been 12,000 livres per day, and for three months	1,080,000
" The pay of 60,000 men, including the General Officers, and the Staff and other Officers attached to the divisions, amounts to a sum of 1,875,000 livres per month, and for three months	5,625,000
" Extraordinary expences 100,000 livres per month, which make in three months	300,000
" Total for the different services and pay	<u>14,405,000</u>

" What the army received will give a just idea of what corn was deficient. It has received, since the beginning of the year 8, only two agreements made between the " Houses

" Houses of Ouvrage and Boisnage, and the Minister of War,  
 " Those Houses have never appeared, nor have they ever  
 " sent a sack of corn. This was supplied by a permission  
 " granted to some mercantile Houses of Ligeance import  
 " corn from France; this permission was annulled by the  
 " Executive Directory, who prohibited the exportation, with-  
 " out providing any,

" As to accoutrements and clothing, the army received  
 " only 6000 coats, no cloaks, 30,000 shirts, and 12,000  
 " pairs of shoes.

" Horses for carriage, — none.

" For removal, — ditto.

" The pecuniary means it has received to supply this  
 " dreadful want consist of the following resources :

" Money, sent by the National Treasury

in three months, — £.v. 1,400,000

" Orders of the Syndicate, — 316,000

" It is easy to shew with equal precision the military ar-  
 " ticles necessary for it, and what it received. No provision  
 " was made for a siege. Of artillery 150 pieces were ne-  
 " cessary; the army had not horses to draw 20 cannon;  
 " 15,000,000 cartridges were indispensable; the army had  
 " not 3,000,000, nor the means of making them.

" No pen can describe what the soldier has suffered in  
 " this horrid crisis.

" They who are isolated on the mountains that are covered  
 " with snow, without shed, coat, or fire, have gone days with-  
 " out food, and several have died of hunger. They who are  
 " stationed in the villages, after exhausting all the resources  
 " of the unfortunate peasants, consider the day a fortunate  
 " one, when they receive a quarter of the usual ration.

" Most of the horses have died for want of forage; the  
 " officers are all dismounted; the Generals and Staff Officers  
 " can scarcely make a movement; there is no provision for  
 " the

" the few tables which have survived the famine ; there is ..  
 " no subsistence on the roads for the travelling soldier, or  
 " the troops in motion ; nor comfort in the hospitals for the  
 " sick or wounded who are carried into them.

" Such is the situation of the army of Italy, which for  
 " more than eight months has been obliged to withstand the  
 " efforts of a victorious army, superior in force, provided  
 " with an immense artillery, supported by a formidable ca-  
 " valry, and abundantly provided with ammunition and  
 " provisions.

" In accepting the chief command of an army in such a  
 " wretched state, Massena gives a proof of the most devoted  
 " ardour. We wish he may carry with him into Italy the  
 " means of saving the army from famine and misery."

The army of Switzerland, notwithstanding the number, the pressing, and the barbarity of its daily requisitions, subsists with infinite difficulty, drives the People to despair, and has been lately threatened with new insurrections.

ALL direct intelligence from Germany being now stopped by the frost or contrary winds, we have no means of forming any judgment respecting the continental war or politics, but such as are afforded by the portions of German Gazettes reported and mutilated in the French papers. Among these we find the extract of a new Proclamation made by the Archduke Charles to the outer Circles of the Empire inserted.

serted in the privileged Gazette of Augsburg on the 18th of this month. This remarkable paper, which is posterior to the late Révolution at Paris, evinces the opinion which the Court of Vienna has formed of that event. It confirms our conjectures at the beginning of this Number, and seems to prove that Peace was far from being considered as concluded, because Buonaparte has pledged his word for it to the French Nation;

“ I see with regret,” says the Archduke, “ that the late events in France, by which the supreme power has passed into other hands, have almost every where renewed the hope which has so often proved deceitful of a general pacification, and that on this premature supposition it is even thought, that the levying of the contingencies, and fulfilling of the other constitutional obligations, may be deferred.

“ We have hitherto always found that every new faction in France has spoken a great deal of peace; not, however, to conclude it on equitable terms, but to inveigle the nation.

“ The event which took place on the 9th of November, properly considered, is not of a nature to raise a thorough confidence in us. Some of the persons who have seized upon the supreme power, are the same men who, both by their principles, and the whole course of their public life, have sown a new species of hatred and eternal enmity to all States not constituted like their own, and who have overturned several, and perfidiously subjugated others in full peace.”

“ The very spirit which is manifested in the public writings of France, is by no means pacific: in these it is frequently said, that this new Revolution has no other object than

" to raise the Republic to the rank which it ought to hold  
 " in Europe; and the late Directory are blamed, not for  
 " commencing the war, but for not carrying it on success-  
 " fully; for not conquering new provinces; and for losing  
 " some of those that had been conquered. In the French  
 " proclamations the first thing mentioned is victory, and then  
 " peace; which shows that circumstances do not appear to  
 " those who issue the proclamations to be yet sufficiently  
 " favorable for the latter, and that they have an inclination  
 " to try again the fortune of war before they think seriously  
 " of peace.

" But even were we disposed to admit no distrust of the  
 " views of the new rulers of France, still the new Constitution  
 " is not sufficiently confirmed; to convince us that it will  
 " not be overturned like the rest. In fine, the peace we  
 " want is not such a one as every armistice may be called;  
 " we want a peace attended with safety; we want the ef-  
 " fectual conditions for which we are contending; conditions  
 " that are required by honour, dignity, liberty; the integrity  
 " of the German Empire, and the inviolability of the most va-  
 " lued treaties. We want a just, proper, and durable peace;  
 " in the sense expressed by the Diet, and by which religion,  
 " property, civil order, and the Constitution of the Empire  
 " may be secured."

The same Paris papers, dated the 25th and 26th, contain a catalogue of the Senators, Legis-  
 lators, Tribunes, &c. &c. whom the *provisional*  
 Sovereigns of France have appointed to fill the curule chairs. The drawing of this lottery will  
 furnish us with some remarks. Several estimable,  
 but timid and pliant men, persons who are nei-  
 ther republicans nor royalists, a number of in-

triguing characters, and a crowd of chymists; geometricians, mechanicians, anatomists, and botanists, are seated upon these new magisterial benches. They have carried the joke so far as to nominate to the Senate, that censorial body whose functions require a knowledge of men as well as of business, the algebraist *La Grange*, who has no head for any thing but mathematics, and whose weakness of heart and spirit fits him to be the instrument of the present Regents.

# BRITISH MERCURY.

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## BRITISH MERCURY.

N<sup>o</sup> XXXII.

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January 15th, 1800.

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We are now concluding a century, the last years of which form an epocha in the history of human vicissitudes, and present a view of one of those climateric calamities which are periodically produced by great natural or moral commotions.

The generations which suffer by those violent changes and subversions, perceive in them only fortuitous events, occasioned by transient causes. They always blame men alone, and do not accuse, nor indeed do they observe the course

of things and the operation of the antecedents, which gave the impulse to agents not less blind in their determinations than in their object.

This habit of separating effects from their causes, the present from the past, and of imputing the consequences of the wearing away and rust of ages to a mere local or casual disorder, easily to be overcome by superior force or powerful authority, is a consolation reserved by PROVIDENCE for those whom it afflicts.

Unfortunately this mode of seeing is altered, these illusions are weakened by the study of history. Extraordinary changes, revolutions, subversions, are not more independent in their origin than earthquakes and volcanos.

Each passing century impels the succeeding one ; by its unheeded mass it insensibly sweeps along opinions, institutions, and the relations upon which they were founded ; Time, that stubborn innovator, prepares his metamorphoses in secret. The skill of a Législator consists in keeping pace with him, and in moderating by sharing his dominion ; but empires and customs fall when the necessary effects of the social state cease to agree with the positive laws, and it is when they strike counter to one another that those general Revolutions take place which overthrow institutions, whether venerable

or

or abusive, whose cement is entirely dissolved.

Not to resort to the multitude of examples furnished by the ancient annals of the world for proofs in support of this opinion, let us observe Europe after the middle ages ; let us follow its progress from the end of the fifteenth century : in the memorable events of the sixteenth and seventeenth we shall perceive the principle and the forerunners of the present agitations.

Never had the Court of Rome been more powerful, its Pontiffs more firmly established, or its empire more extended, than at the moment when *Luther* declared war against it. Its scandal, avarice, and pretensions had before that time moved only some obscure Reformers, who were very soon punished for their boldness. But every thing was ripe for the schism : Rome alone thought herself still in a situation to prevent it by her bulls and thunderbolts. She perceived neither the rapid change which had been successively wrought in the ideas of men, nor the advantage which the policy and the avarice of Princes were preparing to draw from it,

With prudence, management, and some sacrifices, she might have retarded the loss of her authority ; but by attacking the circumstances, spirit, interests, and opinions of the age, she

increased the resistance of them. Rome or Protestantism was to fall. The assistance which the Catholic Church received from Charles V., and his successors, could not prevent the conquests of the Reformation: it survived thirty years of war, fire, devastation, and depression; it prevailed in Germany and the North of Europe, and at one time it extended its preponderance even to the hereditary dominions of Austria\*. From the Empire it made its way to England, tore the Low Countries from Philip II., took root in Hungary, changed the religion of two thirds of Switzerland, and agitated France during four successive reigns.

The peace of Westphalia calmed this prodigious storm, but at the same time consolidated the effects of it. Their consequences appeared rapidly; the Catholic States changed their looks with their doctrine. It was only a religious Revolution, yet its operation extended to morals and to laws, to political as well as to spiritual

\* In 1612 the States of Austria and Moravia sent Deputies to the Emperor *Mathias* for the purpose of obtaining from him a declaration favourable to the Protestants. "The Protestants," said they to their Sovereign, "will not yield to a handful of Catholics. To three hundred Protestant Barons there are scarcely eighty Papist. *Mathias* must take care not to lose temporal advantages for spiritual acquisitions." The Emperor was compelled to yield.

opinions,

opinions, to the interests of Nations and of Sovereigns as well as to the new relations in which they were placed by this grand event.

The greater the difference that there was between the moral and civil state of Europe in the beginning of the fifteenth century, and in the year 1648, the more decisive was the gradual influence of the latter period upon the present time. The revival of letters paved the way for the Reformation, the Reformation for changes in the State and in social order, analogous to those which religious opinions had undergone.

Who would think that it was to a Monarch, rendered intolerant by his confessors and despotic by his Ministers; that it was to his magnificence, his creations, and his taste for letters, the arts, and war, that those fruits of Protestantism, which were yet but of slow growth, owed their maturity?

The political downfall of the nobility was accomplished by *Louis XIV*. By patronising establishments of industry and commerce, he created a new power in the Monarchy, that of capitalists and merchants; by heaping favour and consideration on artists and men of letters, he formed them into a distinguished class, on whom he only meant to confer the superintendence of the productions of taste and talent; but who by an irresistible bias became fifty years after the regulators

gulators of opinion and of the human understanding: without intending or perceiving it he thus diminished the inequality of conditions; the pomp of the great had disappeared; for all private magnificence was eclipsed by that of the Court.

His perpetual wars compelled him to exceed the force of the usual armies, and increase the burden of the taxes, to ruin his finances, and bequeath an enormous debt to his successor; public credit and commerce became a barrier to despotism and an authority that required management: an able and opulent financier acquired more weight than a dignitary of Versailles. The facility of intercourse was extended, the different ranks approached one another, and the advantages of education became general.

Thus was there an essential change wrought in the ancient proportions among the various social classes. At the beginning of the reign of *Louis XV.* there was no more comparison between the orders of the State and their relative existence under *Louis XIII.* than there was between the power of *Clavis* and that of *Henry IV.*

These different effects, which were still imperceptible at the death of *Louis XIV.* quickly unfolded themselves under the Regency. From the cultivation of letters, men proceeded to that  
of

of experimental sciences; and from experimental sciences to that of reasoning.

It is puerile to inveigh against the rise of philosophy: one might as well condemn an oak that, having grown from a shrub and spread its branches wide, was seen at last to have its useful trunk loaded with noxious funguses. The study of philosophy led to scepticism; and that scepticism, which was the offspring not of reflexion but of vanity, engendered the horrid errors of which we are the witnesses and the victims.

Commerce, travelling, increased by the posts and construction of highways, cosmopolitanism, the consequence of that daily and rapid intercourse among nations; printing, which rendered the opinions of one man common to thousands; the equality which the diffusion of riches gave to the influence, education, and capacity of men: all these causes have produced this dreadful struggle between the pre-existing distinctions and the new ones, which arose from such striking changes in the social state.

It is on this conflict, much more than upon liberty, that phantom ever unintelligible to the French, that the Revolution has turned, and will depend till the end of it. Its Republicanism finishes with re-constituting powers it had overthrown; for its founders, leaders, legislators,

have all been ambitious to displace, but not to destroy them.

The Monarchical Governments have now only to guard against its arms: its example is become of more service to royalty abroad, than its crimes and fanaticism have been able to injure it. Where now is the nation so invincibly stupid as to think of renouncing its Government, while it has France before its eyes, and while it reflects on the conduct and calamities of the foolish and dastardly Republics that have suffered themselves to be stripped of their liberty and money?

But the doctrine of civil equality has deeper roots, which have long been too sturdy to be eradicated. The Feudal system is shaken through all its foundations: except in those States that have had the wisdom to strengthen in time hereditary distinctions, by stamping on them the character of political distinctions cemented by liberty itself, rank, as it has hitherto existed in Europe, has lost its principal props.

The Catholic Clergy are threatened with a similar revolution: there is no country, not even Spain excepted, where their wealth is not coveted, and the division of it begun.

It is to be doubted whether the Roman Church can ever be re-established in the power, opulence,

opulence and rank, which it enjoyed twenty years ago, or the Feudal Nobility in the privileges and lustre of which they have been stripped by the Revolution. Almost every age has been marked by some subversions; the new century will be distinguished by the effects of the blow given to catholicism and hereditary privileges by inevitable vicissitudes and the overthrow of social order in France.

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*A BRIEF EXAMINATION into the Increase of  
the Revenue, Commerce, and Manufactures of  
Great Britain, from 1792 to 1799. By George  
Rose, Esq. Sixth Edition, with considerable  
Additions. London, 1799.*

We gave a short account of this instructive work when it first appeared. It has since passed through several editions: in the sixth, which is lately published, Mr. Rose has prefixed a short Introduction, and given a statement of the Revenue up to the 10th of October 1799. In addition to what we have already said on the subject of this Pamphlet we insert the following details, convinced that they will be agreeable to our readers.

" Since the first publication of this view of  
" the increase of the Revenue, Commerce and

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" Manu-

" Manufactures of Great Britain, the author  
 " has had the satisfaction of finding his most  
 " sanguine expectations verified with regard to  
 " the stability and progressive increase of the  
 " public revenue.

" It is not however in vindication of, or in  
 " compliment to, his own productions, but as a  
 " duty he owes to his country, that he now sub-  
 " joins the following abstract of the state of the  
 " Revenue for the year ending October 10th  
 " 1799, distinguishing the old taxes from those  
 " imposed during the war; in order to show  
 " that the new burdens, though called for by  
 " the over-ruling necessity of events, have not  
 " gone beyond the natural resources and ability  
 " of the country; that what was necessary as  
 " the means of its safety is flattering as a cri-  
 " terion of its prosperity.

" Considerations of finance, however dry in  
 " detail, are always of importance to the reader,  
 " because the opulence and prosperity of indi-  
 " viduals must necessarily be connected with the  
 " opulence and prosperity of the State.

" It is not, however, the common advantage  
 " of wealth that we are now to estimate in the  
 " financial prosperity of the country; the in-  
 " crease of its revenue must at all times be an  
 " increase of its security and power; but, at  
 " the present period, it is to afford the means  
 " of

" of public exertions, more deeply important  
 " than any which its history has had to record ;  
 " exertions which are to save Great Britain and  
 " its Allies, (to save perhaps nations, in whose  
 " councils there is not wisdom to foresee, or  
 " courage to withstand, the common danger)  
 " from that gigantic ruin, which, if not resisted  
 " by the Powers who have taken an active part  
 " in the war, would have threatened to over-  
 " whelm the happiness and virtue of mankind."

" Amount of taxes imposed previous	£.	£.
to 1792, in the year ending		
O& 10, 1799 -	14,284,000	
" Add duties in the same year of		
excise on malt and tobacco,		
and the old duty on sugar, which		
existed before the war -	* 961,000	
" Total of old Taxes -		15,245,000
" Amount of taxes imposed during		
the war, within the same year,		
including those of 1799 -	7,331,000	
" Add duties on sugar imposed in		
1794 and 1797, within the same		
year -	* 329,000	
" Total of new taxes -	7,660,000	
Carry forward -		15,245,000

\* These taxes are made annual in lieu of the land-tax,  
 which is made perpetual, with a view to its being redeemed;

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Brought forward		15,245,000
" Add farther expected produce of new taxes	- - -	* 385,000
" Add farther expected produce of old and new wine duties	- -	+ 194,000
" Add annual profit on the land-tax already redeemed	- - -	62,000
" Add land and malt	- - -	2,558,000
	—————	10,859,000
" Add East Indian participation	- -	500,000
" Lottery	- - -	250,000
	—————	750,000
" Total receipt	- -	26,854,000
" Estimate of the peace establishment as stated by the Committee in 1791	- - -	16,000,000
Carry forward	—	26,854,000

and the produce of them since Midsummer 1799, has been paid into the Bank as it came into the Exchequer in discharge of Exchequer Bills, issued for the supply in the beginning of the year, on the credit of these taxes, in the same manner as the bills used to be issued on the credit of the land-tax. Such part of the land-tax as is not redeemed is carried to the credit of the consolidated fund, to supply the place of these taxes : for the part which is redeemed a portion of stock is transferred to the Commissioners of the National Debt ; by which a saving is made in the annual charge of that debt, and of course leaves so much more revenue disposable.

\* The taxes for 1799 had not commencement till the 5th of July.

+ The quantities of wine retained for home consumption are gradually increasing ; but in the half-year ending July 5, 1799, they were only 11,114 tons. This estimate supposes, as before, that they will amount to 25,000 tons.

Brought forward	£.	26,854,000
" Charge incurred during the war by loans and funding	-	8,264,000
	—	24,264,000

" Excess of income above the establishment in the last peace, and the charge incurred for interest of debt and sinking fund in this war

	2,590,000
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" Out of this surplus, provision must be made for the following increased charges not included in the estimate of 1791 :

" Sum annually voted towards the redemption of the national debt	£.	200,000
" Additional charges on the consolidated fund since 1791	—	132,000
" Annual interest on Exchequer bills, to the amount of 1,000,000 l. beyond those in cir- culation in 1791	—	55,000
" Interest on excess of navy-debt beyond what it was in 1791 *	—	130,000
" Additional charge on 18,000 seamen, in con- sequence of augmentation of pay, and addi- tion to their provisions ; and increased price of naval stores	—	351,000
Carry forward	—	868,000

\* On the 31st of December 1798 it was £. 5,556,000  
In 1791, it was —————— £. 2,301,600

Increase since 1791 — £. 3,225,000

Which may be expected to be funded at four per cent.

	Brought forward	-	868,000
" Increase of pay, &c. to the army, on the same number as in the last Peace; deducting stoppages			170,000
" Estimate of increased charge of half-pay, and Chelsea, above the last Peace			130,000
" Increased charges of the ordnance, from the late augmentation to the pay and allowances to the military corps, calculated on the numbers in 1791			49,500
" Probable expence of barrack-establishment in peace *			43,000
			<hr/> 1,260,000

\* Nothing is included in this sum for the expence of forage, coals, candles, beer, &c. as the charge thereof would be equal, if not greater, in quarters than in barracks.

" It must remain for Parliament to determine,  
 " after the return of Peace, whether circumstances may render any or what additional  
 " expence necessary for increasing the army and navy beyond the establishment in the last Peace.  
 " In any event it will probably be thought right to provide for the maintenance, to a considerable extent, of the corps of yeomanry and volunteers, of which experience has proved the inestimable advantages.  
 " It would be premature at present to attempt to estimate any specific sum for such additional

"tional expences; but it is highly satisfactory  
 "to observe, that after allowing for all the  
 "articles before mentioned, there will remain,  
 "according to the estimate here stated, not  
 "less than 1,330,000*l.* applicable to those  
 "purposes."

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### *F R A N C E.*

#### *General Observations on the new Legislative System of the Republic.*

A GENIUS for Legislation is, of all the kinds of genius, that of which nature has dispensed the least to man. In the lapse of ages five or six legislators are to be found among myriads of jurists.—If time, chance, necessity, custom, and conquest, had not in most nations supplied the deficiency of settled codes, they would have had no other Government than such as is seen among savages.

The religious veneration which the ancients attached to their law-givers evinces the almost supernatural difficulty which they imagined attended the exercise of their functions: they treated them as inspired men, judging human nature incapable of attaining the sublimity of such a work without the assistance of Heaven.

The

The wonderful duration of some of those legislative systems ought to confound that swarm of compilers and theorists who in turn undertake to change the Government of nations.

We have but to compare with our modern essays the legislation of *Moses*, which is still preserved by a People dispersed among all nations, and whose attachment to their primitive laws and veneration for them, neither their calamities, their persecutions, nor an immense series of ages have been able to decrease.

China, long before the time of *Confucius*, was governed by the very same institutions by which it is at present governed, although it has passed under the dominion of one and twenty Dynasties, and has been four times conquered.

There has been no alteration in the code of the Persis or that of the Gentoos for more than thirty centuries.

Had the Spaniards not exterminated the Peruvians, the institutions of *Manco-Capac* would have existed to this day.

In reflecting upon such durability, what are we to think of the Editors of Constitutions, whose insolent presumption enters without trembling on the office of a legislator, insults immortal works, and after destroying the ancient laws, substitutes new ones only to prepare for other pretenders the pleasure of a fresh subversion? Religion, laws, customs, government,

police, natural subordination, nay, the very ideas of them, are overthrown by these fabricators, whose creative faculties can work only upon chaos: they first extinguish light and life, then pretend to rekindle the embers in the abyss of darkness into which they have plunged the human mind.

Excepting a portion of the Roman Institutes, the rules of which have formed, and will still long form, the foundation of the jurisprudence in most of our civil codes, Europe presents nothing of this nature but monuments of barbarism or collections of incoherencies. Almost everywhere its political constitutions were confused, uncertain and contradictory: it is to its administration rather than to its laws, to the improvement of society and the customs introduced by experience, rather than to its primitive political regulations, that it owes the advantage of its public police, and the order, stability, and regularity found in its system.—Of the inhabitants of the different quarters of the Globe, the European, turbulent, rough, restless, and fickle, is the least disposed to receive the yoke of a new Legislation: it was only the force of time, habit, religion, opinion, and authority that was able to render him docile, by subduing his inconstancy.

Among the nations of Europe there was none more incapable than France of supporting the trial of a sudden and general reform of its political system. Such experiments should be reserved for serious or new nations, pure in their morals, few in number, circumscribed in territory, and open to impressions which secure an ascendancy to great virtues and to great knowledge.

The Legislators of Paris, from the variety of their legislative inventions, taken from metaphysical abstractions or dictated by party views, and neither adapted to the times, the country, nor the necessary relation between men and things, may be compared to anatomists attempting to form a living creature with the members of several dead bodies.

This comparison is peculiarly applicable to the new Constitution. The most celebrated jurists agree in admitting that the least imperfect political system results from a just mixture of the three principal forms of Government; as uniting the interests of the people to those of the rich and of the Monarch, as equally favorable to authority, liberty, and property; but it is by their balance, by the regularity of their action, and by the unity of their object, which produce the relations, as well as the mutual dependence of those

those powers held together by a common tie, that these social energies are maintained.

On the contrary, in the French Act we discover only parts without ties; it has no centre, no body; there is no affinity between the end and the means, no proportion between the authorities. *The Sovereignty of the People* is engraved in the frontispiece, but juggled away in the course of the work; the exercise of that sovereignty is distributed in fragments; but its trust, its representation, its power, are not to be found either in any of the members of the body politic, or in their collective authority. They have retained the empty phrase of Sovereignty of the People, just as at Venice the nobles called themselves *Il Principe*, but the office of the public and active sovereignty remained vacant. Dissensions are taken for institutions; half-witted men divide and subdivide, and then are at a loss how to put their subdivisions together to produce a whole.

To judge fairly of a Constitution, we must compare it with the end proposed by its authors. Nothing can be weaker than those numerous enquiries, in which the writers are in a hurry to condemn the French Leaders for not giving to France the system, we think the best, and which they think the most injurious to their

302                   interests;

interests; but will these architects have any right to complain, when by observing the title of their edifice and the purposes to which it is destined, we find it raised upon an ordinance incompatible with either? What shall we think then of their intellects, or their sincerity?

**A REPUBLIC FOUNDED ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE, ON LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM:** this is the posy engraved in large characters at the head of their laws, and it was the peremptory instructions to the Committee charged with drawing them up: with this we must compare their work.

What a Republic! What Sovereignty of the People! What a Representative System! Who, after the horrible abuse of these terms ever since the year 1789, could have expected to see the defenders of that abuse running to the other extreme, and while they feigned to support the first principles strictly, boldly deriding them in their application?

I have never heard of any free Republic, in which the People were so stripped of their privileges and of their influence; not even of any mixed or aristocratic State, in which the chief magistrate was invested with so monstrous a power as that of the *Chief Consul*.

Hitherto

Hitherto all founders or reformers of Republics, however they deprived the People of the right of participating in the public deliberations or supreme administration, in the making of laws relative to the taxes and to foreign concerns, in the management or control of the public money, in the discussing, approving, repealing, and executing of the laws, or in the proposing of them to the power that decrees them, still they reserved to the nation, or to such of the inhabitants as enjoyed the freedom of citizens, the privilege of appointing their Deputies or Representatives; whether as their Magistrates, or a part of those who governed the State.

The strange Republicans of France take from their countrymen this right of electing, which they reduce to a most ridiculous formality. The Primary Assemblies are not to appoint even their Municipal Officers, or the public functionaries of their Departments. What a curious kind of *citizens* are men reduced to offer a list of *a tenth* of their number, in order to have the local overseers, who are to attend to the minute concerns of their parishes, appointed from it! If those overseers act amiss they cannot be removed from their offices for three years, unless the Conservative Senate should be pleased to remove them; for it may at pleasure, without

consulting the electors, censure, erase names, or destroy the lists of *eligibles* \*.

In all mixed or popular Republics the citizens retained the privilege, either of choosing their Magistrates and Officers from a presentation of the half, third, or, which was very rare, the fourth of the citizens, made by another of the public authorities ; or, the people themselves presented the candidates to be elected by that authority. In order to baffle intrigues, cabals, venality, and the effects of the passions, the elections left to the people were complicated and rendered dependent in a hundred ways ; but to exclude the Nation from all share in the *direct* choice of its commonest officers was never thought of, not even in most of the strictest Aristocracies, till now by the French Republic.

The Constitution preserves an absolute silence in respect to the privileges of those local administrations ; it merely declares them *dependant on the Ministers*, and subjects the persons employed in them to the censure of the Senate, who may

\* By the seventh article of the Constitution, the election of the officers of the Districts and of the Departments seems to belong to the *eligibles*, of whom the community has formed the previous list. This paragraph is so obscure and incomplete that one is obliged to explain it by the general sense of the institution itself, which fixes the mode and rights of final election.

**strike**

strike them out of the list of eligibles. As these general lists are to furnish all the public functionaries, from the Counsellors of State to the Judges, and from the Senators to the Municipal Officers, the offices of a local nature will not be sought for or discharged but by those among the eligibles who cannot aspire to higher employments; they will be in little estimation, and possess as little power. Those city magistracies, on which all prudent Republics were careful to bestow importance, distinction, and privileges, will sink in France to the same contemptible state as did the *Decuriones* under the Roman despotism, when *Caracalla*, the model of the present Parisian levellers, declared every inhabitant of the Empire, not a slave, to be a citizen of Rome.

But do the French Nation, thus stripped of all the elementary civic rights, which even in some Monarchies are left to the people, receive any compensation by a free and efficacious influence over the choice of the organs of the public will, and of the national agents, appointed to defend its interests, to secure its rights from violations, and gain attention for its complaints?

The dispensers of the fate of France for ten years past, have certainly pushed the spirit of boasting, and their pretensions to originality, beyond all bounds; but for the acme of delirious conceit

conceit we must look at the new *Lycurguses* of that devoted country. "Till we appeared," say they, "no person ever had a just idea of the Representative form of Government; for us has it been reserved to enlighten mankind, who have hitherto been groping in darkness; on this subject as well as many others."

These great geniuses deceive themselves; many a rogue and usurper has set them the example of disfiguring the representation of the national will and authority. In the same manner did they insensibly multiply the degrees between the people and the elected, by keeping the former at a distance from the elections of the persons to act, by not admitting them to the final ballot, and by reducing their privilege of placing at their pleasure their confidence in delegates invested with their authority, to an act merely *virtual*.

The two means of degrading, of altering, indeed of annihilating the *representative system* have been adopted by the French. They began with representatives subjected to the daily control of clubs, popular societies, mobs, armed petitioners, and by-standers. At that time the senator Garat, haranguing on the massacres of the 2d of September, said, *The People have the right of introducing the laws.* Yes, a right distinguished and legalized by insurrection, were

were it only that of five hundred banditti. The two first Assemblies were nothing more than the medium of the violence of the *sovereign* multitude against their intendants and clerks called their *Deputies*. From this abyss of anarchy the Nation passed under the infernal despotism of the Convention: then the representatives became executioners paid by the people for extorting their money and cutting their throats.

At present, the experience of those excesses has led the Reformers to degrade at one blow both the represented and representing: in order to preserve the latter from instability and democratic fury they deprive the former even of the privilege of appointing the electors of their deputies; and in order to prevent tyranny in the Legislative Body they transform it into a college dependent on the Executive power.

Without admitting the ridiculous paradoxes of *J. J. Rousseau* respecting the inalienability of the general will, it is not to be denied that the people sacrifice a portion of their political liberty by leaving to their delegates, without any instructions, the right of determining and expressing it. A Legislature confided to *Deputies*, chained down by limited instructions, forms a corrective of the power of the people without decreasing it; but *Representatives*, whose deliberations are no way dependent upon the previous

wishes of their constituents, are rather the substitutes of the Nation than the organs of the national will.

It required the chance of events, a concurrence of circumstances, a happy agreement among the various social conditions, and between the natural situation of the country and the character as well as interests of its inhabitants; it required gradual improvements and ages, the weight of monarchical authority, the hereditary immunities of a body of Nobles, and the privileges of property, to preserve the noble monument of the English Constitution unimpaired: but this striking instance exposes rather than justifies the modern representative systems; for there is not the smallest analogy between these systems and the Constitution of England.

Happily for public liberty, only one branch of the Legislative Power in that Constitution is formed by popular elections. Against the abuses of its trust and authority into which it might be led, the Nation possesses a double security in the Royal prerogative and that of the Upper House: the people choose their Representatives directly and without intermediate electors; every seven years they may change them: lastly, as the Nation retains the right of sanctioning the public judgment, by continuing or changing their Representatives,

presentatives, public censure and the liberty of the press have great effect.

Compare this order of things in a *Monarchy*, with the contexture of the national representation in the *French Republic*. Formerly, there were two steps between the primary assemblies and their deputies: the electoral bodies were charged to represent, not the *will* but the *suffrage* of those sovereign *comitia*, whose elected elected others to form the Legislature. At present, there is a very different fiction of liberty. We are now treated with a *sovereign People* whose rights consist in drawing up once for all a local list of persons admissible to public offices, and to be filled up every three years; which list is to be reduced to a general list of five thousand, extracted from the whole of the Empire; so that it may happen that the Senators, Tribunes, and Members of the Legislative Body chosen from this collective return may be absolutely strangers and unknown in most of the communities by whom the original lists were made: nay, it can hardly fail to be the case; for Paris being the seat of the electoral powers, it may be expected that their friends and dependents, the intriguers and the orators who shall go and make interest in the capital and settle there will obtain the preference.

Thistles depicted as defenders of the People; pretended Representatives charged with expressing their consent to the laws and taxes; Senators invested with censorial power, with the power of stopping the proceedings of the legislature, and with that of instituting the members of it; Judges, and Judges of Appeal, and Officers of Government, are all to be appointed to the public functions by a Body, over whom no kind of influence is reserved to the Nation, either by elections, by a removal, in the exercise of which they might have shared, or by opinion; for the Senators, absolutely independent of the People both before and after their nomination, have no other incitement than the dictates of their conscience, or the dread of rebellion, to trouble themselves about the public dissents.

This nevertheless is what is boldly presented to the generation about to commence the 19th century, as the perfection of the representative system! If, indeed, the authors of this plan designed to lead their countrymen to political liberty they assuredly cannot pride themselves upon taking the right line. All these circumvolutions in which representation is buried, are worthier the genius of a petty usurper, or a cabal of Nobles in some free town of Italy in the 13th century, than of the majestic founders of a faultless Republic.

If

If the elementary principles of every free State are violated in this whimsical and Jesuitical composition of the powers of election, they are no less set at nought in the nature of the different appointments to which the rights of the supreme authority are delegated.

What can we say of a Legislative Body restrained from proposing a law? of a Legislative Body of which one of the branches has not even the right to deliberate upon a law, while the other is condemned idly to argue against Orators hired by the Executive Power, to hold their tongues when the Government thinks proper to adjourn the debate, and to play in every thing the part of Tribunes in a farce, if they have not courage enough to hear themselves insulted, or to be proscribed as a factious gang!

Who can help laughing while he pities those mute Legislators, gravely seated on their eurule chairs listening to the dissertations of the attorneys of the Government, without the power of making a remark, or of communicating a thought; balloting their *yes* or *no*, and uncertain even then whether the Senate will not abrogate their decision, by declaring it *unconstitutional*? It is to Frenchmen, to Republicans, that the Legislator prescribes in the style of *Augustus to Cinna*, in one of the tragedies of *Corneille*,

Tiers

*Tiens ta langue captive, et dessus toute chose,  
Observe exactement la loi que je t'impose...*

*Keep thy tongue captive, and above all things...  
Religiously observe the law I give.*

And this Tribune, not gagged it is true, but who cannot open their lips, without permission of the Consulate and their Council, who are endowed with the power of making known their ideas upon the laws or abuses without being permitted to propose any reform, or constrain the other authorities to deliberate upon their complaints, whom the Government can when it pleases, interrupt or hurry in their legislative operations, and who are guardians of the rights and interests of the public, this Tribune depend upon the Senate in their election, on the Government in the exercise of their functions, and have with respect to the nation no tie, affection, confidence, subordination, or responsibility.

A permanent body, with the power of filling up its vacancies, placed in the same system with removeable bodies whose vacancies it has the right of supplying, rules by that single superiority all the subaltern colleges of Legislation, of which it is rather the superintendent than the moderator: and such appears the new French Senate. The places of its magistrates are dignities; those of the Tribunes and Legislators are only employ-

ments. To the authority of age, consideration, and independence, is added that of a jurisdiction which associates it with the power of the Chief Consul, a distinction enjoyed by no other of the national bodies. With him it partakes the elections; it is the sovereign judge of illegality, and is constituted umpire of the disputes which may arise in the State, and of all political questions depending upon the validity of the Legislative acts.

If it were intended by this to institute an intermediate authority to serve as a check and balance, without co-operating itself in the making or execution of the laws, the intention is not accomplished. The Government is so superior in strength and power to the Legislature, that the Senate can form no balance to such an unequal weight: it has no power over the Executive authority, it has too much over the Legislative Assemblies.

What, in short, are we to think of a Republic the Chief Magistrate of which possesses more influence, credit, means of seduction and fear, and political prerogatives, than the Chief in most of the limited Monarchies? Had ever the Kings of Sweden, Poland, or even England, so many resources for rendering themselves absolute? Had ever their flatterers, for instance, the audacity to persuade them to pretend to the right of

of suspending the Constitution in case of danger, of which they were to be the judges.

In every line of this Constitution we discover that its authors forgot that they were forming a Republic. They have throughout most grossly erred in the application of the principles and regulations which they have met with in the construction of other States, or in books, without considering that they were confounding subjects totally dissimilar. For example, they had read that, in order to prevent the disorder attending popular deliberations, some prudent Republics placed the right of beginning new laws in the Senate; immediately, they transfer the power of proposing from the body of National Delegates to the Government: but they do not reflect that in the free States in which this form was adopted, the people themselves, or a considerable part of them, gave a sanction to the laws by voting individually in the Comitia; that they had a share in the election of the Magistrates who were entrusted with the exclusive right of introducing them; and that by various other regulations this corrective of anarchy was prevented from being the death of liberty.

Here, the right of proposing laws is taken, not from popular assemblies, but from the Representative Body itself! What do I say?

It

It is taken from a Legislature not elected by the Nation ! Never was there such abuse of precedents.

In mixed Monarchies; the elevating of the head of the State, the august depositary of Sovereignty above responsibility, and the rendering of his person inviolable, arise from a principle dictated by the most enlightened reason; but in what Republic have the French ever heard of a similar distinction being granted to the first Magistrate ?

Did the Americans, whom a few years ago they thought so confined in their conceptions of liberty, so far despise the maxims of every Republican institution as to place their President out of the reach of the laws ? Did they, or any body before them, ever conceive the notion of extending this impunity to the Counsellors of the Supreme Magistrates, to the Senators, Tribunes, and co-operators of Legislation ?

Would they have thought that they had done their duty, by confining the exercise of the national impeachment and resentment to the prosecution of some head-clerks, some registers to the Government, honoured with the appellation of Ministers, and whom one must suppose mad to attempt, in so dependent a situation, abuses of power not dictated to them by their superiors.

To find in a Republic any model of the exorbitance of authority yielded by the French to their Consul, it is necessary to go back to the ancient ducal power of the Doges of Venice before the grand reform of 1033; but it is right that Citizen *Buonaparte* and his trusty friends should be told, that of twenty-eight Doges who usurped an authority similar to that of the Chief Consul of France, eleven were dethroned, three deprived of sight, three massacred, and five banished, or compelled to banish themselves.

We will spare our readers many of the indignant reflexions to which the reading of the details of this Constitution gives birth. We cannot however pass over in silence three very remarkable points.

1st, The Council of State in this strange *Republican* Constitution is evidently superfluous, or an institution purely monarchical: superfluous, because the Ministry, whom the Chief Consul appoints and dismisses, ought to answer the purposes of it; a monarchical institution, because this Council which should be that of the Republic is merely the Consul's. He names, dismisses, and sways the members of it: they are the Privy Council of a King, and not a body of enlightened men charged by the Nation to advise and to watch its supreme Magistrate.

2dly,

2dly, After dispossessing the People of the right of naming their Representatives, and degrading them to the most passive political condition, their deliverers have even robbed them of the right of petitioning. Each individual may send in a petition to one of the authorities; but, according to the formalities and precautions prescribed, no petition or remonstrance can be signed by any meeting of citizens. Messrs. *Sieyes, Rœderer, Daunou, and Cambacères*, thought of gratifying their Republican countrymen more highly than by generously leaving them a right enjoyed by the most miserable of the Asiatics.

3dly, After hearing so many exclamations at St. Cloud and Paris for two months past, on the privileges of property, on the respect for property, on the necessary influence of men of property, who would suppose that in the qualifications requisite for an election to public offices no distinction whatever is left in their favour? Even the paltry modifications of the right of electing made by the law of 1791 and that of 1795 are suppressed. Universal suffrage and an exemption from all pecuniary or political qualification have been probably retained for three reasons. First, in dethroning liberty a feigned homage was paid to equality; and when the persons exclusively eligible to employments for a given time were reduced to the number of five

3 Q. 2 thousand,

thousand, the great men flattered themselves that the twenty-five millions of Republicans who compose the Empire would console themselves for this limitation, by observing that not any of them were excluded the privilege of being returned on the general lists. In the next place, the petty authors, journalists, orators, and scholars, could not bear that property should be thought of more importance than *talents* for granting taxes and watching over the public interests. And lastly, it was of essential consequence to the object of the State reformers, not to exclude that mob of haranguers, writers, intriguers, and candidates of no fortune, who aspire to preferment, and are creatures necessary to the ruling coterie who will reward their services.

The omissions affected in this Constitutional law might also form a chapter worthy of attention. We find the salaries of the functionaries who drew it up enacted, but we see not a word about the liberty of the press: the formation of a national institute makes a part of the code, but there is no law against canvassing and cabals at the elections: and the subjects of pardon and religion are omitted, as in the former Constitutions.

The admirers and the compounders of this fantastical assemblage are prepared with a ready answer

answer to our observations : they will not fail to consider them as the production of *a slave to Kings*, or of *a pensioner of Pitt's*, or of *an agent of Mittau*. Let us then deprive them of this scandalous evasion, by reporting an opinion as sound as it is impartial, which has been passed upon their Constitution by one of the writers of the most celebrated opposition paper : and let the French of all parties and classes reflect upon the following examinations, extracted from the Morning Chronicle of December 27th, which cannot be suspected of partiality :

#### FRENCH CONSTITUTION.

Mr. HUME observes, that if the King's negative, in the British Constitution, went before a measure, and if he " could prevent any bill from coming into Parliament, he would be an absolute Monarch." If this opinion be just, what must be the importance of the preliminary negative of the Executive Power in the new French Constitution ? That scheme, in its very nature, reduces almost to nothing the influence of the people upon those who are styled their Representatives. Not only have the Legislators no sympathies, no connections with the people, to prompt them to watch for their interests and struggle for their rights ; but even if they were the immediate Representatives of the nation, they have not the power to adopt a single law, to promote their advantage or to remedy their grievances. The Executive alone is to feel, to think, to suggest. By its humanity must every abuse be corrected, by its wisdom must every evil be foreseen, by its justice must the benefit of every public measure be recognized. Strange solecism in Goverment ! Every measure

sure of public liberty, of national utility, must originate with that authority whose designs every wise lawgiver has contemplated with incessant jealousy, whose wisdom he has ever thought it necessary to support by authoritative counsel, whose misconduct and incapacity he has thought it indispensable to correct by Senatorial advice, and by Legislative control.

The Executive Government, powerful in so many prerogatives, is thus rendered the only real force in the State. There is nothing to balance it in favour of any of the other parts of the machine, nor in favour of the people. It is independent of both. There is no contrivance by which the Representatives can draw support from the people, even did there exist between them a community of interests and of sentiments, nothing by which the people may be aided through the Representative body. Liberty has no protection in the scheme of Government, while it is excluded from any real share in the choice and composition of its members. There is no provision for the freedom of the press, none to enable the people to meet and to consider the measures of Government. This, if not right, is consistent. It springs from the very character of the Government.

In addition to this, the principal members in the Executive are relieved from all responsibility. The Ministers alone are to be liable to impeachment, after a certain form. The nullity of such a reservation must be evident, when it is considered that the validity of the charges must (in the case of the offence most to be guarded against, the illegality of the acts of Government, signed by them) first be recognised by the Senate, and all of them then admitted by the Legislative Body, before a trial can take place. The influence of the Executive with the Legislative must, however, be sufficient to secure impunity to its instruments.

We have already remarked how mean and degraded the Tribune and Legislative Bodies must be from the manner

of their election ; how narrowed their duties and their importance must be by the negative of the Executive Power ; but, besides all this, though deprived of the dignified origin and the high attributes that ought to distinguish Legislative Assemblies, there is nothing even in what is left that challenges admiration in the construction or the tendency. The Tribune is destitute of fire and energy. The Legislative Body is stripped of the privilege of discussion. There is, in the design of the whole, something little and frivolous, something low and paltry. The Legislators that are to decide upon the measures which the Executive has allowed to be submitted to them, are to hear counsel for or against the bill ; and then, without being allowed to enlighten themselves by debate, without the benefit of drawing truth from the collision of opposite sentiments, without exercising their reasoning faculties, in the comparison of ideas, and the examination of facts, they must decide by ballot ! Is there any thing great and dignified, any thing wise and grave, any commanding aspect, any superior intelligence in this mean assemblage of petty regulations ? The men of France must have travelled far backward in political science (and they never were very far advanced) if this production be regarded as the work of an enlightened and discerning mind. It is indeed a very contemptible combination of everything little in design, with every thing vicious in principle. The heart sickens at it ; the understanding turns away in derision. It possesses neither utility nor beauty ; neither generosity nor greatness. It is alike destitute of aristocratical dignity and democratical freedom.

This wretched thing has been called a system of balances and checks. If it be so, it is the balancing of a man weighing straws with a stupid mock-heroic importance in the scales of Jupiter. If it contains checks, it is nothing but a degraded application of political mechanics, to compose the jarring authorities of a parish vestry, and regulate the various functions in the administration of an alehouse ; it is a burlesque upon political

political establishments ; it is a licentious satire for the *ambigue comique* of all grave and venerable institutions. It seems as if the author had meant to turn every thing sacred in government into ridicule, by applying the most imposing formality upon the most trivial actions, and employing the most dignified forms of political society to the very lowest uses.

In truth, there is nothing in this Government but an Executive invested with unlimited power : the rest of the appendages are calculated for its convenience, and not given for the purpose of independent and liberal assistance, or, if necessary, of adequate control. The Chief Magistrate is indeed a King, invested with royal prerogatives ; he is the fountain of honour, of emolument ; he is the centre to which every thing aspiring must look ; he is the source from which every favour must be expected ; he is the instrument to punish or protect. His satellite Councils, whatever fantastic appellations they assume, are nothing : they give neither light nor heat in the system ; they neither warm nor beautify ; they beget no love ; they dispense no favours ; they inspire no confidence ; they attract no admiration. They are the source of nothing liberal, nothing munificent, nothing beneficial. They do not emanate from the people ; they do not belong to the nation ; they cannot fix its hopes, or be the depositary of its wishes ; they act only by the sufferance of the King. He allots to his Legislators the subject on which they are to work ; he assigns them their several tasks : by his permission " they wear their sapphire crowns, and wield their golden sceptres :" but they are only his dependants, his agents : - as theirs is a mean, inglorious, thankless labour.

Under what head then is this motley thing to be classed ? Can we call it a Republic where the people have no voice in the election of Representatives, or in the choice of Magistrates ? Are we to call that an Aristocracy which recognises neither birth, nor property, nor talents ? where these are independent

independent power in any class or body ! An Oligarchy it seems in one point of view, where a Conservative Senate, self-appointed, nominates the whole members of the Government. Mounting upwards, however, we find the chain by which the whole inferior dependencies are suspended in succession, itself attached to the throne of the Monarch ! There we can rise no higher ; there we find the soul that animates the rest of the creation ; the principle that sustains, the power that can destroy.

We have said, that this is the dominion of one man, and we cannot retract. Yet it is not a Monarchy : the limited Government of a King we prefer, but we cannot praise an usurped despotic Monarchy. We cannot give our suffrage in favour of a system which, under the pretence of liberty, erects despotism ; which, instead of the duly elected magistrate of a free people, exhibits a self-appointed tyrant.

We will not attempt to calculate the nativity of this monster, to foretel its fate, its adventures, and its termination. It cannot last long. Its existence, be what it may, must depend rather upon the character of the men by whom its power is administered, than on the developement of its own strength, and the tendency of its own principle.

Its principle of action, however, must be suited to its nature. It cannot live and move by the influence of Republican motives. It must be actuated and sustained by something corresponding to its character. The talents and vigour of the Chief Magistrate must form its principal strength. As a mere contrivance to aid his exertions, and if the incurable vice of its construction be forgotten, even this Constitution must have its use. It affords ample means of physical force. It may possess all the energy of a well-directed despotism. By a happy distribution and separation of its parts, every thing odious, every thing unpopular, is thrown upon that which is called the Representative of the people. This imposes taxes, passes obnoxious laws ; but in

doing it by the direction of the Executive, it interposes in some measure between the author and the indignation of the country. In the meantime the business of Government may be carried on with success, and the populace may applaud the destroyers of their freedom. Perhaps, on the other hand, the Republicans may disdain the imposture, the Royalists may revolt against a Monarchical usurper, the army may mutiny against its commander, and the Empire may be given away by the cabals of the metropolis, or by the legions from Italy and the banks of the Danube.

We do not censure this plan of Government merely because it does not in its theory come up to the idea of a perfect Commonwealth. We do not greatly rely upon paper Constitutions. They read well; they may circulate awhile, but they rarely are issued upon solid value in the bank of Liberty. They may be issued by swindlers and sharpers. In the day of difficulty and danger they sink to nothing—to less than nothing. The institutions by which it is defended must live no less honoured by the heart than the understanding; they must be held sacred no less by choice than by prejudice; they must be fortified no less by habit than by conviction. Liberty, not liberty in the abstract, but the liberty of a particular country, must grow up and be entwined with the sentiments and character of a people. Then only it is at once strong and temperate. To lay the foundations of freedom among a people is to labour for posterity.

The Constitution which has been given to France indeed promises not much to present times, and will transmit little that can be useful to future. It may, perhaps, correct the absurd and visionary theories which, in the absence of all Government, have been broached. It may again fix the agitated elements of society into settled order. It may teach the people of France that, in order to enjoy political freedom, there must be "a disposition to preserve as well as a desire "to improve."

All

All this may be true ; yet no man can consider France placed under such a Government, at this time of her revolution, without pitying the lot of twenty-five millions of men. After so many sacrifices for liberty to be brought to this ! Reduced almost to despair, they staked their wrecks of fortune, their last of hope, upon this chance in the lottery of Constitutions, and they are left beggared and disappointed. They have given up all, they have suffered all for the sake of freedom ; and the happiness of a great nation, for years, has been bartered for the change of a master.

It is impossible to pursue the subject without awakening the most melancholy sensations. It seems to chill every generous and social sentiment. The cause of Liberty has been cruelly injured by the example of France ; and from the fate both of her enemies and her friends, fallen as we are on “evil times and evil tongues,” we are almost tempted to say of Freedom as Brutus did of Virtue—that it is but an empty name.

Were we to exhaust this subject, which is so well handled in the foregoing paper, we should continually be led to the same conclusion. Considering it as instituting a popular Republic, the Constitution of France offers only contradiction and frauds; as instituting an aristocratic Republic, it is vicious from the excess of power given to the Head of the Government; and as a mixture of Democracy, Aristocracy, and Monarchy, it violates all the proportions of the balance.

Shall we impute such palpable blunders to errors of judgment, and to the incapacity of the Legislators ? Not at all : their intention and not

their understanding, was culpable. They have done what they intended to do ; that is to say, to relieve once for all the Executive Power from the importunities and yoke of the Legislature, to get rid of popular suffrages, and to change the Head of a Republican Government into a Prince-Protector, who wants only the sceptre and diadem.

The grandeur, authority, and independence of this Potentate, form the corner-stone and crowning of the edifice. Of all the restrictions that seem to limit the supremacy of the Chief Consul, his re-election at the end of ten years is the formality that gives him the least pain. He who is a Republic succeeds in creating and taking into his own hands a dignity so formidable, will either lose it by a Revolution before the period of his powers, or secure it for his life.

This Constitution Act has been put together for the personal elevation of *Bonaparte*, to gratify the ambition of his favorites, his flatterers, of those who acted in conjunction with him, and those who were useful to him by their docility, their passions, or talents ; in short, to concentrate for ever, in that privileged fraternity, the whole of the public power.

The mixed faction who seized upon the Offices of Government after instituting them, have treated France as their patrimony, and the

places of the magistracy as their personal domains; they have disclosed the secret of their laws.

We are, however, in justice bound to observe, that the authors of them, by confirming the *indivisibility* and *unity* of the Republic, were necessarily led to change the properties of the Republican State. How was it possible to give motion to an organization really free, in an empire of forty thousand square leagues, in which the character of the inhabitants, the great distances between them, and the annihilation of every moral influence, prescribe the extending without bounds the circumference of authority, and narrowing that of liberty? It was necessary to sacrifice the latter, or the tranquillity of the governing Party and of the Public.

The duration of this new volume of written laws does not depend upon their being conformable to the rules of reason and the principles of a good Government: in the system of the State they figure only as satellites of the primary planet.

The power which instituted them, and on which the observation of them depends, is the living and sovereign law. It may modify, alter, and abrogate this establishment according to circumstances, and survive it. When we consider the genius of the Nation, its lassitude, its past

past sufferings, its servility to any one that promises a period to them, its wonderful indifference as to the choice of its Government and its masters, its invincible ignorance of the commonest notions of liberty, and that readiness, the child of adversity and thoughtlessness, in obeying whatever power lasts for a few weeks; we feel a conviction, that with dexterity, with prudence and firmness, and with an administration that can allay the dread rooted in the Nation by the Revolutionary tyranny, the present Government may acquire a temporary stability.

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#### *GREAT BRITAIN.*

*Buonaparte* had imprudently promised so ostentatiously to become immediately the Pacifier of Europe, that he was not able to recede from making some show of an intention to negotiate. He has sent dispatches to his Majesty, both the substance and form of which are enough to create doubts of the sincerity of this step. Can this great genius be yet ignorant that the forms settled by custom have the force of law throughout Europe, and that he who exalts himself above those ceremonies which are universally respected, stands forward the haughty reformer of the law of nations? What means this

this interrogatory style in addressing a Sovereign, this didactic pedantry in a diplomatic letter? Is Bonaparte so intoxicated with his eight days greatness as to forget the distance between a King of Great Britain and the principal Magistrate of a Republic of four-and-twenty hours?

When he opens his credentials with informing his Majesty that he is called to that supreme Magistracy *by the voice of the French Nation*, does he mean to play the fool with the House of Brunswick as he does with the shop-keepers and Coffee-house men of Paris?

Somebody ought to advise this hero to choose better secretaries; for, in truth, whatever comes from his pen proves that, if nature has endowed him with every other talent, she has denied him that of expressing himself with good sense and wisdom.

We shall confine to these few words our remarks on this Overture, and transcribe the Official Papers which have been the consequences of it, forming a most rapid beginning, middle, and end.

*A Letter from the Minister of Exterior Relations of France to Lord GRENVILLE, his Majesty's Principal Secretary in the Department for Foreign Affairs:*

MY LORD,

I dispatch, by order of General Bonaparte, First Consul of the French Republic, a messenger to London: he is the bearer

Desire of a letter from the Chief Consul of the Republic to his Majesty the King of England. I request you to give the necessary orders that he may be enabled to deliver it directly into your own hands. This step in itself announces the importance of its object.

Accept, my Lord, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) CH. M. V. TALLEYRAND.

Paris, the 5th Nivose, 8th year of the  
French Republic (Dec. 25, 1799.)

French Republic—Sovereignty of the People—Liberty—  
Equality.

Bonaparte, First Consul of the Republic, to his Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland.

Paris, the 5th Nivose, 8th year  
of the Republic.

Called by the wishes of the French Nation to occupy the first Magistracy of the Republic, I think it proper, on entering into office, to make a direct communication of it to your Majesty.

Must the war, which for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the world, be eternal? Are there no means of coming to an understanding?

How can the two most enlightened nations of Europe, powerful and strong beyond what their safety and independence require, sacrifice to ideas of vain greatness the benefits of commerce, internal prosperity, and the happiness of families? How is it that they do not feel that peace is of the first necessity, as well as of the first glory?

These sentiments cannot be foreign to the heart of your Majesty, who reigns over a free nation, and with the sole view of rendering it happy.

Your

Your Majesty will only see in this overture my friends desire to contribute effectually, for the second time, to a general pacification, by a step, speedy, entirely of confidence, and disengaged from those forms which, necessary perhaps to disguise the dependence of weak states, prove only, in those which are strong, the mutual desire of deceiving each other.

France and England, by an abuse of their strength, may still, for a long time, for the misfortune of all nations, retard the period of their being exhausted. But I will venture to say it, the fate of all civilized nations is attached to the termination of a war which involves the whole world.

Of your Majesty,

(Signed) BONAPARTE.

" SIR, Downing-street, Jan. 4, 1800.

" I have received and laid before the King  
 " the two letters which you have transmitted to  
 " me; and his Majesty, seeing no reason to depart  
 " from those forms which have long been esta-  
 " blished in Europe for transacting business with  
 " Foreign States, has commanded me to return,  
 " in his name, the Official Answer which I send  
 " you herewith enclosed. I have the honor to  
 " be, with high consideration, Sir, your most  
 " obedient humble servant,

" (Signed) GRENVILLE,"

To the Minister for Foreign  
 Affairs, &c, at Paris.

## N O T E.

“ The King has given frequent proofs of his  
 “ sincere desire for the re-establishment of security  
 “ and permanent tranquillity in Europe. He  
 “ neither is, nor has been, engaged in any con-  
 “ test for a vain and false glory. He has had no  
 “ other view than that of maintaining, against  
 “ all aggression, the rights and happiness of his  
 “ subjects.

“ For these he has contended against an un-  
 “ provoked attack ; and for the same objects he  
 “ is still obliged to contend ; nor can he hope  
 “ that this necessity could be removed by entering,  
 “ at the present moment, into negotiation with  
 “ those whom a fresh Revolution has so recently  
 “ placed in the exercise of power in France:  
 “ since no real advantage can arise from such  
 “ negotiation to the great and desirable object of  
 “ General Peace, until it shall distinctly appear  
 “ that those causes have ceased to operate  
 “ which originally produced the war, and by  
 “ which it has since been protracted, and, in  
 “ more than one instance, renewed.

“ The same system, to the prevalence of which  
 “ France justly ascribes all her present miseries,  
 “ is that which has also involved the rest of  
 “ Europe in a long and destructive warfare, of  
 “ a na-

“ a nature long since unknown to the practice of  
“ civilized nations.

“ For the extension of this system, and for  
“ the extermination of all the established Govern-  
“ ments, the resources of France have, from  
“ year to year, and in the midst of the most un-  
“ paralleled distress, been lavished and ex-  
“ hausted. To this indiscriminate spirit of de-  
“ struction, the Netherlands, the United Pro-  
“ vinces, the Swiss Cantons, (His Majesty's  
“ antient friends and allies,) have successively  
“ been sacrificed. Germany has been ravaged;  
“ Italy, though now rescued from its invaders,  
“ has been made the scene of unbounded rapine  
“ and anarchy. His Majesty has himself been  
“ compelled to maintain an arduous and burthen-  
“ some contest for the independence and existence  
“ of his kingdoms.

“ Nor have these calamities been confined to  
“ Europe alone; they have been extended to  
“ the most distant quarters of the world, even  
“ to countries so remote in their situation and  
“ interest from the present contest, that the very  
“ existence of such a war was perhaps unknown  
“ to those who found themselves suddenly in-  
“ volved in all its horrors.

“ While such a system continues to prevail,  
“ and while the blood and treasure of a numerous  
“ and powerful Nation can be lavished in its

" support, experience has shewn that no defence  
 " but that of open and steady hostility can be  
 " availing. The most solemn treaties have only  
 " prepared the way for fresh aggression ; and it  
 " is to a determinate resistance alone that is now  
 " due whatever remains in Europe of stability  
 " for property, for personal liberty, for social  
 " order, or for the free exercise of religion.

" For the security therefore of these essential  
 " objects, His Majesty cannot place his reliance  
 " on the mere renewal of general professions of  
 " pacific dispositions. Such professions have been  
 " repeatedly held out by all those who have suc-  
 " cessively directed the resources of France to  
 " the destruction of Europe ; and whom the  
 " present rulers have declared to have been all,  
 " from the beginning, and uniformly, incapable  
 " of maintaining the relations of amity and  
 " peace.

" Greatly, indeed, will His Majesty rejoice,  
 " whenever it shall appear that the danger to  
 " which his own dominions, and those of his  
 " Allies, have been so long exposed, has really  
 " ceased ; whenever he shall be satisfied that the  
 " necessity of resistance is at an end ; that, after  
 " the experience of so many years of crimes and  
 " miseries, better principles have ultimately pre-  
 " vailed in France ; and that all the gigantic  
 " projects of ambition, and all the restless  
 " schemes

“ schemes of destruction, which have endangered  
 “ the very existence of civil society, have at  
 “ length been finally relinquished.—But the con-  
 “ viction of a change, however agreeable to His  
 “ Majesty’s wishes, can result only from ex-  
 “ perience, and from the evidence of facts.

“ The best and most natural pledge of its reality  
 “ and permanence would be the restoration of  
 “ that line of Princes which for so many centu-  
 “ ries maintained the French nation in prosperity  
 “ at home and in consideration and respect  
 “ abroad ; such an event would at once have  
 “ removed, and will at any time remove, all  
 “ obstacles in the way of negotiation or peace.

“ It would confirm to France the unmolested en-  
 “ joyment of its antient territory ; and it would  
 “ give to all the other Nations of Europe, in  
 “ tranquillity and peace, that security which they  
 “ are now compelled to seek by other means.

“ But, desirable as such an event must be both  
 “ to France and to the world, it is not to this mode  
 “ exclusively that His Majesty limits the possi-  
 “ bility of secure and solid pacification. His  
 “ Majesty makes no claim to prescribe to France  
 “ what shall be the form of her Government, or  
 “ in whose hands she shall vest the authority  
 “ necessary for conducting the affairs of a great  
 “ and powerful Nation.

“ His Majesty looks only to the security of  
 “ His own dominions and those of His Allies,  
 “ and

“ and to the general safety of Europe. When-  
 “ ever He shall judge that such security can in  
 “ any manner be attained, as resulting either  
 “ from the internal situation of that country,  
 “ from whose internal situation the danger has  
 “ arisen, or from such other circumstances, of  
 “ whatever nature, as may produce the same  
 “ end, His Majesty will eagerly embrace the  
 “ opportunity to concert with His Allies the  
 “ means of immediate and general pacification.

“ Unhappily no such security hitherto exists:  
 “ no sufficient evidence of the principles by which  
 “ the new Government will be directed; no  
 “ reasonable ground by which to judge of its  
 “ stability. In this situation it can for the pre-  
 “ sent only remain for His Majesty to pursue, in  
 “ conjunction with other Powers, those exertions  
 “ of just and defensive war which his regard to  
 “ the happiness of his subjects will never per-  
 “ mit him either to continue beyond the necessity  
 “ in which they originated, or to terminate on  
 “ any other grounds than such as may best con-  
 “ tribute to the secure enjoyment of their tran-  
 “ quillity, their constitution, and their independ-  
 “ ence.

“ (Signed) GRENVILLE

“ Downing-street, Jan. 4, 1800.”

*To the Minister for Foreign  
 Affairs, &c. at Paris.*

A PAMPHLET has lately been published, under the title of *Coup-d'œil Politique sur le Continent*, of which we are restrained from publishing our opinion by private considerations which no man of honour can overcome. We have made this known to the author himself, from whom we have just received the following letter respecting one of the subjects of our disapprobation.

" SIR,

" Of all the charges urged by you against  
 " my pamphlet, that which gives me the most  
 " concern is, that any person can consider the  
 " freedom I took in bantering Sir *Francis*  
 " *D'Ivernois* as injurious to his character:  
 " I therefore hasten to remove every kind of  
 " doubt of my intention.

" So far was I from having an idea of hurting  
 " Sir *Francis*, that I began by speaking of my  
 " present connexion with him, and certainly I  
 " should never think of connecting myself in  
 " society with a man that I could not esteem.

" I never presumed to impeach his private  
 " character, the purity of his political inten-  
 " tions, or the independent motives that induced  
 " him to take up the pen.

" I am

" I am convinced of the candour of his mind,  
" but I persist in considering his opinions on  
" the exhausted State of France as fallacious,  
" and dangerous to this country.

" You may, Sir, make what use you please of  
" this letter. This free and voluntary assurance  
" of my perfect esteem for a man against whose  
" opinions I contend, would not do away the  
" regret I feel for having given him pain, if  
" I could think that it would not suffice to  
" remove that pain.

" I have the honour to be, &c.

" THE AUTHOR OF COUP-D'OEIL POLITIQUE."

*London,*  
*Jan. 10, 1800.*

THE END OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.

*London: Printed by A. Strahan, Printers-Street.*

British











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